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ABSTRACT  
 
This is a largely theoretical thesis about social studies education in New Zealand. Its aim 
is to consider how learners’ ‘ethical decision-making and action’ (to paraphrase the 
curriculum) could be better supported by proposing a broad theoretical orientation to 
this curriculum requirement. It argues that although ethics is central to learners’ lives and 
to the purposes of social studies education, this has hitherto been minimally 
communicated and elucidated through New Zealand curriculum documentation. It takes 
the view that while providing pedagogical guidance to teachers is urgent and vital, 
theoretical considerations should be a first priority. The thesis begins by offering a partly 
stipulative definition for ethics and foregrounds the complexities of ethical decision-
making and action in our everyday lives and in academic ethics. It then considers the 
relationship between ethics and the purposes of social studies education, and uses a form 
of content analysis to describe the curricular meanings that have been implicitly ascribed 
to ethics over time. It explores how the present New Zealand social studies curriculum is 
framed theoretically and what could be possible within this framing to better support 
learners to navigate in their ethical worlds. Three adjustments to the curriculum’s framing 
are proposed: social studies as issues-based education, as counter-socialisation, and as 
engagement with the philosophy of ethics. These are defended as a matter of social 
justice, and on the basis of their contribution to a range of social studies outcomes. The 
thesis then considers the theoretical underpinnings of these proposed adjustments in 
greater depth. It explores whether an ethically reflexive orientation would better support 
social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, through three analytic moves: 
charting reflexivity’s tropes in the social sciences and social theory literature, developing 
an understanding of ethical reflexivity, and questioning the work this concept could do in 
social studies education. The thesis argues that an ethically reflexive orientation is a 
theoretical space in the literature worthy of attention, not least because it maps onto the 
contemporary ethical space in which learners find themselves. The considerable 
challenges ahead for such an orientation are readily acknowledged, but the thesis finds 
within the literature, and from the perspectives of a small group of social studies teachers 
and learners, some optimism that a reflexive orientation could transcend the ethically 
silent space of New Zealand social studies education. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I am indebted to the expert supervision of Dr Jim Neyland (1953 – 2010), Associate 
Professor Sue Cornforth and Professor Rob Strathdee, whose considerable intellect and 
insight have sustained me through this project.  
 
With love and gratitude, I acknowledge the steadfast support of my fiancé, Tim, who has 
not known me without this ‘small essay’ on my plate. To Jessie, Hana, and Josh, I thank 
you for welcoming me so warmly into the Rochford Barber whānau, and contributing to 
this thesis’ fruition.   
 
I have a fourth supervisor to thank, my father, and environmental ethicist, John. Thank 
you for engaging so keenly with this thesis – it’s your turn next!  To my mother Bev, my 
brother, Peter, sister-in-law, Julia, and nephew, László, I thank you for your love and 
continued interest in this project. I am greatly looking forward to being more fully 
present in your lives.   
 
I am fortunate to have a wonderfully supportive network of colleagues who have 
accompanied me on this journey. In particular, I’d like recognise Associate Professor 
Catherine Manathunga, Dr Mark Sheehan, Mike Taylor, Dr Rowena Taylor, and Dr 
Bronwyn Wood. Thank you, also, to Susan Kaiser for your astute proof-reading. To the 
Te Papa and the Poststructural and ethical perspectives reading groups, thank you for creating 
such superbly generative spaces for thinking about education, for your emotional 
support, and for the fun.  
 
Last, but not least, I wish to thank my friends, especially Jane, who have ever so patiently 
and un-demandingly waited for this time to come. 
  
  
v 
CONTENTS 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ iv 
Tables and figures ................................................................................................................ vii 
Chapter One: Placing the ethical stakes ...................................................................................... 1 
Thesis structure and central argument ................................................................................ 1 
Social studies and citizenship within the New Zealand curriculum ................................. 7 
Exploring assumptions about social studies and ethics education .................................11 
Declaring my stakes in the ground ....................................................................................12 
Chapter Two: Ethics matters..................................................................................................... 14 
Everyday ethics: the ethicist in all of us ............................................................................14 
Distinguishing ‘ethics’ from other proximal concepts.....................................................20 
Ethical perspectives: complex, changeable and contested ..............................................25 
Ethical space as a ‘complex ecology’ .................................................................................34 
Democracy, education, and the ethical life .......................................................................40 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................45 
Chapter Three: How central is ethics to social studies? ........................................................ 46 
Is social studies a natural home for ethics education? .....................................................46 
Locating ethics in New Zealand social studies .................................................................51 
Mapping the conceptual field: ethics in past New Zealand social studies curricula .....51 
Summary: the conceptual field of ethics – where are we now? ......................................77 
Conclusion: The ethically silent space of social studies ...................................................85 
Chapter Four: Engaging with the philosophy of ethics ........................................................ 88 
Introduction .........................................................................................................................88 
The New Zealand curriculum’s theoretical ‘foundations’ as ways to proceed? ............90 
Social studies’ framing philosophies ..................................................................................93 
vi 
Social issues as the focus of ethics education: troubling a public/private divide .........99 
Social studies as counter-socialisation: the need for ethical pluralism and agonism . 105 
Engaging with the philosophy of ethics: the role of perspectives in social studies ... 111 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter Five: Social studies learners’ reflexive engagement in their ethical worlds ........ 128 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 128 
Social studies and the philosophy of ethics: the risks of abstraction .......................... 130 
Critical reflection ............................................................................................................... 133 
Reflexivity’s tropes ............................................................................................................ 135 
Ethical reflexivity .............................................................................................................. 144 
Conclusion: Ethical reflexivity, counter-socialisation and remaking ethical worlds .. 154 
Chapter Six: Prospects and challenges ................................................................................... 161 
Introduction: doing the ‘hard bits’ of social studies ..................................................... 161 
Signalling the shifts in meaning ....................................................................................... 163 
Ethics in an era of scientifically managing education ................................................... 169 
Knowing what works in evidence-based education ...................................................... 172 
The politics and ethics of ethics education .................................................................... 176 
Taking it too far? Social studies teachers’ and learners’ perceptions of ethics ........... 178 
Conclusion: what wiggle room for an ethically reflexive orientation? ........................ 192 
Chapter 7: Transcending the ethically silent space of New Zealand social studies  
        education ........................................................................................................................... 195 
Summary of findings ........................................................................................................ 195 
Limitations of the research .............................................................................................. 200 
Policy recommendations: a need for agonistic spaces .................................................. 201 
Implementation recommendations: Pedagogical models as reflexive surfaces ......... 204 
Placing stakes in the ground ............................................................................................ 210 
References .................................................................................................................................. 213 
 
vii 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 239 
Appendix 1: Values in The New Zealand Curriculum ................................................. 240 
Appendix 2: Concept frequencies ................................................................................... 241 
Appendix 3: Ethics in NCEA achievement standards ................................................. 249 
Appendix 4: Social inquiry overview .............................................................................. 251 
Appendix 5: Student focus group discussion task ........................................................ 252 
 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: The relationship between student ages and year, curriculum and assessment 
levels……………………………………………………………………………………8 
Table 2: Teachers’ perceptions of level of students’ values skills……………………….167 
Figure 1: Some Working Definitions……………………………………………………8 
  
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
CHAPTER ONE: PLACING THE ETHICAL STAKES 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE AND CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
 
I begin with a wero – in Māori, a challenge accompanied by a symbolic peace offering of 
the rautapu, or leaves laid at one’s feet.  It concerns the story of an 11-year old boy who, 
unbeknownst to his teacher, orchestrates a campaign amongst his friends to boycott 
Cadbury in protest at the company’s use of palm oil in their chocolate (Television New 
Zealand, 2009). I am impressed, yet saddened, that his teacher knows nothing of this – 
another social studies conversation lost. At the family dining table I turn to a perennial 
hobby-horse and decry the lack of critical thinking in social studies classrooms. Very 
gently his brother challenges me: “yes, but what matters most is where you place your 
stake in the ground.”  
 
I admit with bemused self-reproach that much of my life has been preoccupied with 
‘examining the stakes’. In relation to social issues and social studies education, I’ve 
largely been concerned with matters such as conceptual understanding, critical thinking, 
and understanding diverse perspectives. The emphasis has been on debate rather than 
action – considering the stakes, rather than putting them in the ground. In light of this, 
the thesis is an imaginative act and an attempt to trouble the familiar ground on which I 
have stood.  In a nutshell, it considers the relationship between ethics education and the 
New Zealand social sciences learning area, in particular social studies as the foundational 
subject. At heart, it worries about how ethics is to move beyond a curriculum page and 
gain meaning in learners’ real-world concerns, desires, and social participation.  
 
I came to this topic as a result of the revised New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007)1, in which the over-arching Values section (see Appendix 1) states that 
students will “be encouraged to value…acting ethically” and “develop their ability 
to…make ethical decisions and act on them” (p. 10).  As a social studies educator of 
over 20 years, two things attracted my attention: (a) that this appeared to mark the first 
occasion where the national curriculum has explicitly linked ethics to social studies 
                                                        
1 See also: http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/The-New-Zealand-Curriculum 
2 
teaching and learning and, (b) that ethical decision-making and action seemed to lack 
curricular explication. I wondered about the life that ethical decision-making and action 
might have in social studies teaching and learning, given that seemingly related features 
of New Zealand’s social studies curriculum have long been considered the ‘hard bits’ 
(Keown, 1998; Wood, Taylor, & Atkins, 2013): values exploration, social decision-
making, and social action. This is, of course, not a particularly strong research reason, 
and the next chapters move the justification for this thesis’ research focus considerably 
forward. But my initial observations, it has turned out, picked up on something of a 
lacuna in social studies education – as in a piece of music, an extended silence. 
 
How should we support learners to consider what is at stake ethically speaking in their 
own and others’ lives, to navigate the complexities of ethical life with a sense of agency, 
and to place stakes in ever-shifting societal ground? Of course, social studies learners 
already do so, whether or not they are conscious of curricular expectation. This thesis is 
therefore guided by the following research question: how could New Zealand social 
studies education better support learners’ ethical decision-making and action?  Three sub-
questions are related to this: 
1. What opportunities for ethical decision-making and action are offered through 
New Zealand social studies curriculum documentation?  
2. What theoretical spaces exist for better supporting social studies learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action? 
3. What could be possibilities and challenges within these spaces? 
 
I seek here to make two central contributions. The first is to establish what ‘is’, that is, 
how ethics gains expression in the New Zealand social studies curriculum. The second 
and primary aim is to consider the ‘ought’, that is, to propose a broad theoretical 
orientation to better supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and 
action. This is, therefore, a largely conceptual piece but also draws on findings from 
summative content analysis and focus group interviews with social studies teachers and 
students, and reviews literature throughout.  
 
The argument is built as follows. Chapter Two introduces ethics and addresses a 
question about its relationship to education. I point out that ethical decision-making is a 
very ordinary activity and central to the human condition; most of us succeed adequately 
in daily life without elevating ethics to an academic exercise. Nevertheless, the 
philosophy of ethics may support us to navigate personal and societal uncertainty. The 
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chapter then clarifies a number of key terms used throughout this thesis. First, the sense 
in which I use ethics is established as an activity – that of coming to an understanding 
of, and reflecting upon, a range of perspectives about social action. To elucidate the 
theoretical complexity involved in this activity, I secondly describe a range of ethical 
theories, terms that are also employed in subsequent chapters. By way of illustration, I 
draw on discussions with six Year 9 social studies students who considered two ethical 
issues: whether or not to accept a Facebook friend, and the kinds of images the media 
should be allowed to use.  
 
Chapter Two then moves to considering the societal backdrop to the proposal advanced 
in this thesis, a matter that is important because all visions for ethics education are 
intended to support learners to respond to the societies in which they find themselves. 
In some respects, this is an elaboration of my Masters’ thesis (Milligan, 2006), in which I 
argued that the social studies curriculum had previously (mis)represented society as 
predominantly static, ordered and predictable, and called for greater curricular 
engagement with societal fluidity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.  In this thesis, I describe 
the complex ecology of contemporary ethical space (Poole, 1972; A. Rorty, 2005) and 
argue that the complexity, plurality and moral ambivalence of contemporary social life 
necessitates a greater societal focus on matters ethical, and not just in educational 
settings. Globalisation, technological advances, and environmental degradation, for 
example, present societies with pressing ethical and political questions as to how we 
shall live together on this planet, issues we cannot resile from, no matter how intractable 
they appear. The last part of the chapter considers how ethics is important to education, 
particularly in democratic settings, and I explore how education could be thought of as a 
crucible for moral uncertainty and conflict. Not only does democracy accommodate a 
diversity of visions for the good life, moral education is expected in some way to invite 
learners to consciously consider the disagreements that stem from such multiplicity. 
Unsurprisingly, the crucible contains multiple views as to how this ought to be achieved.     
 
Having considered the relevance of ethics to education in general, Chapter Three moves 
to a focus on social studies education. I ask (a) how central ethics is to New Zealand 
social studies education, (b) whether social studies might be justifiably considered a 
‘natural home’ for ethics education, and (c) what the subject would amount to if 
stripped of its ethical content. The relationship between ethics and four traditions of 
social studies education (H. Barr, Graham, Hunter, Keown, & McGee, 1997) is 
considered. As a heuristic, these traditions are referred back to as the thesis progresses – 
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although it is important to note that this is not the only way that the theoretical 
traditions of social studies have been categorised. Chapter Three then addresses the first 
of my research sub-questions, that is, the opportunities for ethics education afforded 
through New Zealand’s social studies curriculum. I locate ethics in the subject’s 
curricular history, and consider the extent to which teachers and learners are already 
supported to make sense of the ethical dimensions of the Values statement in The New 
Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). To do this, I undertake a summative 
content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) of historical curriculum statements and 
support documents. By mapping what I have termed ethics’ ‘conceptual field’2, that is, 
the uses of ethics and associated terms over time, one can infer meaning for ethical 
decision-making and action in the present social studies curriculum. The analysis builds 
on the contributions of New Zealand academics who have charted the evolution of 
moral and values education in social studies by focussing specifically on the meanings 
that might be attached to ethics. This reveals social studies as being, what I have termed, 
‘an ethically silent space’ in that the importance and content of ethics have been 
minimally communicated through successive curricula.  
 
In the absence of curricular guidance, the work of Chapters Four and Five is to propose 
a broad theoretical orientation to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and 
action through social studies education. These chapters address the second of my 
research sub-questions about theoretical spaces that are available. They begin from the 
contention that the curriculum’s theoretical framing shapes how the ethical dimensions 
of the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007) might be given expression. This 
immediately raises a question as to the ends of social studies, and the ethical basis upon 
which my proposal for a broad theoretical orientation to ethics education in social 
studies might be defended. Both are addressed recursively over the course of the next 
two chapters. 
 
Chapter Four opens by highlighting the rather theoretically permissive nature of The 
New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) and then moves to considering 
social studies’ implicit educational theory. Two predominant theoretical orientations are 
identified – social studies taught as social science, and reflective inquiry – and I explore 
how these frame ethical decision-making and action. I consider how re-focussing social 
studies in three inter-related ways could open out more opportunities for social studies 
                                                        
2  A term also used in Milligan & Wood (2010) but, in that context, to mean concepts associated with social studies 
curriculum achievement objectives. 
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learners to explore ethical decision-making and action. In the tradition of social studies 
taught as reflective inquiry, the first of these proposed adjustments involves a stronger 
focus on issues-based education and a more flexible conception of issues that collapse a 
public/private divide. A second draws from the work of Shirley Engle and Anna Ochoa 
(Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Ochoa-Becker, 2007) and suggests primarily focussing social 
studies education on counter-socialisation. I consider how these authors’ model of 
decision-making could be expanded, in particular to (a) include a wide range of ethical 
perspectives, (b) draw force from theories of robust ethical pluralism (Hinman, 2013) 
and (c) take an agonistic approach (Mouffe, 2000, 2013). The third proposed adjustment 
suggests a strengthening of social studies taught as social science. I ask how social 
studies education might productively engage with the insights of the philosophy of 
ethics, without collapsing social studies into that discipline. I consider how the 
philosophy of ethics might be considered an extension of M. Young’s (2013) conception 
of ‘powerful knowledge’ and how the more explicit inclusion of the discipline in social 
studies teaching and learning could also be justified in relation to a range of outcomes.  
 
Chapter Five develops this argument into a broad theoretical orientation to better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action. In doing so, it holds 
up the seemingly privileged position of academic ethics in the previous chapter to scrutiny, 
ironically and inescapably using the language of that which I seek to interrupt.  I firstly 
consider the risks of abstraction in employing the philosophy of ethics in social studies 
education. One cannot, of course, hold the field of philosophy to account for this; the 
point is how disciplinary insights are used. The chapter explores whether an ethically 
reflexive orientation could mitigate the risks of abstraction and better support social studies 
learners’ ethical decision-making and action. Having initially been attracted to a concept of 
reflexivity rather like a magpie attracted to a shiny object, a considerable portion of the 
chapter is devoted to exploring how reflexivity is (a) to be distinguished from reflective 
approaches to social studies education, and (b) employed in the social sciences and social 
theory.  
 
From this literature, I build a definition for ethical reflexivity and consider the work it 
could do in social studies education. The chapter arrives at a conception of ethical 
reflexivity that enfolds critical reflection, learners’ lived experience and their imaginations.  
I argue that such an orientation is a vital educational adaptation to the complexity, 
pluralism and ambivalence of contemporary ethical space. That is, social studies 
education requires pedagogical approaches that foster learners’ reflexivity; their ability to 
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assemble possibilities for social action from the resources of critical thought, lived 
experience and imagination. The last portion of Chapter Five considers how my 
argument intersects with a tradition of social studies education that currently exists at 
the curriculum’s margins: social studies ‘taught as personal, social and ethical 
development’ (H. Barr et al., 1997). My argument for an ethically reflexive orientation 
moves beyond this tradition in one important respect: it resists a sense of co-ordinated 
selfhood and certain ground beneath its feet.  
 
Chapter Six begins a consideration of the last of my research sub-questions: what could 
be possibilities and challenges within the theoretical spaces I have identified? It begins 
by asking whether teachers could already be taking an ethically reflexive orientation 
independently of the curriculum. It draws from a range of research evidence about the 
current curriculum’s implementation (for example: Education Review Office, 2010; 
Notman, 2012; Sinnema, 2011). The findings lend weight to my contention that New 
Zealand social studies education is an ethically silent space. Having argued that an 
ethically reflexive orientation warrants consideration as a possibility for better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, the prospects and 
challenges ahead are considered. Given that there is no research literature on this, the 
chapter represents a somewhat limited test of possibilities and difficulties.  
 
To structure Chapter Six’s discussion, Paul Keown’s (1998) insights into why values and 
social action have traditionally been perceived as the ‘hard bits’ of New Zealand social 
studies are synthesised with more recent empirical and theoretical research evidence that is 
suggestive of an ethically reflexive orientation’s prospects. Four themes are considered: 
signalling the shifts in meaning (Aitken, 2006), ethics in an era of the scientific management 
of education (Neyland, 2004, 2005, 2010), knowing what works in evidence based 
education, and the ethics of ethics education. While these themes are only illustrative of 
what could lie ahead, the prospects appear bleak; an ethically reflexive orientation could be 
rendered mute under the weight of current educational forces. The chapter’s discussion is 
then supported by a small-scale study of New Zealand social studies teachers’ and students’ 
perceptions of issues and needs in relation to developing the abilities of ethical decision-
making and action. The methodology is outlined: semi-structured focus group interviews 
with teachers and students in one New Zealand secondary school. These data are analysed 
in light of my conception of ethical reflexivity. While the findings from this study are clearly 
limited in their generalisability, it appears that, despite the challenges outlined, a reflexive 
orientation could transcend the ethically silent space of social studies.  
7 
 
The concluding chapter summarises the main arguments and findings of this thesis, and 
explores the limitation to the evidence that is presented. Two sets of recommendations 
are made: policy and implementation. The latter, in particular, completes the 
consideration of my third research sub-question in that it considers pedagogical insights 
from the existing literature that could be assembled, amplified, and applied to an 
ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education.  
SOCIAL STUDIES AND CITIZENSHIP WITHIN THE NEW ZEALAND CURRICULUM 
 
For the reader unfamiliar with the New Zealand context, this section delimits the scope 
of the thesis and locates social studies in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) within international approaches to social education, particularly 
citizenship education. Social studies is the foundational subject of the social sciences 
learning area in Years 1-10. It is also an optional social sciences specialism in Years 11-
13, which first became an examinable subject in 2002 with the implementation of the 
National certificate of educational assessment (NCEA), New Zealand’s national secondary 
school qualification3. The social sciences learning area is one of eight learning areas 
specified in New Zealand’s curriculum. Teaching and learning in each learning area is 
underpinned by the Vision, Principles, Values, Key competencies and brief learning area 
statements, in what is colloquially termed the ‘front end’ of the curriculum. At the back 
of the document achievement objectives are provided for each learning area in fold-out 
charts. At Years 11-13, achievement objectives are specified across eight curriculum 
levels for economics, geography, history and senior social studies. These subjects are 
supported by teaching and learning guidelines for the senior social sciences (Ministry of 
Education, 2014c). Schools are also able to provide a much broader range of social 
sciences options; there are guidelines for accounting, business studies, classical studies, 
education for sustainability, legal studies, media studies, sociology, philosophy, 
psychology and religious studies. The relationship between student ages, year levels, 
curriculum levels, and NCEA assessment levels is mapped out in Table 1 below. 
 
  
                                                        
3 See: http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/qualifications-standards/qualifications/ncea/understanding-ncea/how-ncea-works/ 
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Social studies with the 
social sciences learning area 
Curriculum 
level 
Year level and 
approximate age 
National Certificate of 
Educational 
Achievement 
As a foundational and 
integrated subject 
1 Year 1-2; ages 5-6  
2 Year 3-4; ages 7-8 
3 Year 5-6; ages 9-10 
4 Year 7-8; ages 11-12 
5 Year 9-10; ages 13-14 
As an optional specialism 6 Year 11; age 15+ NCEA level 1 
7 Year 12; age 16+ NCEA level 2 
8 Year 13; age 17+ NCEA level 3 
Table 1: The relationship between student ages and year, curriculum and assessment levels 
 
New Zealand social studies is a local expression of varying approaches to social 
education in democratic nations. Because a variety of titles for such approaches exists 
internationally, Figure 1 below uses Brian Hill’s (1994) model to place New Zealand’s 
variant. The social sciences learning area is akin to the social studies, whereas social 
studies is strongly analogous to the central sphere of this figure. This is because there 
has been a longstanding commitment to social studies as an integrated field of study, 
dating back to the Thomas report (Department of Education, 1944) which first 
recommended social studies as a ‘new’ subject within the New Zealand post-primary 
school core curriculum. Today, the continued commitment to integrated study is to be 
seen in the four interconnected and overarching conceptual strands of social studies: 
Identity, culture and organisation; Place and environment; Continuity and change; and The economic 
world (Ministry of Education, 2007). These strands draw on a wide range of social 
sciences and humanities disciplines and infuse the social studies achievement objectives.  
 
Figure 1: Some Working Definitions (Hill, 1994, p. 3) 
Social education
All those aspects of the 
curriculum which make 
significnt contributions to the 
social development of students.
the Social Studies 
Those particular curriculum areas, 
single-discipline or integrated, which 
deal explicitly with the study of self in 
society for this purpose.
Social Studies 
A curriculum area committed to 
the strategy of integrated study as 
a means of achieving this purpose.
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A distinctive, integrating feature of the New Zealand social studies curriculum is its 
strongly advocated social inquiry methodology. This builds on a lineage of curriculum 
documents (for example: Department of Education, 1977a; Ministry of Education, 
1991, 1997, 2004) that have emphasised the complementary and inseparable nature of 
ideas/conceptual understandings, inquiry, values exploration, social decision-making 
and social participation. As currently expressed, the social inquiry methodology enables 
students to: 
 ask questions, gather information and background ideas, and examine relevant current 
issues 
 explore and analyse people’s values and perspectives 
 consider the ways in which people make decisions and participate in social action 
 reflect on and evaluate the understandings they have developed and the responses that 
may be required. (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30) 
 
A series of booklets called Building conceptual understandings in social sciences (see especially:  
Ministry of Education, 2008a) fleshes out this methodology. These books exemplify 
how the achievement objectives integrate the conceptual strands and assist in the 
identification of important social issues, ideas and themes that may be explored through 
social inquiry.  In turn, the social inquiry model generates conceptual understandings (as 
opposed to the acquisition of facts), including understandings about the significance of 
these ideas (so what?) and links to social action (now what?). 
A strong connection between social studies and citizenship education4 in New Zealand 
is somewhat difficult to communicate diagrammatically. The reader might imagine 
citizenship education as an ellipse that cuts across each of the aspects of Figure 1. The 
curriculum indicates that citizenship education is an important cross-curricular 
expectation; for instance, students are encouraged to explore “what it means to be a 
citizen and to contribute to the development and well-being of society” (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 39). Additionally, a wide range of co-curricular learning experiences 
offer New Zealand students opportunities to participate in, and contribute to, their 
communities (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). The social sciences 
learning area supports this broader citizenship vision of The New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 2007), an aim immediately established in the opening 
whakatauki/proverb and first sentence of the learning area statement:  
                                                        
4  Numerous characterisations of citizenship education’s landscape exist. See, for example: Arthur and Cremin (2012),  
Arthur and Davies (2008), Arthur, Davies, and Hahn (2008), Scott and Lawson (2002).   
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Unuhia te rito o te harakeke kei whea te kōmako e kō? Whakatairangitia – rere ki uta, 
rere ki tai; Ui mai koe ki ahau he aha te mea nui o te ao, Māku e kī atu he tangata, he 
tangata, he tangata!5 … The social sciences learning area is about how societies work 
and how people can participate as critical, active, informed, and responsible citizens. 
Contexts are drawn from the past, present, and future and from places within and 
beyond New Zealand. (p. 30) 
 
Within this learning area, social studies has historically been identified as the principal 
curricular vehicle for citizenship education. Citizenship has been a longstanding 
organisational concept for social studies, beginning with the Thomas report’s 
recommendation that social studies have a dual purpose: “(a) to assist in the 
development of individuals who are able to take their parts as effective citizens in a 
democracy, and (b) to deepen pupils’ understanding of human affairs and to open up 
wide fields of personal exploration” (Department of Education, 1944, p. 27). 
 
Three points should be made in relation to the citizenship thrust of social studies. First, 
as in other countries, New Zealand social studies curriculum developers have been “the 
inheritors of a plurality of competing and contradictory philosophical ideals and political 
models of citizenship” (Frazer, 2008, p. 282). These have worked their way into a 
somewhat uneasy amalgamation of differing conceptions of citizenship in successive 
New Zealand social studies curricula6. Second, it is important to note that New Zealand 
social studies has tended to accommodate citizenship education rather than being driven 
by its direction and scope (Aitken, 2005b); it is not possible therefore to wholly equate 
social studies in this country, or social sciences for that matter, with citizenship 
education. Third, citizenship education has a low policy priority in New Zealand (Schulz 
et al., 2010) and social studies has a marginalised status in schools. Few students take 
social studies as a subject in the senior secondary school, and social studies receives little 
explicit attention in primary teaching programmes (Education Review Office, 2006). 
The latter has been, very recently, exacerbated by the narrowing of the primary 
curriculum through the implementation of national standards in literacy and numeracy 
(Thrupp & White, 2013).  
 
                                                        
5  Remove the heart of the flax bush and where will the bellbird sing? Proclaim it to the land, proclaim it to the sea; 
Ask me, 'What is the greatest thing in the world?' I will reply, 'It is people, people, people!'  
6  For discussion see: (Aitken, 2005a; E. Archer & Openshaw, 1992; Beals, 2001; J. McGee, 1998; Mutch, 2005a, 2005b, 
2011; Openshaw, 2004).  
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EXPLORING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SOCIAL STUDIES AND ETHICS EDUCATION 
 
This thesis takes as founding propositions many of the ‘basic beliefs’ about social 
studies identified in what is known as the Waikato position paper (H. Barr et al., 1997). 
This was written prior to the publication of Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 1997) in order to provide the Ministry of Education with 
contestable advice on the nature and purpose of social studies: 
 
1. The content of social studies is drawn primarily from the social sciences and the 
humanities subjects and disciplines. 
2. Social studies content reflects the changing nature of knowledge in these disciplines 
and the changing nature of society itself. Therefore, content needs continual 
review. 
3. Social studies is concerned with the study of human beings in the past, present and 
future. 
4. Social studies deals with significant social issues and problems. 
5. Social studies is an integrated subject which draws upon a range of disciplinary and 
philosophical traditions in a systematic manner. 
6. Social studies involves social inquiry and the examination and appraisal of values 
for responsible decision making. 
7. Social studies is concerned with empowerment of the social and ethical self which 
means gaining the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary for social literacy and 
making reasoned judgements considering others’ views and acting for the benefit of 
society. 
8. Social studies is principally concerned with enabling young people to take their 
place in today’s complex world as informed competent and responsible citizens. (H. 
Barr et al., 1997, p. 2) 
 
While not the central work of this thesis, it is interesting to note how these assumptions 
hold up in light of the curricular expectation that social studies education support 
learners’ ethical decision making and action. Some of the basic beliefs are therefore held 
up to considerable scrutiny in the course of my thesis. For example, at various points I 
suggest that the anthropocentric view of (3) could be occluding a consideration of 
environmental concerns. In another example, when read in light of at least the two most 
recent social studies curricula (Ministry of Education, 1997, 2007) these basic beliefs 
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appear to somewhat disembody learners’ ethical decision-making and action. Further, 
Chapter Six presents substantive challenges to basic beliefs (7) and (8) in relation to the 
conception of the learner at the centre of such beliefs. 
 
Of course, the reason that I question these kinds of assumptions rests on my view of 
what ethics education in social studies should entail. As a backdrop to the work of this 
thesis, I have considered Sanger and Osguthorpe’s (2005) framework for understanding 
approaches to moral education:   
 
A. Psychological assumptions regarding what the salient features of our moral 
psychology are; regarding the nature of those features; and regarding how those 
features develop and/or how they are likely to respond to various environmental 
variables 
B. Moral assumptions regarding the nature and scope of morality (metaethical 
assumptions); and regarding what is good/right/virtuous/caring (normative 
assumptions) 
C. Educational assumptions regarding the nature and scope of teaching and 
education in society; and regarding the aims of education 
D. Contingent factors: personal, historical, social, political and institutional. (p. 63) 
 
In building an argument for a particular theoretical approach to better supporting social 
studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, the chapters in this thesis address 
each of the categories of the assumptions above (although not in this order).  The reader 
will note that the argument made in Chapter Four for robust ethical pluralism in relation 
to learners’ consideration of ethical perspectives is both a meta-ethical position and 
contains assumptions about the purposes of social studies education.  
 
DECLARING MY STAKES IN THE GROUND 
 
Before continuing, I wish to acknowledge that my perceptions of what social studies 
education could achieve in relation to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-
making and action have been shaped through professional immersion – first as a teacher 
of social studies, geography, English and health, and then as a social sciences pre-service 
teacher educator and advisor. More latterly, my academic role has expanded to include 
lecturing in undergraduate and postgraduate education papers, and research interests in 
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curriculum theory, the relationships between philosophy and education, and discourses 
of diversity, and social and environmental justice. It important to note that I have been 
involved in the development of a number of Ministry of Education publications 
referred to in this thesis. I hold these contributions lightly, and it is to my very great 
delight when students and others engage in critiquing them.  It is also notable that the 
New Zealand social studies education community is small, and many of the authors I 
refer to in this thesis I count as colleagues, collaborators, and friends. This thesis owes a 
great debt, in particular, to Dr Paul Keown, not least because he has kept alive the 
question of values education in this country over many years. My point here is not a roll 
call but to acknowledge the myriad ways in which the conceptual development of this 
thesis stands on the shoulders and insights of others. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ETHICS MATTERS 
 
The central work of this chapter is to contextualise the argument built in this thesis. First, it introduces 
ethics, both an academic and ordinary activity. I argue that while the ethical thinking does not produce 
certitudes, it is one important means of dealing with the complexity and vicissitudes of life. Second, the 
chapter clarifies key terms used throughout the thesis, including a range of theoretical perspectives that 
inflect the ethical challenges and issues that people, communities and society face. To illustrate these 
perspectives, I draw on a small sample of student data drawn from focus group discussions about ethical 
dilemmas. This explication is especially important given the variety of senses in which ethics and allied 
terms are used in academic, educational and everyday settings. Third, the chapter considers the societal 
context in which ethics (and social studies education) takes place; pluralism, complexity and moral 
ambivalence are themes that recur throughout this thesis and are central to my proposal for better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action. The last section of this chapter 
asks how ethics and education are important to each other. I argue that ethical matters inescapably 
imbue education, and that the ethical intent of education has been a longstanding matter of debate. 
Moreover, education has a central, yet contested, role in enlarging learners’ ethical thinking in order that 
they may better navigate in their social worlds.  
EVERYDAY ETHICS: THE ETHICIST IN ALL OF US 
 
What is ethics and how does it matter? In Australia, Ethi-call (St James Ethics Centre, 
2014), a counselling phone line, offers members of the public an opportunity to talk 
through ethical challenges that confront them, especially where there appears to be no 
easy solution. In Washington DC’s interactive museum, Newseum (2014), the Ethics 
Center invites visitors to explore ethical dilemmas that journalists and editors face in 
their everyday work. In the United Kingdom, Radio 4 and Radio Ulster produce The 
moral maze (BBC, 2014a) and Everyday ethics (BBC, 2014b) respectively, dedicated to 
exploring ethical debates of the day. At New Zealand’s Diocesan School for Girls 
(2014), the Centre for ethics facilitates a series of events focused on ethical issues, delivered 
by distinguished speakers. Ethical concerns underpin many of the perplexing and keenly 
felt aspects of our lives, such as our attitudes towards new reproductive technologies, 
our sense of social and environmental justice, our views about the extent of our right to 
free speech, or simply deciding whether to lie about being late to work or school. They 
very often languish as the proverbial elephant in the room, that is, the often 
unexpressed core of personal, societal and global challenges. Ethical issues are by nature 
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complex, very often intractable and persistent, and sometimes baffling. Some of the 
most heated arguments in public and private arenas, and perhaps social studies 
classrooms, are fundamentally about ethical issues: for instance, human rights issues to 
do with the death penalty, torture, or wearing a hijab or burqa. Most heated political 
debates are inherently ethical disputes. Terry Eagleton (2009), for example, contends 
that the ethical, “a matter of how we may live with each other most rewardingly”, is 
inseparable from the political: “a question of what institutions will best promote this 
end” (p. 325). And there are ethical choices in myriad aspects of learners’ everyday lives 
– whether to buy bottled water, give to a gold coin collection, or accept a Facebook 
friend request, for instance – though they may navigate these subconsciously and 
without being aware that such decision-making has an ethical content.  
 
Much of this thesis is concerned with the contribution that ethics, as an academic 
discipline, could make to social studies education by enlarging thinking about social 
issues and our participation in society. In this sense, I am using ethics to mean an aspect 
of Western philosophical thought, sometimes termed moral philosophy, which is 
concerned with the systematic study of what we ought to do (Singer, 1994). The 
philosophy of ethics is central to the ‘examined life’, involving the consideration of how 
we should or could live, what is a worthwhile life, and what we should do in various 
situations. In essence, the discipline of ethics might be considered philosophies of 
action. Some may dismiss, or conversely look to, ethics as prescription in life, and 
ethicists as the ‘moral police’. It is true that some branches of ethics are concerned with 
determining how people should be and what is right and wrong in any given situation 
(normative ethics). It is also true that many educationalists have particular views about 
the sort of ethical thinking that ought to be encouraged in learners, Kohlberg (1981) 
being a notable example. But the field of ethics extends well beyond the prescriptive. 
Ethics may be concerned, for example, with what people actually do in relation to 
ethical issues (descriptive ethics) or with what constitutes goodness itself (meta-ethics). 
Many ethicists will stress that there are no right or wrong answers, merely possibilities 
for action that depend on the circumstance (situated ethics); in other words, ethical 
action is always particular, impermanent, and contingent.  
 
Philosophers of ethics advance the field and make a contribution to society through 
deliberation, judgement, and reasoning (Burgh, Field, & Freakley, 2006). This requires 
coming to an understanding of, and reflecting upon, a range of theoretical perspectives 
– critical thinking that, for example, takes account of counter-arguments. My central 
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point here is that ethics may be seen as a verb, more a practice than a set of conclusions. 
Amélie Rorty (2005) expresses this in these terms: “even when it takes a detour into the 
terrain of philosophic theories and systems, morality is directed to activity, however 
internal or spiritual, however self-perfectionist it may be” (p. 8). Furthermore, it is a 
lively verb. The field of ethics is vast and ever-expanding; responding to the ethical 
complexities of, for example, scientific and technological breakthroughs and pressing 
current issues involving issues of justice, power and equity. Many projects involve 
disciplinary border-crossing or intellectual mobility (Dogan & Pahre, 1990), that is, 
taking account of the empirical evidence generated by the sciences and social sciences 
and creating new theoretical hybridities such as neurophilosophy, environmental ethics, 
and the ethics of care. Ethics is also a lively verb because numerous ethicists attend to 
liveliness itself: the multiplicities, messiness, and contradictions of our lived contexts 
and the need for flexibility, sensitivity and agility in our ethical decision-making and 
action. One possible counter to this argument is that this activity invariably comes after 
the fact. In his provocatively titled chapter in a guide to ethical theory, The end of ethics, 
John Caputo (2000) comments that: 
Ethicians appear rather like the crowd that gathers around the scene of an accident to 
see what has just happened…everyone has something to say about it, up to and 
including insisting that the proper authorities should have seen this would happen. 
(p. 111).   
 
Even so, one can imagine the animated discussions that ensue.  
 
This thesis is equally concerned with ethics as a very ordinary activity. Ethical decision-
making and action arises from the web of interconnectedness that is human existence and 
our capacity to choose among values (Preston, 2007). Ethics is, firstly, central to the 
human condition. Moral systems can be found in all societies, albeit with varying cultural 
configurations of moral codes, and there are some features, such as kinship and 
reciprocity as sources of obligation, that appear universal to all human moralities.  Three 
points may be made in relation to this. It is, firstly, perhaps plausible to suggest that ethical 
dilemmas have equally been an enduring feature of the human condition. Second, moral 
systems are not static, our changed attitudes to slavery being a notable example (and a 
demonstration that what is right cannot be drawn automatically from universal approval).  
Third, universal principles of kinship and reciprocity may have little bearing on what we 
actually choose to do. Certainly, moral choice is an unavoidable feature of modern day-to-
day existence. Like nutritional choices, “we can ignore morality, but we cannot sidestep 
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the choices to which morality is relevant, just as we cannot avoid the decisions to which 
nutrition is pertinent even if we ignore the information that nutritionists provide” 
(Hinman, 2013, p. 2). 
 
For the most part, ethical matters form the backdrop to all our lives, ethical perspectives 
being a part of the unseen fabric of our daily thoughts and actions, rather than being what 
we think about. Ethics can be “relatively tacit, grounded in agreement rather than rule, in 
practice rather than knowledge or belief, and happening without calling undue attention to 
itself” (Lambek, 2010, p. 2). ‘Ethical know-how’ (Varela, 1999) is, therefore, not solely a 
rational or conscious decision-making exercise. Like driving the car somewhere and then 
realising that we cannot remember anything that happened en route, we tend to navigate 
ethical issues with something akin to ‘blindsight’ (Weiskrantz, 2009). Varela (1999) 
describes our lived worlds as ‘ready-at hand’, one of ‘immediate coping’ in that “we always 
operate in some kind of immediacy of a given situation” (p. 9). None of us can 
consciously process our decision-making on a moment-by-moment basis. Getting from 
home to work, for instance, would be even more exhausting if we were aware of each 
and every action and reaction along the way. If we notice our ethical decision-making at 
all, it’s very often in retrospect or if something goes awry: a strained friendship, a 
student complaint about unfair treatment, or our responses to climate change, for 
example. Similarly, Varela highlights that our most often instinctive and situated ethical 
know-how is seen with greater acuity in moments where we feel ‘stuck’, although we 
may not name this impasse as an ethical dilemma:  
It is at the moments of breakdown, that is, when we are not experts of our microworld 
anymore, that we deliberate and analyze, that we become like beginners seeking to feel 
at ease with the task at hand. (p.18) 
 
At times, as Varela suggests, consideration of ethical matters will be foisted upon us, 
perhaps a full-bodied, visceral and emotive experience. At others, we may elect, or be 
able, to think about ethical dilemmas in slightly more dispassionate terms.  
 
If ethics is such a commonplace activity and for the most part we lead satisfactory lives 
without consciously examining ethical questions, then why engage, as does this thesis, 
with the philosophy of ethics? Notably, ethics as an ordinary activity and a discipline are 
not such distinct spheres. Of course, our sources of ethical guidance and inspiration are 
many, varied, and commonplace: family, loved-ones, the church, the local community, 
for example. We learn in part from experience, mostly without direct access to the 
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language or wisdom of philosophers, and probably without podcasts about ethical 
thinking. However, we can and do employ the insights and hone the skills of philosophy 
in our interactions and relationships with others and the environment. When we reflect 
on everyday practice, moral dilemmas and conventions, when we seek to understand 
where others are coming from, we are moving into the practice of ethics. When we 
consider the consequences of our actions, rights abuses, the content of another’s character or 
how to reduce suffering, we are connecting to the language and conceptual categories of 
academic ethics.  Activities such as these are clearly not exclusively the realm of 
academics and, most importantly, our conscious participation in them does not relegate 
us to an ivory tower. Opportunities to think about how we should act are available to 
the vast majority of us; we are each of us philosophers of action.  
 
In this thesis I argue that the philosophy of ethics could be drawn a little closer to the 
lives of social studies learners. Arguably, thinking more deeply about ethics is of benefit 
to us all: a source of personal meaning, explanation, strength, critique and new 
possibilities for social action (Hinman, 2013). Granted, an examined life does not 
necessarily assure a life worth living, nor does the study of ethics fully equip us to cope 
with the vicissitudes of life. “Likewise, understanding ethics is no guarantee that we can 
live with the doubts often generated by difficult ethical decisions” (Preston, 2007, p. 
223). Even where we do reach a decision, none of us is wholly consistent; there may be 
a marked difference between our professed ethical commitments and our actual 
behaviour. Further, the hope that ethics might provide us with a guide to ethical 
reasoning or a once-and-for-all answer to Socrates’ question, ‘how should one live?’, is 
seriously called into question in Bernard Williams’ (2011) book, Ethics and the limits of 
philosophy. In his view, moral theory is too reductive to cope with the messiness of our 
social worlds and modern life demands too much of it. Morality, he claims, is a ‘peculiar 
institution’, resting on an illusory, almost religious, ideal that “human existence can be 
ultimately just” (p. 217). In his view, ethics cannot formulate answers in advance; one 
must live first, and uncover, in the process, any relationship between truthfulness, 
reflection, self-understanding, and criticism.  
 
Fundamentally, then, ethical thinking is a matter of uncertainty. Even so, the resources of 
the philosophy of ethics could help us to think better about dilemmas that confront us. 
Williams (2011) argues that ethics can play a part in reflective living, as a critique of 
societal institutions and lived experience:   
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It need not seek to join the natural sciences in providing an absolute conception of the 
world, but we need to have some reflective social knowledge, including history, that can 
command unprejudiced assent if the better hopes for self-understanding can be realised. 
(p. 221)   
 
This does not have to be, and is not in this thesis, an argument for the primacy of reason; 
numerous ethicists have an interest in the relevance of experience, emotion or intuition (see: 
de Sousa, 2014; Tong & Williams, 2014). What the philosophy of ethics provides is, for 
example, a means to identify what lies at the heart of particular social issues, a way to step 
back from knee-jerk responses and over-reaction and clarify choices, and frameworks for 
alternative courses of action. It can also provide us with some confidence in re-entering the 
fray, having had the opportunity to think through what went awry. Importantly, however, it 
is unlikely that ethics can ever provide a single right answer to personal and social issues, or 
radically change us. Instead, it is more likely to provide several, perhaps least worst, answers 
that assist in the ongoing (re)negotiation of our lives. Ethical thinking is one means of dealing 
with the complexity and vicissitudes of life. It may help us understand even the most 
seemingly intractable of circumstances further, support greater dialogue and recognition of 
the ‘other’, and open up new possibilities for societal participation.  
 
One last point about the nature of ethics before I progress to clarifying key terms used 
throughout this thesis: doing ethics is alive with danger and contradiction. This is reflected 
in the language this thesis employs – ethical dilemmas, challenges and issues – which 
necessarily captures the unsettled and unsettling aspects of our society and experience. On 
the one hand, as philosophers such as Boethius (d. 524) and latterly Alain de Botton 
(2007) have argued, consolation for the vicissitudes of life may be found in philosophy. I 
think there is also room for adjectives not commonly associated with ethical thinking, 
particularly if one is to read opening passages of academic texts about ethics: wonder, 
delight, relief and creativity, for example. I am not suggesting that ethical questions lack 
seriousness; instead, thinking ethics need not be a sombre affair. Aristotle claimed that the 
philosophy begins in wonder: “philosophy done in this way is pursued for the sheer joy of 
discovery and exploration” (Hinman, 2008, p. 21). Similarly, Critchley (2002) playfully 
suggests that the philosopher has a “family resemblance to a comedian … [both] ask you 
to view the world from a Martian perspective, to look at things as if you had just landed 
from another planet” (p. 103). On the other hand, being asked to think about the ethical 
content of our lives is potentially disquieting. The issues may now appear far more 
complex, challenging, and dispiriting than they first appeared. Amélie Rorty (2005) 
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contends, for example, that morality “sometimes generates the very uncertainties and 
conflicts it was meant to resolve” (p. 14). Invitations to explore the real, the urgent and 
the personal are also fraught with peril; what painful, private experiences might be 
exposed? What harm created? Then again, tears can be joyful, a relief, or washed with 
hope. So, in doing ethics, we confront contradiction and risk.  In this thesis, I do not seek 
to erase such contradictions. Instead, I take Michel Foucault’s (1983) view that we must 
be alert to the dangers of doing ethics and see what might be made of these: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not 
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 
So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. (pp. 231-232) 
 
DISTINGUISHING ‘ETHICS’ FROM OTHER PROXIMAL CONCEPTS 
 
The attempt to create a ‘barbeque’ version of this thesis, a readily understood response 
to those who have generously enquired into what I have been writing about, has elicited 
all manner of responses to the term ethics. Perhaps this should be no surprise. 
Reflecting the competing ends of ethics, people bring a muddled range of meanings to 
the concept, and everyday phrases such as ‘acting ethically’ in fact conceal considerable 
variation across individuals, communities and contexts. In New Zealand educational 
contexts, for example, teachers may connect ethical decision-making with their 
professional code of conduct, with character or virtues education, or with the religious 
background they have been steeped in, each of which reflects particular ethical 
traditions. They may also see ethics as something ‘out there’ that academic philosophers 
engage in. None of these interpretations is incorrect. However, in this thesis I use the 
term ‘ethics’ to mean more than a single moral system, and more than what academic 
philosophers do. This section elaborates my usage of ethics and in doing so draws a 
distinction between ethics and other associated terms used throughout the chapters, 
particularly morals and values.  
 
Ethics can be “applied to any system or theory of moral values or principles” (Singer, 
2014, n.p.), that is, refer to particular moralities, to describe what is. However, “in 
general, ethics is concerned with what is right, fair, just or good; about what we ought to do, 
not just what is the case or what is the most acceptable or expedient” (Preston, 2007, p. 
16). One way of thinking about ethics is to see it as a relationship between moral mores 
– what people actually do or say – and the contemplation of what we could or should 
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do. Ethicists are, however, less concerned with telling people what to do and more with 
the ongoing consideration of moral claims. Put another way, ethics is an association 
between ‘first order’ statements (for example, we should always consider the feelings of 
others) and ‘second order’ statements “which would say what is going on when 
someone makes a first order statement” (Mackie, 1979, p. 9). Though this work may be 
highly theoretical, ethics is nonetheless rooted in the challenges of ordinary life; even the 
most abstracted of philosophical arguments are typically propelled through appeal to 
everyday ethical dilemmas. Ethicists address the intensely practical question “what is to 
be done?” not from delighted abstraction, but from the need to address real-world and 
relational concerns. It is also important to note that, as with all academic disciplines, the 
aim of philosophical ethics is to produce knowledge which may transform individuals and 
society. As Mackie (1979) urges, the object of this work is “to decide what to do, what 
to support and what to condemn, what principles of conduct to accept and foster as 
guiding or controlling our own choices and perhaps those of other people as well” (p. 
106), even where there may be no objective values to lead us.  
 
The philosophy of ethics tends to be divided into three main categories that reflect both 
the types of questions the academic ethicists ask and the way the discipline has evolved. 
Importantly, as Hugh LaFollette (2000) points out, such categories are more a 
convenience that denoting sharp boundaries; ancient philosophers would likely have 
seen them as “a contrivance, carving non-existent joints in the moral universe” (p. 2). 
Nonetheless, present-day philosophers employ these distinctions as heuristics in order 
to locate their inquiries. Normative, or prescriptive, ethics is concerned with the 
theoretical frameworks or perspectives that might be brought to bear on ethical 
decisions. It “provides theories which aim to guide our conduct, to help us decide what 
we ought to do and how we ought to live” (Preston, 2007, p. 17) and addresses 
questions such as “are there general principles, rules, guidelines that we should follow, 
or virtues that we should inculcate that help us distinguish right from wrong and good 
from bad?” (LaFollette, 2000, p. 1). Another branch of ethics, meta-ethics (or analytic 
ethics), attends to the meanings of ethical concepts, and the purposes and processes of 
ethics. The objectivity of moral claims, the viability of ethics, and the relationship 
between psychological processes and ethical decision-making are examples of the types 
of questions that are attended to in this domain (LaFollette, 2000). The work of many 
modern academic ethicists is exclusively devoted to meta-ethics, “due in part to the 
increasing difficulty of formulating a system of ethics applicable to all or even most 
human beings” (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2009, p. 7). A third category of ethics is applied, 
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or practical, ethics which considers what we should do in particular situations, for 
example in relation to euthanasia, war, or the environment. While applied ethics draws 
on philosophical ethics, it is also interdisciplinary in nature, extending into fields such as 
the social sciences and humanities, biological and environmental sciences, and theology. 
Professional ethics in education is another example of applied ethics and, although not 
the subject of this thesis, it nonetheless strongly intersects with a consideration of how 
New Zealand social studies education might better support learners’ ethical decision-
making and action.  
 
Two semantic distinctions are particularly important to the work of this thesis. It is 
firstly notable that much education literature is replete with ‘morals’ and its cognate 
terms (morality, immoral, moral judgement). These are often used interchangeably with 
ethics and its cognates, for a range of defensible reasons. Readers will note, for instance, 
that a later section of this chapter refers extensively to moral education and that I use 
the term morality where other authors have used it. Mirroring the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ usages 
of ethics described above, morality may be defined (a) in a descriptive sense, for 
example as anthropologists would, to characterise codes of conduct that actually exist 
among individuals, groups and societies, and (b) in a normative sense (Gert, 2012). I am 
wary of the latter, not so much the use of morality to make sense of the world, but 
claims to morality dressed as “sanctimonious self-righteousness, self-centred moral 
narcissism, [or] misleading justification” (A. Rorty, 2012, p. 1). For example, as Singer 
(1994) identifies: 
‘Morality’ brings with it a particular, and sometimes inappropriate, resonance today. It 
suggests a stern set of duties that require us to subordinate our natural desires – and our 
sexual desires get particular emphasis here – in order to obey the moral law. A failure to 
fulfil our duty brings with it a heavy sense of guilt.  Very often, morality is assumed to 
have a religious basis. These connotations of ‘morality’ are features of particular 
conceptions of ethics, one linked to the Jewish and Christian traditions, rather than an 
inherent feature of any ethical system. (p. 5)  
 
Thus, to say that someone is immoral (or unethical) refers to a fixed way of doing things 
and carries with it a strong sense of censure, rather than merely an understanding that a 
particular, typically un-named, ethical code or framework(s) has not been adhered to. It 
is perhaps for this reason that though ‘morals’ is listed as an aspect of values in The New 
Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007), it has not been prevalent in New 
Zealand social studies curricula (Department of Education, 1977a; Ministry of 
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Education, 1961, 1993, 1997, 2007). Whether or not this is the case, my preference for 
using ‘ethics’ has two further reasons. First, it reflects a semantic shift in philosophy: “it 
is now common to refer to ethical judgments or ethical principles where once it would 
have been more accurate to speak of moral judgments or moral principles” (Singer, 
2014, n. p.). Secondly, my use of ethics draws attention to how moral values (that is, an 
individual’s or community’s position or judgement about what is right/wrong or 
good/bad) are arrived at, not simply the stances in and of themselves, that is, the 
analysis of the ethical frameworks from which moral claims emanate. Thus, and 
importantly for the work of this thesis, ethics is not the same as the inculcation of moral 
rules, though the latter may be an outcome of ethical processes. 
 
Another important distinction that is needed for the purposes of this thesis is between 
ethics and values. This matter is especially important given the strong association 
between social studies and values education in Australasia and elsewhere, as outlined in 
greater depth in Chapter Three. The concept of values has heavily inflected New 
Zealand social studies curricula for decades, and most noticeably gained prominence in 
the Social studies syllabus guidelines: Forms 1-4 as one of four “complementary and 
inseparable aspects of social studies” (Department of Education, 1977a, p. 5). Ethics is 
one of a cluster of concepts subsumed under this mantle of ‘values’ (Gilbert & 
Hoepper, 2004; Hill, 1994; Keown, McGee, & Sands, 1993). The New Zealand curriculum 
defines values as “a deeply held belief about what is important or valuable” and cites 
examples of values as being “moral, social, cultural, aesthetic, and economic” (Ministry 
of Education, 2007, p. 10). The term values is ambiguous however. In a broad sense, 
values are about preferences and what matters to us, yet: 
Having certain values does not guarantee that we will act in accordance with what we 
cherish as worthwhile. It could be said then that not everything we value has genuine 
worth. There is room for the improvement of judgment and reappraisal of the things 
we value. (Burgh et al., 2006, p. 44) 
 
Such reappraisal may lead us also to see differences in the meanings that are brought to 
particular values. In his book, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers, Anthony 
Appiah (2006) points to a landscape of essentially contested concepts7. The open 
textured nature of values means that “even people who share a moral vocabulary have 
plenty to fight about” (Appiah, 2006, p. 60). In relation to a seemingly incontrovertible 
                                                        
7 A term he draws from Gallie (1956). 
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maxim, do unto others as you would have them do unto you, Appiah notes that the 
‘Golden Rule’ may play out in quite different ways if we take other people’s interests 
seriously into account. He cites the example of Jehovah Witness beliefs about blood 
transfusions. We may view blood transfusions as a gift of life, just as we would wish our 
lives to be saved. However, for most Jehovah Witnesses this act violates the word of 
God and thus not what they would ‘do unto others’.  
 
The conceptual complexity of values aside, ethics is sometimes classed as a subset of 
values, as debatably not all values (such as aesthetic or economic values) have an ethical 
basis. Therefore, values might be regarded as the more encompassing term. Certainly in 
philosophy, one use of ‘value theory’ is as an umbrella term for areas of philosophy that 
have some evaluative aspect; including, for example, social and political philosophy, 
aesthetics, and sometimes the philosophy of religion (Schroeder, 2014). However, not 
all theorists would have it this way, and may prefer to see ethics as distinct in a 
disciplinary sense. Caplan (1979) found that people who used the language of ethics 
tended to see it as “firmly rooted in a tradition of systematic theorizing” (p. 248). By 
contrast, those who used ‘values talk’, in solicitations sent in response to an 
announcement about a study of the teaching of ethics in American higher education, 
took a broader view “associated with a belief in subjectivity, affectivity, and relativity in 
teaching about normative judgements” (p. 249).  
 
An alternative position, and one that I take, regards ethics as a mechanism for 
adjudicating between and accommodating conflicting value positions (Caws, 1996), that 
is, ethics both mediates and provides for the alteration of values. This position has 
values as both a raw material and as an output of ethical processes. So, I take ethics to 
mean those ways of thinking that shape our conduct, the values we espouse and the 
decisions we make as individuals and communities about how we should act. Ethics is a 
process through which what we take to be desirable, worthwhile, valuable, and important 
in life is subjected to reformation and refinement. Thus, while both ethics and values are 
indisputably allied, this thesis draws ethics out from the shadow of values. For the 
present purposes then, ethics might be described as: 
Both the branch of philosophy concerned with the systematic study of what we ought 
to do, and an activity – that of coming to an understanding of, and reflecting upon, a 
range of perspectives about social action.  
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That is, ethics has to do with a conscious, critical exploration of morality and espoused 
values. Here, I come back to Burgh et al.’s (2006) view that there is room for the 
ongoing scrutiny of values. I submit that it is ethical thinking that enables us to conduct 
such reappraisal, especially in relation to moral values. This is because ethical thinking 
encourages us to consider the premises on which our moral values are founded, and 
better understand the forms of action we subsequently take, or do not take. In essence, 
this distinction between values and ethics would focus social studies learners on the 
deeper-set machinations of societies and the often unexpressed core of social issues and 
phenomena, enabling them to “critically analyse values and actions based on them” 
(Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10) and modify their own values and actions in light of 
this. Probing deeper ethical horizons reveals that quite different perspectives may be 
used in the name of social justice or environmental sustainability, for example.  In the 
next section, I provide examples of such perspectives.  
 
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: COMPLEX, CHANGEABLE AND CONTESTED 
 
This section explores a range of normative ethical perspectives, that is, theories about 
the ways in which people respond to ethical questions and issues. Aside from 
introducing these as terms that will be used in this thesis, the purposes of this section 
are to demonstrate (a) how ethical theories are complex, changeable and contested8, and 
(b) how this is mirrored in young people’s ethical decision-making. I seek to 
demonstrate that there are few easy answers to ethical problems, either in academic or 
everyday settings, even when one has a preferred ethical standpoint.  
 
Something of the theoretical complexity involved in considering ways to go on can be 
seen, firstly, in the way that the content of ethics is perennially debated in academic 
contexts. If one were to pose the question ‘what is it to be ethical?’ to ethicists, the 
answers would contain multiple conceptions. The philosophy of ethics encompasses 
considerable theoretical diversity and encounters a vast array of problems, though 
individual ethicists may specialise in particular lines of inquiry. Philosophic differences 
exist over the language, logic and foundations of ethics, even whether there can be 
foundations to ethical systems (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2009). About such moral 
disagreement, Hinman (2013) points out that no field of academic inquiry has reached 
                                                        
8 A heuristic drawn from a paper written with Bronwyn Wood (Milligan & Wood, 2010). 
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its end, nor should we give up on ethics in the absence of complete agreement. The best 
we can do, he says, is to understand and weigh up the various positions and “come to 
the best decision we can” (p. 2).  
 
A second point about theoretical complexity is that different ethical stances may be 
both marshalled and masked under what appears to be the same position. It is notable, 
for example, that The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) uses 
‘sustainability’ in an apparently taken-for-granted and uncontroversial manner. It is 
claimed, for instance, that “ecological sustainability” is a value that enjoys “widespread 
support” (p. 10). And yet, upon closer examination of its usages, one can detect at least 
three ethical perspectives are being drawn upon: an ethic of care, a principle to which 
we all should hold, and a matter to be judged in terms of consequences. One does not 
have to delve too deeply into the literature on environmental ethics to see how these 
perspectives are by no means concordant, nor exhaustive (see, for example, Brennan & 
Lo, 2014).  
 
A third point is that different normative ethical theories can both cohere and, 
conversely, produce quite different answers when applied to the same ethical question. 
By way of an example, recently in our social studies teacher education classes my 
colleague Mike Taylor and I asked students to consider an issue that had cropped up in 
the news: whether or not to buy imported roses for Valentine’s Day. Many students 
argued against the purchase by stating that buying locally should be an important 
consumer principle. This principles-based decision also cohered with a consequentialist 
argument: that buying imported roses sustains inequalities because Indian growers 
receive a negligible return when compared to the final cost to the consumer. Notably, a 
similar, consequentialist argument was used by some students in favour of buying 
imported roses: that a widespread consumer boycott would likely damage a critical 
industry for Indian communities.  
 
To examine these perspectives in a little more depth, what follows is a summary of 
some key ethical theories. To illustrate, I have drawn on two focus group interviews 
conducted with six Year 9 social studies students. Further details about the interviews 
are given in Chapter Six, where I explain how they connected with a study about the 
place of ethics in social studies education. The students were asked to explore two social 
issues: whether or not to accept a Facebook friend, and the images that the media 
should be allowed to use. The following describes the students’ responses to these 
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issues as being typical of a range of normative theories. Almost immediately, one can see 
some difficulties with this exercise related to the complex, changeable, and contested 
nature of ethical perspectives. I firstly caution that the summary of ethical theories is not 
intended as a synoptic exercise; any number of books survey the philosophy of ethics 
and there is not the space to do justice to that exercise here. Second, distilling textbook 
categories of ethical theory can be somewhat misleading. Many synoptic texts 
concentrate on central figures and paradigmatic positions, presenting differences only 
when they have reached a sufficient level of adherence to count as sub-categories. The 
variety of utilitarian positions provides a good example: while adherents of each of these 
positions strive for coherence within their own approach, attempts to find uniting 
elements across the variants tend to be somewhat strained. A third risk is that of un-
historicised, free-floating accounts of ethics (MacIntyre, 1996). Social theorising occurs 
within changing contexts; approaches to virtues ethics now going by that name are 
neither unified within themselves nor with their historical precursors. The fourth 
challenge is that the categorisations one finds in textbooks have to do with developed 
theoretical positions – conceptual schemes that aspire to some kind of internal 
coherence. That is, of course, not where students are likely to be at, nor is it a 
discipline to which they may be attracted. Further, while I describe the students’ 
responses as typical of particular ethical perspectives, it is doubtful that one could 
describe the students as, for example, utilitarians or deontologists; the fluidity of their 
ethical schema described below is a case in point. 
 
FORMS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM. “Well, like on MSN I can block someone and delete and so 
on, but they don’t know if you’re online or not so they just think that you’re offline the whole 
time. It isn’t doing anything.” (Bob)9 
 
Here, Bob reasons that blocking someone as Facebook friend is morally acceptable, 
because the person cannot tell that they have been blocked and therefore no harm is 
created. Bob’s comment reflects a consequentialist approach which, as the term 
suggests, primarily calculates the good in terms of consequences. It is a teleological 
perspective – a theory in which the ends justify the means. One important example of a 
consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. This is often expressed as the greatest good for 
the greatest number, where the good may refer to maximising happiness, pleasure, or 
utility. The long history of utilitarianism is particularly associated with the writings of 
                                                        
9  Student selected pseudonyms. 
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nineteenth century progressive social reformers such as Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill. Mill, for example, believed that the good consists in individuals’ freedom to 
calculate, impartially, the happiness that results from an action. There are numerous 
problems with the basic principles of utilitarianism. Preston (2007) notes, for instance, 
that the exclusion of learners with behavioural issues from schools and classrooms is 
often defended along utilitarian lines. Thus, the position “may lead to a spirit of cold 
pragmatism which often offends our moral sensitivities and ultimately overlooks the 
cause of justice when that cause requires the defence of the vulnerable or seemingly 
uneconomic policies” (p. 38).  Nevertheless, as Peter and Charlotte Vardy (2012) 
observe, modern utilitarians such as R. M. Hare and Peter Singer have “explored the 
difficulties in predicting, measuring and comparing outcomes and the extent to which 
people can really be expected to weigh consequences in relation to each action” (p. 118), 
as well as confronting the possibly inhumane consequences of such a position. 
 
Other forms of consequentialism exist. For example, situation ethics, as articulated by 
James Fletcher, holds as a calculating principle that which maximises unconditional love 
(agape). While his approach assumes that ethical decisions are always contextual, 
Fletcher’s position avoids absolute relativism; the breaking of a law, for example, is 
justified only when its effects violate the law of love. By contrast, ethical egoists10 hold 
that we should base our decisions on self-interest, the universal version of this being 
that everyone should act in a way that considers the consequences to themselves. 
Another form of consequentialism, John Dewey’s pragmatic ethics, differs from these 
previously described versions on a number of counts: his “insistence on a public 
evaluation of goods is similar to the utilitarian principle, but it does not result in 
permanent rules, calculations, or fixed hierarchies of value” (Noddings, 2007, p. 163). 
 
FORMS OF NON-CONSEQUENTIALISM. “I think that rules for the media would be important 
because most of them are about people’s privacy. And that is like real important.” (Michael)  
 
In deontological theories of ethical decision-making, actions are judged generally by 
standards of duty, obligation, or rights. Michael’s point above, about the protections one 
should expect from the media, positions privacy as an inaliable right. “Non-
consequentialist ethics enjoin us to do the right thing simply because it is the right thing, 
intrinsically; no extrinsic justification is needed as with consequentialism” (Preston, 
                                                        
10  This is not to be confused with versions such common-sense, psychological and rational egoism, and egoism as a 
means to the common good (Baier, 1993). 
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2007, p. 40).  Divine command theory, for example, states that moral action is drawn 
from the teachings of religious authorities. Another influential deontological tradition is 
the duty ethics of Immanuel Kant, in which the absolute authority is not a higher power 
but the universal dictates of human reason.  Unlike consequentialist theories, which 
permit an examination of circumstances, Kant’s philosophy relies on moral absolutes. 
For example, Kant’s (1952) categorical imperative states: “act according to a maxim 
which can be adopted at the same time as a universal law” (p. 392). Good will is a 
defining aspect of Kant’s moral theory, that is, acting out of a sense of duty is more 
ethically praiseworthy than acting in accordance with duty (Keller, 2010).  
 
The limits to Kant’s deontology have been keenly contested. There are those, for 
example, who strongly doubt that universal principles may be found within historical 
change, the complexities of societal discourses and differences in cultural traditions  
(O. O’Neill, 1993). By contrast Onora O’Neill herself argues that Kantian reason “can 
speak beyond cultural boundaries … it offers moral philosophers the possibility of 
speaking meaningfully about issues which affect us all while retaining a grip on the 
limitations of the human perspective” (P. Vardy & C. Vardy, 2012, p. 161). Another 
issue resides in the difficulties associated in resolving conflicts between absolute rules; 
“some adherents of non-consequentialism may be forced to resort to consequentialist 
modes of reasoning” (Preston, 2007, p. 42). One attempt to wrestle with such conflicts 
occurs in the work of William Ross, a follower of Kant’s. In response to what he saw as 
being Kant’s inflexible absolutism, Ross posited that we have certain prima facie duties, 
such as not harming others and honesty, “that we must adhere to unless serious 
circumstances or reasons tell us to do otherwise” (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2009, p. 62).  
He also argued, pace Kant, that we have special duties, for example, to family and 
friends, which may override moral absolutes.  Ethical decision-making becomes, on 
Ross’ account, in part an exercise of acting in accordance with the stronger duty. The 
selection and prioritisation of, and justification for, prima facie duties is open to scrutiny. 
However, it is notable that Kant’s deontology remains compelling for many 
contemporary ethicists, and perhaps to us all by engaging with our intuitive, everyday 
sense of fundamental responsibilities to others. Moreover, “deontological theories, 
unlike consequentialist ones, have the potential for explaining why certain people have 
moral standing to complain about and hold to account those who breach moral duties” 
(L. Alexander & Moore, 2014, n.p.). 
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JUSTICE VS. CARE: “And you shouldn’t, like, hang out with the person that’s being mean to your 
friend because you could have known that person for ages and they could actually mean a lot to 
you.” (Michael) 
 
A sometimes polarised debate in contemporary philosophy of ethics is between justice 
and care perspectives. Broadly speaking, the former begins from the position that 
societal well-being depends on a shared commitment to the rights of individuals and just 
resource distribution (Preston, 2007).  Preston notes that social justice and rights are 
often conflated, “as if the granting of rights was the sum total of social justice” (p. 43).  
I reiterate this here because social justice has less of a focus than rights in the New 
Zealand social studies achievement objectives (Ministry of Education, 2007). In 
addition, rights is largely construed in terms of the Universal declaration of human rights. The 
concept of rights has had, in fact, a much longer, contested history in political 
philosophy, and has been justified on a number of theoretical grounds (Almond, 1993). 
On the basis of quite different arguments, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes conceived 
rights in terms of a social contract designed to protect individuals from harm, whereas 
theorists such as John Stuart Mill and R. M. Hare have grounded rights in conceptions 
of utility. More recently, in his book A theory of justice, John Rawls (1999) has spear-
headed a duty-based orientation to social contract theory. Through a thought 
experiment, he argued that people will only choose a social contract “which would not 
disadvantage them in the event that they turn out to have some liability (such as 
economic poverty)” (Preston, 2007, p. 45).  This led Rawls to argue that social justice is 
built on two principles: freedom, and equality and social justice.  The latter makes the 
different treatment of members of society possible only when it addresses social 
disadvantage. 
 
Rawls’ theory has attracted criticism from a number of directions; it has been argued, 
for example, that it overplays the role of rationality and underplays the effects of power. 
Another line of argument takes a more relational turn, reflected in Michael’s feelings 
about her friendship, above. Feminist care ethics takes issue with Rawls’ prescription for 
social justice (Porter, 1999) and, more generally, calls for a re-evaluation of 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. In simple terms: 
Justice insists on general rules. It has a concept of the self that reduces everyone to a 
thin moral sameness and that denigrates the importance of particularities and 
relationships. Caring, in contrast, is context sensitive, has a situated self, and is 
fundamentally concerned for relationships (Katz, Noddings & Strike, 1999, p. 22). 
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The critiques of theorists such as Carol Gilligan, Virginia Held and Nel Noddings have 
particular salience to this thesis, in that they attend to (a) different moral voices, 
especially gendered differences in ethical decision-making, (b) context and moral 
sensitivity, and (c) the lived, embodied experiences of women’s ethical lives, particularly 
as nurturers. However, feminist care ethics is perhaps problematic as a justificatory 
normative theory and it is notable that other traditional theories do not necessarily 
preclude a consideration of care critiques. 
 
VIRTUES/CHARACTER PERSPECTIVES: “I can debate whatever [Michael] said. I can say 
something. If they were not good people they wouldn’t stick to the rules … because if they were 
good people they wouldn’t need them, they’d just know.” (Bob) 
 
Does ethical life require rules? In considering media ethics, Bob suggests that rules are 
not the only source of ethical guidance. Her position invokes an Aristotelian argument 
that the cultivation of the good life lies in considering who we should become, or the 
kind of person we wish to be, rather than what we should do. From an Aristotlean 
virtues perspective “we are not conducting this inquiry [into the good life] in order to 
know what virtue is, but in order to become good” (A. Rorty, 2012, p. 13). In the works 
of Alisdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe and Michael Slote, to name but a few, we 
see a groundswell of attention to virtues theory in contemporary academic ethics. Peter 
and Charlotte Vardy (2012) comment that though such derivations have important 
distinctions, almost all contemporary virtues ethicists import three concepts from 
Aristotelian philosophy: (i) arête – character traits, such as courage, truthfulness and 
good temper, (ii) phronesis – practical wisdom that should begin from experience and, (iii) 
eudaimonia, or flourishing. To put these concepts together, human flourishing emanates 
from the identification and habituation of positive character traits. Happiness stems 
from leading a virtuous life, that is, engaging in continuous reflection on lived 
experience rather than reciting moral principles. In other words, “ethical dilemmas must 
be addressed not fundamentally as intellectual puzzles but by morally-formed persons 
who bring virtuous qualities to the issues before them” (Preston, 2007, p. 52).  
 
Just as Aristotle’s legacy is keenly engaged with in academic circles, and as is discussed 
later in this chapter, virtues ethics strongly inflects contemporary approaches to moral 
education. Aristotelian-type virtues find, for example, their expression in The New 
Zealand curriculum as “values to be encouraged, modelled and explored” (Ministry of 
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Education, 2007, p. 10), such as excellence, integrity and curiosity. The curriculum’s list 
of values is not the same as the virtues Aristotle identified but, as he would remind us, 
what is seen as being important virtues changes with societal context. This points to one 
of the challenges with virtues ethics – if virtues change over time and place, how do we 
avoid the descent into relativism?  The differences between the virtues emphasised in 
New Zealand schools (see Keown, Parker & Tiakiwai, 2005, pp. 90-98) demonstrates 
the difficulty of arriving at consensus, even within the character education movement, in 
the present.  Other challenges lie in determining what virtuous people are to do in the 
face of perplexing modern dilemmas, whether virtues theory “can do all the work of 
ethics” (Pence, 1993, p. 254), and whether there exists an essential connection between 
virtues.  
 
ETHICS AS DISCOURSES:  While the previous selection of ethical perspectives gives 
something of the flavour of debates in ethics, it by no means captures the complexity of 
the contemporary academic landscape. The discussion has, further, almost exclusively 
attended to Western philosophy. The colonising effect of Euro-western philosophies of 
ethics is a matter picked up in Chapter Four, but it is notable that a vast literature exists 
on Eastern philosophy and indigenous ethical perspectives in other parts of the world 
(see, for example, Gyekye, 2014; Singer, 1993). Importantly, in fields such as 
environmental ethics and research ethics, we see a playing out of attempts to find ways 
to recognise differentiated moral experiences and speak across difference – applied 
ethics in a more enriched sense than the application of ethical theories to social and 
environmental concerns. The discussion, thus far, might also seem distanced from 
learners. Yet, in the nuanced exchange about friendship and Facebook between the 
students below, we can discern the traces of previously discussed ethical debates. 
Destiny communicates her rule in relation to friendships and Bob moves this into a 
consideration of the consequences of dissing. Isaac is interested in people’s ethical 
motivations as a basis for decision-making, and together with Michael and Destiny, 
wrestles with deontological approaches in the context of relationships:  
Destiny:  My friends know not to dis all my other friends because I always like say 
“that’s not cool” or something. So they know not to say things about people 
in front of me.  
Andrea:  So if you go on Facebook and they were dissing your mates, that person 
would be – get rid of them pretty quickly? 
Bob:  I’d get upset. Cos everybody’s done that to me and my friend… 
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Andrea:  So you think there’s actually some very hurtful consequences? Dissing? 
Bob:  Yes. 
Isaac:  I’d have a talk to them and ask why they’re doing it. And if they say “just 
cos it’s fun” I’d just tell them to back off. Like at Kapa Haka, we got told to 
look out for each other because we’re one big family.  
Michael:  It’s like if you had a new friend and they were saying stuff about your old 
friend that’s not cool. But it’s also the same the other way round, like if an 
old friend is making fun of your new friend … because like you could 
seriously trust like that new friend or something, and could be really upset 
with them.  
Destiny:  But your friends have also got to learn that you have got other friends, other 
than them.  
 
How could one think about ethical theories in relation to learners? This thesis does not 
aim to make a contribution to any one tradition of the philosophy of ethics, or the field in 
general. Instead, it builds an argument that social studies learners should have access to as 
much of the insights of the philosophy of ethics as possible. This is not to say that the 
argument does not draw on ethical perspectives – the reader may detect an Aristotelian 
thrust to the discussion about lived experience in Chapter Five, for example. Primarily, 
this thesis conceives ethics as discourses that, for the most part, suffuse our lived 
experiences. My use of the term discourse draws from a wide body of literature that 
coalesces around a relationship between post-structural ethics and education, following 
the works of Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida and others (see, for 
example, Bagnall, 1998; Hugman, 2003, 2005; Popke, 2003; Slattery & Rapp, 2003; Todd, 
2003). One of the reasons that post-structural thinking presents something of a challenge 
to traditional ethics is that it calls into question foundational, objective knowledge. “From 
this perspective, the apparent stability of meaning embedded in any system of thought is 
potentially destabilized by elided traces of difference, and by the multiple contexts in 
which knowledge is produced, received and interpreted” (Popke, 2003, p. 300).  
 
In this thesis, I draw on poststructural ethics to assist in the consideration of 
multiplicity, complexity and contradiction in learners’ ethical lives. My justification for 
adopting discourse theory as an approach to thinking about ethical perspectives in 
relation to social studies learners is two-fold. First, discursive ethics offers as an 
understanding of ethical decision-making and action as drawing on socially constructed 
storylines that are never told in isolation and require affirmation to continue to exist. 
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Ethical theories, of the kind outlined in this section, are some of those enfolded 
storylines in learners’ lives – but not all. Second, discursive ethics enables a rethinking of 
the subject, in this case learners, not as corresponding with ethical theories but as 
differently positioned by their storylines. In other words, ethical perspectives have 
constitutive effects (Foucault, 1997) that shape, for example, what is said/not said and 
who is included/excluded in conversations about ways to go on.  Further, “in speaking 
and acting from a position people are bringing to the particular situation their history as 
a subjective being, that is the history of one who has been in multiple positions and 
engaged in different forms of discourse” (Davies & Harré, 2009, n.p.).   
 
I emphasise that this thesis does not argue for presenting ethical decision-making and 
action, including the ethical theories that inform such choices, in solely post-structural 
terms. While I make a case for foregrounding ethical discourses and their effects in the 
lives of social studies learners, this does not preclude a consideration of foundational 
ethical theorising, for example. My interest lies, instead, in surfacing the silenced in 
social studies education – in the context of this thesis, ethical perspectives that languish 
as a backdrop to New Zealand’s social studies curriculum. Most vitally, the argument 
built in this thesis is that opportunities to explore the complex, contested, and changing 
nature of ethical perspectives offers learners stories with which to go on.  
 
ETHICAL SPACE AS A ‘COMPLEX ECOLOGY’  
 
In this section I discuss a number of important features of contemporary democracies 
within which ethics takes place, such as plurality, complexity, uncertainty, and moral 
ambivalence. These are features that we, including our learners, must inevitably navigate. 
Without suggesting that ethical issues are any more important or perplexing today than 
in the past, the discussion draws on two images of occupation to explore the ‘complex 
ecologies’ (A. Rorty, 2005) of contemporary ethical space and how societal change has 
presented new challenges for ethics and ethical decision-making. The argument 
presented in this section is important because it (a) suggests why a greater focus on 
matters ethical is both urgent and vital, and (b) establishes the societal context to which 
this thesis’ proposal responds. 
 
Before continuing, two clarifications are necessary. The first is that ethical dilemmas 
brought about by societal complexity and moral diversity ought not to be seen as 
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something peculiar to the twenty-first century. Historically, the writings of ethicists, 
poets, theologians and politicians alike have responded to the perplexing and troubling 
societal dilemmas of their time. Consider, for example, Greece: if we examine the 
society of Plato’s upbringing, we see the direct influence of the Peloponnesian Wars on 
“a period of physical turbulence, social disarray, and changing values” (Barrow, 1978, 
p. 11). Plato witnessed a diversity of viewpoints and values, drawn variously from poets 
(chiefly Homer and Hesiod), tragedians, itinerant teachers, and prominent politicians 
and citizens (Adkins, 1989), formed against a backdrop of war, economic collapse, and 
tensions within Athenian democracy. Indeed, it was in part this very moral confusion 
that led Plato to offer an antidote, based in his vision of the Republic, that pursued a 
more satisfactory polis focussed on the “twin objectives of harmony and security” 
(Barrow, 1978, p. 11). Since then, we have seen an expansion of the morally 
considerable in the history of ethics, to include slaves, women and more recently the 
environment. Well before the twenty-first century, the Lisbon earthquake and the 
Holocaust ruptured and transformed the philosophy of ethics (Neiman, 2004) and, at 
least in James Sterba’s (2001) view, environmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism 
arose as significant and as yet unresolved ethical challenges.   
 
Secondly, one needs to avoid the temptation to discuss ethics in a panicky ‘we’re all 
going to hell in a hand-cart’ tone, drawing on the type of arguments that proceed “from 
the claim that contemporary society is rapidly sinking in a rising tide of vandalism, 
violence and drug abuse to some pet theory of moral formation that might serve to stem 
this tide” (Carr, 1999, p. 26). Like other educationalists, I think we need to be wary of 
the language of moral crisis that permeates much of the media representation of 
contemporary society and, in particular, the continual and perhaps unwitting reprise of 
Hesiod’s despair over the reckless, arrogance and frivolousness of the young. This is not 
to deny the existence of a sense of moral crisis but to place it, as Carr urges, “in proper 
historical proportion” (p. 23). Similarly, Amanda Rohloff (Rohloff, 2011; Rohloff & 
Wright, 2010) uses the theories of Norbert Elias to argue that we must move beyond 
conceiving moral panics as inherently fleeting, misguided and therefore dismissible, and 
instead pay attention to longer-term societal processes and figurations. Rohloff would 
argue that the recent Roast Busters11 scandal, in which a group of young New Zealand 
men reportedly boasted about having sex with intoxicated young women on Facebook, 
                                                        
11 For a summary of this issue see:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roast_Busters_scandal 
 
36 
should be seen as a short-term episode, where de-civilising trends temporarily dominate 
over civilising trends. My point here is not necessarily an argument for an Eliasian 
approach to ethics, but to suggest that ethical issues are as much a matter of continuity 
as they are of change.  
 
How, then, might one sensibly characterise the ethical landscape of our times? We should 
acknowledge the ever-increasing array of ethical choices that confront people in Western 
societies and issues that compete for our attention. Advances in technology and science 
have presented questions that never existed in modern and pre-modern societies and, in 
academia, have been responded to through a whole host of new areas of thought such as 
bioethics, communication ethics, and machine ethics. We should also note the multiplicity 
of ethical visions in everyday life, something philosophers refer to as the fact of pluralism, or 
the fact of diversity. Bernstein (1987) notes both the shifting meaning of pluralism and its 
relationship to an enduring theme of the one and the many, to be found “at the core of 
Greek philosophy, discernible already in the fragments of the pre-Socratics [and]… replayed 
in such abstract forms as the relation of the one to the many, the relation of sameness or 
identity and difference, the universal and the particular” (p. 520). In philosophy, there is 
considerable debate about whether pluralism exists at a foundational level, that is, whether 
there are distinct and perhaps incommensurable values – termed value pluralism – or 
whether, as monists claim, such values may be reducible to a super value albeit unknown at 
present (Mason, 2014).  Jones (2006) notes an important distinction: “whereas the plurality 
noticed by value-pluralism is a plurality of different and conflicting goods, the plurality 
noticed in the fact of pluralism is a plurality of different and conflicting conceptions of the 
good” (p. 191). About the latter, few philosophers would disagree; ethical complexity, 
fragmentation and plurality are axiomatic of our everyday experience.  
 
A whole host of concerns arise from the fact of pluralism. Just why ethical diversity is a 
social fact is one matter of contention. Lynch (2009) suggests that in political 
philosophy, for example, there are at least two accounts for the reality and persistence of 
diversity.  The first draws on the philosophic conception of value pluralism previously 
discussed whereas the second, reasonable pluralism, attributes moral and political 
diversity to the limitations of human reason in achieving consensus. Further debates 
coalesce around how one should proceed from the fact of ethical pluralism, and 
whether it ought to be regarded as problematic. It is notable that pluralism both extends 
from democracy and is enshrined in the concept of democratic rights. I shall return to 
these issues in subsequent chapters for two reasons. The first is because The New Zealand 
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curriculum’s (Ministry of Education, 2007) requirement to support learners’ ethical 
decision making and action rests on an unelaborated concept of pluralism. The second 
is because this thesis argues for an ethically plural approach to better supporting social 
studies learners’ understanding of social issues and responses to moral conflict.  
 
For now, the discussion concentrates on ethical pluralism at the descriptive level – the 
textures and dimensions of differing conceptions of the good life in what I refer to as 
‘ethical space’ (Poole, 1972). The central point being made here is that as society has 
become increasingly complex, ethical space is marked by hybridity, interpenetration and 
intensification. Arguably, this has always been the case; what has shifted is the academic 
theorising. However, as Gray (2000) argues: 
In pre-modern societies, hybrid identity was a marginal phenomenon; today it is 
common and signifies a vitally important aspect of human well-being. In late modern 
societies, many people practice variations on the several traditions in which they are 
situated. The interpenetration of divergent, sometimes rival ethical perspectives is one 
of the most distinctive features of ethical life today. In few late modern societies is it 
sensible to count forms of ethical life. (p. 330) 
 
To see how this is so, Roger Poole’s (1972) concept of ethical space offers an initial 
anchor-point. His book, Towards deep subjectivity, opens by describing a photograph of 
three Russian soldiers being watched by Czech citizens in a public park. The scene is 
Prague, 1968. The USSR has occupied Czechoslovakia and deposed Dubček, the self-
described developer of communism with a human face. Echoing the student uprisings 
in France, Dubček’s movement is supported by many young people challenging the grey 
conformity of European socialism. Conversely, the USSR is interested in re-imposing 
itself as the central, organising force of communism. About this scene in the park, Poole 
writes:  
The space spread out before the protagonists of the drama is ethical space itself ... 
[t]here can be no flaccid action, no action which is not immediately imbued with an 
ethical ballast, filled in from our point of view in the world of perspectives. The 
meaning attributed to what goes on in the significant space before our eyes will vary 
according to our moral presuppositions, the partial vision we receive, the position we 
occupy in the perspectival world. (p. 6) 
 
Poole uses the concept of ‘ethical space’ to draw attention to the underflows of this 
scene: its enfolded, unstated and embodied ethical dimensions. He observes two sorts of 
intentions, that of the Russians and the Czechs. But widening the frame would reveal, 
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perhaps, this ethical space as being a ‘complex ecology’ (A. Rorty, 2005), marked by 
multiplicity in morality’s demography and sociology, and variations in its tasks and 
purposes. The photograph does not show the popular, non-violent opposition to the 
invasion. Of course, not all Czechs saw the events of 1968 as an occupation nor, indeed, 
did all Russians soldiers view themselves as rescuing Czechoslovakia from the possibility 
of counter-revolution. Our attention might be, secondly, drawn to the intersections of 
identity – the Czech woman in the scene as perhaps also an employee, a partner, and a 
participant in non-violent resistance. As Amélie Rorty puts it, the ‘I’ and ‘we’ morality is 
speaking to has “distinctive needs, rights and obligations, different habits, priorities and 
virtues…[that] struggle with one another for control of our allegiances and virtues” (p. 
9).  Third, we could note the historicity of the park’s ethical space, the ways in which 
morality has been drawn from past and distant places; a “palimpsest history of conquest, 
trade and exile that has formed our practices and evaluation” (p. 11).  Fourth, we might 
see the park scene as an intergenerational ethical space, borne of the incubating ‘moral 
proximity’ (Bauman, 1997) of the home: “the pivotal practices of the home [which are] 
co-constructed by family members in their everyday face-to-face encounters, over time, 
in a range of possible directions” (Payne, 2010, p. 228). Fifth, as Amélie Rorty (2005) 
argues, we should be alert to forms of power, the ways in which institutions structure 
morality, and to inequality: “morality is not always addressed equally to every citizen or 
intrapsychic persona, each deciding for all” (p. 10). Last, and though Poole uses ethical 
space to describe a stand-off, it is notable that more recent usages of the concept 
cognise a space of negotiation, particularly between indigenous and Western ethical 
worldviews (Ermine, 2007; Ermine, Sinclair, & Jeffrey, 2004; Longboat, 2010). 
 
We shift ethical space to Occupy Wellington, a local expression of the international 
protest movement against the global financial system’s production of inequality, and the 
erosion and manipulation of democracy. It is January, 2012, and the site is Civic Square, 
opposite the New Zealand Stock Exchange. A reporter from TV3’s Campbell live12 show 
spends the night in the square after 104 days of occupation. In one respect the scene is a 
mirror-image of Prague; this time the protestors occupy the public space. Both scenes 
are of non-violent resistance to systems and concentrations of power. And, in writing 
about the Occupy movement, Judith Butler (2011) reminds us of the embodied nature 
of such protests: 
                                                        
12 http://www.3news.co.nz/Occupy-Wellington---behind-the-scenes/tabid/367/articleID/240960/Default.aspx 
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When bodies gather as they do to express their indignation and to enact their plural 
existence in public space, they are also making broader demands. They are demanding 
to be recognized and to be valued; they are exercising a right to appear and to exercise 
freedom; they are calling for a liveable life. (p. 12) 
 
There are, however, some important distinctions to be drawn, related to the quickening 
of globalisation and increased complexities of social systems. We see newer forms of 
activism, concurrently global and local, borne of technological possibility. Castells 
(2012) describes the occupiers as a multi-modal, networked movement, using “the 
autonomous space of flows of Internet networks to seize symbolic spaces of places” (p. 
178). In the face of increasingly de-territorialised global financial and corporate systems, 
Occupy Wellington might be seen as an effort to re-territorialise and re-localise power. 
Arguably, the movement’s goals are diffuse, a matter of some public and journalistic 
scepticism. However, Butler (2012) argues that the accelerating inequalities resulting 
from contemporary forms of capitalism have required new ways of objecting that draw 
attention to the inter-connectedness between issues – a refusal to reduce problems to a 
set of demands. In one important sense, the process is the message. Behind these 
concerns lie ethical issues that mark our times: on what basis should we oppose the 
effects of current global economic structures and power relations? What constitutes 
responsible and democratic participation in an increasingly globalised world?  The 
Campbell live story also demonstrates how global and local ethical issues are 
interpenetrated. What form should the rules and relationships with other take in this 
camp? How should one respond to the array of ethical challenges that co-habit with the 
wider issues? One protester, there when Occupy Wellington was established, reflects: 
You start to realise how hard it is to bring everyone together and when conflict happens 
what do you do? We’re in a public space with people with mental disorders and 
alcoholism. How do you deal with that when you’re trying to also build the cause?  
 
I submit that the fact of pluralism and increased societal complexity produces not only a 
clattering array of ethical choices, but profound ambivalence. In many instances this 
ambivalence is hard to resolve; we feel torn between seemingly opposed yet merit-
worthy positions. What to do, for example, in the face of revelations about 
SodaStream13: dispose of our fizzy-drink maker (and be wasteful of resources), continue 
to use it (thereby supporting the Israeli occupation of the West Bank), lobby the 
                                                        
13 http://www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/food-wine/9650582/Fizz-goes-out-of-blood-bubbles 
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company directly, or hope that the company relocates its production site? Though some 
may hope or believe that there exists somewhere in the ethical ether a definitive moral 
compass, the reality is that moral compasses clash, melt and remould, even as we reach 
for them. Even the most prescriptive of ethical codes we might ascribe to do not 
protect us from indeterminacy, ambiguity, and nuance. Bauman (1993), in characterising 
these times as one of ‘postmodern moral crisis’, observes that: 
With the pluralism of rules (and our times are the times of pluralism) the moral choices 
(and the moral conscience left in their wake) appear to us intrinsically and irreparably 
ambivalent. Ours are the times of strongly felt moral ambiguity.  These times offer us freedom 
of choice never before enjoyed, but also cast us into a state of uncertainty never before 
so agonizing … In the end, we trust no authority, at least, we trust none fully, and none 
for long: we cannot help being suspicious about any claim to infallibility. (pp. 20-21, 
emphases in original). 
 
One does not have to accept Bauman’s full thesis to recognise these phenomena in our 
social world. But what now – a wearied cup of tea and a lie down? To acknowledge that 
we exist in an ethically plural and ambivalent social world is not to suggest that we give 
up on ethical thinking as a futile pursuit. By contrast, greater consideration of how we 
might proceed is perhaps no more necessary than in times of strongly felt moral 
ambiguity. To borrow a metaphor from Somerville (2006), when the ‘ethical canary’ 
sings of societal uncertainty and ambivalence, examining the ethical perspectives at the 
bottom of the mineshaft is both necessary and urgent.  
DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND THE ETHICAL LIFE 
 
What business does education, particularly in democracies, have in the contemporary 
ethical space as previously described? Amélie Rorty (2005) argues that “philosophic 
theories of morality without politics and education are empty” (p. 20). How is this so? 
This section considers two aspects of the relationship between ethics, politics and 
education: the ethical intent of education and role of ethics education. I note that 
education is inescapably suffused with ethical intent, even including those who argue 
against moral education. Furthermore, to be educative, moral education must enlarge 
learners’ ethical thinking; it must do more than simply acculturate and inculcate. 
Education must in some way invite learners to debate the good life for themselves. This 
is particularly important in democracies, which require citizens to notice, consider the 
importance of, and engage with social issues that confront them and their communities, 
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the vast majority of which have an ethical content. How to do so is, of course, a matter 
of considerable debate. 
 
Carr (2000) notes that “human interest in moral education probably has its source in a 
general concern with inducting the young into socially acceptable forms of conduct, 
which is as old as recorded history” (p. 19). A persistent view among the many popular 
interpretations of the aims of moral education is that it has a necessary role in 
promoting conformity and ensuring societal wellbeing, that is, a means of social control 
(Haydon, 2003; Wringe, 2006). This runs to the heart of why many theorists have 
presented arguments against moral education:  
The question as to whether educational institutions have the right or responsibility to 
present, propose, teach, or impose a moral perspective is a major point of argument 
throughout the history of education. (Chazan, 1985, p. 101)  
 
Chazan presents two reasons why the diverse views of, what he terms, the ‘anti-moral 
education school’ are defensible: (a) the negative experiences of moral education need to 
be acknowledged, such as manipulation, imposition and loss of self, and (b) whether the 
world is likely to be better off with more, or different, moral education is a moot point. 
However, he also argues that the anti-moral education movement may well remain on the 
margins of educational discourse. This is because the proposed purposes of education, 
including the dismantling or radical readjusting of the structures of schooling, have thus 
far proved overly ambiguous or unpalatable. I think Chazan misses one further argument: 
the fact that each and every alternative presented has an inescapable ethical content. In 
other words, all debates about the relationship between morality and education inevitably 
represent varying visions of the good life; education is suffused with ethical intent. Thus, 
and as Haydon (2003) notes, “there is still room today for the position that all education is 
moral education in the sense of having an overriding moral end[s]” (p. 320). Of course, 
these ends are debated just as education is conceptually fluid (Hirst & Peters, 1970) and its 
purposes and practices are contested (Egan, 1997; Standish, 2003). 
 
Perhaps the least controversial answer to the question of the purpose of education is that it 
is to enable students to live a worthwhile life within the societies in which they find 
themselves. It begins with the contention, attributed to Socrates, as to what a worthwhile 
life is not: the unexamined life is not worth living. The problem of moral education then 
becomes:   
42 
Primarily that of how individual human lives might acquire meaning and purpose 
through the recognition and appreciation of a significant moral dimension to human 
experience which can serve to enhance personal life and growth. (Carr, 1999, p. 24) 
 
What a meaningful and purposeful life consists of is not attempted here; controversy 
and complaints of proselytising would no doubt ensue. Rather, I acknowledge that the 
varying projects of contemporary moral education cognise something more than osmotic 
inculcation via indirect socio-cultural factors and mechanisms of socialisation (such as 
the mass media). Morality is undoubtedly ‘caught’ and emerges, moment-by-moment, in 
the routine relationships and practices of schooling and everyday life. However, moral 
education as it is construed today involves teachers’ conscious influence on their 
students’ responses to social influences (Haydon, 2003). That is, it involves the intended 
curriculum (McGeorge, 1992). Concomitantly, the focus of this thesis is on what is 
‘taught’ rather than ‘caught’, though I stress that intended moral curriculum is not 
divorced from the classroom climate, school ethos and wider societal discourses.  
So to approach the least controversial answer suggested above we, as educationalists, 
must at least attempt to teach ways of reflection, ways in which learners might approach 
at a personal and societal level, the question of what a good life consists in. Following 
Colin Wringe, I contend that ethical education’s central aim is to enable learners to 
respond to questions “in a considered and well-informed manner, rather than in terms 
of simplistic reactions to one’s own or other people’s choices, actions, attitudes or 
beliefs” (Wringe, 2006, p. 18). Indeed, this is an expectation of democratic societies 
because they “not only sustain multiple forms of life but engage in continual 
contestation about which versions are most consistent with the public good” (Jasanoff, 
2002, p. 269). While democracies have their necessary forms of socialisation, a founding 
proposition of this thesis is that, to be democratic, education needs in some way to 
invite learners to debate the good life. In Glass’ (2009) view: 
Public schools (as the institution charged with the forming citizens of the state) must 
build loyalty both for and against the state and the institutions of society. Schools must 
build the capacity for moral and political conflict into the very nature of citizenship (p. 
27, my emphasis) 
 
To take this further, democracy depends on the capacities of critical thought and 
deliberation because it “can only sustain its truth by keeping alive the question of what 
democracy is, by way of its necessary voice within” (Standish, 2003, p. 229). And it is 
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schools that cultivate those voices within, learners who are able to think for and against 
democracy.  
 
This is, of course, a politically contentious view, even within democratic nations, and at 
times the proper relationship between education, politics and ethics is vociferously 
contested. We have seen in recent years, for instance, considerable debate in New South 
Wales, Australia, over the introduction and content of a course in ethics14, offered as an 
alternative to primary school religious education (Cook, 2013; Jensen, 2009; Knight, 
2010; Longstaff, 2010). In the New Zealand context, Roger Openshaw (2000) 
comments that “as in the United States and elsewhere, for broadly similar reasons, social 
studies remains a moral and ideological battleground for the major players involved in 
curriculum reform” (p. 65). Frazer (2008) reminds us that the political nature of 
citizenship education has “the power to exclude, or ignore, other moral claims” (p. 289). 
‘Minimal’ and ‘maximal’ conceptions of citizenship education (McLaughlin, 1992) 
provide a useful illustration of how this is so15. Minimal views tend to cultivate 
democratic voices through providing information about civic life and developing 
students’ commitment to a shared democratic culture. One objection to this is that “it 
may involve merely an unreflective socialisation into the political and social status quo, 
and is therefore inadequate on educational, as well as other grounds” (n.p.). A more 
maximalist or ‘thick’ conception reaches for an understanding of public virtues 
substantial “enough to satisfy the demands of commonality, but which combines 
respect for the important role of independence and critical reason for individuals and 
the demands of justice relating to diversity” (n.p.). This account is equally open to 
critique on the grounds that a commitment to the examined life through encouraging 
learners to think against democracy may exceed the principled consensus on which the 
democracy rests. Each end of the continuum, therefore, represents the assertion of 
particular moral claims – different conceptions about the proper relationship between 
democracy, education, and the good life.  Because such theoretical tensions are very 
often glossed over, a number of educators have urged that a political, philosophical, and 
ethical analysis be brought to bear on citizenship education (see, for example, Frazer, 
2008; Openshaw & White, 2005). 
 
                                                        
14 Now a mandated programme, called Primary Ethics: http://www.primaryethics.com.au/ 
15 McLaughlin cautions against drawing too simplistic a distinction between these categories. Contemporary 
descriptions of citizenship education are typically supple; most writers in the field would argue that citizenship theory 
and education are not reducible to simple binaries.   
 
44 
Such contentions notwithstanding, it is arguable that democracy proliferates the 
possibilities for moral education.  It is notable that moral education’s variations are 
manifold in democratic societies, reaching back into debates in fields such as 
philosophy, sociology and psychology. In a useful overview of USA and UK 
approaches, Noddings (2007) notes, for instance: (a) the influence of Aristotelian 
thinking in virtues and character education, (b) echoes of Kant in Kohlberg’s moral 
reasoning, (c) the utilitarian thrust of courses dedicated to ethics as a philosophic 
inquiry, and that (d) the more recent ‘values clarification’ approach is strongly reflective 
of Dewey’s thinking. Haydon (2003) suggests that responses to the question about the 
content of moral education have had at least two variants, each of which has had its 
critics. Rationalistic accounts (of which a-c above are examples) focus on developing the 
skills of independent reason in line with much post-Enlightenment moral philosophy. 
This “readily cohered with a broader liberal emphasis on individual liberty, including 
freedom of thought” (p. 322). Yet, such accounts have traditionally said little about the 
role of feelings, motivation and behaviour, and have downplayed the influence of 
context and societal expectations. A stronger influence on the philosophy of moral 
education in the last three decades, and certainly the programmes offered in New 
Zealand schools (Keown et al., 2005), is that of virtues/character education, which has 
attempted to capture the multidimensionality of ethical life. On this account, a virtues 
approach “can enable us to give a better and more comprehensive account of an ethical 
life in which rationality and other aspects are seen in balance” (Haydon, 2003, p. 325).  
 
However, Haydon (2003) notes that both variants face challenges related to their 
acceptability within plural and multicultural societies; arguably, this is the case across all 
visions for moral education. To what extent should learners be able to enact the 
principles they have developed through reason? Should the virtues nurtured in special 
character schools be considered a model for all? To what extent should a public 
education enable the cultural and moral continuity of diverse communities? Susan 
Verducci (2009) reminds us that the nexus of democracy, education, and moral life is as 
much a space of contradiction as it is accommodation of diverse visions for the good 
life. She argues that moral citizenship in democracies “requires a stance that recognizes 
complexities and oppositional forces at play. It requires a stance that allows one to see 
clearly and to recognize the haze in the same instant” (p. 7). To answer the question 
posed at the beginning of this section, this is precisely the sort of business that 
education has in contemporary ethical space. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has provided the context for the work of the thesis in a number of ways.  I 
have established the sense in which ethics and a number of other related terms are used 
throughout the thesis. In particular, I have sketched a contemporary ethical landscape – 
in our everyday lives, in society, and in theory – that is by nature plural, complex, and 
changing. This landscape inevitably works its way into education which is then expected 
to, in some way, support learners to navigate the uncertainties and ambivalence of 
ethical life. This discussion is an important backdrop to the work of the thesis because it 
establishes the difficulties of providing a blueprint for ethics education – just as there 
are no simple answers to ethical questions, there are no easy educational responses. 
However, such is the centrality of ethics to learners’ lives and the challenges they face 
that some kind of educational response is commanded. The chapters that follow defend a 
broad theoretical orientation to ethics education, appropriate to the purposes of social 
studies as I see them. While some pedagogical ways forward are offered, the reader will 
note that there is not an attempt here to produce a ‘ready-to-run’ package. The spirit of 
this thesis is very much in line with the themes that have been introduced in this chapter 
– an attempt to reveal, explore, and open up dialogue about a challenging aspect of 
social studies education, acknowledging that my proposal rests in particular moral 
claims.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HOW CENTRAL IS ETHICS TO SOCIAL 
STUDIES?  
 
Chapter Two established that education has a central role in enlarging learners’ ethical thinking so that 
they may better navigate the complexities and vicissitudes of their social worlds. This chapter connects 
this thesis’ key foci: ethics and social studies. In order to establish a rationale for the central research 
question, the chapter begins by asking how central ethics is to New Zealand social studies education. 
Additionally, and given that supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action is a cross-curricular 
expectation of The New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007), the discussion considers 
whether social studies might be justifiably considered a ‘natural home’ for ethics education. The chapter 
then introduces the first of my research sub-questions: what opportunities for ethical decision-making and 
action are offered through New Zealand social studies curriculum documentation? Having noted the 
lack of curricular explication for ethical decision-making and action in the introduction to the thesis, the 
substantive part of this chapter uses a form of concept analysis to map a conceptual field of meanings 
that have been built up in New Zealand social studies curricula over time, into which ethics, its cognates 
and proximal terms have been inserted. The chapter closes with a discussion of what ethical decision-
making and action is most likely to mean in the context of the New Zealand social studies curricula, 
and conceptual moves that are yet to be made. 
 
IS SOCIAL STUDIES A NATURAL HOME FOR ETHICS EDUCATION?  
 
Why consider ethics in relation to social studies education? One reason is because the 
Values section of The New Zealand curriculum, which outlines values that are “to be 
encouraged, modelled and explored” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10) requires 
teachers of all learning areas to do so. Among other values, “students are to be 
encouraged to value integrity, which involves being honest, responsible, and accountable 
and acting ethically” and that “through their learning experiences, students will develop 
their ability to make ethical decisions and act on them” (p. 10).  The Values statement is 
part of what is colloquially termed the ‘front end’ of New Zealand’s curriculum, 
containing the vision, principles, values, and key competencies that span all learning 
areas. The social sciences learning area and social studies within it are therefore but one 
of eight charged with giving expression to the Values statement and its ethical content.  
New Zealand is not alone in seeing ethical decision-making and action as an important 
cross-curricular expectation. The Australian curriculum (Australian Curriculum 
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Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2014), for example, positions ethical 
understanding as a cross-curricular capability, with the following rationale: 
Ethical understanding involves students in building a strong personal and socially oriented 
ethical outlook that helps them to manage context, conflict and uncertainty, and to 
develop an awareness of the influence that their values and behaviour have on others. 
(n.p.) 
 
Another reason to consider ethics in relation to social studies is that numerous 
educators have already identified a connection, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis. 
One can discern a sheaf of connections to ethics across a host of pedagogical 
approaches that have been advocated for social studies. For example, Kohlberg’s moral 
reasoning approach, character education, and values clarification have all inflected New 
Zealand social studies education over time. We have also seen the influence of the 
Philosophy for children community of inquiry approach (Burgh et al., 2006; Lipman, 2003; 
Pritchard, 2014; Splitter & Sharp, 1995), a dimension of which is ethical inquiry. In 
Australasia, this approach has been strongly advocated for social studies (see, for 
example: Collins & Knight, 2006; Golding, 2005; Knight & Collins, 2010a). Other 
authors have noted that the types of issues, arguments and evidence attended to in 
social studies classrooms may be ethical in nature (see, for example: Hess, 2009; 
Lockwood & Harris, 1985). Still others have considered the relationship between ethics 
and the aims of social studies, particularly reflective and affective outcomes (H. Barr et 
al., 1997; Burgh, 2004; Hill, 1994; Zevin, 2007). Indeed, a profoundly ethical orientation 
is detectable in the questions that numerous social studies educationalists argue the 
subject should be directed towards: 
[Social studies] enables one to ask such important questions as, What is the good 
society? What is the good person? What obligations do I have to the ideals and people 
of the past, present, and future? What is the proper relationship between the individual 
and the state? How and to what extent should I be involved with people and 
institutions on this globe? To what extent is our civilization likely to endure? What 
values do we wish to preserve? What heritage should we leave for future generations? 
(Hartoonian & Laughlin, 1989, p. 389) 
 
Those social studies educators who have not expressly articulated the connection 
between social studies and ethics would no doubt see it as axiomatic. One can 
understand why: I submit that all visions for social studies education are imbued with an 
ethical content. That is, each and every theoretical orientation advanced rests on 
particular ethical perspectives. To illustrate, I draw on the influential work of R. D. Barr, 
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Barth, and Shermis (1978) who identified three traditions that have shaped social 
studies’ aims and content over time: social studies taught as citizenship transmission, 
reflective inquiry, and social science. This work has significance for the New Zealand 
context because it was taken up by the Waikato position paper’s authors (H. Barr et al., 
1997) as an organising framework for understanding the likely influences on social 
studies curriculum development in this country. These authors added one further 
tradition: social studies taught for the development and empowerment of the personal 
and ethical self.  While orientations to social studies education have, of course, been 
expressed in other ways16, I employ the Waikato position paper’s ‘four traditions’ heuristic 
throughout this thesis. 
 
What might be the ethical content of each of these four traditions? The first, social 
studies taught as citizenship transmission, is overtly directed towards the inculcation of 
ethical norms such as a commitment to democratic rights and responsibilities, faith in 
societal institutions, and pride in national heritage and traditions. By contrast, social 
studies taught as reflective inquiry appears ethically neutral in that it tends to emphasise 
the development of critical thinking and reasoning skills that allow normative 
propositions and values to be placed under review. However, teaching in this tradition is 
no less devoid of ethical content than citizenship transmission because ethics, although 
not explicitly included, remains inexplicitly within the ambit of reflection. The third 
tradition, social studies taught as a social science, might at first glance seem similarly 
silent on ethical matters because of an emphasis on objective knowledge framed as laws, 
principles, and generalisations (H. Barr et al., 1997). Yet, the universal truth approaches 
in this tradition bear the imprint of Enlightenment thinking, the moral content of which 
emphasises social change through human rationality (Noddings, 2007). Further, ethical 
perspectives are a feature of all cultures and societies, an object of study in the social 
sciences, manifesting as differences in values, social mores, and cultural preferences. The 
fourth tradition, social studies taught for the development and empowerment of the 
personal and ethical self, has strong commitment to open reflective inquiry. Yet, at the 
end of the day, it is directed towards particular moral ends: 
The goal of Social Studies is the empowerment of the social and ethical self, resulting in 
a person critically loyal to democratic society, and therefore committed, not just to 
private or sectional goods, but to the common good … students acquire the capacity to 
interrogate their own cultural conditioning, and be encouraged to embrace beliefs and 
                                                        
16  See, for example: Aitken, 2004; Evans, 2004; Gibson, 2009; Gilbert & Hoepper, 2004; Hill, 1994; Reynolds, 2009; 
Zevin, 2007.  
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values which they have examined and judged reasonable … schools and teachers should 
teach and exemplify a view of citizenship which is based on critical affiliation with their 
communities, while working towards the goal of a just, caring, participatory, 
multicultural and environmentally responsible democracy. (Hill, 1994, pp. 109-110)  
 
I contend that an examination of any heuristic in relation to the nature and purposes of 
social studies education would reveal not simply matters of pedagogical preference but 
of differing conceptions of the proper relationship between learning and society. As R. 
W. Evans (2010) points out, the perennial debates over social studies’ purposes are 
intrinsically ethical controversies, representing “competing visions of the good society” 
(p. 32). Ethics is a central, integrative feature of the subject; it persists no matter which 
tradition or combination thereof predominates. In other words, ethics has an 
inescapable presence in social studies precisely because we may argue about the proper 
purposes of the subject. Furthermore, descriptive and prescriptive approaches are 
inevitably implicated in each tradition of social studies education. Even the most open-
ended and descriptive orientations cannot be separated from decisions about what 
should constitute the good society – a particularly pertinent matter given the current 
endorsement of conceptual, reflective and critical social inquiry in New Zealand social 
studies education. Conversely, “normative theory itself must be based on some 
descriptive theory of how the world works; and, of course, normative theories influence 
the formation of policy and the construction of institutions” (Frazer, 2008, p. 282). The 
point being made here is that social studies can only be ethically null if it sets out 
explicitly to be so, in which case the subject would cease to do what the words imply. 
 
Just because such unavoidable connections can be identified does not answer the 
question as to whether social studies is a natural home for ethics. Hill (1994) argues that 
“the discipline of Ethics…is at least as basic to the social studies as Sociology” (p. 5). 
Rather more strongly, I submit that social studies has an ethical core so fundamental 
that to imagine the field in the absence of ethics would be to render it mute. This is 
because, if it were at all possible to remove the ethical content of the subject, there 
would be little to say about social issues or people’s participation in society, two key 
aspects of social studies in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). 
Students could not “engage critically with societal issues” (p. 30) without recourse to 
ethical debates and questions at some level. And they would be severely constrained in 
their use of the strongly advocated social inquiry methodology, in which they are to 
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“explore and analyse people’s values and perspectives” and “consider the ways in which 
people make decisions and participate in social action” (p. 30).   
 
The temptation here might be to argue that social studies is somehow the curricular 
crucible for ethical thinking. Social studies does not, however, constitute the sole 
domain of experience, educational or otherwise, through which learners might consider 
ethical decisions and actions. It has been argued, for example, that the ‘ethical 
dimension’ is one of six big historical thinking concepts (Seixas, Morton, Colyer, & 
Fornazzari, 2013) and, further, that disciplinary approaches are insufficient without 
ethics and social action being at the core of history education (den Heyer, 2012). 
Similarly, Peter Jackson and Doreen Massey (2005) have urged that learners’ 
geographical thinking should be expanded by including an emphasis on geographical 
challenges to our ethics. A considerable body of work has emerged since the 1980s on 
the relationship between geography and ethics (see, for example: Popke, 2010; D. M. 
Smith, 2001) and, in light of some of the claims, Paul Standish (2009) has questioned the 
risks an ‘ethical turn’ poses for geographical thinking. Other subjects in New Zealand’s 
curriculum can equally lay claim to ethics, and do. The place of ethical thinking in socio-
scientific issues is an aspect of the New Zealand science education literature (see, for 
example: B. Ryan & Buntting, 2012; Saunders & Rennie, 2013).  
 
Further, a number of NCEA achievement and unit standards include ethics as an 
explicit focus of assessment. Appendix 3 lists the subjects that do so, and provides 
examples of selected standards to illustrate varying usages of ethics. Ethics may refer, 
for example, to procedural concerns, understanding social issues or, in the case of 
technology, to the discipline as a whole. In relation to this, it is perhaps important to 
note that there are no achievement standards for philosophy; teaching and learning in 
this subject in the senior school draws from a variety of standards in other subjects, 
including senior social studies. 
 
Because social studies in the New Zealand curriculum is, broadly speaking, charged with 
enabling students to understand more clearly and participate in their social worlds (H. 
Barr, 1998), it might be regarded as a natural home for addressing questions about what 
constitutes a worthwhile life or how we might live together. A strong overlap between 
social studies and ethics exists because, in response to the fact of pluralism, both are 
concerned with social issues and social action, or ‘how should we go on?’ So, just as 
societal controversies necessarily have an ethical content, ethics is inescapably central to 
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the subject that examines such issues and responses to them. Moreover, social studies in 
The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) explicitly offers space to 
critically examine the diverse values and perspectives that contribute to societal debates. 
If this critical stance is to be taken at all seriously, then ethical perspectives should be 
available for learners’ consideration, a matter that I will say more about in Chapter Four. 
 
LOCATING ETHICS IN NEW ZEALAND SOCIAL STUDIES  
 
This chapter has thus far established that ethics and the nature and purposes of social 
studies are inextricably linked. The fact that The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) has signalled that, through the cross-curricular intent of the Values 
statement, ethical decision-making and action is part of the proper content of social 
studies education adds weight to this contention. Given the sheaf of connections 
identified in this chapter thus far, one might safely assume that New Zealand social 
studies teachers have plenty to guide them in relation to the expectation that they 
support their students’ ethical decision-making and action. The bulk of what follows 
tests that assumption through exploring how ethics has been expressed in the history of 
New Zealand social studies curricula and mandated support documents. This is 
important to the work of this thesis because it establishes whether the central research 
question is warranted; social studies teachers may be already well supported in 
interpreting what ethical decision-making and action is to mean. It also begins a 
consideration of the first of my research sub-questions: what opportunities for ethical 
decision-making and action are offered through New Zealand social studies curriculum 
documentation? 
MAPPING THE CONCEPTUAL FIELD: ETHICS IN PAST NEW ZEALAND SOCIAL 
STUDIES CURRICULA 
 
The analysis presented in the following sections reflects C.E. Beeby’s17 (Alcorn, 1999) 
and Roger Openshaw’s (2004) insistence that understanding a curriculum’s antecedents 
is pivotal to making sense of its present content. Yet, I am careful not to infer a 
seamless, linear or cumulative history of curricular re/presentations of ethics. This point 
                                                        
17 An influential New Zealand educationalist: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._E._Beeby 
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is underscored by Colin McGeorge (1992), who notes that the experience of moral 
education in New Zealand has been as much that of continuity as it has transformation: 
when one consults past curricula, school practices and educational resources “there is 
much that is immediately familiar to the historian and much that is familiar on 
reflection” (p. 52). Virtues ethics, for example, has had a longstanding role in New 
Zealand social studies education. I therefore take Davis’ (2004) point that concepts need 
to be understood within a changeable, web-like crossing and re-crossing of sensibilities: 
Concepts do not emerge through successive generations. Critical moments in the 
evolution of an idea can occur at any time as branches flourish, atrophy or fuse. Hence, 
the emergence of a cluster of ideas, such as contemporary conceptions of teaching, 
cannot usefully be interpreted or represented in terms of any sort of chronology. (p. 3) 
 
Acknowledging such fluidity and complexity, what can sensibly be achieved through an 
analysis of past social studies curriculum statements?  After all, what is contained in 
curriculum documents is unlikely to map directly onto the usage within the social studies 
community. Whether or not concepts such as ethics, values, and morals have been present 
in past curricula, for example, will not have fully determined social studies educators’ 
lexicon. And there is no guarantee that particular terms have been used advisedly; it may 
well be that a content analysis imputes far more meaning than was ever considered by 
curriculum writers. I think we can at least gain some insight into curriculum intentions, that 
is, how curriculum writers have historically cognised the relationship between ethics and 
social studies. One can establish semantic dis/continuities through analysing the traces, 
interconnections, divergences and spaces for meaning in previous curricula. My argument 
here is that over time a conceptual field of meanings has been built up in New Zealand 
social studies education into which a phrase such as ethical decision-making and action has 
been inserted. This conceptual field contains numerous proximal terms and phrases, such as 
morality or social decision-making, themselves shifting in meaning. A consideration of the 
relationships within the conceptual field helps to discern a definition of sorts for ethical 
decision-making and action in the present context of social studies education.  
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TEXT SELECTION AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 
 
Davis’ (2004) point presented in the previous section notwithstanding, the texts selected 
for analysis are presented chronologically. I begin with the Syllabus of instruction for primary 
schools, 1928 (Department of Education, 1928)18 which was still in usage in the 1940s and 
therefore provides a backdrop to the inception of social studies. This, of course, does 
not mark the beginning of an ethical content in New Zealand education; indeed much 
of the 1928 syllabus had its origins in nineteenth century thought (J. McGee, 1998). Five 
key clusters of documents that represent critical moments in the history of social studies 
are subsequently analysed, grouped around the report that first recommended social 
studies as a subject and four subsequent curriculum statements (Department of 
Education, 1977a; Ministry of Education, 1961, 1997, 2007). Mandated support 
documents are included in the analysis where they provide elaboration of ethics, its 
cognates or proximal terms in relation to the social studies curriculum.  
 
Cluster Documents and notes Pages 
analysed 
Estimated 
word count 
1 - The post-primary school curriculum: Report of the 
committee appointed by the Minister of Education in 
November, 1942 (the Thomas Report,  Department 
of Education, 1944) which first recommended 
social studies as part of the common core in the 
post-primary school curriculum.  
- The primary school curriculum revised syllabuses: Social 
studies in history and geography (Department of 
Education, 1948). This predates the inception of 
an integrated approach to social studies 
education. 
pp. 1-9, 14-15, 
22-29, 48-50 
 
 
 
 
pp. 78-99 
 
 
19,900 
words 
 
 
 
 
7,200 words 
2 - Syllabuses for schools: Social studies in the primary school 
(Ministry of Education, 1961); the first full social 
studies syllabus. 
- Suggestions for teaching social studies in the primary 
school, a series of four handbooks published in 
1962 and subsequently assembled as one edition 
(Department of Education, 1971) with minimal 
alterations.  
All 
 
 
pp. 7-33  
NB: 
pagination 
refers to the 
1971 edition 
7,800 words 
 
 
11,800 
words 
3 - Form 1-4 social studies syllabus guidelines 
(Department of Education, 1977a). The 
guidelines for Forms 1 and 2 replaced those 
provided in the 1961 syllabus.  
- Faces 4, 5 and 6 (Department of Education, 
1978, 1981, 1983), three of a series of booklets 
designed to help primary teachers re-interpret 
the 1961 syllabus in light of the 1977 statement.  
- Social studies forms 3 and 4: A handbook for teachers 
(Ministry of Education, 1991) which offered a 
All 
 
 
 
4: pp. 2-10 
5: pp. 2-13 
6: pp. 2-15 
 
pp. 1-51 
5,000 words 
 
 
 
3,000 words 
3,900 words 
5,500 words 
 
21,200 
words 
                                                        
18 pp. 5-7, 31-41, 63-65, 147-164. Approximate word count: 19,400 words. 
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Cluster Documents and notes Pages 
analysed 
Estimated 
word count 
“tighter definition of the areas for study and of 
the desired outcomes in terms of knowledge and 
skills” (p. 1) than its 1977 precursor. 
4 - The New Zealand curriculum framework (Ministry of 
Education, 1993) 
- Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum (Ministry 
of Education, 1997)  
pp. 1-9, 14, 
17-28 
pp. 5-58 
 
8,700 words 
 
14,700 
words 
5 - The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007).  
 
 
- Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: 
Approaches to social inquiry (Ministry of Education, 
2008a).  
pp. 4-17, 30, 
34-44, fold 
out charts for 
social sciences 
pp. 2-17 
10,200 
words 
 
 
5,200 words 
 
Two further points may be made about this text selection. First, and given all curriculum 
statements are informed by their context, to the extent that is possible I position the 
texts selected here within local and trans-local discourses that have shaped the 
development of New Zealand social studies education. There is not the space to include 
a detailed account of the periods between publications of the curriculum statements 
listed above but I have attempted to draw on numerous histories of social studies 
education, and moral and values education in the wider curriculum, which have charted 
the troubled waters of curriculum development and intercession.  Second, and bearing 
in mind that ethics education, however expressed, may be specified in cross-curricular 
terms, I have analysed general introductions to the curriculum statements and/or over-
arching curriculum statements where they apply to social studies education.   
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APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
 
The approach used here is a form of content analysis, classical variants of which involve 
identifying, through a process of coding, concepts, themes or variables in text (G. W. 
Ryan & Bernard, 2000). The researcher may code for the existence or frequency of 
explicit and/or implicit instances of these categories. Given that methodological 
approaches to content analysis vary widely (see, for example: Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Stemler, 2001; M. D. White & Marsh, 2006) and may be employed within both 
quantitative and qualitative research paradigms, it behoves the analyst to “make public 
the basis for the sampling and analytic choices… [and ensure that the] culminating 
interpretations are tied to these revealed procedures” (Thomas, 1994, p. 694). Further, it 
is vital that the assumptions (philosophical and otherwise) underpinning the strategy are 
made explicit (Duncan, Cloutier, & Bailey, 2007; Paley, 1996; Risjord, 2009). Duncan et 
al. (2007) contend that this is particularly important if nurse professionals are to be 
supported to “critically examine a concept prior to its adoption into praxis” (p. 294). 
This contention may equally be applied to social studies teacher professional 
development in relation to ethical decision-making and action. 
While the ontological and epistemological status of concepts and therefore conceptual 
analysis is a matter of considerable debate in philosophy (Margolis & Laurence, 2014), 
the position I take is that concept analyses ought not to be directed towards uncovering 
complete or fixed meanings; I am particularly sensitive to the defensible critiques of 
content analysis that point to reductionism and foundationalism (Thomas, 1994). By 
contrast, respectable lines of argument exist in philosophical literature defending the 
idea that concepts are theory-dependent or discursive in nature, and thus might be 
understood as contextual, changeable and contestable (Milligan & Wood, 2010).  This 
section does not therefore offer the kinds of content analyses aimed at concept 
correction or advancement, or statistical reliability or validity. What is undertaken is 
simply aimed at identifying and understanding a conceptual field – how ethics is 
elaborated and related to a range of allied concepts in successive social studies 
curriculum statements. I seek to establish the kinds of trends, relevancies and 
contradictions that may be observed within and across these documents and, moreover, 
the silences or kinds of movements that do not appear.   
 
The approach adopted here is analogous with ‘summative content analysis’ (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005) which begins by identifying occurrences of, in this case, ethics and its 
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cognates and then extends to include concept frequencies for allied terms. To map the 
conceptual field associated with ethics the following were coded for: 
a) explicit mention of ethics and its cognates;  
b) mention of ethics as a contributing discipline to social studies; and 
c) the existence and frequencies of proximal terms that stand in place of ethics, 
such as morals, values, social decision-making and social action19. These are 
plainly used in an ethical sense and, from their context, bear an ethical weight. 
This includes examples of particular virtues, either said to be or plainly implied. 
 
Summative content analyses usually report concept frequencies in relation to other 
variables (such as the roles or ages of interviewees). The frequencies for (a)-(c) above are 
reported against the publication date of each document. A move into latent content 
analysis is made in three ways. First, snippets of text, or illustrative examples, convey the 
sense in which ethics or proximal terms were used and how they articulate with each 
other, that is, the conceptual company that they keep. Second, the analysis is, as much as 
space allows, set within historical events and curriculum debates. Third, and in order to 
strengthen this contextual analysis, I additionally coded for concepts that: 
d) convey societal controversy, complexity and diversity; 
e) imply an ideal society, such as citizenship and democracy (these concepts are in 
part process); 
f) have a bearing on the degree of critical and creative thinking expected from 
students; and 
g) convey affect and/or appreciation of affect in others, including spirituality and 
beliefs.  
 
The concept frequencies are presented in Appendix 2. The second and third columns of 
this table present the concept frequencies for (a)-(c) and (d)-(g) respectively. For reasons 
of space, examples of virtues, part of coding category (c) are included in a fourth 
column. Three further points may be made in relation to (c). First, bearing in mind the 
integral nature of ethics in social studies and education as a whole, my choice of 
proximal terms was limited to those that most closely align with ethics; I acknowledge 
that this selection involves assessments of relevance. Second, and given that the texts 
vary considerably in purpose, length, and structure, the use of frequency coding must be 
regarded with some scepticism. Such a crude approach does little to convey semantic 
                                                        
19 Not including: title pages, tables of content, headings or referents.   
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nuances or identify terms used in the pejorative, for example. It does, however, in some 
small way serve to highlight those concepts that are given greatest emphasis within each 
curriculum statement.  Third, to the best of my knowledge the only other research using 
a similar method has been undertaken by Paul Keown (Keown, 2001, 2003), who 
analysed the values content of seven curriculum documents that stemmed from The New 
Zealand curriculum framework (Ministry of Education, 1993).  This study analysed the 
existence of values terms (values, attitudes, feelings, viewpoints, beliefs, ethics, and 
perspectives) in the aims and objectives of each curriculum. Ethics appears only seven 
times in these documents: technology (3), science (3) and health and physical education 
(1). The analysis undertaken in this chapter differs in three respects: it considers only 
social studies curriculum documents and over a longer time period, the documents are 
largely examined in their entirety and, most importantly, the purpose is to establish the 
meanings that might be brought to ethical decision-making and action in the context of 
the present social studies curriculum.   
 
1928 SYLLABUS OF INSTRUCTION FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
This syllabus provides solely for history and geography and thus predates the inception 
of social studies, but I begin here because teachers were to some extent still grappling 
with the 1928 syllabus even as the Thomas Committee was meeting. While ethics is not 
explicitly mentioned, ethics education is primarily couched in terms of character training 
and principles-based approach to moral instruction. The former receives by far the 
greater emphasis, reflected in the fact that concepts associated with virtues ethics 
(character n=16, virtues and moral habits n=5, examples of virtues n=65) far outweigh 
those associated with right conduct and deontological conceptions of morality (n=9). 
Virtues and conduct are, however, intertwined; duties and responsibilities (n=6), for 
example, are positioned as both a disposition and an ideal. Moreover, pupils are to 
develop “a sense of responsibility” (Department of Education, 1928, p. 65) through 
undertaking school duties. Nevertheless, the weight ascribed to virtues ethics is 
immediately made clear in the opening pages, in which it is stated that “the whole of 
school life should centre on character-training…implanting such moral habits as 
honesty, modesty, perseverance” (p. 6). The virtues identified are most notably those of 
physical and behavioural restraint, including self-reliance, self-control, and self-sacrifice 
– traits and strength of character which “make alike for personal happiness and racial 
uplift” (p. 64). Of particular note is that the history syllabus recommendations advocate 
the sedulous cultivation of “a strong faith in a more peaceful, harmonious, and 
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prosperous world” (p. 145) and explicitly reject patriotism presented as narrow, 
nationalistic and fervent nationalistic allegiance.  
 
This syllabus reflected what Judy McGee (1998) describes as a major shift in curricular 
emphasis leading up to the 1940s: from a perception of schools as formal organisations 
to microcosms of the society in which children were to be “trained for the wider service 
of humanity” (Department of Education, 1928, p. 64). The considerable optimism that 
lay behind the idea that the school, as a miniature society, could cultivate desirable 
characters reflected a “faith in the improvability of mankind and the inevitability of their 
ultimate conversion” (E. Archer & Openshaw, 1992, p. 22). It is, however, notable the 
syllabus’ ethical space is located primarily within the school grounds. Despite the intent 
that service (n=5) would be enacted in ever-widening social spheres, the domains of 
family, public places, workplace, State and international relationships receive far less in 
the way of attention. Yet, within these narrow confines “nothing was left to chance” 
(J. McGee, 2001, p. 9). The ethos and routines of daily school life were to be deliberately 
and conscientiously arranged to instil a sense of duty and responsibility to their fellow 
man. In essence therefore, this syllabus is characterised by a strong moral transmission 
orientation, connoted by the notion of character-training. It is notable for example, 
where questioning is encouraged at all, it is “about the rightness or wrongness of a 
certain course of action” (p. 144), that is, with a correct moral response in mind. 
 
In the main, however, the approach to instilling virtues was not to be direct moral 
inculcation; it was suggested, for example, that a desire to promote peace could be 
developed through participation in annual commemorations of war. The syllabus writers 
distanced themselves from moral lessons (n=2), arguing that “set moral lessons tend to 
be uninteresting and tedious to children” (Department of Education, 1928, p. 6) and 
that much more was to be gained from example and experience. The influence of child 
psychology and developmental education (J. McGee, 1998) is notable in this syllabus. 
The character-training sections explicitly reject the notion of tabula rasa and instead 
speak strongly to the teacher’s role in providing experiences that draw out a pupil’s 
innate goodness, develop desirable traits and promote “growth towards higher moral 
ideals” (Department of Education, 1928, p. 65).  The teacher is expected to model 
virtues, as the success of character-training “depends neither on carefully prepared 
lessons nor on the most vigorously applied injunctions, but on the nature of the 
teachers’ own example and influence” (p. 64).  As with the 1904 syllabus, teachers were 
thought of as “journeyman moralists and expected to exemplify all the conventional 
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virtues rather than express a distinctive moral vision” (McGeorge, 1992, p. 44). 
Vigorous injunctions are applied to the teacher, in that providing a kindly atmosphere in 
which the qualities of the pupil may be nurtured and emerge are positioned as an act of 
obligation to the State. Thus, and in contrast to the considerable focus on the pupil’s 
character, much more is made of the teacher’s duties.  
 
One last point might be made about the way in which the history syllabus less explicitly 
carries the exhortations of the character-training sections. Some dimensions of history 
education, such as romantic stories of great men and women, are intended to exemplify 
“such virtues as kindness and consideration for others, courage, industry, and respect 
for the law” (Department of Education, 1928, p. 31). However, the concept of 
citizenship (n=8) is used much more extensively than character and its cognates, and is 
named as a dimension of history education. Used in this way, citizenship is closer to 
what we might call civics today, that is, predominantly confined to content knowledge 
about social control: club and school rules, the postman and policeman, parliament and 
so on. The geography syllabus, heavily content focussed, uses none of the proximal 
terms for ethics.  
 
DOCUMENT CLUSTER 1: THE THOMAS REPORT  AND THE INCEPTION OF 
SOCIAL STUDIES 
 
The Thomas report’s publication was a significant historical marker for New Zealand 
social studies, as one of its key recommendations was the addition of the subject as part 
of the common core of the post-primary school curriculum. The social studies course 
was to be integrated, “organized around the central theme of man in society” 
(Department of Education, 1944, p. 24) and draw on history, geography, civics, 
psychology, anthropology and descriptive economics. A number of social and political 
forces shaped both the necessity for the Thomas report, and the committee’s findings: the 
interwar years had seen rapidly rising school rolls, the School Certificate examination 
was to be given more clout as a leaving certificate in order to cater for the majority of 
students who were non-academic, and the Labour Government of the day desired a 
well-balanced education open to all (Openshaw, 1995; Shuker, 1992). Secondary 
education, previously oriented towards preparation for university, was now expected to 
“be preparatory to everyday life rather than schooling” (Department of Education, 
1944, p. 8). In part, growing liberal-progressivism, lent greater impetus by World War 
Two, forms the backdrop to these shifts in educational ideals. This partly plays out in 
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greater attention to adolescents’ full development, including their emotional and 
spiritual worlds. The child of this report, for example, has less bodily restraint: “entitled 
to the full enjoyment of the high spirits of youth” (p. 7). A glint of the affective 
dimensions of ethical life is detectable, though never explicitly explored.  
 
At least four important semantic shifts are discernible when one compares the 1928 
curriculum with the Thomas report. It is firstly notable that the term ethics is used in this 
document, though only in relation to a discussion of “the sexual ethic” as an aspect of 
“general ethics” in the committee’s physical education recommendations (Department 
of Education, 1944, p. 47).  Second, morality and its cognates all but disappear (n=1), 
though the report certainly conveys judgement about what is right/wrong or good/bad. 
We thirdly see values (n=5) introduced as a concept, used in relation to democracy and 
spirituality. The third linguistic move is away from the language of character training. 
‘Character’ is mentioned only once in the general aims, in which the authors suggest that 
education should foster such qualities as responsibility and generosity in social life, the 
ability to give and take, willingness to serve “and to lose themselves in social purposes 
greater than themselves” (Department of Education, 1944, p. 4). Yet, this is minimally 
elaborated in the introduction, general aims and recommendations for social studies.  
Notable also is the marked reduction in examples of virtuous qualities (n=18). This is 
despite a statement (again in the physical education section) that the whole report 
implies that “the school should give to the development of character, and particularly to 
the quality of self-discipline, the central place it is always granted in theory” (p. 47).   
 
But if one semantic shift is to both sum up the report’s spirit and provide a conceptual 
nexus for social studies, it is an over-riding focus on democratic citizenship (n=18). It is 
remarkable that the ‘basic’, ‘human’ and ‘essential’ values of democracy are 
unelaborated. Nevertheless, the whole of school life was expected to run along these 
lines and social studies was to take a lead role. The dual purposes of the new subject 
were “(a) to assist the development of individuals who are able to take their parts as 
effective citizens of a democracy…(b) to deepen pupils understanding of human affairs 
and to open up wide fields for personal exploration” (Department of Education, 1944, 
p. 23). To be an effective citizen, the committee meant “one who has a lively sense of 
responsibility towards civilised values, who can make firm social judgements, and who 
acts intelligently and in the common interest” (p. 23). This usage of citizenship, in which 
adolescents are expected to exercise judgement, is therefore somewhat distinguishable 
from the civics thrust of ‘citizenship’ in the 1928 syllabus. A critical orientation was lent 
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somewhat greater weight in the Social studies in history and geography syllabus (Department of 
Education, 1948) for primary schools. An ability to weigh evidence and think 
independently, for example, is linked to the expectation that they analyse the 
achievements and shortcomings of their district and New Zealand. Like the Thomas 
report (Department of Education, 1944), however, such critical thinking is not 
unfettered, making their communities still better to live in is as much a matter “of 
unselfishness and a readiness to accept responsibility” (Department of Education, 1948, 
p. 79). The questionable extent of this shift and the inherent ethical tensions are noted 
by Archer and Openshaw (1992): 
Being committed to ‘civilised values’ and being taught to act ‘in the common interest’ 
do not appear to be self-evidently ‘democratic’, yet these imperatives were, presumably, 
to override the necessity of ‘forming social judgements’ should the goals conflict in any 
way. The citizenship transmission leopard, even in its liberal-progressive guise, still 
displayed its procedural spots. (p. 24) 
 
The rationale that social reconstruction was dependent on democratic citizenship 
underpinned the committee’s view that all School Certificate courses should offer social 
studies. The Thomas report (Department of Education, 1944) emphasised that recent 
troubling events (n=6) had stimulated the need for a better-balanced education that 
enabled students to exercise “unceasing vigilance” (p. 5), and assist in building, 
defending, and extending the influence of democracy. The spirit of international 
brotherhood, detectable in the 1928 primary school syllabus, unsurprisingly sustained its 
place in the Thomas report. One can discern a concomitant widening of the ethical realm 
in the underpinning ethos of the report. Quoting an English White paper on post-war 
education, the authors suggested that the social studies ought to “arouse and quicken in 
pupils a livelier interest in the meaning and responsibilities of citizenship of this country, 
the Empire, and of the world abroad” (p. 23). Though the Social studies in history and 
geography syllabus (Department of Education, 1948) for primary schools did not reflect the 
Thomas report’s vision for integrated social studies, it did carry much of the report’s ethos. 
Notably, co-operation (n=5) and the interdependence of human beings (n= 7) were lent 
even greater weight in 1948. In particular, history and geography were assigned a special 
place in developing world-minded attitudes and the appreciation of human 
connectedness, and numerous co-curricular activities are cited as opportunities for 
practising social living and developing co-operation.   
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DOCUMENT CLUSTER 2: THE FIRST PRIMARY SOCIAL STUDIES SYLLABUS 
 
The Thomas report’s key messages did not reach a wide audience until the early 1960s, 
partly because the report went rapidly out of circulation and was not reprinted until 
1959.  Its minimal uptake has also been variously ascribed to the attitudes and expertise 
of teachers, social and economic pressure for examination success, and a lack of support 
from the Department of Education (Openshaw, 1995; Shuker, 1992). A turning point 
came, however, with the publication of Social studies in the primary school (Ministry of 
Education, 1961) and a set of handbooks Suggestions for teaching social studies in the primary 
school published in 1962, later reprinted with minor alterations as one book (Department 
of Education, 1971). The Thomas Committee’s vision for an integrated subject directed 
towards developing effective citizens in a democracy began to gain expression, 
influenced in part by an American emphasis on teaching democratic values (E. Archer & 
Openshaw, 1992).  
 
The 1961 syllabus opens with the statement that “social studies is the study of people” 
(p. 1), with three-fold aims: clear thinking about social problems, intelligent and 
responsible behaviour, and a sympathetic interest in the lives of others around the 
world. This direction was not without its critics and in particular a number of 
commentators (see, for example: Gorrie, 1963; Lockstone, 1963; Openshaw & Archer, 
1992; Stone, 1963) lamented the neglect of disciplinary approaches which, they argued, 
would enable students to think more systematically. Stone (1963) felt that the syllabus 
overstated ethical and social, as opposed to intellectual, ends. Articulating a perennial 
debate in moral education, he furthermore questioned the extent to which schools should 
be involved in character training or developing social competence. This risked, he 
argued, ethical imperialism.  Another area of concern, at least for R.H. Lockstone 
(1963), was the poorly explicated nature of democratic aims, values, virtues and teaching 
methods. “The word democracy”, he bemoaned, “is so bandied about in the social 
studies books that it assumes all the force of an incantation – or a charm to call fools 
into a circle” (p. 52). Interestingly, as Lockstone notes, the Suggestions handbooks most 
heavily promoted democratic means and ends (n=14), whereas notions of democratic 
citizenry appear somewhat as a back-drop to the syllabus (n=4) and only clearly stated in 
a brief section on social studies in the post-primary school at the back of the document.  
 
The syllabus and suggestions handbooks contain no explicit reference to ethics, but it is 
notable that both refer to ‘the good life’. Further, at least two dimensions of these 
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documents offer some scope for students to think about ethical matters, as opposed to 
being inculcated with particular moral perspectives. First, a striking emphasis on social 
problems (1961, n=32; 1971, n=16) undoubtedly has an ethical content, to the extent 
that students are permitted to explore the contested nature of their social worlds. 
Students are, for example, expected to evaluate differing ideas, appreciate viewpoints 
other than their own (1961, n=3) and discover others’ beliefs about the good life (1971, 
n=1).  Thus, we see in this document the inception of a trend towards values analysis in 
descriptions of the purposes of social studies education20 (Aitken, 2005b). In one report 
of exemplary teaching practice – a teacher’s discussion lesson about what constitutes a 
good man – the students concluded that “there might be varying standards of goodness, 
for different peoples, and at different periods” (Department of Education, 1971, p. 
242). The sense that students might explore differing perceptions of what constitutes 
the good life is strengthened by the fact that the syllabus and handbooks place greater 
weight on critical, clear, and open-minded thinking (1961, n=7; 1971, n=10) than in the 
past. One must be a little cautious however about how synonymous these terms are. 
Moreover, little is said about how students are to address social problems other than the 
expectation that students will act intelligently (1971, n=7) and responsibly (1971, n=9). 
 
The second opportunity for exploring ethical dimensions of people’s lives comes 
through a very evident emphasis on social studies taught for the development and 
empowerment of the personal and ethical self (H. Barr et al., 1997). The syllabus states 
that the subject’s aims “sum up a number of aspects of personal development to which 
all other subjects, and indeed the whole of school life contribute” (Ministry of 
Education, 1961, p. 3). Reprising the expanding universe model advocated in previous 
documents, personal development was to be achieved through programmes that enlarge 
and deepen children’s experience and understanding beyond their own lives. And, in an 
important shift from the Thomas report’s (Department of Education, 1944) focus on the 
feelings of the students themselves, references to affect (1961, n=25) included 
understanding affect in other people – their beliefs, aspirations and pleasures. Children 
were to “enter sympathetically” into the feelings of peoples of other countries and 
“appreciate their ideas and problems” (Ministry of Education, 1961, p. 3). Compared to 
the Thomas report, one can detect here rather more than a glimmer of potential 
connection between affect and ethical decision-making, if only understood in relation to 
the lives of others. 
                                                        
20  Expressed in four New Zealand curriculum documents (Department of Education, 1944, 1977a; Ministry of 
Education, 1961, 1997). 
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Like its predecessors, the syllabus avoids direct moral instruction. Openshaw and 
Archer (1992) suggest that, post war, the impact of “social meliorist-developmental links 
may explain why many early social studies reformers, their social concerns 
notwithstanding, rejected direct inculcation of values” (p. 59). However, a strong 
orientation towards ethical transmission and social reproduction suffuses these 
documents, eclipsing any latent opportunities for enlarging students’ ethical thinking.  
The suggestions handbooks, for example, open with the statement that: 
The school is an instrument of society. Its aims must always be those that society 
requires it to achieve. Our society requires its schools to produce responsible and 
competent citizens who will support its values…The competent citizen of a democratic 
society is one who is aware of democratic values and is both ready and able to do what 
is necessary to uphold those values. (Department of Education, 1971, p. 7)  
 
One can also see an emphasis on desirable character traits, such as “generous attitudes 
to peoples and opinions, a determined loyalty to the truth, and strong feelings of 
humanity and kindness” (Ministry of Education, 1961, p. 2). Rather more strongly than 
the Thomas report, the suggestions handbooks clarify that personal development is to 
result in suitable characters because democracy is “wrapped up with the development of 
people, but…its very existence depends on having the right kind of people” 
(Department of Education, 1971, p. 8), seemingly said without irony. Additionally, 
lurking behind this emphasis on character is the proposition that there are standards of 
behaviour, such as loyalty to humanity and respect for the views of others, that students 
should adhere to. Indeed, the very concept of a competent citizen (1971, n=4) implies 
some set of standards. Furthermore, when one looks at how the term ‘values’ is used in 
these documents, once again social norms are implicated: the handbooks, for example, 
equate the term with societal values, democratic values, or behavioural standards.  
 
The syllabus and handbooks are, in sum, beset with ethical tensions contained in such 
statements as “the syllabus aims at clear thinking and good behaviour” (Department of 
Education, 1971, p. 18).  In the same breath, students should begin to develop “their 
own ideals of behaviour” and feelings of loyalty to New Zealand “which will make them 
neither blind to its faults nor boastful of its merits” (Ministry of Education, 1961, p. 2). 
Stone (1963) was to particularly take issue with these contradictions, arguing that 
responsible and competent democratic citizenship does not amount to someone who 
uncritically upholds New Zealand’s values. This kind of citizen, he argued, “is in fact, a 
faceless committee man, plucking all his ideas from the common stock” (p. 53).  
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E. Archer and Openshaw (1992) note that such comments were “little heeded at the 
time or, for that matter, subsequently. Liberal-progressives had assumed the mantle of 
the traditional conservatives they had displaced” (p. 25). 
 
DOCUMENT CLUSTER 3: SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE MIDDLE YEARS 
 
The 1970s was marked by considerable interest in values and moral education, 
influenced by the values clarification approach and Lawrence Kohlberg’s research on 
moral reasoning in the USA and, in the UK, moral education theory developed by the 
Farmington Trust and the Lifeline curriculum (Keown, 2001; McGeorge, 1992, 2000). 
In New Zealand, The Ross report and the Johnson report (Department of Education, 1973, 
1977b) both reflected and stimulated considerable educational and public debate about 
moral and sex education. Against this backdrop, and a period of economic downturn, 
rapid social change and increased socio-political tensions, the Social studies syllabus 
guidelines: Forms 1-4 (Department of Education, 1977a) underwent a 10-year process of 
development. The syllabus defines social studies as being about how people “think, feel 
and act” (p. 4) and is structured around four “complementary and inseparable aspects”: 
knowledge, abilities, values, and social action (p. 4). In relation to a theme for each 
year21, the selection of content and learning experiences is guided by itemised ‘important 
ideas about human behaviour’ (n=11) which students are to develop through 
comparative and inquiry approaches.  
 
The foreword to the new syllabus (Department of Education, 1977a) contends that 
much of the spirit of the 1961 document is retained. However, the document in fact 
heralded some noteworthy shifts in relation to this thesis’ focus. In line with the growth 
of values education internationally, the language of values (n=33) liberally populates the 
document: values and its cognates appear in nearly half the ‘specific objectives’ and 
close to a third of the ‘important ideas’. Five further curricular expectations hint at the 
existence of ethical theories and perspectives which may inform values. The syllabus: 
1. States that “social studies draws on the knowledge, ideas and methods of inquiry 
of social sciences and humanities disciplines” (p. 4). Thus, but while not 
                                                        
21  Cultural difference (Form 1), Interaction (Form 2), Social control (Form 3) and Social change (Form 4). 
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expressly stipulated, this statement offers the possibility that the philosophy of 
ethics might be considered an underpinning discipline. 
2. Makes much of the changeable and context-specific nature of values, unlike the 
1960s’ statements which implied fixedness in societal and personal values. 
Students are expected “to accept that values conflicts exist” (p. 7)22.  
3. Gives greater weight to values awareness and analysis (Mutch, 2000). Students 
are to have opportunities to: consider diverse values and beliefs, develop the 
ability to form and clarify their own values, and attempt to resolve values 
conflicts through reason.  
4. Advocates a consequentialist approach (n=2) to adjudicating between rival 
values, an approach evident in subsequent documents, although an ultimate 
recourse to principles is also apparent (a matter I pick up on later in this 
section). 
5. Hints at something deeper-set than values in a number of phrases. They are, for 
example, to understand that differences in values arising in part from different 
ways of seeing the world and that “all societies rank individuals on some scale of 
values” (p. 12).  
 
The preponderance of values terminology was a trend that continued across Faces 5 
(n=29), Faces 6 (n=9) and the Forms 3 and 4 handbook (n=79). In particular, Faces 5 
(Department of Education, 1981) stands out as being dedicated to illuminating values 
education, and the first official document to explicitly introduce values clarification 
methodologies based on the work of Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1978). It was also 
notable for emphasising Kohlbergian moral reasoning (n=21), although teachers were 
encouraged to critique this approach. Faces 6 (Department of Education, 1983) reiterates 
that students should “reason about moral dilemmas (related to their own experience) 
and … consider the consequences of moral decisions” (p. 8). But by the publication of 
the Forms 3 and 4 handbook (Ministry of Education, 1991) this emphasis had dropped 
away, leaving values as the term most closely allied to ethics. 
 
Decision-making, problem-solving (n=6) and social action (n=13) emerged as three 
further important proximal terms for ethics in the Social studies syllabus guidelines: Forms 1-4 
                                                        
22  Similarly, an earlier and influential teachers’ handbook (Taba, Durkin, Fraenkel, & McNaughton, 1971) 
emphasised developing in students “the capability not only to expect but to evaluate change, and then to adjust to 
new ways and events” and “a tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity with minimal anxiety” (p. 13). Notably, this 
handbook introduces ethical concern as a major criterion for measuring students’ responses to exercises on 
attitudes, feelings and values.  
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(Department of Education, 1977a). The identification of social action as being one of 
the four key and inseparable elements of social studies conveyed another noteworthy 
shift from the 1960s’ documents: from clear thinking about social problems to how such 
problems might be addressed and students’ participation in society, consistent with the 
increasing view that social studies should support children “to interpret and respond to 
social situations rather than merely describe them” (Department of Education, 1983, p. 
3). The Forms 3 and 4 handbook (Ministry of Education, 1991) expresses an even greater 
sense of mindful, active contribution; decision-making (n=7), social participation, and 
action (n=32) are a strong thrust of this document. Social studies is described as partly 
being about how “people initiate or respond to change” (p. 5) and students are to 
“investigate appropriate forms of social and cultural participation in a changing society” 
(p. 6). The handbook also positions ‘considering social action’ as an integral part of an 
inquiry approach focussed on contemporary, controversial issues.  
 
Another move drew together the inseparable aspects of social studies identified in the 
1977 syllabus and, significantly, was to lay the groundwork for subsequent curricula. 
This was the delineation of valuing and social participation as skills (Department of 
Education, 1983; Ministry of Education, 1991).  The term values exploration emerges 
(n=3) in the Forms 3 and 4 handbook (Ministry of Education, 1991) which includes the 
skills of, for example, identifying and explaining values, recognising the consequences of 
these values, and explaining and resolving conflict that arises from differences in values. 
It is also notable that valuing (n=14) and social participation skills (n=10) are tagged to 
stages of inquiry. Students are to develop, for example, the valuing skill of “remain[ing] 
open-minded and prepared to change position on the basis of new evidence” (p. 34). 
This new spirit of open-ended inquiry was, perhaps unsurprisingly, tempered by 
prescriptive curricular stances. The Form 3 theme of social control, for instance, makes 
it clear that membership of a group “demands some conformity and acceptance of 
responsibility” (p. 16). Further, the development of ‘citizenship virtues’ is very clearly 
expected in all of the documents examined in this cluster (E. Archer & Openshaw, 
1992). Social studies is, for example, to “develop those feelings of empathy and 
humanity which will help them grow towards responsible participation in society” 
(Department of Education, 1978, p. 2; 1981, p. 4) and: 
By its approach and content, aims to commit students and teachers to respect human 
dignity, to show concern for others, to respect and accept the idea of difference and to 
uphold justice. (Department of Education, 1977a, p. 5; Ministry of Education, 1991, p. 6) 
 
68 
For all that these documents hint at learners’ consideration of ethical decision-making 
and action, the enacted, emotional, embodied dimensions of ethical life are occluded by 
a prevailing ethos of reason, distance, and objectivity. Two points may be made in 
relation to this. First, E. Archer and Openshaw (1992) suggest that a Brunerian 
approach to the 1977 syllabus design arguably worked against students’ actual 
participation in addressing social problems. This is because the syllabus established a 
pattern of strongly linking decision-making, problem-solving, and social action with 
critical thinking and rationality, a pattern evident right through to the 1997 curriculum. 
Furthermore, opportunities for social participation and taking action were very much 
confined to the classroom. The 1991 handbook, for example, couches the assessment of 
social action in terms of constructive group contribution (n=8) and states that “social 
studies can lead students to realise that they contribute to the life of their community” 
(Ministry of Education, 1991, p. 6). There is not, therefore, the sense that students are 
to be actually involved in resolving the conflicts or solving the social problems identified 
in their social studies learning.  
 
Second, the affective dimensions of ethical life flourish and wither in the curriculum 
documents of this period, this despite the oft-repeated mantra that social studies’ 
overarching focus is about how people ‘think, feel, and act’. The Faces documents 
(Department of Education, 1978, 1981, 1983) are notable for strongly foregrounding 
the affective domain; the term feelings appeared more frequently in Faces 4 (n=12), Faces 
5 (n=44) and Faces 6 (n=18) than values and its cognates. In addition, the Faces 5 
opening paragraph states: “the viewpoint taken here is that thinking, feeling and valuing 
are closely related, and in most social studies situations children will be using all three 
processes” (Department of Education, 1981, p. 2).  However, by 1991 this emphasis had 
waned considerably, a trend that was to continue in subsequent social studies curricula.   
 
DOCUMENT CLUSTER 4: SOCIAL STUDIES ACROSS YEARS 1 TO 13 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a quiescence of moral and values education debates, 
arguably as administrative reform and curriculum development took precedence (Clark, 
2000). Colin McGeorge (2000) argues that conservative backlash was mitigated by 
Tomorrow’s schools (Minister of Education, 1988) which offered school and parent 
communities the capacity to act at the local level. Added to this, he notes that the 
“disestablishment of the old Department of Education and its Curriculum Development 
Division also squelched any remaining official interest in, for example, Kohlberg’s 
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research or the Farmington Trust’s theorising” (p. 62). The politically and ideologically 
divided nature of the 1990s has been extensively documented elsewhere (see, for 
example: A. O'Neill, Clark, & Openshaw, 2004; Openshaw, Adams, & Hamer, 2005), 
including the vociferous debates that centred on the development of the social studies 
curriculum (see, for example: Hunter & Keown, 2001; Mutch, 1998; Openshaw, 1998; 
Sullivan, 2002). Hard on the heels of Tomorrow’s Schools, and in contrast to the 
evolutionary progress that characterised previous curriculum development, The New 
Zealand curriculum framework (Ministry of Education, 1993) ushered in a period of rapid 
change in which the foundations of the current New Zealand curriculum were laid. The 
framework established a single overarching and outcomes-led structure for all core 
subjects, across all levels of the curriculum. Curriculum documents were subsequently 
published for individual learning areas, among them Social studies in the New Zealand 
curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997). A key support document, Getting started 
(Ministry of Education, 1998) is briefly mentioned in this section; its content has not 
been closely analysed as it largely reiterates Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum 
through the provision of examples.   
 
The New Zealand curriculum framework (Ministry of Education, 1993) stresses the integral 
nature of attitudes (n=13) and values23 (n=21) across the whole curriculum, and devotes 
a section to this. Interestingly, two learning area descriptors make explicit reference to 
ethics. In science, students are to examine ethical questions and values underlying 
decisions about the use of resources. With quite a different end in mind, the Health and 
Physical well-being descriptor encourages students to “develop personal responsibility and 
judgment in matters of values and ethical standards” (p. 16)24. These usages imply a 
degree of critical thinking but the framework most strongly emphasises the 
reinforcement of commonly held values (n=15) and valued attributes (n=27), that is, 
virtues. Valuing skills, for example, receives no more than a passing mention in the 
Essential skills section  
(p. 17). By contrast, the Attitudes and values section contends that “values are mostly 
learned through students’ experience of the total environment, rather than through 
direct instruction” (p. 21). It is notable that the Social sciences descriptor only lightly 
                                                        
23  ‘Attitudes’ is defined in affective and dispositional terms, whereas values are described as “internalised sets of 
beliefs or principles of behaviour held by individuals or groups” (p. 21). 
24  Across this cluster of documents, Keown (2001) identifies three types of values goals, these being that students: 
(a) develop valuing skills such as the ability to “make judgements using criteria and/or ethics” (p. 50), (b) are 
encouraged to adopt particular values, and (c) gain knowledge about values. 
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incorporates the framework’s attitudes and values dimension, and that the emphasis is 
once again on the inculcation of particular values such as “concern for social justice and 
the welfare of others, acceptance of cultural diversity, and respect for the 
environment…along with commonly valued attributes such as initiative, effort and 
responsibility” (p. 14). This perhaps prefigured McGeorge’s (2000) observation that 
1990s’ values programmes were “not the resumption of the unfinished liberal business 
of the 1970s” but rather “their lists of values and virtues are much more reminiscent of 
the 1904 and 1928 primary school syllabuses” (p. 63). The vast majority of values 
programmes still operating in New Zealand schools appear to carry this flavour, for 
example: The Living Values Project, The Cornerstone Values Project, The Virtues 
Project and The New Churches Education Commission Programme (Keown et al., 
2005). 
 
Ethics is once again unmentioned in Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum but, 
interestingly, does appear in its revised draft (Ministry of Education, 1996) in which it is 
stated that students will examine “ethical principles as they apply to specific decisions and 
events in the past and present, developing generalisations about ethical behaviour” (p. 23). 
Quite what is meant by ethical principles is unclear, and the expectation’s ambiguous 
nature may well have led to it being dropped out in the final version.  However, and in 
stark contrast to The New Zealand curriculum framework (Ministry of Education, 1993), one 
move affirmed and considerably amplified the valuing, decision-making and social 
participation aspects of the Forms 3 and 4 handbook (Ministry of Education, 1991).  This 
was the crystallisation of social studies skills into three inter-related processes – inquiry, 
values exploration, and social decision-making became leading features of social studies 
curriculum design. Values (1997, n=12), values exploration (n=10), social decision-making 
(n=44) and social participation (n=60) now received considerable emphasis, albeit with a 
noticeable softening from ‘social action’ to the rather less critical, controversial and active 
terms such as social decision-making (Wood et al., 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, the coalescence of at least five features of Social studies in the New Zealand 
curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997) offered more potential for learners to consider 
ethical decision-making. When read together, these features engender a greater sense of 
contentiousness and criticality. Moreover, the potential for ethics to occupy a more 
explicit space in social studies education is moved considerably further forward than 
previous curriculum statements: 
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1. Picking up social studies’ longstanding focus on social problems, we see the 
burgeoning use of issues (n=44), around which inquiry, values exploration and 
social decision-making processes are built.  
2. There is a much stronger sense of evaluation (n=14) and judgement, both 
throughout the curriculum and built into the values exploration process. The 
definition for values includes “judgements about what is valuable or important in 
life” (p. 58, my emphasis); students should now be “challenged to think about 
the nature of social justice” (p. 17) rather than accept concern for social justice 
as a commonly held value; and Getting started provides a direct injunction that the 
values exploration process “is not a context for the formal teaching of a set of 
values” (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 15).  
3. The values exploration process indicators give an even stronger inkling than the 
1977 syllabus that something lies deeper than values. Students are, for example, 
to: “use criteria to evaluate a range of solutions” (Ministry of Education, 1997, 
p. 53); “establish criteria to evaluate values positions” (p. 54); and “explain how 
people prioritise values positions in order to come to a decision about action”  
(p. 55).  
4. In a move that was to take on more significance over time, perspectives (n=24) 
is introduced as a new term, although undefined and arguably represented more 
as categories than clearly delineated positions (for example, multi-cultural 
perspectives and perspectives on current issues)25.  
5. The curriculum contains the most promising indication that the philosophy of 
ethics might be among social studies’ contributing disciplines. Like the previous 
syllabus, the subject is described as “the systematic study of an integrated body 
of content drawn from the social sciences and the humanities” (p. 7) but here 
the glossary specifically lists philosophies as being part of the humanities (p. 57).  
 
Despite these moves, the inescapable and unconscious socialisation into ethical life, 
common to all the documents examined here, is once again evident in Social studies in the 
New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997). An example of this is contained in 
the highly contentious nature of this curriculum’s development, characterised by Hunter 
and Keown (2001) as being between two dominant discourses: one “calling for an open, 
                                                        
25 Neither Getting started nor The New Zealand exemplars: Social studies (Ministry of Education, 2004) were to shed much 
light on this; however, the latter did clarify that ‘bicultural perspectives’ included a range of stories, commentaries and 
contemporary voices of tāngata whenua, thereby underscoring the multiplicity of Māori perspectives. 
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inclusive, negotiated, and liberal-democratic kind of social studies curriculum [and the 
other] favouring more sectarian (neo-liberal), closed (Eurocentric), and educational 
conservative social studies” (p. 56). One can see in The New Zealand curriculum framework 
(Ministry of Education, 1993) an inkling of the furore that was to surround social 
studies. The framework makes much of the international labour market and trade 
relationships, reflective of a widely documented and debated backdrop of neo-liberal 
reforms. The ideal student of this framework is not just a responsible democratic 
citizen, but one who can participate effectively and productively in a competitive world 
economy. Almost in the same breath, the framework makes an express commitment to 
inclusive education, with a strong rights orientation. It is stipulated that “all programmes 
will be gender-inclusive, non-racist, and non-discriminatory” (p. 7). The critical point 
here is that both discourses make students’ ethical commitments for them, a priori.  For 
this reason, Keown (2001) argues that the framework placed too great an emphasis on 
encouraging particular values, “without linking this to the need to think critically about 
the wide range of values and perspectives in society” (p. 51). Of course, and as has been 
stated previously in this chapter, Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum’s (Ministry of 
Education, 1997) subsequent commitment to critical thinking about values and social 
decisions may equally be regarded as just an unquestioned good. 
 
Both discourses identified by Hunter and Keown (2001) were to inflect Social studies in 
the New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997), which the authors describe as 
being ultimately a compromise position. However, this can by no means be seen as a 
resolution of the ethical tensions contained within the curriculum. While the curriculum 
makes little mention of the social studies learners’ characters, there is a notable emphasis 
on rights-based ethics (n=37), consequentialism (n=35), and principles-based ethics 
encapsulated in terms such as principles (n=2), standards (n=2) and responsibilities 
(n=22). It is unclear therefore which ethical perspectives learners are to bring to bear on 
the social issues under consideration in their social studies lessons26. This point is very 
clearly underscored in the Education Forum’s27 (1996) submission on the curriculum’s 
revised draft (Ministry of Education, 1996), much of which is arguably pertinent to the 
final version. Though the Forum’s submission was given limited credence by many 
social studies educators, perhaps for ideological reasons, it does at least point to the 
contestable nature of values, debates about the limits of freedom in plural societies, and 
                                                        
26  Social studies in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) again emphasises rights (n=8), 
responsibilities (n=7) and consequences (n=8). This may have rather a reductive effect on social studies learners’ 
ethical thinking. 
27  An arm of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. 
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the priority we may give to ethical principles when making judgements. The author, 
Geoffrey Partington (see also, Partington, 1998), argues, for instance, that if we are to 
support the right to hold different values, then we must have higher regard for societies 
that provide the freedom to do so.  Although this position is debatable and there is 
much to be said against the Forum’s advocacy of ‘contingent moral relativism’, the 
submission is significant in its acknowledgement of ethics’ relevance to curricula.  
 
DOCUMENT CLUSTER 5: SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE PRESENT NEW ZEALAND 
CURRICULUM  
 
The last mandated document published in relation to Social studies in the New Zealand 
curriculum was The New Zealand curriculum exemplars: Social studies (Ministry of Education, 
2004). This supported teachers to identify learning, achievement and quality in relation 
to levels 1 to 5 of the curriculum. The exemplars firstly clarified the essence of social 
studies and the conceptual focus of the achievement objectives so that teachers could be 
clear about what to look for. Second, the exemplars repositioned the process skills as 
complex, often reiterative pathways rather than the broadly levelled sets of steps 
identified in Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997).  
Third, they reinforced the inter-related nature of inquiry, values exploration, and social 
decision-making, as being directed towards: 
 developing ideas about human society; 
 participating in society as an individual or part of a group in relation to these ideas; and 
 developing an understanding of the personal and social significance of these ideas. 
(Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 1) 
 
The publication of the exemplars occurred amidst a period of substantial analysis of the 
post-1993 curriculum reforms; they were aimed at reframing, refocusing and revitalising 
the current curriculum. For social studies in The New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) the revisions resulted in: (a) one single ‘social inquiry’ methodology 
(described in the introduction to this thesis), (b) a reduced number of achievement 
objectives, and (c) the provision of achievement objectives for economics, history and 
geography at curriculum levels 6 to 8 (Years 11 to 13). While much of the current social 
sciences/social studies curriculum can be read in light of its 1997 predecessor, two key 
changes to the wider curriculum have a particular bearing on the representation on 
ethics in the current curriculum: the Values and Key competencies statements. These are 
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considered in turn, followed by a section that briefly outlines the place of ethics in the 
senior social studies achievement standards. 
 
THE VALUES STATEMENT: A first key change to the wider curriculum is the centrality of 
values (n=51)28 as a cross-curricular concept, the subject of extensive consultation and 
consideration (Ministry of Education, 2005b). The resultant Values statement (Ministry 
of Education, 2007, p. 10) assumes greater precedence at the ‘front end’ of the 
curriculum than the 1993 framework. Three types of value goals, identified by Keown 
(2001) as being evident in the 1990s’ curriculum documents, are much more explicit in 
the body of this statement (see Appendix 1). In the left-hand column students are (a) 
“encouraged to value”, for example, excellence, diversity and ecological sustainability – 
values, it is maintained, that “enjoy widespread support” (Ministry of Education, 2007, 
p. 10). This carries much of the flavour of the 1993 framework’s value attributes.  In the 
right-hand column students are to (b) learn about different values, among which moral 
values are noted but the connection to ethics is not made clear. Again, in the right-hand 
column students are to (c) “develop the ability to” express, explore and analyse values.  
 
Significantly, two usages of ethics exist within the Values statement, both of which 
appear to mean something different to values. The phrase ‘acting ethically’ appears in 
the left-hand column, in a statement that “students will be encouraged to 
value…integrity, which involves being honest, responsible, and accountable and acting 
ethically” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10). To return to the terminological 
explication undertaken in the previous chapter, the phrase acting ethically could infer a 
particular moral stance or unnamed ethical code – this has rather less to do with ethics 
in the sense that I use the term. The second usage, “make ethical decisions and act on 
them” (p. 10), is to be found in the right-hand column and among a list of abilities 
students are to develop. The phrase appears somewhat more congruent with ethics as it 
is employed in this thesis. One may infer contestability from the wording and, from the 
phrase’s position in the text, that the expectation is more strongly aligned with critical 
thinking than the inculcation of normative values, that is, it is akin to the terms ‘valuing 
skills’ and ‘values exploration’ used in previous social studies curricula. Furthermore, the 
sense that ethics is deeper-set than values was signalled in a key report that fed into the 
development of the Values statement. The authors note that “core values frequently 
conflict with each other in real world situations. This creates complex ethical dilemmas 
                                                        
28  The definition of values, “deeply held beliefs about what is important or desirable” (p. 10), is consistent with the 
1993 framework. 
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that are difficult to resolve with a simple core values lists [sic] and inculcation 
approaches” (Keown et al., 2005, p. 170).  
 
Nevertheless, precisely what teachers are to understand by ethical decision-making and 
action and how, if at all, ethics is to be distinguished from values are open questions. 
This is because phrases ‘acting ethically’ and ‘make ethical decisions and act on them’ 
appear only once in The New Zealand curriculum, within the Values statement (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 10), and are not explicated. Equally unelaborated are concepts such 
as participation for the common good; its contested nature obscured by the debatable 
assertion that it is “associated with values and notions such as peace, citizenship and 
manaakitanga” (p. 10). One further matter adds to the semantic confusion. The 
statement goes some way to acknowledge that the values to be encouraged may be 
situated: “the list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive…the specific ways in which these 
values find expression in an individual school will be guided by dialogue between the 
school and the community” (p. 10). However, the statement simultaneously obfuscates 
the ways that ethical/moral codes play out at a contextual level in the dubious 
contention that “it is by holding these values and acting on them that we are able to live 
together and thrive” (p. 10).  One wonders, then, about the scope for ethical decision-
making and action in such a murky context. 
 
Critically, and despite the Values statement having cross-curricular intent, ethical 
decision-making and action are not explicitly carried through to the social sciences 
learning area. This reflects a wider issue of poor articulation across curricular elements 
(Hunter, 2007). Instead, proximal phrases are used such as “explore and analyse 
people’s values and perspectives” and “consider the ways in which people make 
decisions and participate in social actions” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30). Once 
again, the semantic connections and distinctions between these proximal phrases and 
ethics are not made clear, an important example being the lack of connection between 
ethical decision-making and action, used in the Values statement, and the term 
perspectives, used in the social sciences learning area statement. A subsequent 
clarification made in the Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Approaches to 
social inquiry booklet (Ministry of Education, 2008a) does, however, offer some hope that 
this connection might be established in future. This booklet places considerably more 
weight on perspectives (n=19) than the curriculum, and defines perspective as being “a 
world view or ideology” (p. 9). This definition is fleshed out in inter-related support 
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documentation in senior social studies and geography (Ministry of Education, 2014e, 
2014f), for example: 
 People’s points of view may be expressed in their words or actions.  
 Understanding people’s values involves being able to explain why people hold a 
particular point of view.  
 Points of view and values are shaped by a complex and intersecting landscape of 
perspectives. Other words for this are worldviews, ways of looking at the world, lenses, 
paradigms, ideologies, and theoretical frameworks. (Ministry of Education, 2014e, n.p.) 
  
Thus, perspectives are now strongly aligned to theoretical frameworks, ideologies and 
worldviews, that is, something deeper than values. To the perspectives already identified 
in this support document (such as libertarian and post-colonial perspectives), one might 
add ethical perspectives such as virtues ethics, consequentialism or utilitarianism.   
 
THE KEY COMPETENCIES STATEMENT: The second curricular shift that has bearing on ethical 
decision-making and action is a move from ‘essential skills’ identified in the New Zealand 
curriculum framework (Ministry of Education, 1993) to “key competencies: capabilities for 
living and lifelong learning” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 12). Though the 
competencies are interlinked, three are arguably most strongly aligned to the curriculum’s 
ethical content: thinking, relating to others, and participating and contributing. The 
thinking key competency strongly endorses critical, creative and reflective thinking; 
students are, for example, to reflect on their own learning, draw on personal knowledge 
and intuitions, and “challenge the basis of assumptions and perceptions” (p. 12). ‘Relating 
to others’ and ‘participating and contributing’ focus on students’ capacities to negotiate 
difference and be actively involved in their communities.  Albeit that these come with 
caveats, it is significant that a focus on social participation (n=64) and citizenship (n=7) is 
carried right throughout the curriculum. Reading ethical decision-making and action in 
light of these key competencies would appear to strengthen the critical, relational and 
participatory dimensions of the phrase. However, as this chapter’s summary outlines, 
these opportunities appear restricted by other features of the curriculum. For example, 
subsequent clarifications in support materials notwithstanding, perspectives (n=4) receives 
much less emphasis in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) than in the 
previous curriculum – a matter that arguably works against the critical orientation of the 
Key competencies. In relation to the present curriculum, Philippa Hunter (2007) contends that 
this “diminished status of perspectives learning about New Zealand suggests that any 
critical engagement with social contexts and issues may be nominal” (p. 49). 
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THE SENIOR SOCIAL STUDIES ACHIEVEMENT STANDARDS: While ethics is not a term 
employed in the social sciences learning area statement, it is notable that the NCEA 
achievement standards for senior social studies do: students consider (a) the ethical 
implications of their plans for social action and, (b) the ethical issues related to 
undertaking a social inquiry (see Appendix 3). Both occur prior to undertaking the 
action or inquiry. Presumably, these could offer rich opportunities for exploring ethical 
decision-making and action. However, it is most likely that ethical content of these 
standards is meant as a procedural concern – a matter of adherence to rules. The 
students’ retrospective reflection on their personal involvement in social action is, for 
example, couched largely in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of their involvement 
rather than considering the ongoing ethical issues that came to light. 
SUMMARY: THE CONCEPTUAL FIELD OF ETHICS – WHERE ARE WE NOW?  
 
This section brings together the historical analysis of New Zealand social studies 
curriculum statements by considering how the conceptual field of ethics might be 
mapped in the present. In other words, what kinds of meaning might be brought to 
phrase ethical decision-making and action?  In exploring this question, I come back to 
Davis’ (2004) contention that concept development is non-linear; as the previous 
sections have revealed, particular conceptions and re/presentations of ethics and its 
cognates have involved the flourished, fused or atrophied over time. Not only are the 
alliances, vestiges and absences identified in this section pivotal in discerning curricular 
meaning; they offer potential lines of pursuit in considering how learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action might be better supported in social studies, both 
theoretically and pedagogically.  
 
The first point to be made about ethical decision-making and action’s conceptual field is 
that, as surmised, the concept of ethics is indeed a newcomer to the lexicon of social 
studies.  What is striking about this is the way in which small words, that is, ethics and 
its cognates, appear to have significant meaning yet are left as small words. Perhaps one 
should not be surprised. New Zealand social studies curricula have a history of 
minimally elucidating pivotal concepts, for example, citizenship (Aitken, 2005a; Milligan, 
Taylor, & Wood, 2011), community, society (Hunter, 2007; Milligan, 2006), and New 
Zealand identity (Bailey, 2005; Beals, 2001; Siteine, 2013). The reader will note that 
terms such as democracy, sustainability and social justice have been left similarly 
hanging. Crucially, and in over three decades, very little New Zealand social studies 
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literature sheds light on what might be meant by ethical decision-making and action. 
The Waikato position paper (H. Barr et al., 1997), for example, includes ethical analysis and 
inquiry in the process of values inquiry but this is unelaborated beyond reference to an 
Australian social studies educator, Brian Hill (1994). Additionally, although the Waikato 
position paper puts forward ‘personal development: the empowerment of the ethical self’ 
as a key tradition of social studies education, the section that outlines this does not 
explicate the notion of the ‘ethical self’. One might have hoped for greater illumination 
in the Ministry of Education’s commissioned literature review on values education 
(Keown et al., 2005) which informed the Values statement in The New Zealand curriculum. 
But again, ethics appears infrequently – only 21 minor mentions in a 217 page document 
– and without definition.  
 
Crucially, it appears that very few New Zealand educators have elucidated, to a limited 
extent, ethics or ethical decision-making in the context of social studies (Francis, 2007, 
2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Keown, 1998, 2001; Keown et al., 1993). Keown et al. (1993) 
position ethics thus: 
The study of values includes aesthetics, viz. the study and justification of what people 
enjoy, and ethics which are the study and justification of how people behave (including 
the reflective consideration of what is right and wrong). (p. 2) 
 
Keown’s later work positions ethics in a similar vein; he recommends, for example, the 
Institute for global ethics’ (2014) model of ethical thinking as a useful strategy for social 
studies, in which students consider ethical dilemmas through a range of named 
philosophic frameworks (Keown, 1998). By contrast, the series of resources developed 
by Gwen Francis primarily adopt a deontological approach by encouraging social studies 
learners to appeal to four ethical principles (wisdom, justice, truth, and love) in their 
critical social inquiries. 
 
Although I am sceptical about taxonomies of concepts, one might conclude that ethics 
is akin to a ‘partially mature’ concept (Hupcey, Penrod, Morse, & Mitcham, 2001). Using 
these authors’ parameters for evaluating concept maturity, ethics is certainly 
pragmatically mature in the sense that it fits within phenomena common to New 
Zealand social studies education. Indeed, ethics is potentially very useful to the subject, 
particularly the values exploration, social decision-making and social action aspects of 
social inquiry. Ethics is, furthermore, and as previously argued, central to the nature and 
purposes of social studies. However, on three remaining parameters ethics (as it appears 
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in New Zealand’s curriculum) may be considered epistemologically, linguistically and 
logically immature. This is because they are ill-defined and unclearly differentiated from 
other concepts such as values. Further, and though one cannot say that ethics is used 
inappropriately in the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10), the fact that 
students are both encouraged to value acting ethically and develop the critical valuing 
skill of making ethical decisions is potentially confusing to the reader. Moreover, when 
one looks at the potential synergies between the Values statement and the social sciences 
learning area statement, there lacks coherence and systemisation in the way in which 
values is related to proximal terms such as ‘analysing people’s values and perspectives’. 
Lastly, and critically, in instances where ethics has been used in New Zealand’s 
curriculum documents the field of ethics has been unjustifiably narrowed. For example, 
the use of ethics in the statement that students are to examine “ethical principles as they 
apply to specific decisions and events in the past and present, developing generalisations 
about ethical behaviour” (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 23) appears to restrict their 
examination to deontological perspectives.  
 
A second point about the present conceptual field of ethics within the present 
curriculum is that, like its predecessors, social studies in The New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 2007) has inherited a range of ethical perspectives. Though 
character-training appeared central to the 1928 syllabus for history and geography 
(Department of Education, 1928), we see its embers continually rekindled through the 
kinds of citizen each social studies document seeks to create. For example, the ideal 
pupil to be fashioned through the 1961 syllabus was “to see themselves as people 
striving to be tolerant, kindly, honest, courageous, just, generous and independent” 
(Ministry of Education, 1961, p. 2). Part of the vision for today’s young people is that 
they be “confident: positive in their own identity, motivated and reliable, resourceful, 
enterprising and entrepreneurial, and resilient” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 8). 
Similarly, the responsible citizens social studies is to turn out today is not that far 
removed from the deontological responsibilities and duties of the Thomas Report 
(Department of Education, 1944); while the content of citizenship may have changed, 
the ethical stance has not. Likewise, the flourishing of rights-based ethics in social 
studies curricula since 1961 undoubtedly relates to the growth of the Civil Rights 
movement and legislative change in New Zealand. But rights-based ethics in fact has a 
long history and it is no surprise therefore that the concept was used in the 1928 
syllabus for history and geography. That these ethical perspectives have washed up in 
the current curriculum, and in tension with one another, may be considered inevitable; 
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simply a reflection of the plural nature of society. But if social studies teachers and 
students are to explore the range of ethical perspectives that inhabit society and have 
found their way into the curriculum, they are limited in doing so. This is because by and 
large the reader is left to infer the ethical perspectives each curriculum statement draws 
upon, as they are not named as such. The one exception to this is the 1928 syllabus for 
primary schools which, in an explicit critique of (rule) utilitarianism, established a 
curricular pattern of resistance to direct moral instruction: 
The teacher should be a man or woman of high ideals and inspiring personality – one 
who does consider that the dictum “Honesty is the best policy” is a sufficiently firm 
foundation on which to found any system of morality. The utilitarian aspect of conduct 
is probably too frequently presented to children. (Department of Education, 1928, 
p. 63) 
 
What then, is to be said of the meanings that might be brought to ethical decision-
making and action? Clearly, it is considered an aspect of values education, as indicated 
by the appearance of the phrases acting ethically and make ethical decisions and act on 
them in the current Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10). Ethics 
appears, therefore, to have slipped into New Zealand’s curriculum, and consequently 
social studies, through this already open door. But ethics’ usage in social studies is 
arguably more strongly affiliated with the right-hand column of the Values statement, 
that is, the phrase ‘make ethical decisions and act on them’. It is highly significant that 
the previous process indicators for values exploration (Ministry of Education, 1997) and 
the more recent elaboration of ‘exploring values and perspectives’ in the Building 
conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Approaches to social inquiry booklet (Ministry of 
Education, 2008a) map almost directly onto the right-hand column of the Values 
statement (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10), that is, knowledge about values and the 
development of critical thinking. Furthermore, and because arguably Values statement’s 
aspects are interconnected, the other usage of ethics on the page – the encouragement 
to act ethically – cannot be read in purely prescriptive terms. Thus social studies 
education holds the contestable nature of ‘acting ethically’ up for scrutiny; the right-
hand wants to know why the left-hand acts as it does. 
 
We could equally align ethical decision-making and action, as the term suggests, to the 
‘social decision-making’ (Ministry of Education, 1997) and ‘considering responses and 
actions’ (Ministry of Education, 2008a) aspects of social inquiry, which have gained 
increasing emphasis in recent years. As Keown (2001) points out, social decision-making 
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necessarily turns on value judgements and, one might add, ethical perspectives. As has 
been identified in this chapter, social studies has a history of a critical orientation to 
values and decision-making, dating back at least to the 1977 syllabus. In this regard, the 
subject places considerable weight on counter-socialisation (Engle & Ochoa, 1988), “a 
learning process designed to foster the independent thought and social criticism that is 
crucial to political freedom” (p. 31). One sees this, for example, in how the social 
sciences descriptor tempers the prevailing neo-liberal thrust of the New Zealand curriculum 
framework (Ministry of Education, 1993) by stating that students are to “develop the 
knowledge and sense of perspective needed to understand and appraise New Zealand’s 
changing society and economy” (p. 14, my emphasis). Again today, and if one compares 
how the terms sustainability and citizenship are used in the Future-focused issues section of 
the curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 39) with the social sciences learning area 
statement, we see that the latter is about critical citizenship and enables students to 
“evaluate the sustainability of alternative social, economic, political, and environmental 
practices” (p. 30, my emphasis).  
 
At some level therefore, social studies students are expected to critically consider the 
plurality, complexity, uncertainty, and moral ambivalence described in the previous 
chapter. We see the messy and contestable nature of the ethical realm increasingly being 
conveyed through New Zealand social studies curricula, the use of ‘issues’ having 
reached a peak in Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997), 
and the values exploration and decision-making aspects of social inquiry conveying 
some sense of ethical complexity today. It is clear that students may consider such 
societal controversy at different depths, as a recent clarification of viewpoints, values 
and perspectives indicates (Ministry of Education, 2014b). A future iteration of the 
social studies curriculum may ‘connect the dots’ between perspectives and ethical 
decision-making and action, but for the meantime a strong inference may be made that 
ethical decision-making and action is intended to draw attention to something deeper 
than values. Arguably, the phrase closely aligns to the definition for ethics established in 
Chapter Two: involving the branch of philosophy concerned with the systematic study 
of what we ought to do, and meaning an activity – that of coming to an understanding 
of, and reflecting upon, a range of theoretical perspectives about social action. 
 
So far, the conceptual field’s centre has been examined, that is, ethical decision-making 
and action’s most proximal terms. What lies further afield?  It is firstly noteworthy that 
students’ personal and cultural identities are somewhat peripheral. The current 
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curriculum makes much of diversity (n=15) and identities (n=10), and expects students 
to “learn about their own values” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10) and “clarify their 
own identities” (p. 30). However, it overwhelmingly positions students on the outside of 
ethical life, looking in.  In part, this has to do with social studies’ shifting gaze, that is, a 
change in aims.  The reader will recall that in the 1970s the subject was described as the 
study of people. It was stressed that social studies should “help children to find their 
own identities by developing a growing awareness of society and of their sense of 
belonging to it” (Department of Education, 1978, p. 2). As an example, Faces 6 
(Department of Education, 1983) made much of supporting students to make sense of 
personal moral dilemmas. However, social studies is now positioned as the study of 
societies, in which students clarify their own identities as a consequence of studying how 
others see themselves, and the values perspectives, and decisions of others. The learning 
area statement only minimally communicates that students’ personal and cultural 
contexts might be important funds of knowledge. Though the Building conceptual 
understandings in the social sciences (Ministry of Education, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 
2012) booklets clarify that linking the personal and the societal is pivotal to effective 
social studies education, and that social inquiry might stem from students’ concerns and 
interests, the current social studies learning area statement does not make this clear. 
Such de-centring, that is, disconnection from the complexities of learners’ actual lives 
and real concerns, risks shutting out ethical questions that might matter to them. 
 
It is secondly significant that the affective dimension of social studies, so apparent in the 
1970s’ and 80s’ documents, has become nascent. The Social studies syllabus guidelines: Forms 
1-4 (Department of Education, 1977a) focus on how people think, feel and act and Faces 
6’s bundling together of thinking, feeling and valuing have, in later iterations, become 
dis-affected, that is, drained of any emotional content. Paul Keown (2001) comments 
that the 1997 social studies document made no mention of examining how people meet 
their emotional and spiritual needs, an explicit feature of the social sciences descriptor in 
the over-arching curriculum framework. The current curriculum has not addressed this 
affective absence. Values are now described as being “expressed through the ways that 
people think and act” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10), and although students are to 
“explore, with empathy, the values of others” (p. 10) no mention is made of feelings in 
the social sciences learning area statement, save for only oblique references to beliefs 
(n=4) and well-being elsewhere in the body of the document. In particular, care-based 
and relational ethical perspectives are stripped out of the Values statement, along with 
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ethical sensitivity, this despite ‘relating to others’ being among the key competencies and 
a Vision for connected learners “who are able to relate well to others” (p. 8). 
 
The teaching guidelines and assessment for senior social studies have a similarly 
disembodying effect. Though the recently revised NCEA achievement standards are 
arguably laudable for encouraging social action, learners are not required to discuss their 
feelings about social action they undertake, what meaning it had in the context of their 
own lives, or what they have drawn from that experience into their everyday lives29. 
Similarly, the Teaching and learning guidelines for senior social studies (Ministry of Education, 
2014d) encourage learners to consider the social significance of understandings drawn 
from the achievement objectives, not the personal significance30. In contrast, the 
affective dimensions of citizenship are acknowledged in the Building conceptual 
understandings in the social sciences: Belonging and participating in society (Ministry of Education, 
2008b) booklet, in which it is stated that “the ability to participate in a society or 
community is essentially linked to a feeling of belonging to that group” (p. 5). 
Furthermore, the “ability to explore and analyse their own and others’ values, and…a 
commitment to such values as social justice and equity” are positioned as aspects of 
affective outcomes in the Best evidence synthesis for the social sciences (Aitken & Sinnema, 
2008). But if we are to accept these views, they are not what The New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 2007) seems to say.  
 
It is thirdly critical that the important connection between the ethical and the political 
are not made clear to the reader.  Three points may be made in relation to this. First, 
social sciences learners are to “evaluate the sustainability of alternative social, economic, 
political, and environmental practices” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30). What that 
statement is to mean with reference to the political is unclear, although ethical 
perspectives could conceivably provide one means of evaluation. Second, citizenship, 
and in particular democratic citizenship, lies dormant in The New Zealand curriculum. One 
could be forgiven for overlooking the centrality of citizenship to social studies 
education, given its minimal appearance in successive curricula. Similarly, scant mention 
of democracy in post-Thomas Report social studies curriculum documents has relegated it 
to an axiomatic backdrop. Gregory and Howard Lee (2007) point out that “a diverse, 
democratic society” disappeared from the draft values statement (Ministry of Education, 
                                                        
29  Interestingly, this is not the case in English achievement standards where students are asked to form personal 
responses to texts. 
30  This despite the ‘personal and social significance of ideas’ being identified as one of three key aspects of social 
studies learning in the New Zealand curriculum exemplars: Social studies (Ministry of Education, 2004).  
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1994, p. 10) and its absence in the entirety of the current curriculum is notable. The 
Values statement does align ‘participation for the common good’ with citizenship and 
the Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Belonging and participating in society 
(Ministry of Education, 2008b) booklet outlines four major views of citizenship31. 
However, the content of, and relationships between, citizenship, political practices, 
democracy and participation for the common good are not spelled out. More 
particularly in relation to the work of this thesis, the differences in ethical visions that lie 
behind these concepts are not elucidated, nor are learners strongly encouraged to 
consider the political dimensions of ethical decision-making and action. 
 
Fourthly, and while there has undoubtedly been a flourishing of social participation in the 
most recent social studies curriculum, the extent to which learners’ active engagement in 
their social worlds is genuinely encouraged is debatable. On the one hand it has been 
argued that The New Zealand curriculum suggests greater focus on participatory citizenship 
(Wood et al., 2013) in phrases such as “take action” and “engage critically with social 
issues” (Ministry of Education, 2007, pp. 17, 30). On the other, Jane Abbiss (2011) argues 
that it depends how statements such as “consider the ways in which people make 
decisions and participate in social action” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30) are read; 
both cognitive and participatory interpretations can be construed. One might also 
question the kinds of social action that are encouraged. Wood et al. (2013) argue that 
successive social studies curricula have been oriented towards personally responsible and 
participatory citizenship, rather than fostering a more critical orientation to addressing 
society’s structural inequalities and encouraging political action. Moreover, Philippa 
Hunter (2007) argues there is a reduced sense of conflict and a neutral approach to human 
agency in the present curriculum, and I am inclined to this view. There is a noticeable 
decline in terms that convey societal issues and controversy (n=10) from the 1997 
curriculum, and the phrase “engage critically with social issues” is notably some way down 
the text of the current learning area statement (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30). 
Graeme Aitken (Aitken, 2006b) notes the risk that “without further elaboration…this 
issues-centred shift could be interpreted as an example of social science study, rather than 
the focus” (p. 19). Perhaps this has been heeded to some extent, as social issues (n=19) are 
a greater feature of the more recent Building conceptual understandings in social sciences: 
Approaches to social inquiry booklet (Ministry of Education, 2008a).  
                                                        
31  Drawing on Gilbert (1996), these are listed as being: (a) status implying formal rights and duties, (b) an identity and 
a set of moral and social virtues based on the democratic ideal, (c) a public practice conducted through legal and 
political processes and, (d) participation in decision making in all aspects of life. 
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This curriculum has also been criticised for its timidity, that is, a refusal to confront the 
big issues of the day such as global power relationships, conflict and climate change 
(Hunter, 2007; Snook, 2007). Given the pressing nature of the latter, it seems 
extraordinary that environmental values is not listed among the types of values that 
students are expected to explore (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10). Moreover, the 
minimisation of contemporary issues arguably truncates an important avenue through 
which students could consider ethical decision-making and action. I would also add that 
the curriculum also overlooks learners’ everyday ethical issues and participation. Yet, 
arguably, the day-to-day issues of ordinary life are the big issues writ small. It is 
interesting to note that drafts of the social sciences learning area statement positioned 
social studies as having “significance for their everyday participation” (Ministry of 
Education, 2006a) and “everyday interactions as citizens and members of communities” 
(Ministry of Education, 2006b, p. 22). But such references were omitted in the present 
statement. Furthermore, and though creative thought is part of the cross-curricular 
thinking key competency, it is not a feature of the social sciences learning area 
statement’s description or rationale – subordinated, instead, in only one of the four 
conceptual strands (continuity and change) in which students “imagine possible futures” 
(Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30). Against this static, distanced, and de-contextualised 
curricular backdrop, one could be forgiven for wondering what real and potential 
opportunities for ethical decision-making and action are open to social studies learners.   
CONCLUSION: THE ETHICALLY SILENT SPACE OF SOCIAL STUDIES 
 
What might be said, then, of the opportunities for ethical decision-making and action 
that are offered through the New Zealand social studies curriculum? This chapter has 
identified that ethics has a longstanding and central place in the varying traditions that 
have likely inflected the subject, no matter how social studies’ purposes are construed. 
This point is especially important in light of one of the more persistent criticisms of 
social studies: that it lacks a unifying focus, “about everything – and therefore about 
nothing” (Lockstone, 1996, p. 15). That the purposes of social studies are wholly 
suffused by ethical perspectives presents at least one counter-argument to this view.  
Nevertheless, the content analysis undertaken in this chapter reveals that explicit usage 
of ethics is only a more recent curricular feature, and one that is minimally 
communicated. There is not, therefore, a longstanding corpus of curriculum content 
that clarifies what might be meant by ethical decision-making and action – although 
there is much within successive social studies curriculum statements that is directed 
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towards particular ethical positions. Whilst fixed, universal definitions may not be 
possible or desirable, the lack of elucidation – even as to the variations in meaning that 
may be attached to concepts such as values and ethics – risks confusion among social 
studies teachers and, ultimately, risks restricting learners’ critical engagement in society.  
 
Sadly, and despite the strength of connection between the fields of ethics and social 
studies at a theoretical level, the New Zealand social studies curriculum is an ethically 
silent space. This silence is exacerbated through the ways in which social studies in The 
New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) decentres, disembodies and 
decontextualises learners. This chapter has illustrated how the subject is drained of 
emotional content, positions learners as spectators on ethical life, and renders their 
personal and cultural identities as peripheral to learning. It is a curriculum that has some 
way to go in terms of representing the complexity of learners’ lives, and despite an 
increased curricular emphasis on learners’ social participation, that concept lacks vigour. 
In sum, the social studies curriculum could go much further in enabling learners to 
explore the complex ecology of contemporary ethical space – the plural, uncertain, 
complex, and morally ambivalent substance of ethical decision-making and action. Most 
likely, instead, learners currently make ethical decisions despite the social studies 
curriculum. 
 
This issue appears to be not only a function of curriculum content. Chapter Six reveals 
that current teaching practices are also likely to preclude learners from spaces to expand 
their understanding of ethical decision-making and action in relation to their present and 
future social worlds. What, then, should social studies teachers be making of the cross-
curricular expectations that students are to be supported to value “acting ethically” and 
“make ethical decisions and act on them” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10)? This 
chapter’s content analysis suggests that particularly the second phrase should be 
understood as (a) a dimension of, but deeper set than, values, (b) cognising societal 
complexity and plurality and, (c) involving criticality. The chapter has established that it 
is unlikely to have been the curriculum writers’ intent that social studies education could 
be solely directed towards pre-determined expectations of ‘correct’ ethical decision-
making and action, that is, take a prescriptive orientation. Moreover, when read in the 
context of New Zealand social studies curriculum history, ‘ethical decision-making and 
action’ is likely to be strongly connected to the values exploration and social decision-
making aspects of social inquiry, that is, more readily coheres with a critically reflective 
rather than citizenship transmission tradition of social studies education.  
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Should ethics be elaborated in future iterations of New Zealand’s social studies 
curriculum, it is conceivable that it might align more strongly to the definition offered in 
Chapter One, meaning both the branch of philosophy concerned with the systematic 
study of what we ought to do, and an activity – that of coming to an understanding of, 
and reflecting upon, a range of perspectives about social action. Yet, such semantic 
clarification would not support social studies teachers to consider the theoretical 
underpinnings, and in turn, the broad pedagogical orientation that could be taken to 
better supporting their learners’ ethical decision-making and action. This matter is the 
focus of Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ENGAGING WITH THE PH ILOSOPHY OF 
ETHICS  
 
This chapter addresses the second of my research questions: what theoretical spaces exist for better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action? To begin to answer this question, 
I explore how the New Zealand social studies curriculum’s predominant theoretical orientations frame 
ethical decision-making and action. I then consider what could be re-focussed and amplified within this 
extant framing in order to meet the curricular requirement to make ethics a visible part of social studies 
learners’ lives. Three spaces for theoretical development are identified: social studies taught as social 
issues, as counter-socialisation, and as engaging with the philosophy of ethics. The importance of each of 
these spaces for better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making is discussed in relation to the purposes 
of social studies as I see them, and the proposed adjustments are justified. Of course, a theoretical 
orientation to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action is not necessarily a matter of 
working with the curricular status quo. With this in mind, Chapter Five looks to theoretical spaces that 
appear to lie beyond the purview of the current social studies curriculum. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Three described the place of ethics in New Zealand social studies and 
considered the opportunities that the curriculum affords students in terms of exploring 
ethical decision-making and action. While values exploration has been a strong feature 
of New Zealand’s social studies curriculum since the 1970s, ethics and its cognates have 
not. The New Zealand curriculum’s expectation that learners’ “ethical decision-making 
and action” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10) be supported is therefore a new 
expectation for social studies teaching and learning. Critically, however, this expectation 
is unelaborated; for example, while the Values statement infers that ethics is to be 
distinguished from values, this difference is not elucidated. The problematic nature of 
what I termed the ‘ethical silence’ of New Zealand social studies education is two-fold: 
(a) a central aspect of our lives and of social studies education is only minimally 
acknowledged and (b) what the phrase ethical decision-making and action is to mean is 
likely opaque to social studies teachers and learners, or interpreted in different ways. 
The next two chapters consequently consider the direction that could be given to social 
studies teachers wishing to better support their learners’ ethical decision-making and 
action. Together, their contribution lies in initiating a discussion about the kind of 
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theoretical underpinnings and broad orientation that would be appropriate for ethics 
education in social studies, that is, they question the possible theoretical spaces for 
better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action. 
 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. The opening section looks to the wider New 
Zealand curriculum for guidance about the educational theory that should shape the 
approach to supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action in social studies. I 
find within the curriculum a philosophic mélange. While not particularly helpful in 
clearly determining a way forward, this does at least offer considerable scope in terms of 
supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action. The second section reveals that, 
by contrast, the current social studies curriculum’s implicit educational theory provides a 
little less latitude. Two theoretical orientations predominate in the social studies 
curriculum: the traditions of social studies taught as reflective inquiry and as social 
science. If one were to adhere to these framing philosophies, learners’ ethical decision-
making and action would primarily be shaped by the melded traditions. Of course, the 
thesis is not required to be an exercise in curriculum compliance, and to this end the 
purposes of social studies as I see them is a matter explored recursively throughout the 
chapters. In general terms, I adopt Hugh Barr’s (1998) view that social studies may be 
understood as having two broad goals: understanding society, and one’s effective 
participation within it as citizens.  
 
It is notable that nothing in this chapter is a wild departure from the traditions of social 
studies taught as social science and reflective inquiry. These framing philosophies do, 
however, require re-focussing in order to satisfactorily accommodate the cross-curricular 
expectation that learners’ ethical decision-making and action be supported. The bulk of 
this chapter considers the nature of, and justification for, this refocusing. I propose 
three inter-related adjustments to social studies’ already extant framing philosophies: (a) 
and (b), below, draw primarily from social studies taught as reflective inquiry, whereas 
(c) suggests an expansion of social studies taught as social science.  
 
(a) Social studies as issues-based education: Issues education has long been a feature of the 
reflective inquiry tradition of social studies but, as the previous chapter revealed, has 
only recently received greater emphasis in the New Zealand social studies 
curriculum. Because the phrase ethical decision-making and action presupposes 
dilemmas and controversies of some kind, I argue that ethics education in social 
studies requires a stronger focus on social issues. Further, and in contrast to the 
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existing issues-based social studies education literature, I argue for greater attention 
to the everyday and the ‘private’ in conceptions of social issues and their ethical 
content.  
(b) Social studies as counter-socialisation:  Within the reflective and issues-based tradition, 
Shirley Engle and Anna Ochoa-Becker (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Ochoa-Becker, 2007) 
have argued that over time social studies should involve students in societal critique, 
or ‘counter-socialisation’. I am cautious, however, that their model of reflective 
decision-making underplays the need for counter-socialisation to be supported by, 
and broadly inclusive of, differing worldviews, among them ethical perspectives.  An 
argument is made, therefore, for an ethically plural (Hinman, 2013) and agonistic 
(Mouffe, 2000, 2013) approach to understanding social issues and responding to 
moral conflict.  
(c) Social studies as engaging with the philosophy of ethics:  Social studies taught as social 
science has long focussed on disciplines such as history and geography. I urge that 
aspects of the philosophy of ethics should take a more prominent place in social 
studies’ inter-disciplinary stable. I consider how ethical perspectives, drawn from 
philosophy, might better support learners’ critical exploration of social issues, ethical 
decision-making, and social action. I explain that this amounts to more than applied 
ethics. The justification for bringing the philosophy of ethics more closely into view 
in social studies education is made along two lines, firstly, that this inclusion is a 
matter of social justice and, secondly, that the discipline potentially contributes to a 
range of social studies outcomes related to learners’ counter-socialisation.  
 
Of course, as the conclusion to this chapter underscores, the extent to which the 
philosophy of ethics might support these outcomes is a matter of how it is taught. This 
concern is the focus of Chapter Five. 
THE NEW ZEALAND CURRICULUM’S THEORETICAL ‘FOUNDATIONS’ AS WAYS TO 
PROCEED? 
 
Because educational theory has an inexorable role in considering how to better support 
learners’ ethical decision-making and action, this section enquires as to the guidance 
offered through the New Zealand curriculum. It is firstly notable that, over the last 20 
years, relatively few academics have elucidated the New Zealand curriculum’s 
philosophic underpinnings, though many have attended to the political and ideological 
orientations of curriculum change (for example: Codd, Clark, O'Neill, & O'Neill, 
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1996/7; C. McGee, 1995; A. O'Neill et al., 2004). Still fewer philosophic critiques 
pertain to the current curriculum. What can be gleaned from the literature signals 
persistent and unresolved theoretical tensions, partly stemming from a lack of sustained 
examination of curriculum philosophy on the part of the Ministry of Education. 
According to G. Lee and Hill (1996), the New Zealand curriculum framework’s philosophic 
justification was never established beyond the Ministry’s assertion that “the curriculum 
as a whole has not undergone substantial overhaul since the 1940s’ Thomas Reforms” 
(Ministry of Education, 1993, p. 1).  
 
Even more critically, as John Clark (2004a) argues, the curriculum statements failed to 
convey the theories of knowledge upon which they were based. Instead, the curriculum 
development process admitted a variety of incommensurable and inexplicitly articulated 
philosophic positions, among them: instrumental rationalism, post-positivism, 
constructivism, progressivism, and postmodernism. In Clark’s view, the entire 
framework lacked “an articulated philosophy of the curriculum which would give any 
semblance of unity or cohesion to the foundation and pedagogy of each of the learning 
areas” (p. 127).  The authors of Understanding the social sciences as a learning area: A position 
paper (Mutch, Hunter, Milligan, Openshaw & Siteine, 2009)32 observe that much of the 
controversy surrounding the development of Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 1997) centred on two poles of thought: those that supported or 
resisted postmodern discourses. The lack of resolution to this debate is evident in the 
existence of both modernist and postmodern orientations in the final statement, though 
the extent to which each prevailed is debatable (Beals, 2001; Hunter & Keown, 2001; 
Irwin, 1999; Milligan & Beals, 2004). However, such philosophic eclecticism was not 
necessarily viewed negatively. The authors of the Waikato position paper (H. Barr et al., 
1997) contended, for example, that “most social studies educators would agree…that 
social studies is an integrated field of learning drawing on a range of disciplinary and 
philosophic traditions” (p. 39).  
 
There is little to suggest that The New Zealand curriculum’s (Ministry of Education, 2007) 
advent has added coherence or clarity. The review process leading to its publication was 
always intended as curriculum revision rather than wholesale change and, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Milligan, 2006), revisiting curriculum philosophy was never within the scope. 
Were it not for The New Zealand curriculum’s ‘front end’, one might be forgiven for 
                                                        
32 A position paper written in relation to The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). 
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assuming that the social sciences statement carries a ‘business as usual’ message for social 
studies, as much of its content appears a heavily pruned version of its predecessor 
(Ministry of Education, 1997). This has gone some way to addressing the structural 
inadequacies identified by commentators (Aitken, 2005a; Ferguson, 2007; Le Métais, 
2002), yet the inherent theoretical contradictions remain (Abbiss, 2011). Clark (2004b) 
argues that the 1990s’ curriculum stock-take failed to investigate the philosophic issues 
identified by leading academics, and that conceptual confusion and debatable assertions 
are contained in the report to the Minister. In his view, the Ministry of Education’s 
“refusal to confront philosophical challenges is an intellectual disgrace” (p. 77). Not all 
agreed. Clive McGee (2004), for example, countered that wholesale change was not within 
the ambit of the review process and that “capitalising on what is right about the current 
curriculum” (p. 82) was beneficial. Furthermore, the general tenor of Ministry of 
Education commentary was that broad, sector-wide consultation would create a more 
robust curriculum (Chamberlain, 2004; Cubitt, 2005, 2006; Ministry of Education, 2005a). 
Critically, however, and as Gregory and Howard Lee (2007) note, the arguably laudable 
attempt to include various perspectives in the curriculum development process has had 
the effect of ossifying philosophic and ideological tensions. One consequence of this 
almost determined theoretical obscurantism is that considerable – near impossible – 
decoding is required to discern the theoretical assumptions that underpin the curricular 
requirement to support learners’ ethical decision-making and action. Such efforts would 
likely bring empty reward in terms of a definitive way to proceed, offering instead the 
vestiges of numerous philosophic positions. Alternatively, it could be argued that this 
curriculum is theoretically permissive, offering considerable latitude in the midst of 
incoherence. 
 
But is the theoretical coherence, unity and foundationalism that Clark (2004a) seeks 
achievable, or even desirable? Given the competing purposes perennially alive in 
education, outlined in this thesis’ introductory chapter, attainability seems a distant 
horizon. Myriad philosophies of education exist and, in a shifting field, Burbules (2000) 
argues that “one lasting change may be that the question, ‘What is the philosophy of 
education?’ will never again be asked in the expectation that a single, unified definition is 
either possible or desirable” (p. 16). Many would add that deliberate eclecticism ought 
not to be seen in the pejorative. Amélie Rorty (2005), for example, contends that 
“postmodern attempts at eclectic philosophical systems multiply the number of viable 
theories” (p. 16). I take the view of Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995) that 
theoretical commensurability is not only unattainable, though we may find instances of 
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confluence and consilience, but that we must be wary of the exclusionary effects of any 
attempts at a totalising curriculum philosophy. Curriculum, they argue, is more a matter 
of understanding than theoretical development – a realm of possibility rather than a 
firm foundation, process not product.  
 
The purpose of the next two chapters is, therefore, not to resolve the New Zealand 
curriculum’s philosophic contradictions, or even to settle on a definitive purpose for 
social studies. It is to suggest, instead, a way to proceed – to situate ethics education in 
social studies within a realm of theoretical opportunity. This positioning does require 
coherence, but I do not for a moment suggest that what these chapters proffer is an 
incontestable, water-tight blueprint for ethics education in social studies. 
 
Egan (1997) demonstrates that varying imperatives of education, while not mutually 
exclusive, present a challenge to each other; as outlined in the previous chapter, these 
are tensions that are inevitably mirrored in the social studies traditions (H. Barr et al., 
1997; R. D. Barr et al., 1978). For instance, social studies ‘taught as citizenship 
transmission’ effectively inculcates social norms, whereas social studies ‘taught as 
personal development and the empowerment of the ethical self’ may involve values that 
conflict with these. Similarly, the traditions of social studies taught as social science (akin 
to Plato’s notion of academic excellence in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake) 
and personal development (reaching back into Rousseauian thought) are at philosophic 
odds. Egan (1997) notes that “for Plato education is a time related, epistemological 
process; for Rousseau it is an age-related, psychological process … both the Platonic 
and Rousseauian ideas are necessary for education, but the more we try to implement 
one, the more we undermine the other” (p. 20). Of course, these are not the only 
philosophic tensions evident in the social studies curriculum. 
 
SOCIAL STUDIES’ FRAMING PHILOSOPHIES  
 
The previously described philosophic mélange of the New Zealand curriculum appears 
to permit all manner of proposals for ethics education. Happily for me, perhaps, this 
chapter’s proposal might easily be defended on the basis that nothing in the wider 
curriculum precludes it. But does such a contention hold for the social studies 
curriculum’s implicit educational theory? The theoretical muddle of successive New 
Zealand social studies curricula notwithstanding, this section notes that two broad 
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theoretical orientations frame the current curriculum: social studies taught as reflective 
inquiry and as social science. The reader will recall that these are two of the social 
studies ‘traditions’ introduced in Chapter Three. That I spend some time illuminating 
these framing philosophies is not because I feel the need to adhere to the New Zealand 
curriculum. Instead, I bring to the reader’s attention that my proposal for better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action in many respects 
draws from these framing philosophies, albeit with some important adjustments. 
Further, I ultimately wish to explain to social studies curriculum developers and teachers 
that the proposal built over the next two chapters is a matter of continuity and change, 
rather than radical departure.  
 
I have stated that a strong thrust towards social studies taught as (i) reflective inquiry 
and (ii) social science is discernible in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 
2007). What is the evidence for this? The former, social studies taught as reflective 
inquiry, gains expression in the strongly advocated social inquiry approach (Ministry of 
Education, 2007), outlined in the introduction to this thesis, and the genesis of which 
dates back to at least the 1977 syllabus guidelines (Department of Education, 1977a). 
This approach was expressed in the 1997 social studies curriculum as the processes of 
inquiry, values exploration, and social decision-making. The latter, social studies taught 
as social science, is partly belied by the name of the learning area, within which the 
subject of social studies rests. Hill (1994) suggests that this orientation has 
predominated in New Zealand social studies education33 over time. The dual emphases 
of social studies taught as reflective inquiry and social science are also detectable in the 
section of the learning area statement entitled: How is the learning area structured? (Ministry 
of Education, 2007). Approximately a third of the word count is devoted to the learning 
area’s (i) conceptual focus, (ii) inquiry orientation, and (iii) relationship between the 
contributing disciplines, respectively. Further, the title of a key support document, 
Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Approaches to social inquiry (Ministry of 
Education, 2008a), conveys an important intersection between the reflective inquiry and 
social science orientations – a link also captured in the recurring use of the phrase 
‘conceptual, reflective and critical social inquiry’ in the series. As I explore further in this 
section, the social inquiry methodology is intended to enable students to develop 
conceptual understandings drawn from the contributing disciplines.  
                                                        
33  Before 1961, and though primary school syllabi used ‘social studies’, it was expressed as being through history and 
geography; “thus the application of the concepts and methods of social sciences was not encouraged in social 
studies” (H. Barr et al., 1997, p. 23). 
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How have the traditions of reflective inquiry and social science come to predominate in 
the current social studies curriculum? Through a significant influence on curriculum 
organisation in North America since the 1960s (Ross, 1985), developments in the 
reflective inquiry tradition have strongly shaped New Zealand’s social inquiry model. This 
tradition owes much to John Dewey’s theory of reflective thinking, articulated in works 
such as How we think (Dewey, 1910) and Logic: The theory of inquiry (Dewey, 1939). For 
Dewey, inquiry is central to learners’ growth and is the means by which they adapt to their 
environments. The teacher’s role is to help learners identify their ‘felt difficulties’ (Dewey, 
1910), something that is truly problematic in the context of their own lives. Dewey’s 
process of inquiry enables students to transform their puzzlement into a more 
harmonious, coherent and meaningful understanding, “where that puzzlement is removed 
and where the ‘solution’ re-establishes the essential unity of the situation” (Pring, 2007, 
p. 66). In Dewey’s (1939) words, “that which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by 
definition, knowledge” (pp. 104-105). This process is what might be described as 
scientific, involving the formulation and refinement of hypotheses, and controlled 
experimental testing and observation. It also reflects the philosophic tradition of 
American pragmatism, in which Dewey was a key figure, where all thinking and reflective 
considerations are to be referred “to consequences for final meaning and test” (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 330). Importantly, the result of inquiry is not immutable facts but warranted assertions 
that are amenable to further scrutiny; inquiry is therefore re-iterative.  
 
Dewey’s work is perhaps the least acknowledged influence on New Zealand’s model of 
social inquiry (Lee & Lee, 2007), though his impact on liberal and progressive 
educational thought in this country has been profound (Dowden, 2011). It is hard to 
know for sure what he would have made of this methodology and of social studies in 
The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007), especially given that when 
writing in the 1930s he expressed guarded optimism about the social studies’ potential in 
the USA (Carpenter, 2006). Nevertheless, Dewey’s conviction that education should 
assist students to meet the challenges of democracy through open-minded inquiry has 
been clearly imprinted on numerous models for reflective inquiry developed by social 
studies scholars in North America (R. D. Barr et al., 1978; Ross, 1985). Three features 
of New Zealand’s social inquiry approach reflect Deweyan thought: the presence of 
‘social studies taught as citizenship’ is tempered by ongoing reflection, method is 
emphasised over abstract thinking, and the approach is re-iterative yet orderly. These 
aspects are most clearly conveyed through the visual model of social inquiry provided in 
the Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences series (see Appendix 4). At its heart, 
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the social inquiry model reflects Dewey’s position that effective democracy requires 
inquirers who do not hold slavishly to ideas, but see them as provisional. There are 
shades of Dewey’s pragmatism in these support documents too: it is explained that 
‘considering responses and actions’ should involve “examining the implications and 
consequences of people’s actions and decision making” (Ministry of Education, 2008a, 
p. 9).  
 
Social studies in New Zealand has been historically influenced by the disciplines of 
social sciences and humanities (Abbiss, 2011; Hunter, 2006). Graeme Aitken (2004) 
argues the strong orientation towards social studies taught as social science in part stems 
from the subject having been historically viewed by many New Zealand secondary 
school teachers as a chief vehicle for history and/or geography. Advocates of this 
tradition want “young people to perceive the world through the eyes of a social scientist, 
to ask the kinds of questions that a social scientist asks, and to use the analytical tools 
and concepts of the social scientists” (R. D. Barr et al., 1978, p. 71). Coherent bodies of 
thought are seen as avenues to understanding society, yet not through rote learning and 
memorising facts. Importantly, such an enterprise incorporates relies upon, and arguably 
enhances, critical thinking (Siegel, 2003). Its philosophic roots of the new social studies 
date back to the Platonic idea of education: knowledge understood as a rational view of 
reality, a quest for universal truth, and important for its own sake. In modern day terms, 
it is intended to connect “children with the great cultural conversation that very 
definitely is there and that transcends politics, special milieus, local experiences, and 
conventional sets of norms and experiences” (Egan, 1997, p. 14).  
 
One particularly important strain of thought in this tradition was ‘the new social 
studies’, a series of projects associated with post-Sputnik educational reform in North 
America and the pre-eminence of cognitive and developmental psychology. “A very 
strong emphasis in this period was the focus on the inquiry learning process and the 
development of concepts and methods drawn from a range of social sciences 
disciplines, particularly sociology and anthropology” (H. Barr et al., 1997, p. 20). One 
can trace the emergence of the new social studies movement through (i) the Woods 
Hole, Massachusetts conference of 1959 that drew together leaders in science and 
mathematics reform, (ii) Jerome Bruner’s (1960) summary of the conference themes in 
his book, The process of education, and (iii) a series of meetings in Endicott House, 
Massachusetts that considered broadening these curriculum reforms into other 
curriculum areas, including English and social studies (R. W. Evans, 2004, 2010).  A 
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central intuition of these reforms was that ‘the structure of the disciplines’, as Bruner 
(1960) called it, would enable learners to develop disciplinary epistemology which may 
be transferred to novel situations. He argued that “it is possible to present the 
fundamental structure of a discipline in such a way as to preserve some of the exciting 
sequences that lead a student to discover for himself” (p. 20).  Hill (1994) comments 
that, at the height of this era: 
Little was said about the skills associated with the ethical (and not just social) analysis of 
values and belief systems in their own right. Nor was this model sufficiently alert to the 
part played in the social sciences (and other areas of life) by ‘paradigms’, or value-laden 
models of thought. (p. 149) 
 
While the new social studies movement of the 1960s “was headed mostly in one 
direction, asserting the individual disciplines and abandoning the possibility of 
integrated social studies” (R. W. Evans, 2004, p. 131), there were a number of voices 
suggesting a different path. One cluster of voices coalesced around issues-centred 
developments that grew from the new social studies, among them Shirley Engle, Byron 
G. Massialis and Lawrence E. Metcalf. In varying projects, they proposed applying 
Bruner’s structure of the disciplines to an integrated social studies curriculum that 
incorporated both a reflective inquiry orientation and the social sciences and humanities. 
Significantly, we see in these educators’ work an increasing emphasis on values 
exploration and social decision-making as a critical component of social sciences and 
reflective inquiry. Here, students employ critical thinking to inform their decision-
making about pressing problems related to the immediate needs of students and/or 
wider society. Thus, emphasis is placed on “the synthesizing skills of the decision-
maker, not the analytical skills of the social scientist” (Ross, 1985, p. 9), though the 
importance of the latter is not eschewed.   
 
It was to be this grafting together of a Deweyan tradition of reflective inquiry, the new 
social studies, and a growing emphasis on values education, which significantly shaped 
New Zealand’s approach to social studies education. Notably, the 1960s and 1970s was 
a period of fertile intellectual exchange between the North American and New Zealand 
social studies communities. A key catalyst for New Zealand social studies curriculum 
review during this time drew from the work of Hilda Taba (Mutch et al., 2009), a 
student of Dewey’s, whose influential thinking about social studies curriculum 
organisation was synchronous with the new social studies (Stern, 2010). It is notable that 
Anthony McNaughton (University of Auckland) worked with Taba on what became 
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known as the ‘Taba project’, at San Francisco State University and co-authored the 
significant A teachers’ handbook to elementary social studies: An inductive approach (Taba et al., 
1971). In this book we see the genesis of New Zealand social studies framed as both 
reflective inquiry and social science. It emphasised organising learning experiences 
around concepts and ideas drawn from the social sciences and humanities, and inquiring 
and thinking using the methods of these disciplines. Critically, it also stressed the 
importance of values analysis, and in this way made an important connection to the 
issues-centred developments of the time.  
 
Though Taba died in 1967, and the projects associated with the new social studies were 
being wound back in the USA by the late 1970s, the depth of thought generated in this 
milieu significantly shaped the Syllabus for Forms 1-4 (Department of Education, 1977a) 
and associated documents. It produced a curriculum pattern that emphasised ideas-led34 
(as opposed to facts-driven) learning through processes of self-critical, reflective inquiry 
and revisiting important ideas, a pattern that underpins the structure of the social studies 
curriculum today. Variants of the North American reformers’ watchwords are easily 
detectable in the New Zealand social sciences learning area statement and support 
documents: “concepts, generalizations, the structure of the disciplines, inquiry 
operations, social issues, values clarification, and attitudes and value development” 
(Fenton, 1991, p. 1). The contemporary presence and evolution of these organising 
features in the New Zealand social studies curriculum, particularly as ‘conceptual, critical 
and reflective social inquiry’, owes much to the important contributions of Australian 
and New Zealand social studies academics such as Brian Hill, Paul Keown, Graeme 
Aitken and Bronwyn Wood (Ministry of Education, 2008a). 
 
Where does this discussion leave us in terms of how to better support learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action, theoretically speaking? It suggests several potentially 
productive and inter-connected lines of consideration. It would firstly appear that 
ethical decision-making and action is to be considered within a tradition of ‘social 
studies taught as reflective inquiry’ and that issues-based approaches would be 
consistent with this tradition. Second, and given that ‘social studies taught as social 
science’ (Hill, 1994) is also emphasised in New Zealand’s social studies curriculum, it is 
                                                        
34  For example, the term ‘concept’ was first introduced in Faces 4, and elaborated in Faces 5 (Department of Education, 
1978, 1981). 
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not too much of a stretch to imagine that philosophy, and ethics within this, might 
count within the social studies’ interdisciplinary stable.  
 
I turn now to considering ethical decision-making and action in light of these inter-
related framing philosophies. The next two sections primarily pertain to ‘social studies 
taught as reflective inquiry’ and build a case for an issues approach aimed at counter-
socialisation. The third section draws strongly from ‘social studies taught as social 
sciences’ and urges that the philosophy of ethics be afforded a much stronger curricular 
and pedagogical presence. Notably, both framing philosophies emphasise the importance 
of critical thinking. This strongly aligns with the way that the phrase ‘ethical decision-
making and action’ is conveyed through the text of the Values statement (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 10), that is, as having a critical dimension.  
SOCIAL ISSUES AS THE FOCUS OF ETHICS EDUCATION: TROUBLING A 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 
 
This section explores the first of the previously identified philosophies that currently 
frame the New Zealand social studies curriculum: reflective inquiry. In particular, I 
consider how ethical decision-making and action could be located within issues 
education, an orientation long advocated elsewhere but a comparatively more recent and 
less explicated feature of New Zealand social studies curricula. I argue that issues 
education requires refocusing in order to better accommodate ethical decision-making 
and action because ethics troubles conventional definitions of issues as being matters of 
public concern. Better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action must 
instead cognise issues that have both public and private implications. 
 
As this thesis’ introductory chapter alluded, stormy debate has surrounded questions as 
to the exact rationale for and aim of social studies. In this discordant context, the 
position I take is that discord itself is the very stuff of contemporary social studies – and 
certainly at the heart of ethical decision-making and action. There is undoubtedly a 
legitimate role for social studies in attending to societal stability, that is, “how society 
works” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30, my emphasis) or the ‘positive traditions and 
institutions’ that characterise society (Patrick, Vontz, & Nixon, 2002) such as how local 
or national decision-making processes operate. However, greater attention to societal 
controversy, contradiction and complexity is needed, lifting up phrases such as “engage 
critically with social issues” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30) that are somewhat 
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submerged in the current learning area statement. As Nelson (1996) argues, “pervasive 
human issues remain at the center of the human condition and at the core of 
knowledge. The legitimate study of society, human knowledge, and competing views, 
therefore requires a focus on issues” (p. 14).  
 
What I am essentially proposing is that supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and 
action, as the phrase suggests, necessitates considering social issues and their ethical 
content. In other words, dealing with uncertainty should be the core business of social 
studies education. This is hardly a novel suggestion. Issues education has had a long, 
albeit variable place in social studies and citizenship education internationally. 
Furthermore, its relationship to ethics has been noted in this literature, although mostly 
without substantial analysis. In the USA, and with the associated tradition of social 
studies taught as reflective inquiry, issues education reaches back into the work of 
Dewey, the social welfare and humanitarian movements of the early nineteenth century, 
and arguably to the teachings of Socrates (R. W. Evans & Saxe, 1996; Patrick et al., 
2002; Saxe, 1992). Often referred to as the ‘problems of democracy’, two prominent 
experiments with this approach were The Harvard social studies project and The crucial issues 
in government series of the 1960s and 70s. Zevin (2007) notes both produced small 
pamphlets for students that included data and a range of ethical positions about 
problems such as racism, community participation and foreign aid. Shaver (1992) 
observes that such public issues are of interest to social studies education and are 
inherently ethical because they “involve questions of proper aims and actions for society 
or for individuals and subgroups in society” (p. 97). Academic interest in teaching 
controversial issues in the UK stems from the Humanities Curriculum Project in the late 
1960s led by Lawrence Stenhouse (1968, 1971) and developments in the 1970s and 80s 
(see, for example: Carrington & Troyna, 1988; Dearden, 1981; Stradling, 1984; 
Wellington, 1986). This body of work has seen controversial issues occupying a central 
place in citizenship education in the UK until 2013 (see, for example: Claire & Holden, 
2007; Department for Education, 2014; Oulton, Day, Dillon, & Grace, 2004; 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998). Most notably within this literature, 
Hilary Claire (2001, 2003) has provided examples of how controversial issues can result 
from conflicting interpretations of ethical concepts and differences in theoretical 
positions.  
 
The argument that social studies should focus on issues is not new to Australasia either 
(see, for example: Gilbert & Hoepper, 2004; Reynolds, 2009) and, in particular, Brian 
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Hill (1994) has emphasised the ethical content of social issues.  In the New Zealand 
context, Graeme Aitken (2005a) has argued that topical issues should be a strong feature 
of a social studies curriculum structure based on citizenship education. His suggested 
process for approaching topical issues has considerably influenced the current 
curriculum’s model of social inquiry. Aitken chiefly acknowledges Hill (1994), but also 
the influence of teaching for intercultural understanding, issues-based learning (Zevin, 
2000), and Oliver and Shaver’s (1986) jurisprudential inquiry model. Notably, the latter 
explicitly rests on the exploration of ethical dilemmas. Aitken (2005a) describes topical, 
controversial issues as having the following characteristics:  
 they involve a specific problem about which different groups in a community urge 
conflicting courses of action 
 they are of such significance that each means of resolution is objectionable to some 
groups of citizens and arouses protest 
 they are concerned with value judgements and therefore cannot be settled on facts and 
evidence alone 
 they involve participants in a decision-making process. (p. 102) 
 
Aitken continues: 
They also need to have relevance and meaning to young people, to connect to the civic 
realities of everyday life and to “help them understand their reality and give them a 
stake in the future that rightly belongs to them.” (citing Kennedy, 1997, p. 3)  
 
Such is the weight behind issues education, that the vast majority of contemporary 
social studies and citizenship academics “would agree that social studies involves 
practising problem solving and decision making for developing citizenship skills on 
crucial social issues” (H. Barr et al., 1997, p. 39). It is, however, notable that, 
internationally, varying definitions and characteristics have been ascribed to ‘issues’, 
different rationales have been advanced for this focus in education (see, for example: 
R. W. Evans & Saxe, 1996; Hess, 2008; Levinson, 2006; Shaver, 1992), and opinion is 
divided over how central an organising concept ‘issues’ should be (Patrick et al., 2002). 
Some, for example, “would advocate the study of only perennial issues while other [sic] 
emphasize current or personal issues, such as moral dilemmas and values clarification” 
(Ross, 2006, pp. 22-23).  
 
Beyond the axiomatic observation of societal pluralism, issues education has been 
variously defended on the basis that (i) it enables learners to adapt to society and cope 
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with the complex demands of participating in their social worlds, (ii) it has a 
transformative dimension, allowing students to define the ‘good life’ for themselves and 
their communities, and (iii) controversy is essential to democratic life and that 
democratic well-being depends on a knowledgeable, articulate and politically engaged 
citizenry (see, for example: Hess, 2004, 2009; Ochoa-Becker, 2007; Shaver, 1992). While 
I would defend an issues focus on each of these counts, such variable rationales and 
definitions reflect an unsettled terrain into which ethical decision-making and action 
might be inserted.  
 
One predominant assumption across differing definitions of issues – that they are 
publically observable – requires some revision if ethical decision-making and action is to 
receive greater attention in New Zealand social studies education. Even though the 
difficulty of discerning where the change takes place between public and private is well 
understood (‘public’ issues arise from ‘private’ decisions and matters of public policy 
affect the individual, for example), the issues education literature is overwhelmingly 
directed towards public issues. Diana Hess (2002), for example, provides a stipulative 
definition that controversial issues are “unresolved questions of public policy that spark 
significant disagreement” (p. 11). Here she is not disregarding the private; instead she 
argues that a sole focus on private issues “could lead students to believe that whatever 
they decide to do is what everybody should do” (p. 42). Yet, in the context of this thesis, 
I think more needs to be said. Though Aitken (2005a) suggests that controversial issues 
‘arouse protest’, it may be possible to imagine situations where differences are not open 
and visible, and protest (indeed any form of disagreement) may not be an available 
means of response (Claire, 2003; Levinson, 2006). 
 
But it is the focus on community and societal issues that is the most limiting factor in 
thinking about ethical decision-making and action, and even a stipulative distinction 
between the private (personal) and public (societal) appears insufficient. How so? 
Ethical decision-making and action interrupts a public/private dichotomy because there 
do not appear to be some ethical issues that stop at our front gate and others that take 
over in a ‘public’ domain. Instead, I submit that ethical issues are scalable – as opposed to 
scale-dependent – to the extent that if the private issue in question cannot be expanded 
to the societal level and vice versa, it is unlikely to be an issue within social studies. 
Consider a ‘public’ example: “Should the federal government grant amnesty to people in 
the USA without legal documents?” (Hess, 2009, p. 5). While this is certainly a matter of 
policy debate, its ethical content speaks fundamentally to one’s relationships with, and 
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responsibilities to, the other; thus it does not solely pertain to publicly observable. 
Conversely, the answer to Socrates’ question “how should one live?” may begin with an 
everyday question such as ‘what shall I do?’ but in ethics arrives at a question about ‘a 
manner of life’ (Williams, 2011), and thus expands to include the societal/public sphere.  
 
Recent theorising about intractable ‘wicked problems’ and their implications for public 
policy recognise the complex interdependencies between issues; consumer choices are, 
for example, linked to issues of poverty, global politics, and environmental degradation. 
Just as the roots of such issues are tangled (Camillus, 2008), so too is their public and 
private nature. Among the challenges of global climate change, for example, is that 
those who seek to end the problem are also causing it. Further, “decision makers within 
public authorities do not control all the choices required to alleviate pressures on the 
climate” (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012, p. 127). Ethical responses to climate 
change, therefore, are not easily demarcated along the lines of public policy/private 
action. Allied objections have been raised about citizenship being conceived as having 
clear demarcation points: a matter of public rather than private concern, and/or 
tethered to concentric ‘layers’ such as local, national, regional and global. Some research 
has, therefore, sought more flexible, nuanced and enmeshed conceptions of citizenship 
(see, for example: Abowitz & Harmish, 2006; Lister, 2003, 2007; Mitchell & Parker, 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, a growing body of work questions what we miss as a result of too great a 
preoccupation with the ‘public’: young people’s everyday and ordinary citizenry may be 
valuable sources of insight into, for example, their political worlds. For some (such as 
Kallio & Häkli, 2011; Skelton, 2010; Wood, 2012), this takes seriously the idea that 
children’s life-worlds are not simply a site of induction, or preparation for future public 
political life, but worthy of consideration in their own right. Thus, a second problem 
with a distinction between public/private ethical issues is that this overly simplistic 
dichotomy risks the ‘private’ being dismissed as trivial, domestic and/or the associated 
with particular groups, such as women35 or children. As in traditional moral theory, the 
concerns and domains of these groups may be perceived as a less suitable object of 
moral investigation (Hinman, 2013)36. It is ironic that the vestiges of this position are 
still to be found in the issues education literature. For example, Anna Ochoa-Becker’s 
                                                        
35  For a discussion of the public/private distinction from feminist perspectives see Gavison (1992).  
36  For example, while the nature and ethics of friendship has been debated since Aristotle, more recent friendship 
critiques have forced “moral theories to take personal relationships seriously and consequently to refine and 
complicate their accounts in the process” (Helm, 2014, n.p.). 
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(2007) work conveys a sense that students’ personal issues are something to be left 
behind in pursuit of understanding more serious civic issues:  
Trivial issues should not consume class time. However, in order to motivate young 
citizens, we may start with the immediate issues of personal interest and then expand 
the study to broader issues that are more complex and effect [sic] wider populations. 
(p. 44) 
 
Of course, contemporary social studies and citizenship education does not expressly 
exclude private, domestic or seemingly mundane issues. Gilbert (1996, cited in Ministry 
of Education, 2008a), for example, notes that one major view of citizenship and 
citizenship education is as “participation in decision making in all aspects of life” (p. 5).  
However, the argument being made here is that learners’ everyday experiences, such as 
the ethical challenges they face in family and peer group relationships, requires greater 
status in issues education if they are to explore ethical decision-making and action in any 
real depth. The central point of clarification thus far, distinctive from much of the 
international literature on issues education, is that the ethical content of public issues is 
necessarily interwoven with the personal and vice versa. This means that social studies’ 
gaze need not rest – indeed cannot – on either learners’ immediate ethical worlds or 
some kind of civic ethics existing ‘out there’ in society. By contrast, exploring ethical 
decision-making and action in social studies enables learners to see the personal and 
social significance of ethical issues that are at once private and public in content.   
 
And so, to the sense in which I use ‘issues’ in this thesis. Notably a range of cognates 
are used for issues in the literature, including controversial, current, topical and social 
issues. I am conscious that controversial or topical issues might readily bring to mind 
public policy debates and occlude the private dimension of ethical issues. So, henceforth 
I therefore adopt social issues, the term currently employed in the New Zealand social 
studies curriculum, in order to capture the multiplicity of students’ ethical lives and the 
fullness of their participation in society. Four points may be made in relation to this 
usage. First, it is different from the idea that learners’ social inquiries “provide links to 
wider societal issues” (Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 5, my emphasis) or, alternatively, 
students’ consideration of the personal implications of a public policy debate. Second, and 
acknowledging the interpenetration of problems that confront society, the term social 
issues is to be understood as including environmental issues. I thirdly stress that while 
this thesis concentrates on the ethical content of social issues, this is not to deny the 
interplay with other dimensions such as political, historical or sociological questions and 
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debates. Last, and drawing on Hess’ (2009) work, I view three attributes as inherent in 
my use of social issues; that they are:  
 open and unresolved questions – really matters of debate.  
 authentic – affecting real people in real contexts.   
 contemporary – issues confronting people, communities and societies today, 
though the content of such issues are very often matters of longstanding ethical 
debate. 
SOCIAL STUDIES AS COUNTER-SOCIALISATION: THE NEED FOR ETHICAL PLURALISM 
AND AGONISM 
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing 
pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, 
and so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipatory, and at the same time, 
enslaving conceptions. (Berlin, 1999, p. 159) 
 
Still within a tradition of reflective inquiry, this section considers the deeper intent of 
exploring social issues, their ethical content, and the decision-making and action that 
arise from this. I highlight here, the influential work of Shirley Engle and Anna Ochoa-
Becker (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Ochoa-Becker, 2007) because their reflective decision-
making model appears to align well with ethical decision-making and action. I suggest, 
however, a broadening out of the worldviews and methodologies which students might 
engage with in their consideration of social issues. I argue, in essence, for a plural 
approach to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action. 
 
Citizenship transmission, or socialisation, is an ever-present aspect of social studies 
education. The subject is inevitably, and desirably, a domesticating and conserving force 
that “inducts young children into its customs, values and behaviours as a way of 
continuing existing traditions and practices” (Engle & Ochoa, 1988, p. 30). Further, I 
think there is an important place for a civics approach to ethics in social studies; 
understanding New Zealand’s decision-making processes is a notable example in the 
context of this thesis. Similarly, the Values statement in The New Zealand curriculum 
(Ministry of Education, 2007) states that students should learn about different kinds of 
values, the values of others, and those that underpin New Zealand’s cultural and 
institutional traditions. I have no quarrel with this and of course accept that, in any 
society, values are inculcated – or, in the words of the curriculum, “to be encouraged” 
(p. 10).   
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However, I contend that social studies education in a democracy equally requires counter-
socialisation (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Ochoa-Becker, 2007). This by no means eradicates 
the forces and products of socialisation, nor the need for social cohesion. Counter-
socialisation is, instead, responsible social criticism and action borne of ongoing, 
independent, and thoughtful assessment of social norms – an ethic of critique (Starratt, 
1994) or ‘thinking against’ socialisation. Perhaps, therefore, one could more properly 
characterise counter-socialisation as a differing kind of socialisation, focussed on 
interrupting and interrogating the status quo. For Engle and Ochoa-Becker, the 
intellectual dimensions of this include the ability to appraise the validity of truth claims, 
and make decisions in relation to public issues, the latter involving problem clarification, 
and identifying values assumptions, suggesting alternatives, predicting consequences, 
reaching and justifying decisions. To return to a theme explored in Chapter Two, these 
educators stress the tentative nature of ideas: “democracy assumes an open society in the 
sense that change and improvement are taken for granted. Democracy is never completed. 
There are no final solutions, no unquestioned answers” (Engle & Ochoa, 1988, p. 10).  
 
Like Engle and Ochoa, I contend that counter-socialisation can and should become the 
dominant goal of social studies as learners progress through their schooling, and that 
socially critical understanding is entirely possible for young learners. I do, however, 
depart from their position over three key matters. To return to the argument made in 
the previous section, I firstly stress that counter-socialisation is directed towards public 
and private transformation. Social criticism, therefore, includes critical reflection on, and 
action in, one’s own ethical life. A second departure is discussed more extensively in 
Chapter Five: the need for a greater focus on social action, in other words, imbuing the 
‘counter’ with a sense of agency and the enacted. This understanding of counter-
socialisation places social transformation at the heart of social studies learning rather than 
social criticism, although the latter is a vital dimension. Might this conception of 
counter-socialisation more properly be described as an argument for orienting social 
studies education towards ‘educating citizens for cultural transformation’ (Gibson, 2009; 
Gibson & McKay, 2005)?  To the extent that a strong relationship between critically 
informed and engaged citizenry is emphasised, my answer to this question is yes. 
However, cultural transformation, at least in the sense used by Susan Gibson and 
Roberta McKay, strongly links social action to a critical pedagogy approach. This carries 
forward a conception of ethics and society which sees social justice in particular terms.  
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This brings me to my third reservation about Engle and Ochoa’s (1998) conception of 
counter-socialisation and, likewise, social studies directed towards cultural transformation 
(Gibson, 2009; Gibson & McKay, 2005). I contend that counter-socialisation should draw 
its force from multiple paradigms, that is, social studies’ purposes should enable students to 
critically explore their social worlds, issues and participation, through as wide a range of 
ethical perspectives as possible. By contrast, Engle and Ochoa’s (1998) work sits squarely 
within the American pragmatic tradition of philosophy, this despite the authors’ distancing 
from what they see as Dewey’s scientism. I do not wish learners to be confined to this 
tradition or their model of reflective decision-making, partly because pragmatism takes a, 
broadly speaking, consequentialist approach to ethics. As Chapter Two introduced, there 
is rather more to be said about ethical decision-making and action than this. Moreover, 
one can arrive at a similar notion of counter-socialisation from a whole host of alternative 
theoretical underpinnings. Avner Segall (2004), for example, identifies a wide variety of 
proposals for social studies education that share a critical goal, albeit with differing 
ontological and methodological dispositions. This thesis is not, therefore, an argument for 
paradigmatic privileging or dethroning, nor, as I go on to point out, is it an attempt to 
smoothly synthesise perspectives or dissolve theoretical tensions. I do, however, have an 
interest in drawing in theoretical terrains that have existed at the margins of social studies 
education, such as postmodernism and poststructuralism (Segall, 2013; Segall, Heilman, & 
Cherryholmes, 2006), in order to offer learners a broader range of tools for societal 
critique and action. So my primary interest lies in introducing learners to a wider realm of 
possibility than might have otherwise been the case if, at heart, the purposes of social 
studies were anchored in a narrow set of commitments.  
 
Familiar and defensible objections to an encompassing position of this kind draw on 
critiques of relativism. Examples of relativism include the claim that truth is relative to 
particular conceptual frameworks and that reality is a social construction (Swoyer, 2014). 
There is not the space here to canvas all species of, and arguments for and against, 
relativism. So, I focus instead on relativism as a meta-ethical standpoint, given its 
particular salience to this thesis. In its most extreme form, ethical relativism “claims that 
what is right or good is always relative to the particular circumstances of cultures, 
groups or even individuals. It denies that there are objective ethical standards” (Preston, 
2007, p. 30). Hinman (2013) notes the immediate attractiveness of this as a doctrine 
because, for instance, it offers the promise of tolerance and understanding, reflects the 
fact of moral diversity, and addresses a lack of a plausible alternative. But there are 
numerous limits to these stances. Tolerance, for example, and at least at this extreme 
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end of the relativist spectrum, presents particular philosophic problems. At its most self-
refuting level, ethical relativism commits one to being tolerant of intolerance. In 
addition, the reality of experience is that, sooner or later, the ethical relativist who 
desires tolerance finds unpalatable exceptions and thus reaches for an ethical standard. 
Such tolerance may also offer little in the way of compulsion to change, or even to take 
a position. By taking seriously multiple ethical perspectives, it is argued that “for the 
full-fledged moral relativist, there is no vantage point from which to exert moral 
pressure, for each person is considered right relative to his or her culture” (Hinman, 
2013, p. 43). Presenting learners with such limited means for adjudication has a 
potentially numbing effect, producing inertia in the very subject that encourages taking 
ethical action.  I should point out here that a criticism often levelled at post-
structuralism is that of extreme relativism. However, in post-structural arguments about 
the need to attend to power relations and open up spaces for considering 
marginalisation, the relative positions are necessarily critiqued; this is not the same as 
‘anything goes’. 
 
The previous objections considered, this thesis locates counter-socialisation within 
Hinman’s (2013) conception of robust ethical pluralism, which posits that “disagreement 
and difference are standard features of the moral landscape and can be sources of moral 
strength” (p. 45). I note Swoyer’s (2014) point that “relativistic themes are frequently 
defended under alternative banners like ‘pluralism’ or ‘constructivism’ (with a particular 
author’s line between relativism and pluralism typically marking off those views he likes 
from those he doesn’t)” (n.p.). The content of robust ethical pluralism is indeed 
relativistic but, pace Swoyer, the argument in its defence necessarily requires some kind 
of ‘marking off’.  For Hinman, robust ethical pluralism may be distinguished from 
weaker versions that suggest ethical theories offer different answers to different types of 
questions, and therefore offer different angles on moral life. The lack of recognition this 
gives to contradiction is central to Hinman’s thesis. Robust ethical pluralism is therefore 
more alert to inconsistency and while it “does not give up the hope of compatibility [it] 
does not make compatibility a necessary requirement” (Hinman, 2013, p. 49). But this is 
not an ‘anything goes’ position; Hinman argues that four principles, though not 
incontrovertible, ought to guide our responses to moral conflict: 
 Understanding – avoiding judgemental un-thought and seeking instead to understand 
people’s moral practices with their wider cultural contexts;  
 Tolerance –  providing space for the pursuit of diverse moral visions, to the extent that 
this is possible; 
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 Standing/speaking up against evil – “at least in the cases of egregious moral 
wrongdoing” particularly because this is often directed at the powerless; and, 
 Fallibility – recognising with humility that moral ideas may be mistaken or incomplete 
and committing to continual process of scrutinising such ideas. (pp. 50-51) 
 
My expectation is that these principles would be made explicit to students and they are, 
of course, open to scrutiny. The productive intersection between ‘social studies as 
counter-socialisation’ and robust ethical pluralism is at least two-fold. Robust ethical 
pluralism firstly cognises the diversity and complexity of our ethical worlds, including 
that: (i) our moral codes are contingent, historically constituted and culture-soaked, (ii) 
there is not (yet) a moral system that both claims to be absolute and is universally 
accepted as such, and (iii) there exist multiple and not necessarily consistent ethical 
frameworks. These recognitions offer considerable scope in terms of learners’ critical 
consideration of ethical decision-making and action, particularly if they are made 
explicit. Attentive, unsettling or disturbing pedagogical practices would therefore expose 
ethical diversity and contradiction and support learners to locate social issues, and their 
own and others’ ethical decision-making and action within a landscape of theoretical 
tension. Importantly, this is not to dismiss varieties of, and defences for, moral 
absolutism. To do so would be to undermine legitimate stances within the purview of 
social studies education, such as adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, students’ own religious-ethical views, and arguments for cosmopolitan 
citizenship (Osler & Starkey, 2005). As a description of the social world, robust ethical 
pluralism counts universalist approaches as being among a range of considerations that 
exist in the world and that might be brought to bear on ethical issues. 
 
A second reason why robust ethical pluralism is cogent for ‘social studies as counter-
socialisation’ is that it engages with ethical inconsistency and disagreement – the stuff of 
contemporary social issues. From this standpoint, social decision-making may be 
strengthened because ethical perspectives are positioned as productive counter-points in 
considering ways to go on. In another context, Patti Lather (2006) points out that 
philosophic tensions borne of paradigm proliferation are ‘good things to think with’ 
because they “keep us moving in order to produce and learn from ruptures, failures, 
breaks, refusals” (p. 45). What Hinman’s (2013) notion of robust ethical pluralism 
conveys, I think, is a sense of agonism, as opposed to antagonism, between ethical 
perspectives. In taking up this concept to argue against merging the inclinations of 
continental and analytic philosophy, Robrecht Vanderbeeken (2011) explains that: 
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Agonism implies the opportunity to express disagreements.  It does not assume that 
conflicts are harmful by definition and that every conflict can be eliminated given 
sufficient time for deliberation and rational agreement.  In other words, it does assume 
that conflicts can have a non-rational or emotional component which should not be 
neglected and that they can have a productive contribution in the long run. (p. 21) 
 
Similarly, Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2013) draws attention to the ways in which deliberative 
democracy’s search for consensus is overly rational and ends up excluding some voices.  
Her work sits in feminist political philosophy which:  
…comes out of poststructural continental feminist and philosophical traditions. It takes 
from Marxism the hope for a more radically egalitarian society. It takes from 
contemporary continental philosophy notions of subjectivity and solidarity as malleable 
and constructed. Along with postmodern thought, it repudiates any notion of pre-
existing moral or political truths or foundations (McAfee, 2014, n.p.) 
 
For Mouffe, the aim of democratic politics “is to transform antagonism into agonism. This 
requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to 
express themselves over issues” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 16) and in which political ideas are 
seen as interlocutors. In an analogous context, Malcolm MacDonald and John O’Regan 
(2013) theorise through Levinas and Derrida to argue that the ethical grounds for 
intercultural praxis should lie in keeping the conversation going; in their words keeping 
“a reflexive eye on the many” (p. 1016).  In their view, it is through responsibility for the 
other “that the discursive terrain remains open and that a non-normative ethics 
becomes possible” (p. 1015). Retaining this openness enables constant alertness to the 
silencing of alternatives and the potential for turning away from the other. Significantly, 
this position rejects closure brought about through tolerance – where tolerance is 
understood as retaining one’s power in the process of suffering the other – a position 
similar to Hinman’s (2013) even though he uses the term tolerance.  
 
Critically, given the extensive social studies education literature that is dedicated to 
democratic values, virtues, ideals (and so on), robust ethical pluralism and agonistic 
approaches enable learners’ counter-socialisation to extend to a critique of the ethical 
content of democracy. Following Mouffe (2009), democracies are a matter of historical 
and spatial specificity; one cannot speak of democracy as being immutable.  This point 
has been sheeted home in a recent comparative study (Fischer, 2012) which indicates 
that the democratic values evident in the USA may well be distinct from New Zealand.  
Moreover, I concur with Mouffe’s (2009) argument that while liberal democracy is: 
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Constitutive of our form of life and it is certainly worthy of our allegiance…there is no 
reason to present it as the only legitimate way of organising human existence and to try 
to impose it on the rest of the world. (p. 557)  
 
To summarise the argument thus far, ethical decision-making and action understood within 
a reflective, issues-based tradition does not promote “critical thinking for the sake of debate, 
argument or logical reasoning, but for constructive change, for the transformation of 
society” (Alquist, 1990, cited in R. W. Evans, Newmann, & Saxe, 1996). Critical ethical 
decision-making and action has a personal dimension also, attending to the transformation 
of learners’ everyday experiences. Understood in this more expansive sense, social issues are 
pedagogical sites of counter-socialisation in which students agonise with ethical perspectives in 
order to consider social action, or ways to go on.  But to support the critical function of 
reflective inquiry in any meaningful sense, social studies needs to open the windows wide to 
ethical perspectives.  It is to this end that I suggest that social studies may profitably engage 
with the philosophy of ethics – a matter to which the next section now turns.  
 
ENGAGING WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS: THE ROLE OF PERSPECTIVES IN 
SOCIAL STUDIES 
Until you can see the truth in at least three sides of an issue, you probably don’t 
understand it. And until you can convincingly argue all three perspectives, you probably 
can’t work with a diverse group of people to find a mutually satisfactory solution 
(Schutt, 2001, p.108) 
 
Up until this point, the discussion about ethical decision-making and action’s theoretical 
framing has taken place within the context of social studies taught as reflective inquiry.  
This section considers the intersection with social studies taught as social science and, in 
many respects, reflects the way in which these two traditions have been brought 
together in the New Zealand social studies curriculum. My argument builds on that of 
the previous two sections by exploring how the philosophy of ethics could better 
support learners’ capacity to critically and reflectively engage with social issues and their 
ethical content.  I contemplate the role that the formal study of this discipline should 
play in social studies learners’ exploration of ethical decision-making and action.  
Chapter Three revealed that successive New Zealand curricula have barely noted the 
potential contribution of philosophy to social studies’ interdisciplinary approach. I take 
it that this is a matter of oversight rather than deliberate exclusion but, either way, I urge 
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that the philosophy of ethics should have a greater voice.  What might this look like, and 
on what basis might one argue for its more overt inclusion?  This section rests on a 
fairly simple proposition, and advances an aspect of Preston’s (2007) recommendations 
for whole-school approaches to understanding ethics: that if social studies education is 
to permit an open exploration of ethical decision-making and action, learners require 
access to the language or discourse of philosophical ethics, as well as an understanding of 
the ethical systems ‘in play’. Preston argues that though we mostly learn to navigate our 
ethical lives experientially – through interactions with significant others and from 
significant events – the study of ethics potentially complements the educative 
experiences of life. In his view, this provides a vital “bridge between the micro-moral 
world of home and the macro-impersonal ethical systems of society” (p. 217). He 
further contends that students: 
Can be educated to recognise when they are encountering ethical issues, and to be 
aware of the principles or normative considerations at stake, and then to be able to 
relate this to decision-making in their own lives. This approach goes well beyond the 
clarification of values to a conversation about the justification of ethical decisions 
within a caring environment. (p. 217) 
  
In other words, the discipline of ethics offers a means with which to conduct and 
extend discussion about ethical decision-making and action in educational settings, and 
in a way that stands outside programmes for the inculcation of ‘morals’. This potential 
contribution is here explored in two parts: (a) its nature and extent, and (b) a 
justification for inserting ethics’ disciplinary modes of thinking and theoretical 
perspectives into social studies.  
 
A. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ETHICS’ DISCIPLINARY CONTRIBUTION TO 
SOCIAL STUDIES 
If the language and discourse of ethics were to be employed in social studies, what 
would this include? Preston’s (2007) use of ‘discourse’ can be understood in two senses. 
The first has to do with doing ethics, and pertains particularly to the analytic traditions of 
philosophy that, broadly speaking, focus on the clarity and cogency of argument. These 
modes of thinking and discussion involve both rational procedures and analytical 
concepts, such as logic.  A second sense in which Preston’s use of discourse can be 
understood is as a field of substantive concepts that categorise (i) what is thought about 
in ethics, such as fairness or responsibility, and (ii) types of inquiries, arguments and 
positions in ethical theory. The latter arrives at a term introduced in Chapter Two and 
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that has recently become a feature of New Zealand senior social studies and geography 
curriculum and assessment support materials (see Chapter Three): ethical perspectives. As 
previously discussed, within the field of ethics we can identify categories, or 
perspectives, that classify particular inquiries, arguments and positions: virtues, 
deontological, or consequentialist ethics, for example. Ethicists use these categories to 
provide comprehensibility to a diverse range of philosophic positions. It is possible to 
trace genealogies of these perspectives, to identify debates within and between them, 
and even to recognise the limits of such systems of classification. 
 
One could see this characterisation as advocating something along an axis between 
‘social studies as normative ethics’ and ‘social studies as applied ethics’ – relegating 
meta-ethics, for example, to the periphery. In many ways, applied ethics does come very 
close to what I am proposing, if understood as reflection on social issues and action 
through a range of ethical perspectives. The field’s themes and issues – such as war, 
capital punishment, and poverty – are certainly rich resources for social studies teaching 
and learning. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of applied ethics is analogous to 
that of social studies education. However, I think one needs to be cautious about 
conflating social studies’ interest in ethics with applied ethics, not least because the 
latter’s nature and status is a matter of debate (Beauchamp, 1984, 2003; Cortina, García-
Marzá, & Conill, 2008). At least one line of critique suggests that the field, which has 
grown in academic interest since the 1970s, does what philosophers of ethics have 
always done: attend to practical social problems. If we accept Adela Cortina’s (2008) 
contention that “applied ethics limits its sphere of prescription to the exigencies of a civic 
ethics and does not get involved in the personal projects of a good life” (p. 15), an 
assertion that seems descriptively false, then we are once again caught in the 
dichotomous bind outlined in the previous section. But perhaps a greater concern is that 
a sole focus on normative or applied ethics belies the extent to which the many fields of 
philosophy and ethics intersect.  
 
To locate social studies learners’ exploration of ethical decision-making and action 
purely in normative or applied ethics is to neglect at least two dimensions of 
philosophical ethics education: (i) an area of content, that is, “a body of historical and 
theoretical knowledge and of perennially contestable questions” and (ii) meta-ethics, “in 
which contending theories are studied conceptually and logically, but then the move is 
made to epistemology and/or critical theory in order to determine how these theories 
can be evaluated”  (Gregory, 2009, p. 105).  How might this affect social studies 
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teaching and learning? It could, firstly, minimise an important contextual dimension: 
learners’ ability to locate the present ethical issue in question within a history of 
(Western) ideas, and to see that the ethical content of many current issues are matters of 
longstanding debate. In the language of the New Zealand social studies curriculum’s 
social inquiry approach, they would be limited in their capacity to “ask questions, gather 
information and background ideas, and examine relevant current issues” (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 30). Secondly, learners could be restricted in their ability to consider 
the meanings and nature of moral judgements or how the adjudication between rival 
ethical perspectives might be defended. And yet meta-ethical theories may throw 
‘exploring values and perspectives’ – another aspect of social inquiry – into sharp relief. 
For example, surfacing a distinction between moral universalism and moral relativism is 
both simple to explain and would offer learners a conceptual framework with which to 
explore debates about the extent to which rules or human rights37 ought to apply. This 
distinction may also support them to consider ethical issues close to their experience, 
such as disjunctions between espoused school rules and instances of differential 
treatment. 
 
B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BRINGING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS 
The previous section argued that social studies’ engagement with the philosophy of 
ethics should incorporate the latter’s conceptual, analytic/modes of thinking and 
contextual/history of ideas dimensions. I have also suggested that, while applied ethics 
aligns strongly with a focus on social issues in social studies, other branches of ethics 
have a potentially important role to play in learners’ counter-socialisation. I have begun 
to suggest how such a disciplinary insertion is concordant with the New Zealand social 
studies curriculum, particularly its social inquiry methodology. There is, however, a 
rather more substantive argument to be made as to why the philosophy of ethics should 
occupy a more overt space in social studies’ interdisciplinary stable.  The following 
subsections develop this argument. I firstly argue that the philosophy of ethics is among 
the powerful knowledges that learners should have access to as a matter of social justice. 
I secondly argue that, in principle at least, the philosophy of ethics contributes to a 
range of social studies outcomes that support counter-socialisation. 
 
                                                        
37 Concepts central to Level 3 and Level 5/6 of the New Zealand social studies curriculum, respectively. 
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ACCESS TO POWERFUL KNOWLEDGES AS A MATTER OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The main contention laid out in this section is that social studies learners’ access to the 
language and discourse of ethics rests on a principle of social justice.  Here, I draw on 
the work of sociologists such as Michael Young and Johan Muller (M. Young, 2008, 
2013; M. Young & Muller, 2010, 2013) who fear that the worst excesses of progressive 
education – a system that ‘over-socialises’ knowledge, or emphasises process to the 
detriment of content – risks excluding already socially disadvantaged learners. This, they 
argue, is because they are precluded access to the ‘powerful knowledge’ to which all are 
entitled: specialised disciplinary knowledge that, although fallible, has considerable 
capacity for generalisation. This concern has resonated with many academics similarly 
concerned with “constructivist variants that make little reference to existing bodies of 
knowledge” (Dyke, 2013, p. 1).   
 
Notably, Michael Young (2013) cites ethics as an example of powerful knowledge, and 
in particular Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself as being as “near to being a generalizable 
(or universal) principle for how human beings should treat others as we can get” (p. 
108). As Chapter Two outlined, other normative theories may be similarly defended as 
having generalising capacities. Rather more generously, one could assume that he would 
want to count the insights generated from virtues ethics, consequentialism or an ethic of 
care as ‘powerful knowledge’. Understanding diverse ethical perspectives, therefore, 
might indeed have some explanatory power in terms of ethical controversies in plural 
societies. Second, Young wants to use ethics as an example of powerful knowledge that 
is not restricted to STEM38 subjects, and which has two important characteristics: it is 
(a) specialised (with generalising capacities) and (b) differentiated from that knowledge 
that learners bring to school. The argument built thus far in this thesis casts some doubt 
over where exactly the line might be drawn between ‘academic’ and ‘everyday’ ethics.  
Furthermore, when one links explanatory power, as Young does, to meritocracy and 
social mobility his argument appears to founder. In an important sense the philosophy 
of ethics is not powerful knowledge – one can conduct life without such academic 
insight and it does not appear necessary for social mobility.  
 
I do, however, contend that bringing the knowledge foundations into the curriculum 
mitigates the risks of unfettered constructivism and share Young’s view about the power 
of disciplinary knowledge, that epistemic access is crucial in addressing educational 
                                                        
38 Science, technology, engineering and mathematics. 
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inequality. Because I am cautious about where the concept of powerful knowledge takes 
us, I wish to explore these reservations before suggesting how Young’s argument could 
be re-worked in order to more satisfactorily defend the role of ethics in social studies 
education. Thus, what follows could be considered an extension of his thinking. Young 
wants to suggest, for example, that learners’ everyday knowledge is to be reworked in 
light of more sophisticated, powerful knowledge. As Simon Catling and Fran Martin 
(2011) note, “inherent in this perspective is that children’s experience, knowledge and 
understanding are poorly formed and of limited everyday use and value” (p. 317). The 
discipline of ethics is thus valorised over one’s ‘ordinary’ experience of successfully 
navigating in a complex ethical world, for example. I’m not convinced, therefore, that 
learners fetch up to school with sloppy ethical thought. But even if this were the case, 
and as has been argued earlier in this chapter, better supporting learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action most particularly requires an ‘articulation’ (Catling & Martin, 
2011) between their everyday ethical learning and that to which they might be exposed 
at school. This is what Parker Palmer (1998) describes as honouring both “the ‘little’ 
stories of the individual and the big stories of the discipline and tradition” (p. 76). 
Arguably, social studies can explore the productive multiplicities across these spheres, 
without subordinating one to the other. Martin Dyke (2013) questions whether: 
In trying to reassert the value of knowledge (scientific or otherwise) over more 
experiential approaches to learning, Young has missed the importance of practice and 
the relationship between knowing and doing. Perhaps what really counts is the 
relationship between our knowledge and our practice: how we engage, critique and test 
ideas and theories and practice, and upon what basis we make our judgements. (p. 8) 
 
As someone with an interest in poststructural theorising, I contend that powerful 
knowledge is both contextual and discursive in nature, as does Michael Young (2013). 
But I do not assume “that ‘access to subject knowledge’ can be discarded as a priority” 
(p. 114) for those included in New Zealand’s ‘long tail’ of underachievement. Ethics’ 
more explicit insertion in social studies is, as I have argued, a critical and urgent move. 
However, a key tenet of this thesis is that ethics’ contribution to social studies is just 
that, the input of one discourse among many ways of seeing. I wonder, therefore, 
whether cultural discourses are to count among the ‘specialised’ sites, institutions and 
forms of transmission that Young contends produce powerful knowledge. I think that 
there are some important reasons they should. Māori and Pacific cultural discourses, for 
example, have their own epistemic forms and discipline, legitimate certain practices and 
forms of authority, and ‘fiction’ certain truths (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1984). Māori 
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ethical perspectives are, furthermore, diverse and tied to local contexts (Keown et al., 
2005, p. 17).  For young Māori connected to their marae, such knowledges offer 
different powerful positions in their communities and, increasingly, in a wider society 
coming to terms with decolonisation – in iwi corporations and businesses, tourism and 
hospitality, the creative arts, and public service, for example. While the powerful 
knowledges Michael Young (2013) speaks of may predominantly determine access to 
these employment sectors, a degree of comfort and ease in tikanga and te reo Māori is 
increasingly advantageous. Granted, we are by no means witnessing an end to a 
consistent and deplorable pattern of Māori social and educational disadvantage in this 
country. However, education’s role in realising cultural potential, that is, offering young 
Māori opportunities to enlarge what may exist as tacit cultural knowledge, is pivotal to 
reducing disparities – a view strongly endorsed through the Ministry of Education’s Ka 
hikitia 2013-2017 strategy (Ministry of Education, 2014a). Furthermore, New Zealand’s 
education system has a critical role to play in prising open the “particular forms of 
ethics” (Munshi, Broadfoot, & Smith, 2011, p. 128) that have shaped Māori-Pākehā 
communication since colonisation. This is perhaps no more acute than in social studies 
education, which has a concerning history of silencing Māori (and Pacific) worldviews 
(Harrison, 1998; Luke, 2005; May, 1992; Samu, 2009; J. Simon, 1992).  
 
My point here is that all learners require access to the powerful knowledges produced in 
multiple epistemes and discourses if they are to successfully navigate in New Zealand’s 
bicultural, plural and complex society. In particular, addressing historical injustice and 
concomitant educational disparity cannot be achieved by marginalising cultural 
epistemologies – any more than it can by precluding access to the powerful knowledges 
Michael Young (2013) cognises. Young’s question of social justice stretches, therefore, 
into the interdependent issues of content and representation that have confronted the 
philosophy of education at least since the 1970s and 80s: which philosophical issues are 
discussed/never discussed, how those conversation take place, and who is 
included/excluded from the discussions (Burbules, 2000). An allied debate is the extent 
to which Western philosophy may be extended to non-Western thought. Philip Catton 
(2012) asks: if we are at all serious about cross-cultural dialogue, and about those who 
are present, at what point might philosophy hurt?  
We aim to consider philosophy in relation to traditional Māori intellection; to learn 
philosophically from Māori; to engage in bicultural dialogue…Is philosophising 
universal to all cultures? Does the question ‘is philosophising universal to all cultures’ in 
net terms help or harm cross-cultural dialogue and understanding? (p. 1) 
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Thus, while I defend the philosophy of ethics’ role in better supporting learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action as a matter of social justice, I am sensitive to the limits of 
Western philosophising. Also, as previously discussed, I do not think the field offers a 
complete account of, and response to ethical life, a matter I explore in greater depth in 
the next chapter. To see ethics as a matter for philosophical abstraction is also to lose 
something of the inter-woven texture of academic thought and overlook the need for 
interdisciplinary responses to the complex issues that face societies – again, powerful 
knowledges produced in multiple epistemes and discourses.  
SUPPORTING COUNTER-SOCIALISATION: ETHICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL 
STUDIES OUTCOMES 
How could the philosophy of ethics be powerful knowledge in social studies learners’ 
lives? This section canvasses the potential disciplinary contribution to a range of inter-
related outcomes in social studies education: (i) affective/dispositional, (ii) skills,  
(iii) knowledge/conceptual understanding, (iv) cultural identities, and (v) participatory 
(Aitken & Sinnema, 2008). I explore how the philosophy of ethics might contribute to 
each of these in turn, particularly when social studies has a focus on social issues and 
counter-socialisation.  
 
AFFECTIVE: One of the principal reasons for bringing the philosophy of ethics into social 
studies is its role in consciousness raising and encouraging learners to care about social 
issues. Because the discipline is fundamentally about what kind of life is worth living, it 
directly supports learners’ consideration of what matters most in their own lives and in 
the lives of others. It enables them to explore what they care about and offers 
opportunities for discussion and debate in relation to contextual issues. The New 
Zealand Philosophy Teachers’ Association argues, further, that the subject “is in a 
unique position to nurture and strengthen the (innate) desire to find meaning in the 
world” (Tweedie, 2013, n.p.). Tempting though it may be to describe learners as 
apathetic about social issues, at least in relation to climate change, a number of 
psychological barriers may limit their engagement with the issue. Gifford (2011) 
describes these as dragons of inaction, manifested as, for example: numbness, optimism 
bias, denial and unwillingness to confront the effects of one’s worldviews. To add to 
Gifford’s suggestions as to how these barriers could be overcome, environmental ethics 
could assist students, for example, to formulate their own ethical vision for the 
environment or to cope with uncertain environmental knowledge (Warner & De Cosse, 
2014). Undertaking these kinds of exploration need not undermine learners’ spirituality 
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or religious views. In an example explored further in Chapter Seven, the Dialogue 
Australasian network39, which has shaped numerous religious education programmes, 
includes theoretical and applied ethics as one of its five key strands. 
 
Another strongly dispositional reason for mobilising the field of ethics in social studies 
pertains to appreciating difference. I draw here on Robert Hanvey’s (2004) and others’ 
(for example: Banks et al., 2005; Case, 1993; Pike & Selby, 1988) conception of 
perspective consciousness.  These authors argue that learners’ capacity to make effective 
judgements in a plural, globally interconnected world is dependent on developing their 
perceptivity and receptivity: “the recognition of the existence, the malleability, and the 
diversity of perspective” (Hanvey, 2004, p. 5). In their view, the benefits of developing 
learners’ perspective consciousness are two-fold. First, it may add to learners ‘synoptic 
view’ of the world, their ability to “see the ‘whole picture’ whether focussing on a local 
or international matter” (Case, 1993, p. 318). Importantly, seeing the whole picture does 
not mean a crisp, permanent global view; the authors emphasise the dynamic and 
complex nature of social and environmental issues. They secondly argue that 
perspective consciousness may prompt an inclination to “probe the deep layers” 
(Hanvey, 2004, p. 7) of claims, that is, to move past too ready an assessment of 
individual stances and instead more closely consider the assumptions that give rise to 
those positions. Although their use of ‘perspective’ is somewhat different to mine, I 
should think it likely that they would wish learners to be conscious of ethical 
perspectives and would see some role for the formal study of ethics in this. Hanvey 
mentions, for example, that “some (but not all) values clarification exercises can 
heighten awareness of otherwise unrevealed aspects of perspective” (p. 7). 
 
Another reason for drawing the philosophy of ethics into social studies is that the 
discipline’s modes of thinking encourage the disposition of tolerance, a capacity 
required for agonising with differing ethical perspectives. The New Zealand philosophy 
teaching and learning guidelines (Ministry of Education, 2014b) suggest that it is the reasoned 
exchange of ideas in the classroom that fosters tolerance of, and respect for others, a 
matter expanded upon in Teaching philosophy in Asia and the Pacific (UNESCO, 2009):  
Learning how to reflect is important for the construction of the personality of children 
and adolescents. It is an opportunity for them to experience that they are thinking 
                                                        
39 http://www.dialogueaustralasia.org/ 
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beings, which strengthens their self-esteem and helps them grow in humanity by 
experiencing disagreement in discussion in peaceful coexistence. This, in turn, raises the 
threshold of tolerance with respect to others and prevents violence. (p. 18) 
 
SKILLS: Critically, the kind of perspective consciousness that Hanvey et al., and no doubt 
many social studies teachers, seek cannot be arrived at without the tools fit for the task. 
There is a vast body of international philosophy education literature that suggests the 
discipline has much to offer in this regard. Clinton Golding (2005) argues that 
philosophy should be added to the social sciences curriculum because “the discipline is 
specifically designed for answering complex conceptual questions and resolving 
controversial ethical issues” (p. 115) that are central to the learning area. As a 
methodology, Golding (2002) argues that philosophical inquiry’s benefits for social 
studies learners are three-fold: it (i) aids meaning-making and conceptual understanding, 
(ii) enables learners to examine the ‘substructure’ of social studies and make connections 
to their own experiences because philosophy is foundational to education and life, and 
(iii) promotes ‘good thinking’ – both the conditions for, and improvements in, rational 
thought, critique and discussion. Similarly, The New Zealand philosophy teaching and learning 
guidelines (Ministry of Education, 2014b) argue that philosophy has a vital role in 
developing students’ ability to question, to form rational, plausible arguments, and to 
explore the limits of their understanding.  These are precisely the sort of intellectual 
skills that Engle, Ochoa and others have argued are necessary for counter-socialisation. 
Arguably, and as explored further in Chapter Six, the philosophy of ethics’ modes of 
thought are able to be encompassed with social inquiry, the methodology strongly 
advocated for the social sciences (Ministry of Education, 2007).  
 
KNOWLEDGE/CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING: A further justification for bringing the 
language and discourse of ethics into social studies relates to the development of 
conceptual understanding. I submit that just as history and geography has its specialist 
languages, social studies education might conceivably mobilise ethical concepts in order 
to assist learners to make connections across the vast array of ethical issues that 
confront themselves and others. This contention rests on wide-ranging research on the 
role of concepts in enlarging understanding in social studies (e.g., Ministry of Education, 
2009a; Taba et al., 1971), geographic and historical thinking (e.g. Brooks, 2013; Centre 
for the Study of Historical Consciousness, 2014; Counsell, 2011; Lambert & Morgan, 
2010), discipline mastery (e.g., Meyer & Land, 2003, 2005, 2006), and conceptual change 
in science education (e.g., Vosniadou, 2010). Although this literature encompasses 
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considerable debate, some agreement might be found in The New Zealand Curriculum’s 
(2007) statement on learning areas and language: 
Each learning area has its own language or languages.  As students discover how to use 
them, they find they are able to think in different ways, access new areas of knowledge, 
and see their world from new perspectives. (p. 16) 
 
Many concepts central to the social studies curriculum are also central to ethical inquiry: 
rights, racism, justice, rules, responsibilities and so on (Collins, 2004; Knight & Collins, 
2010a). Clinton Golding (2005) points out that these concepts are contestable, and that 
“there is a tangle of related questions and issues that need to be addressed before we 
can really understand” them (p. 118).   For example, “would we be irresponsible in 
certain circumstances (Nazi Germany perhaps) if we followed the rules?” or “do we 
have a duty to uphold a Treaty signed by our forefathers?” (p. 119). The formal study of 
ethics supports students to ask questions about these concepts and debate the essential 
questions that underlie their citizenry. It is of course entirely possible for ethical inquiry 
to possess the critical thinking and reflective capacities previously noted, without 
recourse to what might seem like the heavy ‘jargon’ of ethical theories, as the 
Philosophy for Children literature demonstrates (see: Burgh et al., 2006). But harnessing 
the language of ethical perspectives is, I submit, a particularly important aspect of 
learners’ conceptual growth in relation to their ethical decision-making and action. A 
statement on perspectives for geography (Crown, 2001) argues that: 
We do not often get the opportunity to sit back and think about the mind-sets or theoretical 
perspectives that inform these disciplines or to think about the key philosophers whose 
ideas shaped these perspectives in compelling ways…[but]…different theoretical 
perspectives give us the capacity to critique and challenge these taken-for-granted ways of 
understanding the world. New perspectives give us the opportunity: to ask hard questions 
about the information we are dealing with in geography, to wonder whether or not there are 
other ways to represent information and ideas, to encourage school students to think very 
differently about the world that they are part of. (pp. 2-3) 
 
Ethical perspectives are, therefore, a key aspect of content knowledge, or information 
that social studies learners might bring to discussing ethical issues. Learners’ facility with 
ethical perspectives is, moreover, central to meeting The New Zealand Curriculum’s 
(Ministry of Education, 2007) expectation that they will develop their ability to 
“critically analyse values and actions based on them” (p. 10). This is because ethical 
perspectives offer a language to explain why, for example, the curriculum’s espoused 
values, such as social justice and sustainability, are contested. Learners may come to see 
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that such values may be considered and translated into action from quite different 
ethical worldviews. Further, ethical perspectives provide a language to describe and 
explore similarities, differences, and contradictions across ethical issues, decision-
making processes and proposed courses of action. Learners may notice, for example, 
that consequentialist arguments cut across people’s views about giving to charity, public 
spending, and international aid. They may come to understand that, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the social studies curriculum they learn from draws on some ethical 
perspectives, but not others. In short, ethical perspectives have descriptive and genetic 
dimensions: the first because of a focus on normative stances found within society as to 
how we should act, and the latter because it seeks to locate those stances within the 
wider frameworks of which they are part. 
 
CULTURAL IDENTITIES: Another reason for affording the philosophy of ethics a more 
prominent role in social studies is that it potentially supports learners’ understanding of 
their own and others’ cultural identities. This could include becoming more aware of the 
ethical underpinnings of New Zealand’s religious, cultural and institutional traditions, 
such as the trade union, women’s suffrage or Ratana movement. The philosophy of 
ethics could prompt students to think about the relationship between culture, ethics and 
social issues – to ask, for instance, who decides whether a matter is an issue or 
problematic in the first place, whether morality is culturally relative, or the extent to 
which Western philosophy provides a sufficient account of ethical decision-making and 
action in their own cultural communities. Critically, to suggest the philosophy of ethics 
contributes to cultural identity outcomes is not to say that it should determine learners’ 
cultural identities. Instead, and particularly in New Zealand’s bicultural and Pacific 
context, greater attention to the philosophy of ethics would enable students to explore 
consonance and contradiction in non-Western and Western cultural traditions. I am 
thinking, for instance, of John Patterson’s (1992, 1994) consideration of Māori 
worldviews in light of virtues ethics, and Tula Brannelly, Amohia Boulton and Allie te 
Hiini’s (2013) more recent paper on the relationship between care-based ethics and 
Māori mental health provision. I am also thinking of Paul Janman’s (2012) documentary, 
The Tongan Ark. This portrait of Futa Helu and the Atenisi40 Institute he founded 
highlights the challenges of bridging Tongan and Western intellectual traditions. In 
different ways, each of these texts contemplates how we should live together in 
                                                        
40 The Tongan word for Athens. 
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postcolonial contexts, a question that is as pressing for learners who have their feet in 
two cultural traditions as it is for Pākehā learners. 
 
PARTICIPATORY: Access to ethics’ analytic modes of thought, concepts and theoretical 
perspectives is also arguably central to participatory outcomes, particularly that of 
democratic citizenship. In one sense, the formal study of ethics ideally establishes a habit 
of democracy through relying “on a communal ethic that requires a co-operative approach 
to resolve complex or controversial human problems in practical situations” (Tweedie, 
2013, n.p.). In another, philosophy’s role in democratic education can be viewed as 
encouraging freedom of thought and judgment in future citizens, “protecting them from 
ideological indoctrination and persuasive advertising” (UNESCO, 2009, n.p.). Further, 
having an understanding of the range of ethical perspectives and considerations involved 
in societal controversy, decision-making and participation is a key aspect of being an 
ethically-informed citizen. Precluding learners’ access to such perspectives has, I argue, a 
narrowing effect: it removes significant pieces from the puzzles of moral life and limits the 
options for democratic participation within learners’ purview. Here, I am reminded of 
John Annette’s (2006) reflections on community involvement: 
Digging a pensioner’s garden is itself an act of doing good rather than an act of good 
Citizenship. The Citizenship learning begins when the student gardener begins to 
question why the pensioner is in the position that they are: in short, they may learn a 
thing or two about gardening, but the greater lessons are less about the pansies and 
more about the politics. (p. 263) 
 
The greater lessons are also, I add, about ethics. It is notable, for example, that the Level 
2 NCEA Education for Sustainability achievement standard41 that requires learners to 
undertake social action does not ask them to reflect on the ethics of their personal 
involvement. As discussed in the previous chapter, a similar standard in social studies42 
somewhat obliquely requires students to describe the perspectives that justify their 
position but greater ethical evaluation could be encouraged. Similarly, a variety of 
school-wide efforts are aimed at raising awareness of the nature of other lives and of 
promoting the virtue of empathy, such as fund-raising for disaster relief or the 40 hour 
famine. These could be enlarged to include contemplation of the ethical basis for such 
action and alternatives, without dismissing learners’ very real desire to make a difference 
                                                        
41  AS90810: Plan, implement and evaluate a personal action that will contribute towards a sustainable future. 
http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/qualifications-standards/qualifications/ncea/subjects/education-for-
sustainability/levels/ 
42  AS91282: Describe personal involvement in a social action related to rights and responsibilities. 
http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/qualifications-standards/qualifications/ncea/subjects/social-studies/levels/ 
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in the lives of others. This would resist social and cultural transformation amounting to 
a-critical volunteerism and service learning. 
 
SUMMARY: What might the philosophy of ethics add to learners’ everyday and educative 
experiences of social issues and their ethical content? How is this powerful knowledge? 
This section has articulated a range of disciplinary contributions to social studies 
outcomes and counter-socialisation. Two of the most significant are directly related to 
the social studies curriculum’s framing philosophies: social studies as reflective inquiry 
and as social science. As a social science, philosophy offers thinking tools for making 
sense of social issues and decisions about social action, that is, for socially critical 
reflective inquiry. The conceptual language and categories of ethics also enable social 
studies learners to understand what they are agonising with and make connections in 
their consideration of ethical decision-making and action. If I had to select the single 
most important contribution the discipline could make to social studies, this would be it. 
This is because ethical perspectives tug at the heart of the social studies; they have a 
uniquely powerful role to play in digging deeply beneath social issues, supporting 
learners’ values exploration, critically assessing social participation and considering 
alternative actions. Moreover, the use of ethical concepts and perspectives in social 
studies is what makes ethics an explicit rather than a hidden dimension of their lives, the 
social studies curriculum, and their educative experiences.  Not only do the analytic 
language and discourses of ethics open out the possibilities for genuine dialogue and 
inquiry about curricular concepts such as responsibility, human rights, and sustainability, 
but the substantive content of discipline holds a great deal of as yet unrealised potential 
to enrich this dialogue. The substantive content of ethics is perhaps akin to ‘threshold 
concepts’ (Meyer & Land, 2003). These concepts are characterised as: 
 Transformative, in that, once understood, its potential effect on student learning and 
behaviour is to occasion a significant shift in the perception of a subject, or part 
thereof; 
 Probably irreversible, in that the change of perspective occasioned by acquisition of a 
threshold concept is unlikely to be forgotten, or will be unlearned only by considerable 
effort; 
 Integrative; that is, it exposed the previously hidden inter-relatedness of something; 
 Possibly often (though not necessarily always) bounded in that any conceptual space will 
have terminal frontiers, bordering with thresholds into new conceptual areas; and 
 Potentially (and possibly inherently) troublesome.  (pp. 4-5) 
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I have also argued that providing an entrée to the discipline’s language and discourses 
potentially supports more than purely cognitive aims. As I see it, the ‘end game’ of the 
discipline’s involvement in social studies education is not to develop young philosophers 
of ethics or to hone rational thought, though these ends are most certainly positive. 
Without suggesting that social studies become the philosophy of ethics by another 
name, I have argued that the field plays a vital role in consciousness-raising about, and 
the critical examination of, social issues. The philosophy of ethics could also better 
support affective, cultural identity and participatory outcomes in social studies. The 
discipline offers learners opportunities to consider what lies at the heart of social issues, 
what matters most, and the cohering elements and contradictions of their own and 
others ethical decision-making and action. An understanding of ethical perspectives also 
supports learners’ critical reflection about the cultural identities they have inherited and 
those they might select. Further, the discipline brings to light the ethical dimensions of 
participatory citizenship by enabling students to evaluate justifications for social action 
and ask, ultimately, whether we might do or be otherwise.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter set out to consider theoretical spaces that could better support learners’ 
ethical decision-making and action. I explored the extant framing philosophies of the 
wider New Zealand curriculum, and social studies within this. I have identified that the 
current social studies curriculum embeds ethical-decision-making and action in two 
theoretical traditions: social studies taught as reflective inquiry and as social science, both of 
which emphasise critical thinking.   It is important to note that the alliance between 
social studies’ framing philosophies is by no means unproblematic. Critical thinking, for 
example, has traditionally had quite different roles in social studies taught as reflective 
inquiry and social science. There exist also potentially uneasy philosophic tensions 
between, for example, approaches to reflective inquiry that draw on forms of 
constructivism, and critical realist positions in the social sciences. Further, Mullen (2004) 
notes a longstanding debate between disciplinary and issues-based approaches, the 
former seeing the social sciences as generating knowledge and the latter positioning 
social studies as the application of that knowledge to social problems. While such 
tensions are not entirely resolved here, this chapter has suggested that the distance 
between disciplinary and issues-based approaches may not be as great as others have 
suggested. We can see within the philosophy of ethics, for example, a strong focus on 
bridging that gap. 
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Much of this chapter has been devoted to considering what would need adjusting within 
social studies’ ‘framing philosophies’ to accommodate ethics.  I have made a case that, 
in order to better support learners’ ethical decision-making and action, (a) social studies 
requires a stronger focus on social issues and that learners’ everyday experiences of 
ethical dilemmas and challenges should be more visible, (b) social studies should serve a 
largely critical function and, in order to do so, should be as encompassing of ethical 
perspectives as possible, and (c) learners require access to the language and discourses of 
the philosophy of ethics if they are to give full consideration to the ethical content of 
social issues and be able to speak into power. The justification for bringing in 
philosophy was two-fold: it provides access to powerful knowledge and contributes to a 
range of social studies outcomes.  I have argued that, in particular, the formal study of 
ethics provides social studies learners with (a) the tools with which to engage critically 
with social issues, and (b) categories of thought to make connections in their learning. 
The latter, the substantive content of the discipline, is what I mean by a ‘range of 
perspectives’ in understanding ethics as:   
…meaning both the branch of philosophy concerned with the systematic study of what 
we ought to do, and an activity – that of coming to an understanding of, and reflecting 
upon, a range of perspectives about social action. 
 
My next chapter troubles the happy coincidence between the proposal put forward in 
this chapter and the already implicit theoretical orientations in the current social studies 
curriculum. Thus far, the proposal appears to rest squarely within the reflective, issues-
based and social sciences traditions of the subject. While an approach focused on social 
issues, counter-socialisation and the philosophy of ethics is both urgent and vital, these 
foci may not be sufficient, particularly if they are to be framed purely by the traditions of 
reflective inquiry and social sciences. Chapter Five, therefore, looks to the theoretical 
spaces that lie beyond social studies’ existing framing philosophies. We have started to 
see in the discussion up to this point, for example, some important links to social 
studies taught ‘personal, social and ethical development’ (H. Barr et al., 1997) – a 
tradition focussed on the development of the whole person and much less emphasised 
in the current social studies curriculum.  Chapter Five also shifts to a consideration of 
how the philosophy of ethics could be brought into social studies. I argue that whether 
the discipline meaningfully assists in learners’ counter-socialisation is a matter of 
approach rather than content; one can, for example, teach the philosophy of ethics and 
social studies in an arid manner. My proposal for better supporting learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action builds to what I term an ‘ethically reflexive’ approach to 
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social studies education, one that resists construing learners’ exploration of social issues, 
their counter-socialisation and engagement with the philosophy of ethics understood as 
just having to do with abstracted thinking. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL STUDIES LEARNERS ’  REFLEXIVE 
ENGAGEMENT IN THEIR ETHICAL WORLDS 
 
This chapter continues a consideration of the second of my research sub-questions, regarding the 
theoretical spaces that could be better support learners’ ethical decision-making and action. Whereas 
Chapter Four urged a more overt insertion of the philosophy of ethics into social studies education, this 
chapter considers how ethics could be mobilised in social studies. I ask: could ‘ethically reflexive’ 
approaches better support social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action?  Ethical reflexivity 
is a concept that has not as yet been employed in relation to social studies education. In building a 
definition for this concept, I explore its theoretical wellsprings in social theory and social sciences research. 
My point here is not to produce a settled term from unsettled academic terrain, but to consider what these 
diverse conceptions of reflexivity might coalesce around and, in turn, to consider its usefulness in better 
supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action. The chapter arrives at a sense of 
‘ethical reflexivity’ that emphasises critical reflection, lived experience and imagination – approaches to 
social studies education that draw on the insights of the philosophy of ethics as learners encounter, 
explore and shape their ethical world. An argument is made that ethical decision-making and action 
must amount to more than critical analysis if learners’ counter-socialisation is to be supported. The 
chapter concludes with a consideration of the relationship between ethically reflexive approaches and the 
traditions of social studies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In considering the theoretical spaces for better supporting social studies learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action, Chapter Four stressed a productive intersection between a 
focus on social issues, the subject taught as counter-socialisation, and the philosophy of 
ethics. Philosophy’s modes of inquiry, ethics especially, enable students to ask questions 
about concepts central to their understanding of their ethical world and participation 
within it. In the previous chapter, I re-worked Michael Young’s (2013) notion of 
powerful knowledge to draw attention to the explanatory power of multiple ethical 
perspectives. I argued that a facility with diverse theoretical perspectives would enable 
learners to better understand moral conflict and navigate in plurality; such a facility 
would support learners to situate themselves within a realm of ethical tensions and 
provides important intellectual tools with which to agonise. While there is no 
established empirical link between ethics education and social mobility, I argued that 
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access to the powerful knowledges of ethics ought not to be limited to the already 
educationally privileged or confined to higher education. Further, to be both democratic 
and educative, social studies must not exclude learners from a cultural conversation that 
has spanned many centuries and informs many of the issues that face communities 
today. Nor should learners be sheltered from the uncertainty that coming to see a 
diversity of ethical perspectives may provoke. Ethics is more likely to bring clarity to the 
messiness of life that they already intuit. 
 
Chapter Four also urged against viewing the philosophy of ethics as a narrow form of 
intellection – that is, simply knowledge and skills employed in the abstract. Instead, 
ethics contributes to a range of social studies outcomes that support learners’ counter-
socialisation. I suggested, for example, that the field has much to offer social studies 
learners in terms of consciousness-raising, considering what matters most in their social 
worlds, the search for personal meaning in their lives, and exploring how they will live 
together within a postcolonial context. Bringing ethics more overtly into social studies – 
currently framed as reflective inquiry and social science – encourages critical thought, 
but this is not critical thinking for its own sake. This is because, to return to a theme 
introduced in Chapter Three, both ethics and social studies are innately concerned with 
participation in society. The language and discourse of ethics is one of participatory 
possibility, offering social studies learners mechanisms with which to re/consider social 
action and potential moves in responding to ethical issues in front of them. Ethics, in 
the sense that I use the term here, is not simply a mode of societal critique, but a means 
with which to go on.  
 
Whether the philosophy of ethics fulfils its potential in social studies education depends, 
of course, on how it is taught. This chapter begins by considering what might be lost if 
social studies education looked to academic philosophy in order to reflect on ethical life, 
rather than in ethical life. That is, I point out the risks of mobilising ethics in social 
studies in ways that are overly abstracted and distance theory from learners’ lives. Most 
centrally, this chapter continues to address my second research sub-question, an 
exploration of theoretical possibility. I ask: could ‘ethically reflexive’ approaches better 
support social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action? Given that the 
reflexivity may be used interchangeably with reflectivity and critical reflection (D’Cruz, 
Gillingham, & Melendez, 2007; Dyke, 2009), I begin by providing a description of 
reflective approaches. The semantic shift from reflective to reflexive is particularly 
important to tease out because social studies teachers are most likely familiar with 
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‘reflective’ social inquiry. Then, aware of the protean nature of ‘reflexivity’, I explore 
how the term is employed across the social sciences. From this literature, I highlight the 
ways in which ethical reflexivity may be thought of as incorporating a critically reflective 
dimension – in the sense of re-casting our understanding of ethical decision-making and 
action. My use of ethical reflexivity, however, moves on from critical reflection by 
emphasising learners’ lived experiences and ethical imaginations. The last section of the 
chapter considers how this conception of ethical reflexivity might pay in social studies 
education when it is directed towards counter-socialisation.  
 
SOCIAL STUDIES AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS: THE RISKS OF ABSTRACTION 
 
No doubt we can all imagine situations where the philosophy of ethics, and indeed 
social studies, might be taught as if learners are in an art gallery and expected to observe 
the retrospective of someone else’s creativity, from behind a white floor-marked line 
that divides the expert from the observer. Perhaps we might say that this has something 
to do with philosophy itself. In vastly different projects and contexts, for example, John 
Dewey and Martin Heidegger have questioned the roles and goals of philosophy (R. 
Rorty, 1976). Dewey wanted to turn away from philosophy as a distinctive activity 
altogether and argued, instead, for a logic of inquiry “as a model for all forms of 
disciplined reflection” (Blattner, 2008, p. 58) that would both engage with learners’ 
experience and more readily address society’s problems. Heidegger essentially felt that 
philosophy, trapped in its own language of analytic reasoning, had moved further and 
further from a consideration of a way of being in the world. He argued that we access the 
world not through the abstractedness of philosophy but through being immersed in 
activities, projects, and practices.  
 
There is much that divides these philosophers; Heidegger, for example, avowedly 
rejected epistemology whereas Dewey did not. But there is something in the flavour of 
their work that wrestles with a distinction between philosophy as an academic enterprise 
and ‘real life’. Each perceives the discipline as having distanced itself from lived 
experience. I mention these authors here because their work inflects this chapter’s 
discussion, but they are not the only theorists to have raised such meta-philosophical 
problems (Joll, 2010), nor are they issues that social studies may resolve. The salient 
insight for this thesis is, instead, the danger of importing the philosophy of ethics into 
social studies in ways that make the subject seem distanced from learners’ emotions, 
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experience, and real-world concerns. The problem is not that the philosophy of ethics’ 
potential contribution to social studies is conceptual, academic, or rigorous – it is how it 
is used. I point out, therefore, the risks of abstraction.  
 
The sense in which I use notions of distancing and abstractedness is akin to Donald 
Schön’s (1983, 1987) conception of ‘reflection-on-action’ in teachers’ professional work.  
By this he means that the real work of learning to be a teacher is mistakenly perceived as 
coming after the fact when one has the opportunity to step back and reflect on the 
lessons learned.  The analogy here would be to think of ethics education as existing solely 
in classrooms rather than in the everyday experiences of life, or as an exercise that is 
perennially in retrospect. Schön argues that the reflection-on-action model is 
exacerbated by a climate of ‘technical rationality’, positioning teacher educators as the 
deliverers of pre-packaged knowledge and where teachers “often collude in seeing the 
truth as lying wholly outside themselves, regarding as ‘higher’ the knowledge that 
appears more general, abstract and theoretical” (Schön, 1992, p. 121). Again by analogy, 
the risk is that the social studies learner comes to see the ways that they already navigate 
in the swampy, indeterminate nature (to use Schön’s metaphor) of their ethical life as 
something lesser than the seemingly assured higher ground of a classroom lesson in 
ethics. 
 
Schön’s contribution to education lies in drawing attention to the previously, and 
arguably still, marginalised aspects of professional practice and learning. Critically, he is 
not rejecting ‘expert’ knowledge. Instead, and in a genealogy that owes much to Dewey, 
Schön argued for much greater research attention to reflection within action – the artistry 
of practitioners’ decision-making. Within this, he saw a variety of complex components. 
Knowing-in-action, for example, is the “knowing built into and revealed by our 
performance of everyday routines of action” (Schön, 1992, p. 124) such as riding a bike, 
and is akin to the notion of blindsight introduced in Chapter One. This type of 
reflection is to be distinguished from Dewey’s notion of a felt difficulty because the 
situation does not feel problematic. By contrast, reflection-in-action is our ability to take 
note of surprise and respond to it in a fleeting moment. Conversation with the 
(uncertain) situation is, for Schön, much more like Deweyan inquiry: “mediated by 
conscious reflection and, at the same time, on one’s way of thinking and acting on it” (p. 
126). There is much that is open to question in Schön’s work. The difficulty in finding 
examples that match ethical experience makes me somewhat uncomfortable about this 
typology. Moreover, and as others have pointed out (Munby, 1989), Schön relies on 
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dualistic thinking to make his argument for greater attention to ‘the swamp’ as opposed 
to the ‘higher ground’ of academic thought, and to distinguish between reflection-on-
action and reflection within action. Alan Bleakley (1999) argues Schön’s thesis 
“paradoxically smacks of the kind of technical mapping that Schön opposes in 
principle” (p. 322) when he equates developing teachers’ artistry and capacity to 
improvise with good coaching and modelling.  
 
Schön is not, of course, directly commenting on ethics education in social studies. But, 
despite the previously expressed reservations, and in extending his work into the 
purposes of this thesis, I contend that, like teaching practice, learners’ everyday 
experience may be conceived as sites for “generating, not only applying, usable knowledge” 
(Schön, 1992, p. 134). The role of the philosophy of ethics in social studies may 
therefore be contrasted against ‘banking education’, in the Freirean sense (see Freire, 
1986), where the teacher issues ethical communiqués and deposits the insights of 
philosophy. Perhaps today this distinction seems rather crude. Surely no educator sees 
their practice in these terms?  As I explore in subsequent chapters, much of the 
philosophy education literature strenuously resists a banking model. But abstraction and 
distancing are, anecdotally, challenges already faced in New Zealand social studies 
education. It is not too much of a stretch to imagine, for example, that the history of 
ethical ideas might be left in the past or that a glossary of ethical terms would be 
relegated to the back pages of learners’ notebooks. Furthermore, there is some risk of 
the definition I have provided for ethics, exacerbating the distance between ethics and 
learners’ lives (see below). This is because the definition infers that the role of the 
student is to consider accepted wisdom – to assimilate or accommodate that 
information, or perhaps even to reject it – but not to generate wisdom. It positions 
learners as being in a dialogic relationship with ethical perspectives, but there appears to 
be nothing outside of theory. It is as if learners are locked in a reflective bubble, 
divorced from their existence. In voicing a similar concern in the context of higher 
education, and in arguing for an ‘ontological turn’, Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007) argue 
that knowing is not merely intellectual; it is inhabited, enacted and transformative. 
Drawing on Heidegger, they urge a much closer coupling between “formal and 
propositional knowledge, and the informal kind of knowing that arises out of being in 
the world” (p. 683).  
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…meaning both the branch of philosophy concerned with the systematic study of what 
we ought to do, and an activity – that of coming to an understanding of, and 
reflecting upon, a range of perspectives about social action. 
 
To use Schön’s metaphor, this chapter attempts to re-balance the scales of the definition 
(above) for ethics in the direction of learners’ swamps. This is because there is 
something more that I wish to capture in relation to bringing the philosophy of ethics 
into social studies learning – about learners as ethical beings, dealing with the everyday, 
emotive, indeterminate, and emergent nature of ethical decision-making and action. As 
an index43 to this, I was initially attracted to the idea of reflexivity, rather like a magpie 
attracted to the shiny quality of a newly found item.  As the reader will see, others have 
similarly been drawn to reflexivity, but for all manner of reasons. The work undertaken 
in the next sections of this chapter is three-fold. I firstly consider the term critical 
reflection in order to set this apart from my use of reflexivity. The following section 
surveys the ways in which reflexivity has been employed in social theory and the social 
sciences. I then consider whether this concept has any force in social studies education, 
and what precisely reflexivity is an index to in the context of better supporting learners’ 
ethical decision-making and action. 
CRITICAL REFLECTION 
 
The argument built thus far has been that greater opportunities for social studies 
learners to consider ethical decision-making and action are afforded through a more 
explicit insertion of the philosophy of ethics. The previous chapter stressed that such an 
insertion ought not to be seen as a narrow form of intellection; affective, participatory 
and identity are strongly associative outcomes. There can be no doubt, however, that 
the predominant framings of the current New Zealand social studies curriculum (taught 
as reflective inquiry and social science) draw heavily on critical thinking skills and 
dispositions, as does each aspect of my proposed adjustments to this framing. The 
argument so far might therefore be seen as speaking directly into that which has been 
called the ‘critical thinking movement’ (Ennis, 2011; Paul, 2014). 
 
                                                        
43  Indexicality is, notably, a central concept in ethnomethodology: “a phenomenon which Husserl has addressed 
under another name – implies that a meaning bearing unit (a word, a behaviour, a happening) may have more 
than one sense” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 39). 
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Notably, a definition for critical thinking is by no means settled, and whether its skills 
are generalisable or domain-specific is an open debate (T. Moore, 2011; Mulnix, 2012). 
Furthermore, the extent to which varying models of critical thinking enable learners to 
challenge the theoretical landscape on which they stand is also a matter of critique. For 
example, moral reasoning approaches may limit the extent to which learners are invited 
to consider the ethical ends that are privileged, and some have questioned whether such 
approaches amount to a philosophical exploration of morality (Pring, 2008). This issue 
notwithstanding, critical thinking, with reason at its core, has become a leading feature 
of contemporary education (Goldberg, 2011). Because critical thinking and critical 
reflection are cognate terms familiar to social studies, and my use of reflexivity may 
appear synonymous, I offer here stipulative definitions. 
 
The sense in which I use critical thinking and reflection has at least two dimensions.  
The first is the rational capacity to think otherwise, developed, for example, in the skills 
of logic and argument analysis. I have contended in the preceding chapter that these 
critical orientations, particularly as expressed in the philosophy of ethics, play a vital role 
in learners deciding for themselves what the good life consists in.  Interestingly, one of 
the most prodigious writers on critical thinking, Richard Paul (2012), makes the 
converse link. He argues that multi-dimensional ethical issues are a vital site for teaching 
critical thinking in the strong sense – that which avoids atomistic approaches that treat 
critical thinking as a “battery of technical skills” (p. 467) to be mastered. He argues that 
by introducing ethical issues into “the analysis and evaluation of reasoning, we help 
them [students] more clearly see the relationship between world views, forms of life, 
human engagements and interests, what is at stake (versus what is at issue)…” and so on 
(p. 468).  
 
The second dimension refers more particularly to the term critical reflection, the way 
that thinking may arc back on theory and concepts, that is, draw on inherited 
understandings and existing bodies of thought. The philosophy of ethics is an example 
of such knowledge that has been laid down over time. If this discipline were to be 
brought more overtly into social studies, students would employ its conceptual 
categories of thought and modes of intellection to critically reflect upon, for example, 
the understandings about social decision-making generated through the process of social 
inquiry or the ethics of the process itself. Importantly for the stipulative definition I am 
building here, critical reflection carries with it a strong sense of re-examining and 
reframing of a social world that was – things having inexorably moved on since the time 
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of the occurrences or the thoughts being reflected upon. Notably, this interpretation 
predominates in what is called the conceptual, reflective and critical (Ministry of 
Education, 2008a) social inquiry methodology. It is explained that critical thinking skills 
“involve thinking outside the square, asking effective questions, and stepping back to 
reflect on the answers and findings” (p. 5) and that reflecting and evaluating “should 
focus on: the knowledge and understandings developed through the social inquiry 
process; the actual learning process itself; the depth of critical thinking about the 
understandings gained” (p. 9). Notwithstanding critical reflection being described as an 
ongoing dimension of social inquiry (that is, occurring throughout the process, not just 
as the end), the stance is largely one of “revisiting aspects of learning” (p. 4). 
 
I return to a consideration of critical reflection later in this chapter. The reader will note 
there that my argument for an approach to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-
making and action does not dismiss critical reflection. Instead, my contention is that 
critical reflection is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of reflexive approaches to 
expanding learners’ ethical explorations. Two further points may be made in relation to 
this. First, while I argue that an emphasis on critical reflection is limiting, I do not 
suggest that this is a problem with the centrality of reason to that concept.  Following 
Mulnix (2012), I take the view that critical reflection “is an inherently reason-based 
process, and as such, it cannot escape the central focus it places on reason” (p. 468). It 
is, secondly, important to stress that I am in no way suggesting there is something awry 
with retrospective analyses, or that somehow we are condemned to the past. Critical 
reflection means that we can never go back, because one is transformed in the process 
of thinking otherwise. As I go on to argue, there is also an important connection 
between reflection and imagination because we find the seeds of the latter in our own 
past and in the changing perceptions of the world within which it is formed.  
REFLEXIVITY’S TROPES  
 
I turn now to the prospects for an ethically reflexive approach in social studies. This 
section attends to the ways in which the concept of reflexivity has been taken up in 
social theory and in the social sciences, with a view to considering whether reflexivity 
might have a function in better supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-
making. In general terms, the concept of ‘reflexivity’ connotes something bending back 
on or taking account of itself: “conceptions of reflexivity range from self-reference to 
self-awareness to the constitutive circularity of accounts or texts” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 
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36).  It is not a new idea and has, for example, long been implicit in social theory, 
interpretative social sciences and lay contexts such as ‘mulling things over’ (M. S. 
Archer, 2007; Holland, 1999). Neither is the concept of reflexivity settled: its etymology 
is complex, it has various meanings and usages across academic contexts (Ashmore, 
1989; M. Lynch, 2000) and is very often used as a portmanteau term, the meaning of 
which is tacitly assumed (M. S. Archer, 2007). With appreciative humour, R. Smith 
(2005) declares that the concept “has undoubtedly joined the pantheon of great words 
with multiple meanings. We may be sure that the word signals a cluster of debates, 
linked areas of inquiry, rather than a clearly articulated stance” (p. 2). This landscape 
notwithstanding, I consider in turn four basic and inter-related senses in which 
‘reflexivity’ is employed within the social sciences: (a) the capacity of human beings to 
consider and act on their social worlds, (b) which may extend into academic critique and 
disciplinary self-critique, and (c) has implications for the interplay between research and 
that being researched, including a consideration of how they themselves are constructed 
as such. Further, (d) reflexivity recognises the emotional and embodied experience of 
ethical life. 
 
(A) CONSIDERING AND ACTING ON OUR SOCIAL WORLDS 
The capacity that the vast majority of us have to make choices in life rests on the fact 
that we possess awareness that context shapes us, an ability to take cues from our 
environment, and endeavour to reshape our contexts in light of this information. This is 
the kind of reflexivity “that appears (at least since Descartes) to characterize 
consciousness: thought or feeling is also awareness of there being thought or feeling” 
(Smith, 2005, p. 3). The idea that we act mindfully and further that our selves are 
constructed through experience, was famously explored by the social psychologist 
George Herbert Mead (1934), whose notion of reflexiveness rested on the idea that “the 
individual is not a self in the reflective sense unless he is an object to himself” (cited in 
Adams, 2003, p. 232) and this is achieved through shared activity.  
 
In charting reflexivity’s biographies in social theory, Margaret Archer (2007) argues that 
it is a necessary condition of social life, though sociologists may argue about whether 
“some social formations and ways of life generate more reflexivity than others” and why  
(p. 29). Her own conception of reflexivity reconceptualises socialisation away from a 
structure/agency dualism: she sees reflexivity as mediating structure and agency, and 
socialisation as relational. As a consequence of the latter, her definition does not 
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encompass individual actions and pursuits such as mountaineering that also require a 
type of reflexivity in terms of taking cues from one’s context. Drawing on Max Weber, 
she conceives reflexivity as “the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all 
normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice 
versa” (p. 4). So central is reflexivity to the human condition, argues Archer, that 
without it there can be no society. In critiquing the work of early anthropologists such 
as Evans-Pritchard, who contended that traditional societies were utterly shaped by 
social norms, she argues that such communities must have been reflexive, for three 
reasons: (a) “all societies are open systems and hence no normative canon covers all 
contingencies” (p. 27), (b) that what might be described as routine, practical and ‘second 
nature’ actions require reflexivity in order to deal with the unexpected, and (c) that the 
very concept of tradition “needs the exercise of reflexivity to make it so” (p. 27).  Such 
reflexivity may also extend beyond inter-personal action and bend back on, for example, 
the environment and the spiritual domain. “Metadiscourses about religion that are 
found in theology, philosophy and the history of religion have long since established the 
fact that a reflexive stance is intrinsic to religious belief and faith” (Højbjerg, 2002, p. 3).  
 
Matthew Adams (2003, 2006) contends that an ‘extended reflexivity thesis’ is 
commonplace in contemporary sociology, even among social theorists whose work 
otherwise differs. The concept of reflexive modernization (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 
1994) is a notable nexus for this thinking. The sense in which these and other authors 
explore reflexivity is in relation to the conditions of late modernity. It denotes a radical 
questioning and perpetual doubt in a contemporary social world characterised by an 
increased tendency to remove sources of insecurity by acting on itself. Rather than being 
rule following, society is conceived as rule altering.  Similarly, and particularly in the 
view of Giddens (1991), one’s self-identity in post-traditional societies is also reflexive. 
In his view, “nothing is more central to, and distinctive of, human life than the reflexive 
monitoring of behaviour, which is expected by all ‘competent’ members of society of 
others” (Giddens, 1976, cited in Adams. 2003, p. 222). But there is something more 
distinctive about late modernity, he argues. No longer necessarily tied to tradition and 
culture, we may select from myriad choices of lifestyle and life-politics such that “the 
individual is no longer painting by numbers, so to speak, she is creating her own work 
of art” (Adams, 2003, p. 223). It is also notable that at both the societal and individual 
levels, reflexivity is implicated in our unconscious as much as our conscious choices. 
The green movement and ‘sustainability’, for example, may gain expression in mindful 
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actions such as recycling or reducing our use of plastic bags, but has also become so 
suffused in our identities that we may not see these actions as rule-altering. 
 
Just how reflexivity plays itself out in ‘second’ or ‘late’ modernity is a matter of open debate 
among sociologists. Margaret Archer, for example, has taken issue with the idea that 
reflexivity is a property of the structures and institutions of late modernity; for her it is 
people that are reflexive (Adams, 2003; Dyke, Johnston, & Fuller, 2012). By contrast, Beck, 
Bonss and Lau (2003) argue that more recently “the challenge of theorising reflexive 
modernization is that the system of co-ordinates is changing” (p. 2). Individualisation, 
globalisation and trans-nationalisation, for example, trouble previous conceptions of 
modernity being tied to the nation-state. Another extension of ‘reflexive modernisation’ 
engages with the insights of complexity theory. Lash (2003), for example, finds in the work 
of Beck a register of ‘reflexivity as non-linearity’ associated with the work of Niklas 
Luhmann (1995). Luhmann emphasises that communication-based interaction and 
organisations are inexorably shaped by external forces and influences. Drawing on Maturana 
and Varela’s (1998) use of autopoesis in cognitive biology, Luhmann has argued that, in 
much the same way cells are shaped within their environment, societies may be ‘autopoetic’ 
responding to environmental influences with systemic changes. Ethics, for example, could 
be thought of as ‘laying down a path in walking’ (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993). Here 
the concept of autopoesis is strongly linked with reflexivity, recursiveness and adaptation; 
social systems are seen as re/adapting to, re/modifying and potentially dissolving back into 
their environments. Thus the persistence of social order is not seen as pre-given: “reflexivity 
is now at the same time system de-stabilization” (Lash, 2003, p. 50) and reflexive 
modernization must be understood as a much more emergent, non-normative and non-
foundational process.  
 
The concept of reflexive modernisation is by no means the only way in which reflexivity 
has been employed in social theory and the human sciences (Ritzer, 2005; Sandywell, 
2013; R. Smith, 2005). It is equally important to note that social theory’s reflexivities 
have attracted vigorous critique. Reflexive modernization theorists have, for example, 
drawn criticism for overlooking the embedded, socialised and culturally-located nature 
of reflexivity (Adams, 2003; J. Alexander, 1996) and, moreover, for reasserting Western 
superiority through positioning reflexivity as a “‘modern-modern’ or ‘purely’ modern 
condition, which makes it superior to everyone else, to all traditional conditions and all 
Other, ‘lesser’ modernities” (Argyrou, 2003, p. 39). Perhaps, posits Adams (2003), 
“contemporary notions of reflexivity tell us more about the cultures and traditions of 
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Western, late modern society than they do about our liberation from them” (p. 225). 
Further, Bauman (1993) notes a tacit assumption of a better, safer world contained in 
‘reflexive’ and further points out that the human capacity to learn from experience is not 
at all guaranteed. Others have argued that the nature and content of reflexive processes 
warrants greater elucidation (M. S. Archer, 2007; R. Smith, 2005), and have suggested 
that the notion of ‘degrees’ of reflexivity “may tell us much more about social division 
and difference than an individual ability” (Adams, 2003, p. 234). Adams further views 
the ‘project’ of reflexivity as overly-rational and individualised because it “implies a 
centred subject at the helm, overseeing a purposeful trajectory” (pp. 224), thus over-
estimating the extent to which people may exert control over their conditions.  
 
(B) REFLEXIVITY AS CRITIQUE AND DISCIPLINARY SELF-CRITIQUE  
Let me now turn to the next sense in which reflexivity is used in social sciences 
literature: as academic critique and disciplinary self-critique. First, and if one accepts that 
reflexivity is a condition of consciousness, academic thinking is inherently self-reflexive 
in the way that it involves the systematic re/examination of one’s ideas or “persuading 
colleagues to examine the taken-for granted concepts, values and practices of the field” 
(R. Smith, 2005, p. 3). Though not all academics would necessarily characterise their 
thinking as reflexive, particularly given the unsettled nature of the term, each would no 
doubt see themselves as engaged in critical thinking; fundamental to, and a prized ideal 
of, education (Bailin & Siegel, 2003). Yet, intra- and inter-paradigmatic critical thinking 
involves some kind of recursiveness in thought. In the context of philosophy, for 
example, Radder (1997) argues that the investigation of the limitations or ‘conditions of 
possibility’ of ideas might best be described as ‘philosophic reflexivity’. Some authors 
have argued further that transdisciplinary reflexivity is a requisite element of critical 
thinking in academia. Holland (1999), for example identifies a radical mode of 
reflexivity:  
Not bound by either paradigms or disciplines. This is transdisciplinary reflexivity … not 
so much a fixed location as a method for evaluating systems of knowledge, tied as they 
are to sectional interests and constellations of power. It invites re-entry into the 
epistemological and sectional complexities of our human condition to intervene, 
“knowingly” according to our ethical priorities. (p.476)  
 
This argument points to a more substantive sense in which reflexivity has been applied 
to disciplinary thinking, one that extends beyond a simple metaphor of cognitive 
circularity. This is ‘epistemological reflexivity’, or seeking to understand “the manner in 
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which knowledge changes its own subject” (R. Smith, 2005, p. 12). A notable example 
of this is reflexive sociology, associated with theorists such as Bennett Berger, Alvin 
Gouldner and Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, reflexive sociology entails more than 
simply acknowledging one’s position in sociological work – it requires “identifying the 
key filters that alter sociological perception…limits of knowledge specifically associated 
with the analyst’s membership and position in the intellectual field” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 
38). It is through a process of reflexivity, Bourdieu argues, that the epistemic moorings 
of sociology are both laid bare and strengthened. The ethical content of this stance is 
particularly notable, especially given the focus of this thesis. Epistemic reflexivity, 
understood in Bourdieu’s terms, is an express commitment to the avoidance of duplicity 
and complicity in sociological thinking. Though Bourdieu was reluctant to advocate 
particular moral ends, his sociology “may also be read as an attempt to transform the 
principles of vision whereby we construct, and therefore rationally and humanely shape, 
sociology, society and, ultimately, our selves” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 59).   
 
Bourdieu’s work moves us closer to a critical orientation to epistemic reflexivity that 
more overtly ‘bends back on’ ethical implications. In another context, working in the 
field of management and organisation theory, Willmott (2008) argues that critical 
reflexivity involves: 
A capacity to recognise the inescapably partial and constructed foundation of all 
knowledge claims…It involves an awareness of the contingencies of knowledge 
production, embedded as knowledge inescapably is in particular traditions, disciplines, 
methodological protocols, temporal contexts, etc. In addition to re-minding us of the 
particularity of what counts as knowledge – for example, in its dependence upon the 
privileging of particular epistemological and ontological assumptions - critical reflexivity 
heightens attentiveness to its (unavoidable) ethical significance with regard to the 
consequences of taking knowledge claims to be true. (p. 83) 
 
(C) REFLEXIVITY, RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
A third landscape of usages relates reflexivity to qualitative, interpretative social sciences 
research fields and methodologies such as ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, critical 
theory and poststructuralism (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). 
Douglas Macbeth (2001) notes that contemporary social science research reflexivities 
may turn back on inquiry, theory and/or text. For example, ‘textual reflexivity’ connotes 
the researchers’ sensitivity to absences and erasures in text, including their own writing. 
We might think here of literary deconstruction influenced by Derrida, or critical 
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discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003) – methodologies that are alive to textual 
equivocation, ambiguity and contradiction and historicity, and in which the researcher 
very often writes “the disruption of realist assurances about representation and textual 
coherence into the text and, often enough, the disruption of the text itself by various 
devices and experiments in textual display (Macbeth, 2001, p. 43).  ‘Positional 
reflexivity’, for Macbeth, involves the researcher critically examining, for example, 
taken-for-granted assumptions, power relationships and researcher/researched 
constructions. It begins with an acknowledgement of their location within the research: 
Reflexivity demands that inquirers place themselves on the same causal plane as the 
object of knowledge. They must make explicit the social positions, interests, 
background assumptions, biases, and other contingent, perspectival features of 
themselves that shaped the questions, methods, interpretations, and modes of 
presentation of the claims the knower accepts as knowledge. Reflexivity affirms the 
partiality of representations without denying their possible claim to truth. (E. Anderson, 
2014) 
 
Positional reflexivity sees researchers not as passive scribes but as active participants in 
knowledge production (Hertz, 1996). While their methodologies may be vastly different, 
those who deploy the concept of reflexivity in their research inquiries typically share 
some central intuitions: the partiality of research, the limits of representation, the 
inseparability of power/knowledge and how this is historically and socially constituted. 
Sue White (2001) suggests that reflexivity is a process of destabilising research and 
practice, “looking ‘outward, to the social and cultural artefacts and forms of thought 
which saturate our practices’, and inward to challenge the processes by which we make 
sense of the world” (cited in D’Cruz et al., 2007, p. 78). The analytic rigour sought 
through surfacing these complicit factors may also incorporate the epistemic reflexivity 
discussed in the previous section: “decentering not only the sedimentations of the 
analyst but (reflexively) those of the field itself” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 39).  
 
Another, related use of reflexivity in research methodologies and practice is as a critique 
of emancipatory and liberal humanism. This links back to the sociological critique made 
in the last section, that is, of the idea that reflexivity enables one to single-handedly steer 
the course of life towards something better and freer. For example, Alan Bleakley (1999) 
argues that, for all that Schön’s focus on the artistry of teaching orients us away from 
technical-rational certainty, it “is still firmly rooted in personalistic humanism and its 
project of self-development” (p. 322). By contrast, postmodern, poststructuralist and 
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deconstructive perspectives attend to the culturally, historically and discursively 
constituted nature of agency.  Critically reflexive practice, “problematises the ‘subject’, 
and investigates the conditions of possibility for the constructions of subjectivities” 
(p. 317).  Interestingly, Bleakley wants to stretch a conception of reflexivity further. 
Drawing on Heidegger, he argues that reflexive teaching practices in higher education 
should account for being in the world: as ecological, an active world engagement and 
sensitivity towards context. Further, and in light of his concern that reflection-as-action 
could simply be an act of faith, his conception of holistic reflexivity incorporates an 
ethical dimension:  
What makes holistic reflexivity different from reflection-as-action is, again, its inclusion 
of both the aesthetic and the ethical, as a practice of sensitivity to, and a caring for, the 
world. The ethical dimension in particular constitutes a shift from descriptive reflectivity 
to critical reflexivity, where the latter theorises (problematises and relativises) action as it 
happens, reflecting on action against value perspectives. Holistic reflexivity is an 
inclusive ecological or caring act of reflection as well as an appreciative gesture, with an 
explicit concern for 'otherness' and 'difference'. (p. 328) 
 
A third sense that reflexivity is used in qualitative inquiries relates to research ethics. 
Marilys Guillemin and Lynne Gillam (2004) suggest that reflexivity is “a helpful 
conceptual tool for understanding both the nature of ethics in qualitative research and 
how ethical practice in research can be achieved” (pp. 262-263). They note three 
dimensions of ethics in qualitative research: (i) professional codes of ethics that guide 
research practice, (ii) procedural ethics, involving approval from ethics committees for 
undertaking research involving people, and (iii) ethics in practice, for instance the 
unanticipated ethical dilemmas that arise within the course of the research. They focus 
particularly on ethically important moments, or micro-ethics, “where the approach taken 
or the decision made has important ethical ramifications, but where the researcher does 
not necessarily feel himself or herself to be on the horns of a dilemma” (p. 265). For 
these authors, ethical reflexivity involves subjecting the purpose of the research to 
ethical scrutiny and attention to the relational substrate of the research. They argue that, 
for example, it is in ongoing, complex interpersonal interactions “that the process of 
informed consent really occurs – not on the pieces of paper that an ethics committee 
peruses” (p. 275). This argument is illustrated by Aaron Kuntz’s (2010) and Kim 
Etherington’s (2007) research work. These authors reflect on the importance of being 
aware of, and sensitive to, the ethically important moments that arose in the 
(re)negotiation of the research process. Kuntz (2010) experienced an ongoing ethical 
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tension between protecting his participants’ identities and representing his participants’ 
lives in ways that “recognized the fluid nature of identity, the multiply constituted 
individual, and the multiple slippages inherent in representation” (p. 426). Etherington 
(2007) tells of the power and trust relationships that required mindful renegotiation 
when her work with two ex-clients moved from a therapeutic relationship to her writing 
a book that included their experiences.  
 
The complexities of both Kuntz’s and Etherington’s research and writing remind us of 
the limitations of ‘in advance’ codified and procedural ethics, both in research and 
professional practice. Their work instead points to the need for a much greater, ongoing 
sensitivity and agility in ethical decision-making and action. Tom Strong (2005) argues 
that, for constructivist psychologists, “practicing reflexively requires some element of 
social improvisation” (p. 96) but this does not mean that professional codes of ethics are 
unimportant.  
 
(D) REFLEXIVITY AND EMBODIEMENT 
In her introduction to an article entitled The emotionalization of reflexivity, Mary Holmes 
(2010) apologises for the way that her writing has subordinated emotion to clarity and 
muses, “it is perhaps that very effort at clarity which has washed away the flavour of 
feelings which attend all our thinking (pp. 139-140). Such a statement speaks to a 
challenge for each of the reflexivity theses outlined above: “how to rescue definitions 
and explanations of reflexivity from their over-focus on the cognitive and the 
individual” (p. 140). Holmes’s subsequent argument is part of a widening body of 
sociological research literature that redresses, in varying projects, a lack of attention to 
the emotional aspects of reflexivity (see also: Brownlie, 2011; Burkitt, 2012; King, 2006). 
One can see similar concerns cropping out in other fields. In the context of social work, 
for example, D’Cruz et al. (2007) point out a dominant discourse has been practitioners’ 
control of their emotions, seen as negative and coercive. They argue that emotions may 
be seen in a more positive and productive light: “the acknowledgment of emotional 
responses by the practitioner can be used to promote deeper understanding between 
practitioner and client and ultimately enhance practice” (p. 81). This is not meant to 
imply uniform success or a simplistic view of the relationship between emotions and 
one’s ability to be reflexive: “emotional reflexivity is not simply a matter of individuals 
exercising skills. Emotions are done in interaction with others; they involve bodies, 
thought, talk and action” (Holmes, 2010, p. 149). Thus, for Holmes, reflexivity is: 
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An emotional, embodied and cognitive process in which social actors have feelings 
about and try to understand and alter their lives in relation to their social and natural 
environment and to others. Emotions are understood not in terms of some that may 
retard reflection and some that may enhance it; rather reflexivity is thought to be more 
than reflection and to include bodies, practices and emotions. (p.140)   
 
Holmes’ thesis draws our attention to the complex connection between reflexivity, 
emotion, context and bodies. This brings us to the final trope of reflexivity that I will 
explore here, and one informed by phenomenological44 and post-structural 
understandings. Broadly speaking, phenomenological theorists may be distinguished 
from post-structural thinkers in terms of a tendency to focus on the individual rather 
than the discursive constructions of bodies (Davies, 2010). The notion of embodied 
reflexivity is underpinned by the idea that the body gives rise to the very possibility of 
experience (Stoller, 2009; Wilson & Foglia, 2014) and consequently that “the practice of 
reflexivity should extend to a consideration of research as embodied experience, both 
for the participants and the researcher” (Del Busso, 2007, p. 310). A recent return to 
feminist phenomenology interrupts this apparent binary and has sought to acknowledge 
both the material reality of bodies and their socially constructed, inscribed nature. 
Research in this field highlights the “experiences of bodies in situations, in which it is 
impossible to disentangle so called ‘natural’ and ‘social’ elements” (Lennon, 2014, n.p.). 
Rather than speaking of bodies as a purely discursive construction ‘without flesh’ or as a 
material reality with ‘fleshy feelings’, we might think of bodies as changing over the life 
course, in processes that are both biological and social (J. Evans, Davies, & Rich, 2009). 
Thus, embodied reflexivity attends to lived experience. Reflexivity’s locus is shifted from 
the head to a whole-bodied account; one that is visceral, spiritual and present in the 
moment. As Bai and Banack (2006) suggest, “the difference between sensing oneself as 
having relationships and as being relationships has profound ethical and educational 
implications” (p. 13).   
 
ETHICAL REFLEXIVITY 
 
The plethora of meanings canvassed in the previous section perhaps renders reflexivity 
as a rather figurative and confused concept. This is because at one level it appears 
                                                        
44 Associated with theorists such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. 
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axiomatic that reflexivity is a fact of our social world. We all interpret our experience 
and act on that interpretation; one might call this learning. While it is speculative to 
suggest that contemporary society has produced more or better reflexivity, it is 
impossible to deal with the vicissitudes of our ethical world without it. Further, simply 
being in the world requires a reflexive recourse to the other; having regard to the 
feelings of those around us or considering what principles should guide interaction, for 
example, are dependent on the idea that there is a ‘something else’ one must take 
account of.  
 
Beyond this self-evident account, reflexivity cannot be expected to do the same 
extraordinary range of work in social studies education as it does in social theory and the 
social sciences. This section, therefore, attempts to draw out a conception of ethical 
reflexivity from the previously described tropes and critiques and considers the usefulness 
of ethical reflexivity for social studies teaching and learning. For the purposes of social 
studies education, I argue that ethical reflexivity encapsulates three important 
dimensions: (a) critical reflection, (b) lived experience, that is, the emotive, embodied, 
everyday, and emergent dimensions of ethical life, and (c) imagination – a dimension 
only lightly touched upon in the reflexivity literature.  I stress here that these are not 
separate spheres. For example, the relational and embodied aspects of lived experience 
that I go on to describe are enfolded with critical reflection and imagination.  
 
CRITICAL REFLECTION 
One persistent meaning of reflexivity in the literature canvassed in this chapter is that of 
reconsideration – recasting, for example, one’s understanding about society, the social 
sciences as a discipline or role as a researcher. It includes a notion of recursion – 
thought processes that continually fold back on our social world in ways that contribute 
to the growth of our conceptual schema or radically re-alter it.  This extends to self-
questioning accounts of philosophy in matters of scope and representation, that is, an 
awareness of the field’s limits. For Holland and others, transdisciplinary reflexivity also 
cognises the ways in which the field’s modes of thought might move between varying 
ethical perspectives and into other disciplines. For a number of theorists, such as 
Bleakley (1999) and Willmott (2008), critical reflexivity takes account of ethical 
considerations, as assumptions are prised open. In this sense, ethical perspectives serve 
as a kind of convex mirror, where ideas do not directly arc back on themselves or return 
to the same point of origin, but are refracted in new lines of thought.  
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These varying usages of reflexivity are, following the stipulative definition offered 
earlier, what I would term critical reflection. Construed as rational ‘thinking otherwise’ 
about that which has gone before, this is an important component of my stipulative 
definition for ethical reflexivity. The previous chapter’s argument – a call for a more 
explicit role for the philosophy of ethics in social studies – draws strongly on critical 
modes of thought. Thus, my proposal for better supporting learners’ ethical decision-
making and action necessarily involves critical consciousness and reflection through lifting 
ethical phenomena into the realm of the examined life. The reflexivity literature extends 
this argument somewhat by suggesting that we should not position learners’ reasoning 
as lab work, that is, as a matter of practising doing ethics with criteria. This point has 
been made in relation to history education by Kent den Heyer (2012), who argues that 
critical reflection should “provide opportunities to question the changing 
epistemological basis of what it means to do history” (p. 190); by extension, to question 
the truth-processes of their ethics education. Returning to the notion of ethical 
discourses, introduced in Chapter Two, the reflexivity literature also extends critical 
reflection to include a discursive interpretation, that is, reflection on the discourses in 
which we are engaged and in which we are positioned. Here, I am reminded of 
Elizabeth Heilman’s (2006) argument that social studies and global education should 
include “a deconstructive critical education that continuously explores meaning, power, 
and positionality and is aware that all teachings, texts, and media, claim, distort, enhance, 
open, and close perspectives” (p. 207). An important connection to the imaginative 
aspects of ethical reflexivity lies in the ways in which learners’ awareness of their own 
and others’ positionality opens up the consideration of strategies with which to go on.  
 
LIVED EXPERIENCE 
The varying tropes of reflexivity explored in this chapter suggest that the concept has 
been developed in a more expansive sense than critical reflection. A second dimension 
seeks to territorialise and re-embody the sense of detachment that I think is conveyed by 
the term critical reflection – and returns to Schön’s swampy, complex and indeterminate 
aspects of social life. As I intend it, the ‘lived experience’ aspect of ethical reflexivity 
pulls in the uncertain messiness of the present and recognises that we are not always in a 
position to put a great deal of distance on ethical issues at hand or to draw on formal, 
reasoned knowledge. Very often we muddle through ethical life, sometimes stumbling 
but other times operating in quite innovative ways. The inclusion of lived experience 
extends beyond critical reflection in at least three ways. First, ‘lived experience’ captures 
147 
the emergent nature of ethical action: “contextually appropriate action that is not 
consciously mediated” (Davis, 2004, p. 214). In Varela’s (1999) terms, ethical decision-
making and action is in many instances ‘immediate coping’. It very rarely proceeds along 
predictable and orderly lines, though much social studies and citizenship literature 
understandably focuses on the observable means (curricula and pedagogies, for 
example) by which the overt products of participation may be achieved.  Ethical 
reflexivity does not, however, refer to mindless spontaneity. The concept of emergence 
“draws attention to the fact that there is required a kind of ethical noticing of what is 
good…learned after years of listening and practising” (Neyland, 2010, p. 172), such 
noticing being akin to the improvisational nature of jazz.   
 
Lived experience, secondly, captures the everyday ethical dilemmas and challenges that 
emerge in social studies learners’ daily lives, relationships and experiences. It 
acknowledges the interpenetration of the distant events and the everyday: the similarities 
in ethical questions that arise from what they notice in ‘private’ and ‘public’ domains, 
and the ways in which distant controversies become enmeshed in the daily 
commonplace of cell phones, iPads, and social networks, for example. Understood in 
this sense, bringing in the ‘everyday’ facilitates students’ contextual thinking (Eilam & 
Trop, 2010), that is, their ability to move between circumstance and theory. This 
reminds us of Dewey’s experientialist view that “our principles, values and possibilities 
for the resolution of morally problematic situations arise within those very situations 
themselves” (Johnson, 2009, p. 150). Dewey’s emphasis on the interplay between first-
hand, everyday experience and theory is a theme taken up by Martin Dyke (2013) in his 
research with dockyard workers who had elected not to participate in higher education. 
Connecting to M. S. Archer’s (2012) conception of relational reflexivity, Dyke 
interrogates Michael Young’s (2008) account of powerful knowledge, outlined in the 
previous chapter. In the context of the dockyard, Dyke (2013) records: 
…a rich seam of informal and lifelong learning. A situated and creative learning culture 
had developed, one carved from a traditional working-class industrial landscape where 
people have related reflexively to circumstance in order to shape their lives in ways 
valued by them and the members of their social network. (p. 14) 
 
To parallel this argument in the formal educational setting of the social studies 
classroom is to suggest a more complex view of education than the presumption that 
constructivist/bottom-up learning is necessarily in tension with powerful/top-down 
approaches. In Dyke’s (2013) view, “we should perhaps seek to have a better 
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understanding of the relationships between the elements of learning such as knowledge, 
practice, reflection and our engagement with others, rather than simply assert the 
primacy of the aspects over all others” (p. 15). 
 
To understand lived experience as being part of ethical reflexivity is, thirdly, to point to 
the embodied nature of ethical life: the visceral, spiritual, emotional and fleshy feelings 
innately connected to ethical decision-making and action. As with research and 
professional practice, it is to recognise vulnerability and uncertainty. A connection 
between ethics and emotions is, of course, hardly new. Graham Oddie (2009), for 
example, points to the history of values empiricists who, in quite different theories, have 
posited that emotions, feelings and desires are an important source of data about value. 
Furthermore, not all philosophers regard emotions as morally suspect or something to 
be overcome. In the book Valuing emotions, Stocker and Hegeman (1996) argue that 
emotions are central to the good life and are co-constitutive with values. Some ten years 
on, Ronald de Sousa (2014) argues that there now appears some consensus among 
philosophers as to the characteristics that an acceptable theory of emotion would need 
to account for.  Among these: 
 they typically involve more pervasive bodily manifestations than other conscious states; 
 they contribute crucially to defining our ends and priorities; 
 they play a crucial role in the regulation of social life; 
 they protect us from an excessively slavish devotion to narrow conceptions of 
rationality; 
 they have a central place in moral education and the moral life. (n.p.) 
 
Ethical decision-making and action is, therefore, both cognitive and emotional. And yet, 
as Marjorie O’Loughlin (2006) argues, “educating the body is not an idea encountered in 
most programmes of citizenship today. Ideas about democracy and the development of 
democratic dispositions as a way of being do not at present include the body” (p. 18). 
As Chapter Three revealed, this critique could be extended to the New Zealand social 
studies curriculum and, I suspect, if ethical decision-making and action were a stronger 
curricular feature, this too would read as disembodied and devoid of emotion. 
Importantly, my sense of ethical reflexivity includes the emergent, embodied and 
emotive in people’s everyday relationships with others, their communities and the 
environment, without subordinating lived experience to critical thought. It also suggests 
some caution about placing too much educative weight on the critical. Jim Neyland 
(2010) argues that while “deliberative knowing plays a kind of watching brief that allows 
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us to intervene should the full flow of ethical know-how need to be interrupted” 
(p. 174), constraining ‘full-bodied’ know-how through allowing critical reflection to 
overstep its role reduces people’s capacities for fully functioning in the world. But, 
equally, I do not dismiss the important role of critical reflection. Emotions may 
inherently raise questions of value and ethics, that is, involving emotions in learning 
could activate critical ethical thought (Eilam & Trop, 2010).  Further, as Megan Boler 
(1999), in her book Feeling power: Emotions and education, insists, “a pedagogy that 
recognizes emotions as central to cognition and morality need not preclude intellectual 
rigor or critical inquiry (p. 110). Similarly, Varela (1999) argues that formal education has 
a vital role in developing learners’ “understanding of ethics in a non-moralistic 
framework” (p. ix).  
 
What work does lived experience, together with critical reflection, do in a conception of 
ethical reflexivity? An ethically reflexive approach that takes account of lived experience 
invites learners to notice the ethical as it emerges in the particular circumstances of their 
lives, as they undertake social inquiries, and locate themselves in social issues. 
Acknowledging that social issues are very often palpable, sticky, and problematic, ethical 
reflexivity enables social studies learners to see their lived encounters as “social, 
logistical, and ideological resources” for ethical action (Peterson, 2009, p. 18, my 
emphasis) that are equally as useful as top-down ethical theories. Ethical reflexivity also 
offers learners a more central role in philosophic debates, one in which they can use 
their “personal experience to critique what passes as accepted knowledge in a field, 
while also making sense of personal experience through the lens of that accepted 
knowledge” (Sinacore, Blaisure, Justin, Healy, & Brawer, 1999, p. 267). Thus, ethical 
reflexivity locates the learner as wrestling and agonising with the ethical, not as the 
recipients of pre-figured perspectives. Further, bringing in lived experience draws 
attention to the relational nature of ethics; social inquiry, for example, becomes that of 
ongoing, sensitive renegotiation between people in research relationships, rather than a 
matter of procedural ethical compliance.  
 
ETHICAL IMAGINATION 
What then of bringing about social change? As the previous sections have conveyed, 
ethical reflexivity is innately concerned with complexity and uncertainty in ethical life. 
Just as the need for decision-making stems from swampy situations, ethical responses 
are not a matter of certitude. Notably, much of the social studies and citizenship 
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literature carries a kind of instrumental rationality through the use of terms such as: 
active citizenship, social action, taking action, service learning, and making a difference. 
By contrast, critical reflection and lived experience imbues ethical reflexivity with a 
‘participatory sensibility’ (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2008): 
Everything matters, but we can only be aware of only a small part of what goes on 
around us. We can never know the full consequences of an action and, as such, we must 
participate mindfully in the unfolding of circumstances around us. (p. 173) 
 
It is this participatory sensibility and its relationship to imagination that I see as being as 
being a third central aspect of ethical reflexivity.  This recognises that the resources of 
critical thought and daily life provide learners with insufficient response to the 
complexities of ethical decision-making and action; creativity, innovation, and 
imagination are also required. It is this, I contend, that propels them beyond the status 
quo, enables them to create new trajectories and lies in the remaking of their ethical 
worlds. To me, ethical imagination is generative; it shifts our learners’ gaze from 
absences identified in critical reflection to what could be in their ethical worlds. Using 
the work of Alain Badiou, den Heyer (2012) argues that social studies education should 
open and support “an institutional space for truths to emerge from such creative and 
inventive potential” (p. 205). These spaces may exist in their wonder, for example, at 
random acts of kindness, or what appears unusual in others’ ethical actions, or what 
moves them. It is, further, what transports them from what they thought they had 
towards that which is essentially indeterminate, at least in prospect.  
 
Imagination, of course, has been of interest in almost every field of academic thought. 
C Wright Mills (1959), for example, argued that sociological imagination – a quality of 
mind that seeks to link history, biography and wider social forces – was vital in terms of 
developing the capacities of reason and societal critique. And to be sure, imagination has 
had both a wide variety of applications in philosophy (Gendler, 2014) and something of 
a chequered history in classical ethics. Thomas Alexander (1993) notes that:  
While thinkers in the classical tradition, like Plato and Descartes, saw imagination as a 
source of error or, like Aristotle, at best as a lower, necessary condition of thought, the 
romantics and their inheritors made it the source of nonnatural insight into the 
transcendental infinite or the subconscious, archetypal world inaccessible to mere 
understanding. (p. 371) 
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I will not here attempt to précis all the ways in which imagination and ethics have been 
linked in moral philosophy, except to point out its prominence amongst contemporary 
philosophers and social theorists. Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Martha Nussbaum and 
others have stressed the role of literature and public works such as documentaries in 
cultivating moral imagination. For Nussbaum, “the novel, more the philosophical text, 
provides an opportunity to explore the complexities, conflicts, and ambiguities inherent 
in human life” (Wright, 2003, p. 107). Margaret Somerville (2006) similarly argues that 
the language of poetry is an important route to many ways of ethical knowing, where 
“we can gain access to, and explore, numinous realities…What we learn from through 
them is not inconsistent with reason and logic, just different” (p. 16). For her, 
imagination is an important building block in creating a shared ethics because it enables 
consideration of questions that cannot be answered by experiential knowledge and the 
‘hard sciences’ alone. Equally important, she argues, are the stories we tell because they 
are a vital mechanism for enabling the consideration of difference.  
 
The imaginative consideration of how to go on is thus, firstly, about desire, understood 
as a will to change.  It is also fundamentally relational, whether unfamiliar moral 
perspectives are accessed through, for example, fictions or face-to-face encounters with 
the other. The relational importance of ethical imagination is stressed by Henrietta 
Moore (2011), who views ethical imagination as the primary site for social change, 
political protest and cultural invention: 
… because it engages with and refigures self-stylization and self-other relations in the 
context of [affect, emotion, the placement of the body, fantasy, and relations with objects, 
technologies and the material world] … To grasp it in all its fullness, we have to recognise 
that it is not just about conformity to the normative or to power, but it is about the 
strategies that individuals ‘in their freedom’ can use in dealing with each other. (p. 21, my emphasis) 
 
When this literature is read together, imagination might be seen as arcing back on 
myriad surfaces and contributing a constellation of possibilities for social action to my 
use of ethical reflexivity. The way in which I use ethical imagination, however, is more 
directly conjunctive with creation and world formation, and resists a sense in which 
imagination/thought exists a priori to action among these authors’ work. Adams’ (2003) 
consideration of life-politics mentioned earlier provides an important link to the way in 
which I use ethical imagination: the idea that, in reflexive modernity, “the individual is 
no longer painting by numbers, so to speak, she is creating her own work of art” (p. 
223). This is suggestive of what I see as being the enfolded nature of imagination and 
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creation, an idea that crops out in a number of authors’ work, from a diverse range of 
theoretical perspectives. Dewey (1922), for example, saw moral reasoning as an 
imaginative thought experiment, conducted as one temporarily suspends action:  
A dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action…an 
experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and 
impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. (p. 190)  
 
Understood within Dewey’s theory of experience, imagination is not separate from 
moral life; instead, moral imagination grows in and through experience. Moreover, on 
Dewey’s account we understand what images mean when they show themselves in 
action. And in his lectures on ethics, it is apparent that “forming and striving to 
actualize the image constitute a continuous experience: imaging and taking action are 
not different kinds of experience, but phases in a continuous stream of experience” 
(Chambliss, 1991, p. 47). More recently, and through Dewey, Mark Johnson (1993, 
2009) has developed a metaphor of ‘morality as art’ to emphasise the role of moral 
imagination in creativity.  Johnson (2009) argues that imagination “is the key to the 
moral acts by which old conceptions and values are reshaped, our ways of perceiving and 
responding to situations and people are transformed, and new realities come into existence” 
(p. 212, my emphases). He posits three types of imagination: imaginative perception, 
imaginative envisionment, and imaginative action. Although one needs to be cautious 
about simple taxonomies of imagination, the latter comes close to my use of the 
imagination within ‘ethical reflexivity’, in particular because it breaks down a 
thought/action binary.  
 
Another insight that shapes my use of imagination within ethical reflexivity is that of the 
social imaginary, most notably from the work of Cornelius Castoriadis. The title of his 
book, The imaginary institution of society (1987) refers not to fantasy, but to the ways in 
which imagination brings forth, or institutes social practices and organisations. The 
social imaginary, for Castoriadis, reflects humanity’s profoundly creative dimension, as 
expressed in its enormous imaginative capacity. Human beings are led continuously to 
create their social world – one which is in a continuous state of coming-in-to-being.  
Castoriadis’ ontology was particularly sceptical of any view that societal evolution and 
forms of life are determined by forces or relationships. In his view, society is self-
instituting “emergence of radical otherness, immanent creation, non-trivial novelty”  
(p. 184). Importantly, drawing Castoriadis’ central intuitions about the evolution of 
society into ethical reflexivity goes beyond autopoesis described earlier in this chapter. 
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For Castoriadis a free or autonomous society “is a society that gives itself, effectively 
and reflexively, its own laws, while knowing that it is doing so” (cited in Asara, Profumi 
& Kallis, 2013, p. 227). On his account, people and societies – ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
worlds as co-existent – may knowingly conceive of themselves, and this is strongly 
linked to what it is to be free and autonomous. Individual political autonomy “is the 
active and lucid agency that constantly reorganizes its contents, through the help of 
those same contents…mixtures of what it has already found there before and what it 
has produced itself” (p. 106). Castoriadis argued that we should be recreating our world, 
self-consciously and collectively, through ‘objective reflexivity’45. As Gaonkar (2002) 
explains: 
Autonomous societies habitually call into question their own institutions and 
representations and the social imaginary that underwrites them. Here the people as 
collective agents recognize the contingency and constructedness of their world and how 
that world is made possible through the workings of the social imaginary. Hence, one 
need not think of the social imaginary as a demiurge that sets itself to work behind the 
backs of the people. It can be reflexively interrogated and hermeneutically 
reappropriated. (p. 8) 
 
My undertaking in this section has not been to wholly align myself with Dewey, Johnson, 
Castoriadis or others, or to firmly locate myself within fields such phenomenology or 
complexity theory. One may derive similar arguments to those I have presented here from 
a variety of theoretical positions. My concern has been to explore the work that 
imagination could do in a concept of ethical reflexivity. The argument has been that 
wonder, desire and generativity, for example, enable social studies learners to move 
beyond the resources of critical thinking and lived experience (although I re-emphasise 
that these are not separate spheres). Ethical imagination impels learners’ becoming 
onwards, knowing not where this will lead or whether the strategies they employ in ethical 
life will amount to satisfactory solutions. Importantly, this expands the places for the 
possible in learners’ counter-socialisation. It suggests that while social issues necessarily 
involve dilemmas and contentiousness, their ethical action may not always speak to 
problems. And it reminds us that the insights and modes of thought of the philosophy of 
ethics, while a much needed insertion into social studies education, is only one 
contribution to the artistry of learners’ ethical lives. Most certainly, the philosophy of 
ethics offers the means with which to go on but other possibilities are generated and 
enacted through lived experience and imagination. Thus, ethical reflexivity invites the 
                                                        
45 Which he contrasts with the ‘purely reflexive’, that is, unconscious reflex. 
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philosophy of ethics to the artistry of learners’ ethical lives, but is not itself the artwork. 
This view, I think, would be readily accepted among contemporary academic ethicists, 
particularly as they have turned away from ‘grand theory’.  
CONCLUSION: ETHICAL REFLEXIVITY, COUNTER-SOCIALISATION AND REMAKING 
ETHICAL WORLDS 
There is only one subject and that is life in all its manifestations. (Alfred North 
Whitehead, 1929) 
 
The work of Chapters Four and Five has been to propose a broad theoretical 
orientation to supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action. The 
argument developed in Chapter Four was that the curriculum requirement to bring 
ethics into social studies education (a) requires a focus on social issues, (b) should be 
directed towards learners’ counter-socialisation and that, (c) both are strengthened by 
explicitly incorporating the modes of thinking and theoretical perspectives of academic 
ethics. I argued that mobilising the philosophy of ethics within social studies education 
is a matter of social justice, in that learners are offered powerful knowledges with which 
to critically explore ethical decision-making and action, and is vital, furthermore, 
because it enhances a range of social studies outcomes.  
 
This chapter began from the premise that whether the philosophy of ethics realises its 
potential in social studies education is dependent on how it is incorporated. The risk, as 
with any subject, is that it could be taught in an abstracted and distanced manner. In 
pursuing my research question as to the theoretical spaces that exist for better supporting 
social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, the chapter has taken ideas of 
reflexivity from social theory and social sciences research. On my account, ethical 
reflexivity is a term capable, stipulatively, of incorporating people’s capacities for critical 
reflection and imaginative action. It recognises also that these capacities are largely borne 
from lived experience; the surfaces that ethical reflexivity spring back from are manifold 
and not just those of academic ethics. Of course, other terms may have sufficed as 
indexical for these features. However, to me the term ethical reflexivity provides 
continuity for social studies teachers and learners who are familiar with the term critical 
reflection but at the same time reflection is interrupted, making the familiar unfamiliar.  
 
Having developed this stipulative definition, the final work of this chapter is two-fold: 
(i) to draw together the bases upon which reflexive approaches can be defended as an 
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important theoretical orientation to better supporting social studies learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action, and (ii) to consider whether, in contrast to the argument 
developed in the last chapter, an ethically reflexive orientation would require a radical 
departure from the ways in which social studies in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry 
of Education, 2007) currently frames ethical decision-making and action. 
 
ETHICALLY REFLEXIVE APPROACHES AS SUPPORT FOR LEARNERS’ ETHICAL 
DECISION-MAKING AND ACTION 
This chapter has shifted from considering reflexivity’s tropes in the social sciences and 
in social theory to how a concept of ethical reflexivity might be useful in social studies 
education. In the sense I turn to now, ethical reflexivity describes an educational adaptation 
to the society within which learners find themselves – a contemporary ethical space that, 
from a variety of accounts, may be thought of as being marked by reflexivity. We 
respond reflexively to the demands of societal complexity, pluralism and ambivalence; 
assembling from myriad reflexive surfaces bespoke, ‘good enough for now’, responses 
to the contingencies of ethical life. In this context, strongly aligning ethical decision-
making and action with critical thinking, as The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) does, underserves the needs of learners as they navigate in their ethical 
worlds. In one important respect, my use of ethical reflexivity highlights aspects of 
ethical decision-making and action that appear under-acknowledged, and might be 
arbitrarily distinguished, in social studies teaching and learning. It is notable that recent 
theorising in North American contexts has revealed the minimal attention to affect 
(Helmsing, 2014) and imagination (Egan & Judson, 2009) in social studies education. 
Even more critically, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no social studies 
literature that considers the interplay of critical reflection, lived experience, and 
imagination, let alone the relationship to learners’ ethical decision-making and action.  
 
My use of ethical reflexivity resists, as elsewhere in academic thought, representing the 
social and ethical world as conforming to dualistic conceptions of reason/emotion, 
formal/informal knowledge and so on. It might be possible, for example, and on one 
reading of this chapter, to think of ethical reflexivity as the domain of individual thought 
and action and thus ethical decision-making and action as being a solitary act. As this 
chapter has pointed out, the individual and society are not separate spheres. Ethical 
decision-making and action is necessarily a relational activity that arises from a 
consideration of how we should live our lives with others and the environment. A second 
binary that I have interrogated is implicit in the phrase ethical decision making and action. I 
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submit that conscious ethical decision-making is not separate from, or a priori to, action. 
Often in the lived world, action is decision. Furthermore, action is a site of ethical 
imagination. Social studies taught as counter-socialisation ought not, therefore, to simply 
engage learners in rational decision-making or an ethic of critique (Starratt, 1994) ahead of 
their active citizenship, but in continuous and evolutionary processes of knowingly 
recreating their ethical worlds – even if we cannot be certain of how those future worlds 
will be.  
 
Thus, in another important sense, the literature reviewed in this chapter underscores the 
need for careful consideration of how ethical decision-making and action might be given 
expression in New Zealand social studies classrooms. An arid introduction of the 
philosophy of ethics, minimal opportunities for critical reflection, inattention to learners’ 
lives and ethical imaginations risks closing off the actual and potential contribution that 
social studies might make to learners’ counter-socialisation. Rather than positioning social 
studies learners as simply recipients of pre-packaged ethical knowledge, reflexive 
approaches could better support their ethical decision-making and action by encouraging 
them to assemble the resources of critical reflection, philosophy, lived experience and their 
imagination in enacting their good life. This resists flat, monotone and distanced 
approaches, where the aim is to reach once and for all conclusions by the end of the lesson. 
By contrast, it acknowledges and calls for considerable responsiveness on the part of social 
studies learners in terms of intellectual agility, sensitivity towards the other, and to context.  
 
A precedent for this approach may be found in Martin Dyke’s (2009) framework for 
reflexive learning, a response to what he sees as the demands of reflexive modernity. 
Dyke’s approach calls on four elements conceived as a non-linear and holistic process: 
theory (or claims to knowledge), practice (or concrete experience), reflection, and 
interaction with the other (in a social context). There are significant parallels between 
Dyke’s conception of reflexive learning and an ethically reflexive orientation, not least a 
connection to the work of Dewey and Schön. The elements of theory and reflection are 
broadly analogous to my use of critical reflection, practice and interaction with lived 
experience, and doing with imagination and creativity. There are, of course, some 
important distinctions; Dyke’s concern is not immediately with ethics and the embodied 
dimensions of reflexivity are not overtly considered, for example. My point here is not 
to assert that Dyke’s argument confirms mine, or is lacking in some respect, but to 
suggest instead that beyond social studies education others are similarly exploring a 
concept of reflexivity as it applies to teaching and learning processes. His search, like 
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mine, is for pedagogies where the academic disciplines are not seen as directing practice 
but where the relationship to received wisdom “values the past experience and 
knowledge claims of others but…does not defer to it” (p. 295).  
 
Dyke’s (2009) non-linear and holistic approach suggests how an ethically reflexive 
orientation could move past a debate/action binary, pedagogically speaking. Much of 
the previous chapter was indeed concerned with the ‘debate side’ of this binary and the 
more explicit insertion of the philosophy of ethics into social studies education. 
However, I stress that teaching and learning about ethical decision-making and action 
need not necessarily begin with theoretically informed ethical discussion or debate. It 
could instead begin and continue with the imaginative – the unusual, absurd or 
humorous as entry points and stimuli for ethical discussion. An ethically reflexive 
orientation also leaves room for beginning with action, or the ‘concrete’ in Dyke’s 
terms. In this way, learners’ existing and everyday social participation, their lived 
experiences, become the site of, and resources for, ethical exploration. This is important 
because, “now what might be done” (Ministry of Education, 2008, p. 10) about an issue 
is currently positioned as the outcome of social inquiry, the re-iterative nature of the 
methodology notwithstanding. I contend that turning the social inquiry model ‘on its 
head’ could offer much more fertile ground for learners’ consideration of the ethical 
content of social action.  
 
A pedagogical emphasis on the imaginative and learners’ lived experience resists the 
assumption, implicit in cognitive developmental approaches (Hill, 2014), that reason and 
debate are the inevitable precursors to acceptable moral behaviour. Moreover, it places 
critical, ethical reflection in the service of learners’ whole lives, rather than being the sole 
outcome of social studies teaching and learning. What an ethically reflexive approach 
could look like in social studies classrooms is further developed in Chapter Seven, where 
I recommend a range of pedagogical approaches that could be assembled, adapted or 
amplified in strategies for social studies teaching and learning.  
 
BEYOND THE NEW ZEALAND CURRICULUM? 
The previous chapter proposed adjustments to the New Zealand social studies 
curriculum’s extant framing in order to better accommodate learners’ ethical decision-
making and action. There I argued that social studies, as the melded traditions of 
reflective inquiry and social science, could and should overtly mobilise the philosophy of 
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ethics, reconceive social issues as including the ‘private’, and be more strongly directed 
towards counter-socialisation. When the argument for an ethically reflexive orientation 
is also taken into account it would seem, on the surface at least, that all resemblance to 
social studies as reflective inquiry and social science are lost – an exercise of curricular 
extrapolation that stretches all bounds of credibility. In this section I demonstrate 
through the work of Brian Hill (1994) that the connections may not be as strained as 
they first appear, and that we may expand them further.  
 
The reader will recall two significant features of Hill’s work, a first being its strong 
influence on the development of social inquiry in the New Zealand social studies 
curriculum. Second, he sees the ultimate aim of social studies as being the 
empowerment of the social and ethical self. This perspective was cited by the authors of 
the Waikato position paper (H. Barr et al., 1997) as an important example in the tradition 
of social studies taught as personal, social and ethical development:   
Proponents of this tradition argue that the purpose of social studies is to help students 
face and deal with problems in today’s changing world. They claim that social studies be 
concerned with the development of the whole person and should help students develop 
a positive self concept. (p. 3) 
 
I submit that Hill might recognise much of his thinking in relation to the argument I 
have built across the previous two chapters. Most certainly, and as I have acknowledged, 
he is one of the very few Australasian academics to have explored the place of the 
philosophy of ethics in learners’ social studies education. His book, Teaching social studies 
in a multicultural society (Hill, 1994), devotes an entire chapter to ethical issues and 
perspectives in social studies. In particular, he argues for an explicit insertion of the 
philosophy of ethics, as justificatory theories, into social studies. Such is the strength of 
his conviction, he argues that teachers and learners owe it to themselves to study the 
field in more depth. I think that Hill would, secondly, concur with the suggestion that a 
definition of social issues should be expanded to include challenges and dilemmas that 
are not publicly observable. His suggestions for ‘hot topics’ at the time of publication 
could be read as an attempt to bridge a public/private divide in relation to social issues 
described in Chapter Four. Such topics include ‘sex and family’, ‘my community’, 
‘becoming a person’, and ‘religion and life’. For all that eyebrows might raise over these 
topic choices, his motivation appears to lie in ensuring that the nature and purposes of 
social studies remain close to learners’ being in the world. Third, the argument that social 
studies should be directed towards learners’ counter-socialisation appears one that Hill 
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would endorse. The aim of social studies, as he sees it, stresses equipping learners with 
the resources to navigate in and change society: “not merely to achieve the goal of 
academic understanding and competence, but to build this learning into one’s own 
response to the social environment” (p. 216). He argues for stronger pedagogical attention 
to social action, that is, a move beyond the skills of reaching and justifying decisions. He 
stresses the importance of encouraging learners to interrogate their own cultural 
conditioning and discursive formation in order to consider strategies for change.  
 
The conception of ethical reflexivity developed in this chapter also appears to resonate 
with Hill’s (1994) work. Notably, what he describes as the initiative domain of social 
studies is very close to my use of ethical imagination. For him, this domain “is where 
cognitive and affective elements are inextricably interwoven with the choices and 
purposes of the integrated self” (pp. 151-152, my emphasis). Further, and in line with 
my use of critical reflection, he argues that paradigm analysis is central to social studies 
education, without which “we will not be alerted to the risks of having our 
understanding limited by inadequate basic assumptions and values” (p. 163). Though he 
is sceptical of thorough-going relativism, he argues that it “is never too soon, however, 
to tackle the question of what sorts of evidence and faith underlie particular truth-claims 
in social explanation” (p. 164). Perhaps we might debate how far this should to be 
taken. Hill’s ‘critical affiliation’ model allows for an open exploration of democracy’s 
imperfections, in contrast to democracy being an implicit feature of reflective decision-
making. But he stops short of suggesting that learners could critique values he sees as 
being “centrally located in democratic ethos” (p. 218).  
 
Arguably, a re-reading of social studies in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) in light of Hill’s work could highlight the important intersection of the 
tradition of social studies taught as personal, social and ethical development (H. Barr et 
al., 1997) with the curriculum’s extant framings. This could address some of the 
curricular absences noted in Chapter Three – such as its ethical silence, the absence of 
feeling, and the de-centring of learners – which appear not to be what Hill would have 
intended for social studies or a model of social inquiry.  It perhaps positions ethics 
education in social studies as responding to what Dewey (1910) called learners’ felt 
difficulties. Further, it could acknowledge the fact that many New Zealand experienced 
and pre-service social studies teachers see this tradition (in combination with reflective 
inquiry) as being central to the purposes of social studies (Hawe, Browne, Siteine & 
Tuck, 2010), irrespective of the curriculum.  
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But I think there are at least two very important reasons for caution about reading my 
argument for ethically reflexive approaches to social studies education as being wholly 
aligned with social studies taught as personal, social and ethical development and/or 
Hill’s (1994) variant, the empowerment of the social and ethical self. A first relates to 
the way in which the whole person is theorised through each orientation. I am wary, for 
example, of the inherent, humanistic assumptions in concepts such as development and 
empowerment: of a coherent, bounded self; able to shape its own destiny through 
inquiry and reason; and conforming to predictable pathways to integrated selfhood. 
Reflexivity, as I use it, resists these conceptions and instead emphasises an arcing back 
on the multiplicities of the self and the ground on which its stands.  Something of the 
flavour of this contention is carried in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (2013) 
resistance to conceptions of co-ordinated selfhood. As Mansfield (2000) summarises:  
Being is to be conceptualised in terms of the endless and multiple involvements that 
enwrap things in the world in an inevitable, albeit dynamic and transitory 
interrelationship – in the ‘assemblages’ that establish ‘connections between certain 
multiplicities’. (p. 140) 
 
These ideas tie in with the idea of counter-socialisation employed in the preceding 
chapter in the sense that constant, embodied engagement and re-formation in life 
moves beyond social studies taught as personal, social and ethical development. An 
ethically reflexive orientation focuses more closely on the complexities and 
contradictions of social transformation. A second reason why ethical reflexivity moves 
beyond social studies taught as personal, social and ethical development returns to my 
point about arcing back on multiplicities. I submit that asserting the primacy of this 
tradition risks occluding the ways in which ethically reflexive approaches, in life and in 
pedagogy, may be thought of as assemblages. While it is of course the case that the 
varying traditions of social studies, however characterised, are inter-related and have 
been given different emphases over time, my argument here is that ethically reflexive 
approaches transcend the rather arbitrary nature of such boundaries. One contribution 
ethical reflexivity makes to social studies is not, therefore, a grand theory of everything, 
but a provocation in thinking more expansively about how learners’ ethical decision-
making and action might be better supported.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PROSPECTS AND CHAL LENGES 
 
Having proposed an ethically reflexive orientation to better supporting social studies learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action, this chapter turns to considering the challenges and prospects ahead. It 
begins by reviewing research about the implementation of the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007), especially the Values statement and the social sciences learning area, in order to 
establish the extent to which teachers may already be taking an ethically reflexive orientation, despite 
minimal curricular elucidation. This research suggests that signalling the shifts in meaning (Aitken, 
2006) could be a determinant in terms of how ethical decision-making and action is picked up in social 
studies classrooms. I then explore three further potential influences on how curriculum materials and 
social studies teaching and learning may give expression to ethical decision-making and action: ethics in 
an era of the scientific management of education, and knowing what works in evidence-based education, 
and the ethics of ethics education. While this predominantly reads as a series of constraints, the 
perspective of a small group of New Zealand social studies teachers and their students, who were asked 
to consider the role of ethics in social studies education, suggests that a reflexive orientation could 
transcend the ethically silent space of social studies. 
 
INTRODUCTION: DOING THE ‘HARD BITS’ OF SOCIAL STUDIES 
 
I have proposed that learners’ ethical decision-making and action would be better 
supported through an ethically reflexive orientation, one that brings the philosophy of 
ethics into their critical reflection, and enfolds their lived experiences and ethical 
imaginations. Across two chapters, the argument for this ‘preferable future’46 has been 
built primarily along philosophical and sociological lines. In Chapter Four I argued that 
any approach to ethics education in social studies must focus on social issues and 
recognise the enmeshed nature of learners’ ‘private’ and ‘public’ ethical lives. I secondly 
contended that social studies education should be directed towards counter-socialisation 
because personal and societal transformation is at least in part dependent on social 
criticism. In order for social studies education to enlarge learners’ critical reflection 
about ethical decision-making and action, I argued that it needs to (a) be as 
encompassing of ethical perspectives as possible and (b) make better use of the 
philosophy of ethics modes of thinking, conceptual language, and categories of thought.   
                                                        
46  ‘Preferable, possible and probable futures’ is a heuristic drawn from Futures Studies, for example the work of 
Wendell Bell (Kicker, 2009). 
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The argument developed in Chapter Five was that ethical decision-making and action 
involves more than developing the knowledge and skills associated with critical 
reflection. Thus critical reflection is a necessary but not sufficient condition. This is 
because ethical decision-making and action is not simply a rational, cognitive and 
ordered thought experiment. It arises from the multiplicity of learners’ selves – 
including bodies, emotions, identities and desires – and in relation to the diverse 
contexts of their everyday lives. Ethical decision-making is also enacted in learners’ lives, 
through their ‘swampy’ experiences and imaginations, and within the context of societal 
uncertainty. These features of learners’ ethical lives, together with critical thought, 
demand considerable agility and sensitivity. For these reasons, I have advocated a 
reflexive rather than reflective orientation to implementing the curricular expectation that 
learners’ ethical decision-making and action be supported.  
 
This chapter turns to the third of my research sub-questions, an exploration of the 
difficulties and possibilities for an ethically reflexive orientation that could lie ahead. It 
considers ‘contingent factors’ in moral education (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005) 
introduced in Chapter One. It is important to note that the research evidence about this 
is at best tenuous. We know from Paul Keown’s (1998) research that there has been a 
longstanding marginalisation of values exploration, social decision-making and social 
action in New Zealand social studies teaching and learning; these he called the ‘hard 
bits’ of social studies. But there has been no research that has directly considered the 
place of ethics, pedagogically speaking, in social studies education. So, considerable 
extrapolation from research evidence that could intersect with my proposal for an 
ethically reflexive orientation to social studies appears necessary. With the limitations of 
the data in mind, this chapter considers a range of influences on how the ethical aspects 
of the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007) could be given expression. This 
consideration is made through a number of avenues.  I take as a starting point for this 
chapter Paul Keown’s (1998) findings, from a range of empirical and theoretical sources, 
about what was contributing to values and social action being perceived as the hard bits 
of New Zealand social studies in the 1990s. His findings structure this chapter as 
illustrative themes, a selection of the kinds of challenges possibly in store for an ethically 
reflexive orientation. To consider Keown’s findings in the present, I explore how they 
intersect with more recent research about the multiple, and often contradictory, 
influences on education and, in turn, the prospects and challenges for an ethically 
reflexive orientation.  
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The chapter begins with reviewing research literature to consider whether New Zealand 
social studies teachers are, in fact, taking an ethically reflexive orientation in spite of 
minimal curricular guidance as to what ethical decision-making is to mean. I infer from a 
range of evidence about curriculum delivery that ethical decision-making and action is 
rarely explicitly attended to in New Zealand social studies teaching and learning. One 
possible influence on this phenomenon is stressed within this research evidence: the 
need for curriculum design and professional development to support teachers’ 
interpretation of curricular requirements, or to signal the shifts in meaning. Three 
further potential influences are then explored in turn, and look to the political, 
historical, economic and ethical forces that constrain and facilitate educational change: 
ethics in an era of the scientific management of education, knowing what works in 
evidence-based education, and the ethics of ethics education. It is important to note that 
these are examples of what could, in future, contribute to an extended silence in relation 
to social studies learners’ consideration of ethical decision-making and action; the 
exploration of this lacuna is therefore not exhaustive or conclusive. Instead, the 
potential influences I outline signal the kinds of prospects and challenges that could be 
ahead for an ethically reflexive orientation. While the discussion cumulatively suggests 
that the ‘probable future’ for an ethically reflexive orientation contains some significant 
challenges, I consider what ‘wriggle room’ there might be even within such constraints. 
To this end, the last section of this chapter reports on a study of the views of a small 
group of New Zealand social studies teachers and their students, who in the early stages 
of this thesis were asked to consider the role of ethics in social studies education. Many 
of the findings might have been safely predicted from the research considered in this 
chapter; however, some offer perhaps surprising glimpses into the ‘possible futures’ for 
an ethically reflexive orientation.  
SIGNALLING THE SHIFTS IN MEANING 
 
In this section I explore whether New Zealand teachers, independently of the 
curriculum, may already be taking an ethically reflexive orientation to social studies 
teaching and learning. In addition, I ask what might be influencing this.  Given that no 
research expressly addresses these questions, I draw instead from a range of existing 
evidence about the delivery of social studies and, more broadly, values education. I 
consider, firstly, successive Education Review Office (ERO) reports that have provided 
insight into the quality of social studies teaching and learning prior to the publication of 
The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). There have been no equivalent 
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ERO reports since that time. I consider, secondly, the evidence from three recent 
reports which have examined the progress towards The New Zealand curriculum’s 
implementation. While these do not specifically comment on the social sciences learning 
area, they provide insight into how the Values statement has been interpreted and 
imbedded within wider school programmes (Education Review Office, 2010; Sinnema, 
2011). My interest is, in particular, how New Zealand social studies teachers might be 
interpreting the expectation that they encourage learners to “act ethically” and develop 
their abilities to act ethically and “make ethical decisions and act on them” (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 10).  
 
Certainly, in the period leading up to the current curriculum’s publication teachers were 
aware of aspects of social studies that strongly align with ethical decision-making and 
action. The overwhelming majority of 853 primary and secondary teachers who 
participated in the National school sampling study in 2002 (C. McGee et al., 2003) reported 
that they were addressing values exploration and social decision-making in their 
programmes. Nevertheless, considerable disjunction appeared to exist between what 
teachers reported and the reality of classroom practice. Successive ERO reports (ERO, 
2001, 2006) found that values exploration and social decision-making tend to be 
minimally integrated into planning and assessment practices. Social decision-making was 
often conflated with rather more generic problem-solving approaches that failed to focus 
on social issues and taking action. Additionally, values exploration tended to amount to 
identifying points of view, rather than extending to values analysis. The quality of teaching in 
years 4 and 8: Social studies report (Education Review Office, 2006) found that planning was 
rarely linked to what is now called social inquiry, and a reliance on content-driven 
approaches and recall of knowledge assessment practices47 appeared to be limiting 
opportunities for developing students’ social inquiry skills. Fifty-one per cent of the 
teachers could show little or no evidence of having made links to the social studies 
curriculum in their planning48. Such findings need to be read in light of persistent disquiet 
over social studies teachers’ curriculum understanding, reflected in a lack of alignment 
between social studies programmes and the curriculum. In sum, therefore, those aspects 
of social studies curriculum that most closely relate to my understanding of ethical 
decision-making and action were very unlikely to have been given explicit attention.  
                                                        
47  Of the 40 per cent of teachers who were gathering assessment information. 
48  A follow-up report noted some instances of good social studies teaching practice (Education Review Office, 2007), 
but this sheds little light on how the teachers who were successfully delivering the social studies curriculum were 
enacting the values exploration and social decision-making processes. 
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Did this state of affairs alter after the publication of The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry 
of Education, 2007)? One report, by ERO (2010) found that by the end of 2009 over 
three-quarters of 245 primary and secondary schools were ‘giving full effect’ or ‘making 
good progress’ towards giving effect to the new curriculum. The review was particularly 
complimentary of school-wide approaches to integrating shared school values into 
teaching and learning, and the way in which schools had heeded the curricular 
expectation of community dialogue over the values to be encouraged and modelled. A 
second report, Monitoring and evaluating curriculum implementation (MECI; Sinnema, 2011), 
suggests that caution should be exercised over the ERO findings. This evaluation 
sought to examine the progress made in the first two years of the curriculum’s 
implementation, and factors that explain the degree of progress. More than 5000 
educators took part in the period between 2008 and 2009. Notably, and in contrast to 
the ERO (2010) findings, the MECI evaluation found that only limited progress was 
being made in implementing the curriculum across four elements of the evaluation: 
support encounters, receptivity, understanding, and practice. Though the revised 
curriculum was generally well regarded by the respondents, and perceived as being an 
improvement on the last, the report noted considerable incongruence between 
curriculum intent and interpretation, in particular a lack of recognition of the complex 
and interconnected nature of the curriculum.  
 
Two aspects of the MECI findings have particular salience for the question as to how 
the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007), including the requirement to 
support learners’ ethical decision-making, is being interpreted. Its finer-grained analysis 
(than that undertaken by ERO) found that less attention had been given to the right-
hand column of the Values statement, crucially, that which encourages greater criticality 
with regard to ethical decision-making and actions. Notably, there was no change 
between 2008 and 2009 in the proportion of teachers (15%) who reported that 
developing students' skills for exploring values was very strongly evident in their 
practice and there existed, for example: 
…a superficial view of values in the curriculum (focused on inculcating the national 
curriculum and school values) rather than the deeper three way values education process 
signalled in The New Zealand Curriculum (education about values, and in valuing skills 
alongside encouraging affiliation to key public values). (Sinnema, 2011, p. 4)  
 
And the report later explains: 
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While almost one third of respondents said that they consistently or often encourage 
students to hold The New Zealand Curriculum values, there is still less attention…to the 
more difficult aspects. Only a small proportion of respondents report integrating values 
into learning experiences across the curriculum (22%), learning about the nature of 
values (17%), and developing skills for exploring values (15%). (p.37) 
 
Another aspect of the MECI findings that lends weight to the contention that New 
Zealand teachers are underplaying the critical aspects of values education is that there 
was little progress in developing students’ competency in thinking. This is one of five 
cross-curricular competencies of New Zealand’s curriculum, and the one that has an 
express focus on critical thinking. Only 30% of participants said that this was very 
strongly evident in their practice by 2009, and less than a quarter reported that all five 
key competencies had been strongly integrated into learning areas.  When findings 
related to values education and the thinking key competency are read together, it seems 
unlikely that New Zealand teachers would be interpreting and/or implementing the 
ethical dimensions of the curriculum through a critical lens.  
 
A third report, which considered the effect of the Values statement on teaching and 
learning (Notman, 2012; Notman et al., 2012) drew from a sample of four schools in 
Otago. This included surveys of 90 intermediate and secondary teachers who were asked 
about their perceptions of their students’ knowledge about values and valuing skills. The 
teachers perceived their knowledge of the values to be encouraged as uniformly high, as 
was their perception of their schools’ support of those values. On both measures, 
integrity (which includes acting ethically) rated as extremely high, and it was also the 
value of most importance to the teachers. However, integrity did not feature highly in 
the values the teachers had taught explicitly in the last year.  The study also found that 
teachers perceived their students’ skill levels as being low “in relation to critically 
analysing values; negotiating solutions to differences; and making and acting on ethical 
decisions” (Notman, 2012, p. 46). Interestingly, when one examines these data 
(reproduced below), it is an open question as to how teachers interpreted the skill of 
making ethical decisions and acting on them, as this appears not as strongly aligned with 
the other, more overtly critical skill areas. My suspicion is that they read this in a 
normative sense, that is, arriving at ‘good’ decisions rather than considering a range of 
possibilities. 
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One further report is important to mention here also: the recent International civic and 
citizenship education study (ICCS) (Schulz et al., 2010). This is the largest international study 
on civic and citizenship education ever conducted, and in which over 4000 New 
Zealand Year 10 students and teachers participated.  In this report, New Zealand 
students’ perceptions of openness in classroom discussions were one of the highest 
rates for any country that participated in the ICCS. On the face of it, this might appear 
to suggest that, across the curriculum, New Zealand students are being offered 
opportunities to participate in discussions about social issues that have an ethical 
content. However, other international research suggests a need to know more about 
these findings. Diana Hess (2008) points out that “although many teachers and students 
report social studies classes as being rich with controversial issues discussion, when 
researchers observe social studies classes they rarely find discussion of any sort and little 
attention to controversial issues” (p. 127). Students tend to conflate classroom talk with 
discussion and though they may report their classroom climates as being open, the fact 
that they feel they have a voice does not equate with an emphasis on controversial 
issues.  
 
At best, the reports referred to in this section can only be a proxy for evidence about 
the implementation of the New Zealand curriculum’s ethical dimensions in social 
studies. The ERO, MECI and ICCS findings certainly do not paint a conclusive account 
of, for example, teachers’ engagement with social issues, the philosophy of education or 
the counter-socialising dimensions of social studies education. However, Paul Keown’s 
(1998) summation of values and social action being the ‘hard bits’ of social studies 
education may well be as true today as it was then. That the New Zealand social studies 
curriculum is an ethically silent space – a matter established in Chapter Three – appears 
a contention that could well be applied to the subject’s programme content and 
Table 2: Teachers’ perceptions of level of 
students’ values skills, reproduced from 
Notman (2012, p. 46) 
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pedagogies. Certainly, one may infer that the opportunities for students’ critical 
reflection about ethical decision-making and action are limited. However, I again stress 
some caution about such inferences, particularly in relation to an ethically reflexive 
orientation. It is notable, for example, that the studies discussed in this section position 
ethical decision-making and action as a skill, which means that we can tell very little 
about how teachers may be drawing in their learners’ lived experiences or stimulating 
their ethical imaginations. 
 
If this is the case that ethically reflexive approaches are rare in New Zealand social 
studies classrooms, where will the practices that give rise to change evolve from? 
Curriculum design may be one stimulus for change. At least where ethical decision-
making and action is concerned, there has been a complete failure to clearly signal the 
shifts in meaning (Aitken, 2006) in the current curriculum.  Another stimulus may be 
the provision of pedagogical resources. Keown (1998) contends that teachers avoid the 
hard bits of social studies partly because of a longstanding perception that there “is a 
lack of solid, creditable and easy to implement methodologies for dealing with values 
and action issues in the classroom” (p. 140). While Keown’s work in this field suggests 
(see, for example: 1998, 1999, 2003) that this perception is not borne out in reality, it is 
true to say that there are few New Zealand social studies resources that explicitly draw 
out the ethical dimensions of values and action. A third stimulus for change could be 
more professional development in order to support teachers to deliver high quality 
programmes related to the ethical dimensions of social studies education. The MECI 
report particularly highlights the inter-dependent nature of curriculum design and 
professional learning in concluding that progress in curriculum implementation requires 
greater teacher confidence, which is in turn dependent on developing “deep 
understandings about the distinctions between the new and the old curriculum 
elements” (Sinnema, 2011, p. 74). In this view, the prospects for any approach to ethical 
decision-making and action would be, at least in part, dependent on a careful elucidation 
of the semantic shift between values and ethics, and the relationship between theoretical 
underpinnings and pedagogies.  
 
I think some caution is necessary, however, around suggesting that change may solely be 
brought about through greater curricular and pedagogical clarity. Some may further 
argue for a culture change, on the basis that curricular attempts to control practice often 
produce negligible results in relation to teaching and learning. Certainly, my view is that 
signalling the shifts in meaning is an important component of the ethical dimensions of 
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New Zealand’s curriculum gaining expression. But a wider view is necessary – looking 
to the forces that could constrain or support an ethically reflexive orientation to social 
studies education. 
ETHICS IN AN ERA OF SCIENTIFICALLY MANAGING EDUCATION 
 
The pragmatic issues outlined in the last section do not provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive account of possible prospects and challenges for an ethically reflexive 
orientation. In this section I consider another of Keown’s (1998) explanations as to why 
New Zealand teachers tend to avoid values and social action, and instead place greater 
emphasis on knowledge and skills. He argues that “those in the Western tradition tend 
to place a very high value on reason, on knowledge, and on the cognitive and tend to 
undervalue feelings, aesthetics and the affective” (p. 139). This he describes as a dualistic 
rather than holistic view of education. A related issue identified by Keown is that 
concepts, facts and skills are rather more straightforward to assess than affective and 
participatory outcomes. Commenting on developments subsequent to the publication of 
Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1997), Rowena Taylor 
and Rose Atkins (2005) suggest that this has continued to be the case. While teachers 
and students have found collaboratively developed templates helpful in terms of 
clarifying senior social studies assessment requirements (Wood, 2005, as cited in Aitken 
& Sinnema, 2008), Taylor and Atkins (2005) observe that even where attempts have 
been made to assess values exploration, this amounts to generic ‘fill in the box’ 
comprehension activities of discrete elements of the process. A risk is that “students can 
conduct assessments in quite a dispassionate manner as they are not required to reflect 
on or clarify their own values, or make the transfer to their own values schema, and 
internalise such values” (p. 134). By extension, the emphasis on critical reflection may 
marginalise the lived experience and imaginative aspects of ethical reflexivity.    
 
Bronwyn Wood (2007) has argued that social studies teachers’ tendency to favour 
concepts, facts and skills – and thereby avoid societal controversy – has been 
exacerbated by the scientific management of education. She draws this argument from 
the work of Jim Neyland (2004, 2010) whose account is, of course, only one 
explanation. Neyland’s (2010) view is that “under scientific management, education 
must, in ever increasing detail, be made readable, recountable in writing, and enumerable 
so that it can be monitored and managed” (p. 51). This is expressed, for example, in the 
molecular nature of social studies curriculum and assessment: achievement objectives, 
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achievement standards, and assessment programmes at Years 9 and 10 which tend to 
rely on NCEA-like rubrics (Picken & Milligan, 2013). It is also detectable in Notman’s 
(2012) recommendation that New Zealand students’ learning about values be 
benchmarked “in the manner of the International Civic and Citizenship Education 
Study” (p. 48). Neyland traces a marked shift towards scientific management from the 
1980s onwards but, like the associated neo-liberal political and educational reforms, it is 
important to note that this shift was as much a matter of continuity as it was change. 
Neyland (2005) himself records that a number of social theorists, as early as the 1950s, 
were arguing that “Western culture is in the grip of a trend towards a largely 
unquestioned instrumentalism” (p. 110-111). In his view, this preoccupation with the 
means rather than purposes of education “enfeebles the curriculum’s ethical 
orientation” (p. 109) because teachers and students are not invited to participate in 
questions as to education’s purpose, or asked to explore the good life for themselves. 
Similarly, Paul Standish (2003) has argued that instrumental reason “has emaciated the 
ethical language in which we consider our lives and education, distorting the public and 
private realms of our experience” (p. 230). 
 
One does not have to look too far afield to see how scientific management could 
manifest itself in relation to the potential expression of ethical decision-making and 
action in New Zealand’s curriculum development. Just across ‘the ditch’49, ethical 
understanding is now identified as one of seven general capabilities to be developed 
across the Australian Curriculum (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting 
Authority, 2014)50. This represents a significant shift from curriculum development in 
the mid-2000s which focussed on identifying values to be encouraged in Australian 
schools (Australian Government Department of Education, 2005)51 52. By contrast, 
‘ethical understanding’ in the Australian Curriculum now focuses on assisting “students 
to engage with the more complex issues that they are likely to encounter in the future, 
and to navigate a world of competing values, rights, interests and norms” (Australian 
Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2014, p. 1). This general capability has 
                                                        
49  The Tasman Sea. 
50  These are: Literacy, Numeracy, Information and communication technology (ICT) capability, Critical and creative 
thinking, Personal and social capability, Ethical understanding, Intercultural understanding. 
51  At that time, The National framework for values education in Australian schools (Australian Government Department of 
Education, 2005) defined values education as: “Any explicit and /or implicit school-based activity which 
promotes student understanding and knowledge of values, and which develops the skills and dispositions of 
students so they can enact particular values as individuals and members of the wider community” (p. 8).  
52  Interestingly, the association between ethics and value of integrity is akin to the Values statement in New 
Zealand’s curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). 
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three inter-related organising elements: understanding ethical concepts and issues; 
reasoning in decision making and actions; and exploring values, rights and 
responsibilities. Further, the ethical understandings that students can reasonably be 
expected to have developed across Levels 1 to 6 are identified for each of the organising 
elements – a broad developmental sequence comprising 48 discrete indicators.   
 
Australia’s recent focus on ethical understanding could be considered as something of a 
model for New Zealand teachers wishing to make sense of the phrase ethical decision-
making and action. The document represents a significant possible future for materials 
development, not least because ethics occupies an explicit, central and critical place in 
the curriculum. I think we would want to exercise some caution about mirroring this 
path, partly because many incoherent statements are made throughout the document. 
For example, what constitutes a distinction between “ethical and non-ethical dimensions 
of ethical issues” (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2014, p. 
7) or “the objectivity or subjectivity behind decision-making where there are many 
possible consequences” (p. 9) is not made clear. My more substantive concerns, 
however, relate to an impoverished approach to supporting learners’ ethical decision-
making and action. The document does little to elucidate the range of ethical 
perspectives that inform conflict, complexity and uncertainty; only oblique references 
are made to character, principles and consequences, for example. Consequently, 
teachers and learners are offered little in the way of intellectual tools with which to 
agonise with ethical issues.  
 
But it is the learning continuum in the last pages of the document (Australian 
Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2014) that most keenly suggests that 
scientific management could present something of a handbrake for ethically reflexive 
approaches. This is for at least three inter-related reasons. First, not only are the 
developmental assumptions open to question but the molecular approach of the 
learning progression misrepresents the complexity of ethical decision-making and action 
and the interpenetrated nature of social and ethical issues.  Second, the teachers and 
students are not participants in questions about the good life; instead they are 
participants in mastering the component pieces of ethical understanding. Teachers and 
students become the deliverers and the recipients of pre-packaged ethical understanding 
in which students are positioned as the “aggregates of traits in such a way that it is 
difficult to reassemble the face of the individual” (Neyland, 2004, p. 156). Third, the 
lived (including emotional and embodied) and imaginative dimensions of an ethically 
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reflexive life are entirely subordinated to an emphasis on orderly rational thought, which 
is reflective of the entire document’s tenor. As Neyland (2010) would argue, the spirit of 
education is marginalised: pleasure, creativity, learning for its own sake, and the use of 
humour as a response to the ‘itch for certainty’, for example.   
 
In sum, if the ethical dimensions of New Zealand’s curriculum are to be managed 
scientifically, the prospects for an ethically reflexive approach to better supporting social 
studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action seem enervated. Yet we might take 
some comfort from the literature that increasingly takes exception with instrumental 
reason and scientific management, whether within education or elsewhere – this is 
because much of what goes on in society is concerned with the question of what is the 
next best decision in a never-ending agonistic struggle. Instrumental reason, scientific 
management and as I turn to in the next section, scientific evidence (at least) have 
nothing compelling to say here.   
 
KNOWING WHAT WORKS IN EVIDENCE-BASED EDUCATION 
 
Another reason that teachers have been reluctant to tackle the ‘hard bits’ of social 
studies is “the seeming lack of knowledge about how values learning works and how to 
influence values through education” (Keown, 1998, p. 140). In this section, I argue that 
the prospects for an ethically reflexive orientation are at least partly dependent on being 
able to address the sorts of questions raised by teachers about values education – for 
example, can one teach ethical decision-making, and if so what actual difference does 
this make to learners’ actions? These kinds of questions also lie at the heart of evidence-
based policy and practice which has had a considerable impact on New Zealand 
educational policy in recent years, including the social sciences learning area (M. Taylor, 
2012, 2013). What counts in educational decision-making in this discourse is the 
systematic use of ‘trustworthy’ empirical evidence; found, for example, in John Hattie’s 
(2009) synthesis of meta-analyses, and in the Ministry of Education’s publications of 
iterative ‘best evidence’ syntheses53.  
 
Evidence-based education has drawn sharp criticism (see, for example: Biesta, 2007, 
2009, 2010), in part via the argument that a focus on evidence is too distant from 
                                                        
53 http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/topics/BES 
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questions of purpose and value in education. Evidence-based policy and practice can tell 
us little about whether, for example, social studies education should be directed towards 
counter-socialisation and adopt a reflexive approach to ethical issues. My considerable 
sympathy for this view notwithstanding, this section suggests a qualified value in 
evidence-based education. As M. Anderson and Della Sala (2012) point out, choices 
about educational interventions are moral and political decisions but this does not 
remove the need for appropriately answering associated empirical questions. Scientific 
evidence could help us determine whether aspects of the proposal presented in this 
thesis need refining or whether, practically speaking, it warrants implementation at all. 
To illustrate, I consider two types of data that inform educational evidence-based policy 
and practice. The first is classroom-based pedagogy-outcomes evidence, an example of 
which is the Effective pedagogy in social sciences/Tikanga a iwi best evidence synthesis iteration 
[Social sciences BES] (Aitken & Sinnema, 2008; Sinnema & Aitken, 2012) which has 
sought to establish “what works, for whom and in what circumstances?” (p. 34) in social 
sciences education. The authors express their findings as causal yet context-dependent 
‘mechanisms’, or explanations for learning. The second example looks to the kinds of 
evidential questions “asked, and sometimes answered, by the empirical human sciences” 
(Doris & Stich, 2014, n.p.), such as how ethical decision-making is made possible 
biologically speaking. Given that the literature related to the latter is vast, I focus 
particularly on neuroscience and neuroethics, examples of fields in which there is 
growing momentum and which some have argued could make a direct contribution to 
education’s evidence base (M. Anderson & Della Sala, 2012).  
 
What does the evidence presented in the Social Sciences BES (Aitken & Sinnema, 2008) 
suggest about the prospects and challenges ahead for an ethically reflexive orientation to 
social studies education? It is firstly notable that the strength of the evidence is limited 
in relation to my topic; what can be established is currently a matter of inference. The 
synthesis does not include studies about ethics education and relatively few relate to 
values education. This likely reflects the authors’ finding that:  
…there are strategies popular in the social sciences for which there is limited or 
contradictory evidence concerning efficacy. These include project work, 
processes such as values exploration and social decision-making, and service 
learning. (p. 48)  
 
One can understand, therefore, why teachers have been somewhat sceptical about the 
evidence base for teaching the hard bits of social studies. This issue notwithstanding, at 
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least three Social Sciences BES (Aitken & Sinnema, 2008) findings have a bearing on 
ethically reflexive approaches to social studies education and, most particularly, affirm 
the need to bring lived experience and imagination into supporting learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action. One mechanism, ‘build and sustain a learning community’, 
suggests that if learners are to participate effectively in plural democracies, the content 
and processes of social studies need to enable them to engage with the societal 
controversy they encounter. In particular, teaching with and for purposeful discussion 
promotes forms of civic engagement such as political interest and tolerance. What 
strikes me as being salient about this mechanism is that the relational experiences of 
interaction, albeit within the confines of the classroom, are as important to democratic 
outcomes as the critical aspects of discussion. Thus, if social studies education is to be 
oriented towards ethically reflexive approaches, it is insufficient to acknowledge 
learners’ lived experiences of the good life as being out there in the world; the classroom 
is a particular space of emotional, embodied, everyday and emergent experience. In 
relation to discussion pedagogies, Walter Parker (2006) argues that “seminar and 
deliberation are not vacuous “processes”. They are content intensive; they are about their 
topics and their participants” (p. 15).   
 
A second mechanism, ‘make connections to learners’ lives’, includes the finding that 
engagement and achievement are promoted when teaching and learning is “compatible 
with students’ cultural identities and experience” (Aitken & Sinnema, 2008, p. 60). For 
example, when studying The Aeneid, Christine McNeight (1998, as cited in Aitken & 
Sinnema, 2008) found that her Samoan students’ conceptual understandings about Roman 
religion improved when she asked them to make their own cultural experiences a point of 
comparison54. While there is a need for caution around unwelcome intrusion into learners’ 
life-worlds, and perceptions of cultural compatibility may differ across students and 
cultural groups, such findings appear to affirm the need to draw on social studies learners’ 
lived experience so that they can see themselves in the content and processes of educative 
approaches to ethical decision-making and action.  A third mechanism, ‘interest’, includes 
the finding that stories and narratives with emotional appeal can stimulate learners’ 
imaginations and assist in offering possibilities for personal and social transformation. The 
reader will recall a similar point made in the previous chapter, albeit without substantiation 
with the kinds of evidence referred to here. 
 
                                                        
54  Aitken and Sinnema (2008) caution, however, about the risks of a binary approach and the other-ing that could 
occur as a result. 
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How could evidence generated outside the classroom influence the ways in which an 
ethically reflexive orientation is taken up, reworked or radically re-altered? Some 
scientists claim that rapid advances being made in neuroscience may lead us to brain-
based explanations for ethical behaviours (Glannon, 2007; Levy, 2007) and at least one 
view of neuroethics claims that understanding the biological mechanisms underpinning 
ethical decision-making could carry us to a ‘brain-based philosophy of life’ (Gazzinga, 
2006)55. The potential influence of this research in education can be seen, for example, 
in the recent establishment of the Centre for educational neuroscience, a joint research venture 
across three UK universities56 with a focus on the connections between developmental 
psychology, neuroscience, and evidence-based education. Others are more directly 
considering the relationship between brain science, the human ethical sense and 
education (Aoki, Funane, & Koizumi, 2010) and the ethical issues that ‘come along for 
the ride’ with educational neuroscience (see, for example, Zocchi & Pollack, 2013). 
Though the brain science of ethics is in its infancy, there are some findings that appear 
to support an ethically reflexive orientation. For example, there is now general 
agreement (a) about the regions of the brain that are implicated in moral judgement, (b) 
that both emotion and cognition are associated elements (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & 
Zahn, 2008; Prinz, 2011) and (c) that empathising with the intentions and emotional 
states of others are key elements of the ethical sense (Aoki et al., 2010). At the very least, 
this research lends weight to my contention that ethical decision-making and action 
ought not to be represented to learners as simply a matter of critical reflection.  
 
I stated at this section’s outset that such evidence is of qualified value in giving 
expression to the curricular expectation that learners’ ethical decision-making and action 
be supported. The growing evidence base drawn from neuroscience, moral psychology 
and other human sciences would no doubt richly inform decisions about whether the 
proposal for an ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education warrants 
application in policy and practice. But there is also good reason to be cautious about 
evidence drawn from these fields. This is firstly because one needs to be wary of 
assumptions that underpin ‘knowing what works’. Illes and Racine (2005) point out, for 
example, that studies based on concepts such as moral emotions assume “that some 
emotions are moral and others not. They illustrate the cultural aspect of the 
interpretation challenge, which is based on the fact that the self is defined in diverse 
                                                        
55  Others have argued that the neurosciences have not produced a complete picture of ethical decision-making, and 
are unlikely ever to (Kaposy, 2009; Lavazza & De Caro, 2010; Rasmusson, 2009). 
56  University College London, Birkbeck College London, Institute of Education, 
http://www.educationalneuroscience.org.uk/ 
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ways” (p. 14). Similarly, the way in which affect and emotions are positioned as an 
outcome in the Social Sciences BES (Aitken & Sinnema, 2008) is a matter open to critique. 
Second, the instrumental orientation of evidence-based policy and practice ought not to 
detract from discussions about the purposes of ethics education in social studies. It is 
notable, for instance, that questions regarding the purposes of social studies education 
are effectively buried beneath an over-riding emphasis on pedagogical mechanisms in 
the Social Sciences BES. Third, a danger is that we may move too readily from ‘is’ to 
‘ought’. Take, for example, an article entitled Mechanisms underlying an ability to behave 
ethically (Pfaff, Kavaliers, & Choleris, 2008) which suggests that a shared, ‘blurring’ 
experience of fear prevents us from harming other and underlies our ability to operate 
from the ‘golden rule’. A response to this article reminds us, “the fact that one is wired 
for reciprocity does not imply that one ought to act reciprocally” (Da Rocha & 
Bergareche, 2008, p. 25). Thus, I submit that despite a movement towards evidence-
based policy and practice, social studies educators cannot solely rely on instrumental 
evidence to determine how learners’ ethical decision-making and action could be better 
supported. It is society that must judge the extent to which such empirical evidence 
should influence our judgements about morality and, likewise, ethics education.  
THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF ETHICS EDUCATION 
 
Another reason that Keown (1998) identifies as to why social studies teachers hesitate in 
relation to values and social action is that they fear both indoctrinating their students 
and disapprobation from the school community. Diana Hess (2004) adds that “many 
adults want schools to mirror their ideas, or fear that adding controversy to the 
curriculum creates controversy” (p. 258). She adds that this general aversion to 
controversy is supplemented by a range of other barriers: 
(1) differing views about the purposes of democracy education, 
(2) fears that teachers, other students, or instruments of the “official curriculum” 
(such as textbooks and films) will indoctrinate students into particular positions 
on issues, and 
(3) sharp conflicts about what should rightly be considered an issue in the first 
place. 
 
One can see each of the barriers identified above operating in a very public stoush that 
occurred between a group of Otaki Primary school students, who wrote to Mayor 
Michael Laws of Wanganui, arguing that Wanganui should be spelt Whanganui, as local 
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Māori would wish. In his response, the Mayor accused the teachers of putting their 
students up to the letter-writing and was reported as saying that he felt they ought not to 
be “angry about something inanimate” (Newton & Francis, 2009, n.p.). For Mayor 
Laws, this was not the kind of participation that the school should be fostering, nor in 
his view should the matter be of concern to students from another town. The teacher 
felt, by contrast, that this exercise was entirely within the scope and spirit of the New 
Zealand curriculum – a piece of persuasive writing in relation to an authentic social 
issue.  He may also have felt that the New Zealand Teachers Council’s (2004) code of 
ethics lent some support to the choice of learning activity in that it is stated that 
“teachers will strive to…encourage learners to think critically about significant social 
issues” (n.p.). 
 
That the prospects for an ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education are at 
least in part a matter of political determination is likely self-evident from the argument 
built thus far. As Chapter Three indicated, the political machinations in relation to the 
content and status of values education have been well documented in New Zealand. 
It is notable that citizenship education in the UK has recently taken, in my mind, a 
conservative turn and, with that, the curricular focus on ethical controversy has 
diminished. Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4 in the UK was in the past intended to 
help “young people to develop their critical skills, consider a wide range of political, 
social, ethical and moral problems, and explore opinions and ideas other than their 
own” (Department for Education, 2014, n.p.). Following a change of government, the 
national citizenship curriculum retains a focus on political and social issues, including 
students’ ability to evaluate viewpoints. However, these aspects are considerably 
subordinated to civic knowledge. The winds of political change could similarly shape the 
future direction of ethics education in New Zealand’s curriculum. Leaving such 
speculation aside, however, Chapter Seven’s recommendations in part suggest that the 
prospects for an ethically reflexive orientation to social studies (and, indeed, any 
approach to ethics education in social studies) would be greatly enhanced through a 
policy environment that accords greater priority to social studies and citizenship 
education. 
 
While social studies teachers’ professional ethics is not the focus of this thesis, it is 
important to stress that the prospects for an ethically reflexive orientation are 
intertwined with both teachers’ confidence in workable approaches and their own ethical 
decision-making in relation to the challenges of addressing social issues in the 
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classroom. The latter is not just a matter of how teachers choose to operate – such as 
making decisions about disclosing their own position or about what is legitimately 
controversial (Hess, 2009) – but also the effects of such choices. Hess (2004) reminds 
us, for example, that while we all might readily accept that social issues require 
discussion in social studies classrooms, how students experience those discussions will 
shape their relationship with democracy.  There is not the space here to do justice to the 
literature that links the teaching of social issues to teachers’ ethical decision-making; 
considerably more insight is likely to be gained from The political classroom: Evidence and 
ethics in democratic education (Hess & McAvoy, in press). However, to return to the 
discussion about reflexivity in relation to wider spheres of professional spheres, social 
studies teachers’ explorations with an ethically reflexive orientation are, themselves, 
likely to be reflexive – a matter of moment-by-moment negotiation, even with a 
preferred stance.  
 
TAKING IT TOO FAR? SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHERS’ AND LEARNERS’ PERCEPTIONS 
OF ETHICS 
 
This last part of the chapter troubles the discussion thus far, in which I have suggested 
that the prospects for ethical decision-making and action gaining an explicit toe-hold in 
New Zealand social studies teaching and learning are bleak, and that ethically reflexive 
approaches may be fraught with challenges. The discussion returns to the conversation 
between students, introduced in Chapter Two, and includes findings from focus group 
discussions with teachers in the school’s social studies department, about the place of 
ethics in social studies education. Given the limited and exploratory nature of this study, 
one needs to be careful about the promise of these data. Nevertheless, and from many 
years’ work as an adviser in schools, I emphasise that the context and findings of this 
study are unlikely to be extraordinary. I begin by outlining the research focus and 
methodology, and then consider how the findings from focus group discussions with 
the teachers and students speak to the challenges identified in this chapter.   
 
The study57 reported here took place in a state, co-educational secondary school in the 
Wellington region, in which the students are predominantly New Zealand 
European/Pākehā and drawn from a relatively high socio-economic area. The school 
                                                        
57 Approved by Victoria University of Wellington Faculty of Education Ethics Committee: Approval number RN17078 
179 
was selected largely on the basis of an existing relationship with its social sciences 
department, developed over some years in my role as an in-service adviser. This was not 
intended as a case study of teacher excellence; therefore, the sampling procedure did not 
try to identify schools in which there were social studies teachers who might be 
considered experts in ethics education. Instead, the potential for the topic to be 
perceived as both sensitive and extraneous to their teaching programmes led to the 
selection of a school where a level of collegial trust was already established. Seven 
teachers within the social sciences department participated, all currently teaching Year 9 
and 10 social studies. Six Year 9 social studies students (three boys and three girls) were 
selected from class members who volunteered to participate. This sample was not 
intended to be representative; I was interested in talking with a group of students who 
had shown interest in the subject matter and were willing to articulate their thoughts. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the meanings that teachers attach to ethical 
decision-making and action, and their responses to the inclusion of this statement in the 
New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007).  This study therefore rests on an 
interpretative approach (Clark, 1997), where the focus is on the subjective meanings that 
social studies teachers bring to ethical decision-making and action. In order to permit 
open discussion, the study was not wedded to any particular ethical framework – such as 
a ‘character’ or Kohlbergian view (Kohlberg, 1981). One exception to this open-
endedness should be noted, however: teachers were introduced to the idea that ethics 
may be understood in a non-normative, descriptive sense.  
 
Semi-structured focus group interviews were used in order to stimulate naturalistic and 
open conversation in a social setting (Grudens-Schuck, Allen, & Larson, 2004). Over 
two sessions, teachers discussed their understanding of, and enablers and constraints in 
relation to, supporting students’ ethical decision-making and action. The first discussion 
began by asking the teachers to share their thoughts about the nature and purposes of 
social studies and ethics education. This was followed by a concept-mapping exercise in 
which teachers established connections between 13 concepts proximal to ethical 
decision-making and action,58 drawn from the Values section and social sciences learning 
area statement (Ministry of Education, 2007). Teachers were free to include other 
concepts if they wished. The questions and concept-mapping strategy (Novak & Cañas, 
                                                        
58  Ethical thinking, social inquiry, conceptual understanding, participating in society, social action, citizenship, 
challenging the basis of assumptions and perceptions, values, perspectives/worldviews, engaging critically with 
social issues, morals, cultural identities, affective/emotions. 
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2014) were designed to draw out the teachers’ existing conceptions of ethics and ethical 
decision-making. In preparation for the next interview, teachers were asked to reflect on 
the content and relevance of three web pages (BBC, 2014c; University of San Diego, 
2014a, 2014b) that provide an overview of the field of ethics and ethical perspectives. In 
the second interview59, teachers were asked to report their responses to these web pages, 
as I was interested in whether greater exposure to the field of ethics and ethical 
philosophies would shift their thinking about the relationship between ethics and social 
studies education. Teachers were also asked about their perceptions of the opportunities 
and challenges that a greater emphasis on ethical decision-making in social studies might 
present.  
 
The findings from two focus group interviews with students are also reported here, in 
which they were asked to reflect on contemporary social issues with an ethical content 
and strategies for ethical thinking. Importantly, the students explored ethical decision-
making and action from quite different angles. Whereas the teachers directly considered 
the concept of ethics, the students were not asked directly about the meanings that they 
attached to the concept.  The students were, however, introduced to the concept of 
ethics as being about making decisions about what they should do and this definition 
appeared to make sense for them. Students completed a survey about their moral 
orientations60 and then debated the following scenario about accepting friends on 
Facebook61: 
Tania checks her Facebook site and finds a notification for a friend request and a brief 
message. It’s Mike Boswell, a guy she met at MacDonald’s when she was with a group 
of friends last week.  She didn’t really talk much to Mike that day, but he seemed OK.  
She wasn’t really sure whether she would see him again. She feels kind of odd accepting 
him as a friend, but does so anyway, without responding to the message. What should 
Tania do now and why? 
 
In another session, they explored an ethical issue of their choice, one that had arisen in 
the previous discussion about media ethics. The questions posed in this session were: 
                                                        
59  Due to unforeseen circumstances, this was conducted in two ‘bites’; Josh, Jessie, Alexa and Mia in one group, and 
Hana and Simon in the other. David was unable to participate in either of the second sessions.  
60  Adapted from University of San Diego (2010). On a five point Likert scale, the students were asked how 
important the following are in their life: religious commands, following my conscience, looking out for myself, 
doing the right thing/doing my duty, showing respect for everyone, human rights, making the world a better 
place, justice/fairness, being a good person, caring about others.  
61  Adapted from ‘When do I friend?’  
 http://www.scu.edu/ethics-center/ethicsblog/atthecenter.cfm?action=viewpost&c=73483 
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What sorts of images should the media be allowed to show on TV or in the newspaper? 
How should we decide what is OK/not OK for the media to show? They examined 
these through three ethical lenses (deontological/rule-based, consequentialist and 
virtues/character perspectives), selected so as to represent a range of perspectives and 
keep the conversation manageable. A written task-sheet with question prompts (see 
Appendix 5) was designed to support a ‘think/pair/share’ exploration of these ethical 
perspectives, but in reality the students preferred to think their way into the issue 
through conversation.  
 
This study was not devoid of ethical dilemmas. All social studies staff in the department 
were invited to participate, and all accepted. In one staff member’s class, all students were 
invited to be participants in the focus group discussions. As there were more volunteers 
than needed, their teacher was asked to select six students on the basis of their ability to 
articulate their thoughts and likely interest in the project (criteria that were not disclosed to 
the students); it is possible that some students may have feel left out through this process. 
While I negotiated discussion times and venues to suit the social studies staff, I was 
conscious of the demands on their time. Further, and as the student focus group 
interviews took place in class time, another challenge related to minimising the disruption 
to the students’ learning and ensuring that they were not disadvantaged in any way. The 
strategy I used was to have, with the teachers’ agreement, the remaining students in the 
Year 9 class participate in the same activities and discussion tasks described above. 
However, I acknowledge that this lesson was a diversion from the unit of learning at the 
time. By far the biggest ethical challenge lay in the analysis of the focus group interview 
discussions and, in particular, representing the teachers’ views. I was extremely conscious 
of not wanting to position the teachers as somehow lacking in relation to giving 
expression to the ethical content of the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007); 
after all, I was just as mystified as them. However, my initial cut at writing up the results 
for publication left me concerned about how the teachers felt about the findings and how 
they had been represented. In retrospect, I wish I had built in more time for discussion 
with the social studies teachers about my emergent findings. Despite the fact that this 
would have taken up more of their time, I feel I could have done more to offset the risk 
of this study appearing as something being done to them, rather than with them. 
 
I initially undertook an inductive thematic analysis of these data, paying attention to 
both the semantic and latent themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At that point I was 
particularly interested in the teachers’ views about the role of ethical perspectives in 
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students’ critical reflections, and in retrospect I think I was somewhat disappointed that 
this did not appear as compelling to them as it did to me. Part of the issue here was the 
coding process used, in which the coding categories – such as the teachers’ ‘conceptions 
of ethics’ and ‘pedagogical use of ethical perspectives’ – lacked a theoretical lens for 
analysis. The process of developing a stipulative definition for ethical reflexivity led me 
to return to these data, and this time I used a deductive approach to coding the teacher 
and student conversations, in which I coded for: (a) the meanings attached to ‘ethics’ 
(teachers only), (b) critical thinking, (c) lived experience and (d) imaginative action, and 
(e) the theoretical and pedagogical tensions implicitly and explicitly identified.  
 
SIGNALLING THE SHIFTS IN MEANING 
A first finding is perhaps entirely predictable given the interpretative challenges noted 
earlier in this chapter. For this group of teachers at least, the prospects for an ethically 
reflexive orientation would be likely dependent on greater semantic clarity and 
elucidation about the work that ethical decision-making and action is intended to do in 
social studies education. All could see connections between ethics, their existing 
teaching programmes and current controversies. They identified a wide range of units of 
work which have an ethical content, although not named as such to the students, 
including contexts/topics such as ‘Earth Rights’, ‘Human Rights’, and ‘Values and 
Beliefs’.  Yet, while all saw ethics as being relevant to social studies, they differed in their 
views about its centrality. Simon, with a university background in ethics, saw the 
discipline as lying at the heart of social studies: “every topic we teach is about ethics. It’s 
about making choices in society. That’s what ethics is.” By contrast, Mia asked the 
group, “Aren’t we meant to be thinking about using, bringing in ethics into every unit 
we teach, or making it an aspect of each unit?” In the main, there was not a strong sense 
that the teachers saw ethical questions as lying at the heart of controversial issues and 
therefore being central to social studies. Furthermore, and in line with Keown’s (1998) 
research, it was clear that this was a ‘hard bit’ of social studies for which they needed 
greater pedagogical and content knowledge support. Alexa seemed to sum up the feeling 
of the group, that ethics was seen as a bit of an add-on:  
If the term ethical values or whatever they call it in the NZC was clearer and it comes 
with resources for us to be able to look at and use, then I might be more comfortable, 
perhaps, doing a unit on ethics.  
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UNDERSTANDING SIDES OF A DEBATE: BRINGING IN CRITICAL REFLECTION 
How, then, did teachers conceive ethical decision-making and action? Most importantly, 
they largely wanted to eschew prescriptive interpretations and, in terms of an ethically 
reflexive orientation, placed considerable weight on critical reflection. Initially, however, 
six of the seven teachers aligned ethics with prescriptive morality. For example, Josh 
explained that ethics means “behaving properly towards others. I think of an ethical 
business person, you know, someone you can trust”. But at the same time the teachers 
wanted to distance themselves from morals and ethics, vastly preferring the term values 
because it felt less narrow and more usefully ambiguous. For example, Hana felt that 
values “is seen as a more PC, useable word than moral”. Mia added: 
Well, it’s that word [ethics] isn’t it…we don’t use that word, we use ‘values’ which 
seems to be less value-laden than ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’… [and later said]… We don’t use 
that term. We haven’t before in social studies I think. It’s always been ‘values’ which has 
sat quite comfortably with me because it’s looking at different viewpoints isn’t it.  
 
What transpired was that what the teachers were wary about was ethics being perceived in 
a prescriptive sense. Josh and Alexa, for example worried that ethics and morals might 
“get parents’ backs up”. They themselves understood ethical decision-making and action 
as being both contextual and contested – in their terms, “grey” and “value-laden” – and 
it was this that they wanted their learners to think critically about.  The teachers’ concept 
maps emphasised a critical orientation to social inquiry, social action, citizenship and 
participating in society. Similarly, in the interview discussions, they most strongly aligned 
ethical decision-making and action with thinking critically about viewpoints and values. 
Ethics was for them about understanding sides of a debate; of the sort that occur in 
their social studies classrooms and connected to notions of choice, rational thought and 
deliberation. David, for example, associated ethics with wisdom, “You know 
enlightened as opposed to what’s normal, what you’d normally expect to happen. And 
yet you might go against the grain and that’s based on rationalization”.  
 
The BBC and San Diego (BBC, 2014c; University of San Diego, 2014a, 2014b) web 
pages appeared to stimulate the teachers’ thinking about opportunities for critical 
reflection. For five teachers, the website content came as something of a revelation. Mia 
reflected that “I never knew that there were schools of thought about ethics, I never 
knew that, and I’ve never known that anyone had written them down and catalogued 
them.” Similarly, Hana reported an ‘a-ha’ moment having read about ethics in relation to 
the global financial crisis: 
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But then reading it in the Guardian and it’s a big topic, you know, with some really big 
people [debating the ethical issues]…I thought “gosh, we’re talking about a real hot 
topic here”. It was really interesting…discussing it with you and then reading it in the 
paper. I really felt there was some connection. I thought “oh, this is great”.  
 
The majority of teachers could see the immediate pedagogical relevance of the website 
content as a support for critical reflection. Four teachers reported that one or both was 
helpful and accessible and, to my surprise, three reported that at least one of the web 
pages was sufficiently accessible for students. It was suggested that students could use 
the ethical perspectives outlined in the web pages to reflect their own beliefs. Alexa 
described this approach as: “just talk to the kids about ‘which school of thought do you 
think you fall into?’ Does this govern the decisions you make?’” In a variation on this, 
Simon felt that the students could then evaluate a situation (such as sheltering a Jew 
from the Nazis) from ethical stand-points. Other strategies for critical ethical reflection 
suggested by the teachers included the use of dilemmas, creating a court situation where 
jurors are assigned different perspectives, asking students to put themselves in someone 
else’s shoes, and the use of newspaper photographs as a stimulus for ethical debate. 
Simon pointed out that strategies such as these are not without their drawbacks and 
stressed the need to ground ethical dilemmas in context and fact. Citing an image of an 
Islamic woman being punished, he commented: 
…you can’t actually discuss that as an ethical issue in isolation without discussing the 
whole propaganda brought against Muslims at the moment. You know, ethics is not in 
isolation, the ethical issues and the way they’re posed is very much a product of society 
around us. 
 
Yet, despite seeing a strong link to critical reflection about social issues, the teachers 
were cautious about the extent to which ethical perspectives might be used as a tool for 
this. They were reluctant to take this into a deeper exploration of ethical perspectives 
and were hesitant about employing the conceptual language and categories of thought 
of the philosophy of ethics. This hesitancy manifested in the language that they drew on. 
Unless referring to the web pages, the teachers tended not to use the term ethical 
perspectives to mean the theoretical frameworks that shape decisions about social 
actions. For the most part, they used ethics interchangeably with points of view, values 
and perspectives (by which they meant viewpoints) throughout the interviews. The 
semantic distance between ethics and perspectives was also evident in the concept maps 
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where all teachers placed ‘ethical thinking’ well apart from ‘perspectives/worldviews’, 
yet five located it more closely to ‘challenging the basis of assumptions and perceptions’.  
 
For the teachers, ethical perspectives were too abstracted, in two senses. A first related 
to the cognitive demand they perceived ethical perspectives presented for themselves 
and their students. The teachers queried students’ readiness for thinking about ethical 
perspectives and raised the need to develop students’ critical and independent thinking 
skills in order to be able to tackle ethical dilemmas. One teacher also felt that clarifying 
‘ethics’ may be a pedagogical challenge when the students are most used to the term 
values. Furthermore, how one might go about teaching theoretical perspectives was a 
matter of some discussion, in particular whether or not students should be taught a list 
of these, and where in the learning cycle it would be most appropriate to do so. It was 
notable that while they discussed the potential of using ethical perspectives in a lesson(s) 
and possibly units of work, none suggested that they might be a recurring thread in their 
social studies programmes. Two teachers noted that the vast and contested nature of 
ethics would make such an endeavour complex: 
It makes it very mind-boggling to think about how you would use [ethical perspectives] 
in your teaching and how you would actually put it to the kids, and do it enough depth 
that you didn’t feel like you’ve simplified it so much that you were dictating to the kids 
your morals. [Mia] 
 
I could see maybe teaching this at a higher level, you know linking the theories with real 
life. But I think just as we are I think that’s enough. You know, it’s like a taster isn’t it of 
what we could do later on. I was just thinking it’s too much…What would you teach, I 
mean that BBC, that’s hard, that’s going to be about two or three years’ worth of 
teaching. It’s difficult, what bit of the ethics would you teach? Whoa. Would you just 
teach the history of ethics, would you teach the religious aspect of it, I don’t, yeah, and 
it’s all interlinked and that’s the difficult part isn’t it? [Hana] 
 
A second sense in which ethical perspectives were seen as being abstracted related to 
the perception that philosophy in general was too distanced from social life. This was 
expressed most strongly by Simon, who felt that ethics was a very academic and dry 
discipline “lost in time” and preferred instead to focus on ideologies such as fascism and 
nationalism. By contrast, Hana felt that ethics was “happening now, it’s still a modern 
issue … you can use these age-old … theories can’t you?” Nevertheless, and whilst the 
majority of teachers were not dismissing the philosophy of ethics, it was clearly viewed 
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as something quite distinct from what they stressed as being the contextualised nature of 
social studies:   
We teach it [ethics] through a study of society rather than through a study of 
philosophy … which does it in an abstract fashion. I think that’s progress, I think it’s a 
better way to understand ethics, to understand the world. [Simon] 
 
LINKING THEORIES WITH REAL LIFE: BRINGING IN LIVED EXPERIENCE  
To summarise the discussion so far: while much of the discussion implicitly emphasised 
the critical reflection aspect of an ethically reflexive orientation, the teachers were on the 
whole ambivalent about the role of ethical perspectives in social studies education. 
Thus, there was some distance between their sense of critical reflection and the way in 
which I have described this in Chapter Four, and whether they would have viewed the 
philosophy of ethics as powerful knowledge is an open question.  
 
It seemed to me, however, that the teachers were reaching for something more than 
critical reflection in their thoughts about ethical decision-making and action. In a 
notable departure from Keown’s (1998) findings, the teachers saw ethics as being distant 
from social studies precisely because they felt the field of ethics places too much emphasis 
on reason and rational thought. To characterise their views in relation to the argument 
built in this thesis: bringing in their students’ lived experience was as central to better 
supporting their ethical decision-making and action as critical reflection. This was 
foreshadowed in their responses to an initial question about what they saw as being the 
nature and purposes of social studies education. Without naming it as such, and of the 
four previously described social studies traditions (H. Barr et al., 1997; R. D. Barr et al., 
1978), the teachers placed by far the greatest weight on social studies taught as personal, 
social and ethical development. In their concept map, Hana and Mia expressed this as 
‘becoming’. All the teachers made much of personal awakening and awareness in the 
lives of their students, stimulating an interest in “what’s going on every day” (Hana), 
both in New Zealand and overseas. They secondly emphasised relational aspects of 
social studies learning: their students’ connectedness to others and society, cultural 
identities, empathy, and capacity to appreciate difference. And, thirdly, they were 
strongly focussed on their students’ agency. In their words, this involved helping 
students to see that “they can make a change” (Simon), be proactive and use their social 
studies learning to make a difference, “hopefully for good over evil” (David).   
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Throughout the rest of the interviews, it was apparent that the teachers wanted to 
ground ethics in the experiences and decision-making of their learners’ lives. They 
emphasised that their students’ critical reflection should be directed towards their lived 
experience; that is, to come to their own decisions about social issues that affect them 
and how they will participate in society. For the teachers, ‘responsible’ decision-making 
was much more closely connected with their students’ consideration of participatory 
possibilities than it was arriving at a teacher’s view about the right thing to do. Jessie, for 
example, said that in relation to topics such as euthanasia and children in armed conflict, 
she saw her role as helping the students to make sense of “where people stood on the 
spectrum of an issue” in order for them to decide where they fit. They did, however, 
recognise the uncertainty of pedagogical outcomes. Mia began one line of discussion by 
asking “if it doesn’t lead to social action, what’s the point?” to which others replied that 
this might occur in the future and that, at least where public political figures are 
concerned, one can never be sure about one’s influence on students’ moral compass.  
 
Two further features signalled that the teachers’ views of ethical decision-making and 
action were directed towards lived experience. First, Hana argued combining “real life 
scenarios” with ethical theories. Simon repeatedly stressed the contextual nature of 
ethical decision-making and action, and saw the particularity of lived experience as being 
central to the work of social studies: 
What we teach in social studies is in many ways better than ethics because you’ve got to 
start from the situations we find ourselves in and the choices that people make – and 
then you can ask questions about right and wrong.  
 
Second, the emotional dimensions of ethical life were a strong feature of the 
discussions. It was notable, for instance, that in all three concept maps 
‘affective/emotions’ was strongly associated with ethical thinking, either directly or via 
values and morals. The teachers spoke warmly of their students’ embodied, “ants in 
their pants” (Jessie) connection with controversial issues and the lives of others. Jessie 
felt that “they really care, because they’re developing their own values and what they 
want and who they are”. Josh noted the connection students felt to the challenges faced 
by people in other parts of the world: “some of the things that they come across they 
can’t believe”.  The teachers wanted to stimulate and affirm what they described as 
being their students’ passion, but were keenly aware about the sensitivities of ethical 
discussions and that critical reflection had an important role in relation to their students’ 
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emotional responses. In the words of Mia, “kids get upset and they get on their high 
horse about stuff and sometimes it can be totally misguided”.  
 
KNOWING WHAT TO DO: BRINGING IN IMAGINATION  
This fourth set of findings brings in the students’ voices in relation to the discussion 
above. I share the findings, from the students’ point of view, about the relationship 
between ethics and (a) critical thinking and (b) their lived experience. Their discussion 
moves beyond that of their teachers in one important respect; they saw the ethical 
discussions as offering considerable imaginative stimulus. 
 
Like their teachers, the students saw ethical controversies as being appropriate to social 
studies education. But likely a result of the methodology, they had rather fewer 
reservations about employing ethical perspectives in their critical reflections. Three 
students could see a direct connection between the content of the Facebook debate and 
the moral orientations survey they completed at the beginning of the session. One 
student, Destiny, reflected that she had initially filled out the survey without thinking 
too much about it, and that the Facebook conversation had made her realise that using 
her conscience to make a decision was much more important to her:  
I’ve just realised that I’ve done – for following your conscience thing I did ‘agree’ – and 
after talking about this I think I should have changed it … I was doing it and then I’m 
like “oh that’s easy, that’s easy, that’s easy”. And then I’ve talked about it, like I’ve talked 
what I do more, then I’ve realised that I’ve not done it right.  
 
Another, Bob, could readily see that a religious moral orientation might affect people’s 
decisions and feelings about controversial issues.  In the last session, where they elected 
to discuss the images that the media should be allowed to publish, the students had a 
minimal introduction to consequentialist, deontological/rules and virtues/character 
perspectives. I briefly explained what each perspective involved, and there were further 
prompts on the worksheet they were provided. Yet, despite this minimal elucidation, the 
students took these up with relative ease and were able to ‘inhabit’ one or more of the 
ethical perspectives, albeit with varying degrees of confidence. Michael, for example, 
explained that considering the consequences is important in determining the images the 
media should be allowed to show: 
I was just going to say like I think like the rule should be like if it’s going to harm, like 
affect us, then we should know. So that like if it’s like got all these people are dying blah 
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blah blah blah then that’s like fair enough. But if it’s like ‘this person was killed but we 
caught the killer’ then what’s the point in telling us? 
 
The importance of bringing in learners’ everyday lives was palpable in the students’ 
conversations. Most reflected that they were more engaged in the Facebook activity 
than the discussion about the images the media should be allowed to portray, and all 
said that they related to the Facebook dilemma better. The students felt that the 
noticeable decline in engagement in the ‘media’ discussion stemmed from the context 
being distant from their everyday lives, and lacked sufficient detail to support them to 
make sense of the debate. However, this did not dent their enthusiasm for debates of 
this nature. In particular, they stressed the relational nature of ethical decision-making 
and action. In their final reflections the students reported that they got more of a chance 
to: offer their thoughts without embarrassment; listen to other people’s views; get to 
know people with whom they had not previously worked; and become more aware 
about what is going on in the world. Echoing the views of the group, Money said “we 
should just stay like this forever”. Though there was clearly more room for developing 
the students’ understanding of ethical perspectives, the sole reservation the students had 
about the activities was that: “you should only do this in class if you’re in a small group 
like this because a whole class group there would be hardly be any say, you know it 
would be only the teacher’s favourites like…” (Michael). It is interesting to note, here, 
that the students strongly equated critical reflection with the relational, lived experience 
of such discussions. 
 
What was particularly striking about the students’ conversations was their emphasis on the 
imaginative aspects of ethical reflexivity. This manifested in at least three related ways. 
First, the extent to which the respondents felt able to adjust their positions (at times, 
somewhat microscopically) as the discussion progressed was impressive. They each began 
with a ‘working model’ of what it is to behave decently, at many points drawing on 
influences in their lives which they had either followed, rejected, or both. At times they 
found difficulties in making that model work to their own satisfaction when applied to 
situations that they had not thought through or when considering another student’s 
argument. Rather than feeling stuck, the conversations generated multiple ways forward. 
Second, and in contrast to their teachers’ tendency to construe ethical decision-making 
and action in either/or terms, the students resisted coming to an easy consensus. Third, 
and although the students did not radically alter their positions about whether they would 
accept a Facebook friend they barely knew, all said that this activity gave them increased 
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confidence about the actions they would take, typically reporting that “if it happens I know 
what to do” (Isaac). Even the least engaged student, Money, emphasised that the real-life 
nature of the Facebook scenario could “teach you what to do and stuff.”  There was not the 
sense here that the students were seeing these ‘solutions’ in once and for all terms; rather 
that the conversations had opened a realm of possibility and offered ways to go on.  
 
The students’ experiences of these focus group discussions appear to resonate with the 
findings from similar studies conducted by Susan Pass and Wendy Willingham (Pass, 
2007; Pass & Willingham, 2009), who have explored the power of ethical perspectives in 
social studies education. The participants’ responses to their research, which involved 
making ethical philosophies transparent to teachers and students, has encouraged the 
authors in their view that open discussion about these perspectives is not only desirable 
in social studies education but that there exists a “real hunger” (p. 29) because it helps 
students to make sense of complex societal debates. However, what struck me most 
about the students with which I worked was the reflexive nature of their conversations 
– the movement between the critical, lived and imaginative dimensions of ethical 
decision-making and action. In the discussion below, for example, the ‘Facebook’ ethical 
dilemma prompted the students’ thinking about police professional ethics. It might have 
been easy to regard this portion of the discussion as a digression. The students were, in 
fact imaginatively bringing the ethical content of the fictitious Facebook dilemma into 
the context of their own lives. And, in doing so, they were exploring consequentialist 
and deontological perspectives.  
 
Destiny:  On I think Facebook or something the police did this search thing where 
they sign up as a 16-year-old or 17-year-old or, whatever, 14-year-old, and 
then they like emailed everyone and whoever replies like “Oh I really like 
this school” and like “blah blah blah” and then they go round to their house 
and they get their parents and they all talk about how that could affect 
everyone if had been someone else other than the police. 
Michael:  It’s like on Bebo a couple of years ago there was these two English girls and 
they started talking to this guy and they decided to meet him one day and 
one of the girls got sick and she couldn’t go and the other girl got murdered. 
And they’d never met him. 
Isaac:  Well, what the police did that was fraud, so they could get in trouble for 
that…So they’re not telling the truth. 
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Destiny:  It’s not protecting them, because what if it happened to be like someone 
else that actually meant harm. 
 
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY: THEORETICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL 
TENSIONS 
One last set of findings returns to the ethics of ethics education. The teachers primarily 
sought to provide balance in their approach, yet they also clearly articulated concerns 
about indoctrination and a tension between privileging a position and avoiding it 
altogether (responses outlined by Hess, 2004). Though they were particularly anxious to 
avoid strongly normative ends in ethics education, all could identify aspirations for their 
students that could be construed in these terms. The teachers mentioned that they 
directed social studies teaching and learning towards: social justice, fair play, anti-
exploitation, right and wrong, fairness, the way to treat others, social conscience, 
appreciating difference, empathy, and a balanced view of society. Yet they viewed the 
socialising aspects of social studies education as being in tension with a counter-
socialising approach to ethical decision-making and action. The teachers themselves 
noted that one can never entirely eradicate prescriptive expectations from social studies 
curricula no matter how much one might prefer to maintain a neutral stance. Further, 
numerous interchanges highlighted the multiple, often competing, ethical frameworks 
that infuse societal decision-making. For example, the problem of moral relativity was 
discussed in relation to the Holocaust and Mia picked up on ethical universalism, 
pondering “is there a set of rules that is intergenerational, universal? I guess there is”. 
Simon most clearly expressed the group’s central conundrum by questioning what was 
expected by the curriculum: “exactly what’s the line between indoctrination and teaching 
people to think for themselves?” While some stressed that social studies teachers tried 
hard not to impose their views or sway students’ thinking, and that neutrality was 
important, the same teachers readily acknowledged that their own moral stand-points 
inevitably infused their social studies teaching: 
I do think that on a day-to-day basis there’s a subtle undertone of morality in social 
studies lessons, but I’ve never wanted to explicitly say that to the kids. I’ve wanted to 
put stuff before them and then they become passionate about it, upset and all that sort 
of stuff. [Mia] 
 
I think it’s very hard as a teacher to be unbiased because even though you say ‘these are 
all the viewpoints’…you still some come over and, like the Holocaust, you know, you 
still go ‘this was awful, we never want this to happen again’. [Hana] 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT WIGGLE ROOM FOR AN ETHICALLY REFLEXIVE 
ORIENTATION? 
Where do the insights of these teachers and students leave us, the large part of this 
chapter having painted a somewhat sombre future for ethically reflexive approaches to 
social studies education?  It is important to restate that the findings are only a limited 
test of the barriers to, and prospects for, an ethically reflexive orientation identified in 
this chapter. The data are limited, and clearly there is a long way to go in terms of 
understanding New Zealand social studies teachers’ conceptions of, and pedagogical 
approaches to, supporting their learners’ ethical decision-making and action. 
Nevertheless, and especially given the lack of professional development in relation to 
this aspect of The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007), I doubt that the 
findings would be significantly different if the study were to be expanded to include 
more Year 9 and 10 social studies teachers in different schools. 
 
It was not possible to determine from this study what the impact of scientifically 
managed or evidence-based education might be on the teachers’ approaches to enacting 
the ethical aspects of the Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007). This is 
unsurprising given that the focus group discussions represented, for the majority of 
teachers, their first foray into thinking about the relationship between ethics and social 
studies. I suspect that the potential influences of instrumentalism and evidence-based 
policy would be more likely detectable if the teachers had been at the point of 
considering the relationship between the Values statement, social inquiry, and the 
content of assessment tasks. In the main, the teachers’ concerns related to the need for 
(a) greater clarity about what ethics is to mean and the work it is to do in social studies, 
(b) appropriate pedagogical tools, and (c) the inherent ethical challenges in any ‘values-
laden’ approach to social studies. 
 
Moving beyond these concerns, there was some evidence to suggest that an ethically 
reflexive orientation to social studies would sit comfortably with the teachers and 
students in this study. Their responses strongly emphasised the need for ethics 
education in social studies to amount to something more than critical reflection, most 
particularly that which appears an exercise in abstraction. Indeed, the teachers’ 
somewhat subdued responses to the role of ethical perspectives in social studies 
challenged me to take my thinking further in this regard. The need for a more expansive 
sense of ethical decision-making and action notwithstanding, one wonders how greater 
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support for exploring the philosophy of ethics and its relationship to social studies 
education, as Brian Hill (1994) has urged, might shift teachers’ perceptions of the 
discipline. It is entirely possible that the novelty of ‘ethics’ and/or the way it was 
presented to the teachers in this study hampered a deeper consideration about its 
fertility. Arguably, this reinforces the need for both research methodologies and 
curriculum support materials that more carefully bridge pedagogical and content 
knowledge. In particular, it would appear that teachers may need greatest support in 
terms of teaching ethics as societal perspectives, if classroom discourse is to move 
beyond the language of values.  
 
Chapter Three noted the ways in which the current curriculum decontextualises, 
disembodies and decentres learners. These appear matters that the teachers and students 
would want to strongly resist. It is notable that lived experience, in the sense I have 
previously outlined, was an important dimension of social studies education from their 
perspective. For them, giving expression to the ethical dimensions of the New Zealand 
curriculum’s Values statement (Ministry of Education, 2007) would require considerable 
attention to grounding ethical dilemmas and challenges in contemporary societal 
contexts; moving between the abstract and concrete, the everyday and what is ‘out there 
in the world’, the personal and the socio-political. Furthermore, the emotional 
dimensions of ethical decision-making and action would need greater acknowledgement. 
For the teachers and students, the challenges of ethical issues, and pedagogical 
approaches to exploring these, were ‘felt difficulties’ for the teachers and students; not 
simply a matter of intellectual engagement but emotional and relational work also.  
 
It would appear that, for the students in particular, bringing in the imaginative 
dimension of ethical decision-making is vitally important. It was in their generative 
discussions, focussed on exploration rather than conclusion, that they felt a sense of 
agency; they could see a constellation of possibilities for social action. Most likely this 
dimension of ethical reflexivity was compelling because they could draw their 
experiences of discussing ethical dilemmas; the teachers, by contrast, were discussing the 
pedagogical implications in the abstract. One wonders, therefore, how the teachers 
would have responded if they had trialled a similar activity, and whether their emphasis 
on sides of a debate and making choices might have opened out to a language of 
multiplicities. The latter question is particularly interesting, given the tension that they 
felt between the socialising and counter-socialising aspects of social studies. While I 
have argued that better supporting social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and 
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action requires robust ethical pluralism (Hinman, 2013) and agonism (Mouffe, 2000, 
2013), one cannot say for certain what the teachers’ views about this might be. It is also 
an open question as to whether they would concur with ‘social studies as counter-
socialisation’ in the terms described in Chapter Four.  
 
Such questions aside, and to address the third of my research sub-questions, the focus 
group discussions suggest that the prospects for an ethically reflexive orientation to 
social studies might not be as bleak as it would appear from the bulk of this chapter. 
Between the teachers’ desire for a pedagogy that placed their learners’ lived experience 
at the centre, and their students’ capacity to imaginatively engage with ethical 
perspectives, one sees the potential for an ethically reflexive orientation to more 
successfully respond to what each group was reaching for in doing ethics. Greater 
support for such approaches might just conceivably transcend the ethically silent space 
of social studies. Possibilities for this are explored in the next, concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7: TRANSCEND ING THE ETHICALLY SILENT  SPACE OF 
NEW ZEALAND SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION 
 
This chapter comprises five sections. It opens with a summary of the thesis’ theoretical and empirical 
findings in relation to my research questions, and is followed by a section that explores the limitations to 
the thesis. The third and fourth sections consider where practices that give rise to change could evolve 
from, in light of the possibilities and constraints explored in the previous chapter. Two sets of 
recommendations are made: (i) policy related, centring on an appeal for agonistic spaces in which the 
New Zealand social studies community could engage with this thesis’ argument and, (ii) implementation 
related, suggesting a variety of existing pedagogical strategies that intersect with an ethically reflexive 
orientation and could usefully be explored in social studies teaching and learning. The latter rounds off a 
consideration of my third research sub-question by exploring pedagogical possibilities for an ethically 
reflexive orientation. The thesis closes by returning to the wero/challenge with which it began: a question 
of placing stakes in the ground.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis has considered how social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and 
action could be better supported. This concern arose in part from The New Zealand 
curriculum’s expectation that students will “be encouraged to value…acting ethically” and 
“develop their ability to…make ethical decisions and act on them” (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 10). However, the research rationale extends beyond a matter of 
policy directive; it stems from ongoing debates about the proper relationship between 
ethics and education. Chapter Two established that ethics matters in life and in 
education because it is central to the human condition – each of us must make moral 
choices, whether or not we bring the philosophy of ethics to bear on them. Were the 
choices simple and unemotional, there would perhaps be no need for discussion about 
the relationship between education and ethical life. But contemporary ethical space is 
marked by pluralism, ambivalence and multiplicities; the choices are far more complex 
than either/or or once-and-for-all decisions. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that 
educational debates, especially in democracies charged with supporting learners to 
respond to such complexity, are unlikely to arrive at an incontrovertible blueprint.  
 
Against the backdrop of an ongoing conversation, the work of this thesis has been to 
propose a broad theoretical orientation to better supporting social studies learners’ 
ethical decision-making and action. The argument has distinguished ethics from values 
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and morals, taking ethics to mean an activity – that of coming to an understanding of, 
and reflecting upon, a range of perspectives about social action. Successive chapters 
have considered the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, for example, how ethics has gained expression 
in social studies curricula and the place that it could occupy in future. In this section I 
summarise this thesis’ findings, responding to each of my research sub-questions in 
turn: 
1. What opportunities for ethical decision-making and action are offered through 
New Zealand social studies curriculum documentation?  
2. What theoretical spaces exist for better supporting social studies learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action? 
3. What could be possibilities and challenges within these spaces? 
 
In relation to the first of these questions, this thesis has found rich veins of opportunity 
for learners’ exploration of ethical decision-making within the purposes of social studies, 
at least as they are ostensibly construed in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007). Social studies could be considered a natural home for ethics because the 
subject focuses on learners’ open and critical exploration of their societies and 
participation within them. It is notable that the social studies curriculum (i) recognises the 
societally contentious, (ii) prompts learners’ consideration of diverse values, perspectives, 
and, implicitly, conceptions of the good life, and (iii) provokes questions about how to go 
on.  Further, and as Chapter Three’s content analysis revealed, the phrases “acting 
ethically” and “make ethical decisions and act on them” (p. 10) are closely connected to 
supporting learners to think otherwise about what constitutes a worthwhile life or how we 
might live together. Such considerations are arguably central to social studies education 
because the subject focuses on social issues and responses to them.  
 
For all these opportunities, in a semantic and theoretical fog, ethics looms as a silent and 
ghostly presence in New Zealand’s social studies curriculum. This is because ethics has 
appeared over the curricular horizon, without a clear sense of the work it is meant to do 
in social studies. This is not to say that social studies is devoid of ethical content; over 
80 years of curriculum documents examined in this thesis have highlighted ethical 
tensions inherent in the subject. It is to say that (a) the usages of ethics in the Values 
statement (Ministry of Education, 2007) are not clarified, (b) the concept does not 
reappear in the social sciences learning area statement, and (c) ethics’ linkages to other 
proximal social studies terms are not made clear to the reader. Furthermore, there is a 
lifelessness to the social sciences learning area statement that works against the purposes 
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of social studies and learners’ exploration of ethical decision-making and action. As has 
been argued, the statement is somewhat disconnected from learners’ identities, emotions 
and everyday lives and enervates both the participatory dimensions of social studies and 
the sense that there are pressing, complex societal issues at hand.   
 
If ethics’ centrality to social studies education was to be made more explicit, what 
theoretical spaces exist for better supporting learners’ ethical decision-making and action? 
This thesis has found that the usages of ethics in The New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of 
Education, 2007) float on an open and permissive sea of curricular theory. One appears 
able to cast the net wide in considering a theoretical re-orientation; a great deal appears 
possible. This matter notwithstanding, the social studies curriculum is pulled by an 
undertow of two melded theoretical traditions: social studies taught as reflective inquiry, 
and as social science. The reflective inquiry tradition frames the social inquiry 
methodology as a re-iterative analysis of social issues, ideas, and themes related to 
decision-making and participation in society. The social sciences tradition provides, in a 
sense, the raw material for such inquiry and analysis – conceptual understandings drawn 
from disciplinary modes of thinking. These traditions have in common an emphasis on 
critical reflection, understood as the rational capacity to think otherwise and thinking that 
‘arcs back’ on theory and concepts, that is, inherited understandings and existing bodies of 
thought. 
 
Three findings point to a need to adjust the melded traditions of social studies taught as 
reflective inquiry and social sciences, in order to (a) offer ethics a more explicit place 
within these extant theoretical framings, and (b) to better accommodate learners’ 
consideration of ethical life. The first relates to the way in which the phrase “engage 
critically with societal issues” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30) is subordinated in the 
social sciences learning area statement. In order to meet the present curriculum’s Values 
statement expectations, social studies requires a stronger focus on social issues, as the 
very notion of ethical decision-making and action presupposes dilemmas and challenges 
of some kind. Further, and because ethical questions do not map easily onto a 
public/private divide, attention to learners’ everyday experiences of ethical decision-
making and action could provide them with a great deal of insight into the ethical 
content of ‘public’ issues, and vice versa.  
 
A second necessary adjustment to the New Zealand social studies curriculum pertains to 
its participatory aims; currently a curriculum aspect open to considerable interpretation 
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(Abbiss, 2011). I have argued that social studies education needs to be primarily directed 
towards counter-socialisation (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Ochoa-Becker, 2007) if learners’ 
exploration of ethical decision-making and action is (a) to have any meaningful scope, 
and (b) amount to more than a replication of the status quo. My use of counter-
socialisation emphasises the enacted dimensions of social criticism, and that critical 
reflection takes places in an ethical world marked by inconsistency, disagreement and 
uncertainty. Further, I have argued that the complexities of learners’ counter-
socialisation could be better supported through (a) learners having access to as an 
encompassing range of ethical perspectives as possible and, (b) representing ethics as an 
ongoing conversation about the best decision that can be made in the moment and 
circumstances, rather than an exercise in arriving at final decisions. In light of this, social 
studies education could usefully employ robust ethical pluralism (Hinman, 2013) and 
agonism (Mouffe, 2000, 2013) as approaches to better supporting learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action, in part because both position differences in worldview as 
productive counter-points in considering how we shall live together.  
 
A third curricular adjustment builds from the previous two. I have made a case for 
strengthening New Zealand social studies education through a more overt mobilisation 
of the philosophy of ethics. As Chapter Three has described, the centrality of this 
discipline to social studies education has been under-acknowledged in the history of 
New Zealand curriculum development. And yet, the philosophy of ethics’ discourses 
and modes of thought – among many resources that learners may draw on in navigating 
the vicissitudes of ethical life – offer social studies learners significant tools with which 
to explore the ethical content of social issues in depth. The formal study of ethics does 
so through (i) access to powerful knowledge that holds considerable explanatory power, 
and (ii) supporting a wide range of social studies outcomes. 
 
However, the extent to which the proposed adjustments better support social studies 
learners’ ethical decision-making and action depends on (a) how they are mobilised in 
educational approaches, and (b) how they articulate with the society within which 
learners find themselves. Here, the thesis arrived at a fourth, and arguably the most 
important, finding in relation to the second of my research questions. It charts a course 
through the curriculum’s extant theoretical framings and on to more open waters, 
finding that theoretical spaces exist for understanding what it is to be in our ethical 
world as ethically reflexive acts. The stipulative definition built for ethical reflexivity 
enfolds three important dimensions: (a) critical reflection, (b) lived experience, that is, 
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the emotive, embodied, everyday, and emergent dimensions of ethical life, and (c) 
imagination – a dimension only lightly touched upon in the reflexivity literature. An 
ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education thus brings in bodies, feelings, 
relationships, desires, creativity and wonder. Attention to such dimensions moves social 
studies taught as social issues, as counter-socialisation and as engaging with the 
philosophy of ethics beyond being purely matters of critical reflection. Enfolding 
learners’ lived experiences and imaginations recognises that ethical decision-making and 
action does not solely arc back on inherited understandings in a rational and orderly 
manner. Ethical life is not a simple matter of reflection or even refraction; the multiple, 
fluid and contradictory nature of its surfaces make such linear moves impossible. Thus, 
a conception of ethical reflexivity in social studies education resists the sense that 
learners’ ethical decision-making and action is to converge at permanence; the cogency 
of this lies in a more honest representation of the uncertain and emergent nature of 
ethical life.  
 
What challenges and possibilities lie within ethically reflexive spaces? Building from Paul 
Keown’s (1998) research, this thesis has explored four forces that may shape the barriers 
and prospects ahead: (a) a continued lack of curricular explication as to what ethics is to 
mean and look like in social studies education, (b) scientific, or instrumental, approaches 
that render ethics as a cognitive exercise of molecular mastery, (c) evidence-based 
approaches that occlude a consideration of the aims of ethics education, and (d) teachers’ 
legitimate concerns as to ethics of an ethically reflexive orientation. This was not meant as 
an exhaustive consideration, and most certainly the contentions made here warrant 
stronger empirical evidence, but it is notable that these forces have already imprinted social 
studies education in New Zealand, albeit not directly in relation to learners’ ethical 
decision-making and action. While these read primarily as a set of possible constraints, the 
views of a small group of social studies teachers and several of their students offered some 
cause for optimism. The first and last of the previously described factors appeared central 
to the teachers’ immediate concerns about the place of ethics in social studies education. 
These reservations notwithstanding, the teachers and students arguably saw the role of 
ethics in social studies education as encompassing of, but being more than, critical 
reflection. The teachers particularly emphasised abstractedness as being a risk of employing 
the philosophy of ethics in social studies teaching and learning, and instead wanted to 
attend to their learners’ lived experiences. The students were less reticent about ethical 
perspectives, having engaged with a selection of these in conversations about ethical 
dilemmas. They saw such ethical discussions as connected to their own lives and as 
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offering considerable imaginative stimulus. Thus, whilst not directly endorsing an ethically 
reflexive approach (partly because they were not directly asked about this), there appeared 
some ‘wiggle room’ for such an orientation to gain expression in social studies teaching and 
learning. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis is a largely conceptual piece that has, at various points, drawn on empirical 
evidence. I acknowledge at least three limitations to the strength of this evidence. First, 
and given international variations in social studies and citizenship education, one may 
question the extent to which the international evidence to which I have referred to speaks 
to the New Zealand context. Second, the justification for mobilising the philosophy of 
ethics in social studies education, made in relation to powerful knowledge and social 
studies outcomes, could be strengthened with empirical evidence. There is no research, 
for example, about the link between the formal study of ethics in schools and social 
mobility.  Further, while there is more general evidence about philosophy education in 
schools, none relates ethical thinking to the full range of social studies education 
outcomes. Third, there are few large-scale studies of New Zealand social studies 
classroom practice; much of what does exist is anecdotal or based on the perceptions of 
teachers. For example, while principals, teachers and students report an emphasis on 
open-ended discussion in their classrooms (Schulz et al., 2010), the actual extent to which 
social studies learning is counter-socialising is not known.  So, in relation to the focus of 
this thesis it would be helpful to have a better picture of (a) where ethics is explicitly 
addressed in New Zealand schools as, for example, part of social studies, religious or 
philosophy education, and (b) how the curricular requirement to better support learners’ 
ethical decision-making and action is given expression in these sites. The curricular 
content analysis presented in Chapter Two offers only a partial insight into the place of 
ethics in social studies education and the ways in which ethics and its cognates have been 
understood by social studies curriculum writers, teachers and learners.  Further, and 
though focus group interviews reported in Chapter Six offer a window into teachers’ and 
learners’ conceptions of, and explorations with, ethics, the small-scale nature of the study 
is limited in its generalisability.  
 
One further limitation of this research has to do with the argument for an ethically 
reflexive orientation. While this has been defended on theoretical grounds, the idea is 
yet to be tested in practice. Such empirical research could take place in classrooms that 
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already make ethics an explicit part of teaching and learning or with teachers who have 
an interest in exploring ethically reflexive approaches.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: A NEED FOR AGONISTIC SPACES 
 
Such limitations acknowledged, this section considers policy recommendations that 
could be drawn from the thesis. Given the challenging, complex issues that face all of us 
on this earth and form a perhaps less visible part of learners’ lives, this thesis has argued 
that ethics requires a far more explicit role in social studies education. A way forward 
has been proffered in theoretical terms, the argument being that an ethically reflexive 
orientation could be a means to transcend the ethical silence New Zealand’s social 
studies curriculum. But clearly, and especially given the constraints outlined in the 
previous chapter, some consideration of where, practically speaking, future change 
could evolve from is necessary. I suggest that this is not simply to be achieved by way of 
social studies support materials that might, for example, provide a glossary or links 
between terms familiar to social studies teachers (such as values exploration and social 
decision-making) and usages of ethics in the Values statement.  
 
If the history of moral education and over 70 years of social studies policy development 
in this country are any indication, the place of ethics in social studies is necessarily a 
matter of ongoing reconsideration. However, I urge that greater policy attention be 
given to the nature of that conversation: where and how the voices of the New Zealand 
social studies community are brought in, who the conversation includes, what is 
discussed, and how it takes place. The central recommendation made here is for a more 
inclusive approach to social studies policy development – one that permits the whole 
community to agonise, or wrestle with, diverse aspirations for social studies education in 
New Zealand. This includes a consideration of the work that ethics is to do, that is, its 
cogency, in social studies education. There is not necessarily a shared understanding of 
the aims of social studies education in this country. New Zealand social studies 
academics have tended towards counter-socialisation as being the subject’s primary goal, 
variously expressed through emphases on social studies’ critical, participatory citizenship 
and/or transformative dimensions. Transcending the ethically silent space of the social 
studies curriculum, in the terms outlined in this thesis, is tied to a counter-socialising 
orientation but, in view of limited data, it is an open question as to the extent to which 
teachers share this orientation and/or feel able to translate it into practice.   
 
202 
I make three points about the agonistic spaces that are needed. The first relates to the 
small size of the social studies community. My experience of the social studies 
curriculum, support material and NCEA assessment development process over at least 
10 years has been that of a piecemeal and fracturing approach. Subsets of an already 
small community have been called upon to contribute to developments and initiatives 
without the opportunity to co-ordinate their efforts with others, or discuss the 
challenges and considerations that arise from that work. Much of the ensuing confusion 
and distrust could, I venture, be offset through closer attention, on the part of the 
Ministry of Education’s part, to (a) building and maintaining relationships across the 
social studies community, and (b) wherever possible, ensuring that there is collaboration 
and continuity across projects.   
 
The second point is that any consideration of the work ethics is to do in social studies 
education requires the input of philosophers of education and ethics – a marginalised 
voice in recent curriculum revisions, at least since the 1990s. To be sure, the extent of 
sector engagement with the most recent curricular revision, and extent of political 
accord in relation to the final document, is commendable. But, like many aspects of The 
New Zealand curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007), the detail is bedevilled where the 
relationship between ethics and social studies education is concerned. One important 
contribution that philosophers could make is in sketching out the contentiousness that 
forms the backdrop to perhaps attractive and too readily taken-for-granted curriculum 
terminology. Granted, policy documents inescapably must be stakes in the ground and 
represent choices made among possibilities. But, if the social studies community is to be 
genuinely invited to future policy debates, then the insights of philosophic critique 
should be available to all as one means of considering what the possibilities could be 
and an understanding of where disagreement lies. I think we need to be wary of the 
politics of consensus that contributed to the marginalisation of theoretical 
considerations in the last curriculum revision round, and alert always to the voices that 
are silenced or excluded in the name of consensus.   
 
A third point returns to the marginalisation of citizenship and social studies education 
described in this thesis’ introduction. Perhaps there is little to be done about a crowded 
curriculum and timetabling decisions at the school level. However, I suggest that, with 
effort, we could better co-ordinate the independent industry, within and beyond the 
education sector, related to social studies resourcing. For example, social studies is 
viewed by many governmental and non-governmental organisations as being a key 
203 
anchor for their educational aims. We have seen see a plethora of resources produced 
for social studies education, about, for example: tax education, voting, blood donation, 
World War I commemorations, naturalization, and child poverty. In addition, there are 
numerous programmes that relate to social studies education: Human Rights in 
Education, Amnesty International, Enviroschools and the Outlook for Someday 
sustainability film challenge, for example.  All of these compete for social studies 
teachers’ and learners’ time and attention. But, in a strongly marketised approach to 
education resourcing, there is not a consistent, collective, or prioritised approach to 
such learning materials and experiences. I stress that there is an urgent need to consider 
how the varying projects articulate with (a) each other, and (b) the transformative 
potential of social studies and citizenship education. This would greatly support a 
discussion about the place of ethics in social studies education. 
 
There is, in sum, a very great need for the social studies community to have the 
opportunities to agonise with ideas about the future direction of social studies in a way 
that seeks to include marginalised and isolated voices. However, while I venture that an 
ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education is most likely to evolve from 
the recommendation above, I do not suggest that one must wait for policy leadership. 
Here, I think we could recognise the power of school-based curriculum decision-making 
and, in particular, the role of social studies teachers as reflexive practitioners. This 
contention returns the swampy-ness (Schön, 1992) and full-bodied knowing (Neyland, 
2010) of teachers’ professional experience, and particularly their felt difficulties.  It 
suggests that future change in relation to an ethically reflexive orientation could well 
evolve from individual or small groups of teachers who have an interest in 
re/considering the nature and purposes of social studies education and exploring the 
role that ethics could play – if that matters to them.  In this context, teacher professional 
learning becomes much less about deciphering or over-assimilating policy intent, and 
more about a reflexive exploration of how multiple visions for the good life might be 
accommodated in, and enacted through, social studies education. My second 
recommendation is, therefore, that consideration be given to a more organic approach 
to policy development which develops out of such reflexive explorations, and the 
challenges and contradictions that are revealed in the process. In this way, social studies 
policy development becomes a genuinely agonistic undertaking, with teachers. 
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IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS: PEDAGOGICAL MODELS AS REFLEXIVE 
SURFACES 
 
Recommending an organic approach may be all very well, but how might social studies 
teachers come to a point of noticing or rethinking the relationship between ethical 
decision-making and action and social studies, much less a desire to reconsider 
professional practice?  Of the many possible impetuses, my central recommendation in 
this section relates to the need for second-tier materials that support the Values 
statement (Ministry of Education, 2007).  I urge that such support materials should 
stimulate a reflexive consideration of possibilities for giving expression to the curriculum 
requirement that learners’ ethical decision-making and action be supported. That is, they 
should resist representing ethics education as a matter of pedagogical bullets – of the 
sort that might be marketed to schools as ‘ticking off’ the Values statement. 
 
This section suggests practical ways in which such an ethically reflexive orientation 
could be given expression in New Zealand social studies classrooms. It picks up on 
teachers’ concerns, reported in the previous chapter, about a lack of pedagogical models 
for mobilising ethics in social studies education. What follows is in no way an attempt to 
quell the reservations of those teachers. It is written in the spirit of keeping the 
conversation going and offers, instead, an array of reflexive surfaces – potentially 
fruitful avenues of inquiry for the social studies community’s ongoing re/ consideration 
of the place of ethics in social studies education. The discussion demonstrates that 
exploring an ethically reflexive orientation to social studies education need not be an 
exercise in pedagogical novelty; there are valuable insights in the existing literature that 
could be assembled, altered, or amplified.  It is, admittedly, a highly partial selection of 
strategies that might be considered. While each aspect of ethical reflexivity is treated 
separately, the reader is invited to think of the following discussion as inter-connected 
and cumulative, hence the use of ‘enfolding’ in the section headings.  
 
ENFOLDING CRITICAL REFLECTION: There exists a plethora of literature and teaching 
materials dedicated to enabling learners to thinking critically about ethical concepts, 
questions and issues and, in many cases, to explore named ethical perspectives. There is 
not the space here to do justice to it all. Instead, I recommend several productive seams 
of inspiration, drawn primarily from the literature on values and philosophy education 
(Keown, 2003), and focussed, in particular, on approaches to ethical reasoning. 
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Keown outlines several alternatives to Kohlbergian moral reasoning that make thinking 
about a range of ethical perspectives a more explicit feature of critical reflection. A first, 
‘the moral principles test’ (Quality Public Education Coalition, 2000; Snook, 2000; 
Snook & McGeorge, 1978) asks students to apply five ethical principles to a proposed 
action, such as whether the action minimises harm or preserves the right for people to 
pursue their own ends. A second, from the work of Kidder (1995) and the Institute for 
global ethics (2014), broadens the ethical landscape by including, for example, 
consequentialist and care-based thinking. To Keown’s examples, I would add the 
Markkula center for applied ethics’ (Santa Clara University, 2014) framework for ethical 
thinking, which encourages the use of utilitarian, rights, fairness/justice, common good, 
and virtue approaches as resources for ethical decision-making. Closer to home, and 
drawing on work of Reiss (1999, 2010), approaches to ethical inquiry in science focus 
learners’ ethical reasoning on both established ethical frameworks (consequentialism, 
rights and duties, autonomy, and virtues ethics) and multiple perspectives/axes of 
identity (B. Ryan & Buntting, 2012; Saunders & Rennie, 2013). Notably, the New Zealand 
biotechnology learning hub62, which provides resources for primary and secondary teachers, 
supplies a digital thinking tool that uses this framework for considering socio-scientific 
issues. Another approach, exemplified in The if machine (Worley, 2011), centres on 
philosophical questions and topics such as The Ring of Gyges as the basis for classroom 
discussion. What makes this kind of approach distinctive from those previously 
discussed is that primary school “children discuss, in an obviously simplified form, ideas 
that might figure in a standard philosophy syllabus” (J. White, 2012, p. 453).    
 
Another approach, Philosophy for children, was mentioned in Chapter Four.  Arguably, it 
has less to do with ‘teaching children Aristotle’ or how to apply ethical theories. It 
nonetheless has a strong orientation towards critical reflection and a central 
commitment to collaborative procedures of inquiry, including ethical inquiry. Drawing 
on a social constructivist approach (Gregory, 2011; Keown, 2003), learners are 
encouraged, in communities of inquiry, to determine, and think together about, 
philosophical questions and ethical issues (Burgh et al., 2006; Sprod, 2002). The 
teacher’s role is primarily to open up thinking and provide an environment in which the 
habits of good questioning and good reasoning are cultivated (Golding, 2005).  
 
                                                        
62 http://www.biotechlearn.org.nz/ 
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How could such approaches to critical reflection be enfolded with lived experience and 
imagination?  One example lies in the array of opportunities for social action that 
already exist in learners’ schools and communities – through, for example, the 
requirements of senior social studies and education for sustainability assessment, service 
projects and activities, and the day-to-day organisation of school life. In many cases, 
learners’ social action stems from personal connections to, and concerns about, social 
issues that they have identified as being important. Their actions may represent a careful 
consideration of possibilities, and enacting their responses may well provide a 
considerable sense of agency – a community garden is created, money is raised, students 
have contributed to a political decision-making process, and so on. This thesis has made 
an argument for extending such experiences to include a critical exploration of ethical 
questions and perspectives. At the very least, the students’ engagement with ethical 
dilemmas (reported in the previous chapter) suggest that it is possible to do so without 
eroding positive affect. 
 
ENFOLDING LIVED EXPERIENCE: As the argument built in this thesis has stressed, an ethically 
reflexive orientation to social studies education moves pedagogy beyond critical reflection. 
In this section, I recommend several approaches to narrative ethics, suggested because in 
varying ways they draw in learners’ lived experiences, that is, the everyday, embodied and 
emergent dimensions of their ethical decision-making action. I emphasise that what is 
suggested here is highly selective, given that the field of narrative ethics is both wide 
(Adams, 2008; Montello, 2014) and informed by a variety of theoretical positions.  
 
As could all the approaches noted in the previous section, Philosophy for children has been 
subjected to extensive criticism “as just one normative model of human subjectivity 
among many” (Gregory, 2011, p. 208) and, in particular, for privileging analytic reasoning 
(J. White, 2012). While I share these reservations, Philosophy for children draws in lived 
experience in three ways. First, advocates of the approach argue that the deliberative 
nature of ethical inquiry not only allows learners to “examine precisely what is normally 
taken for granted in moral discourse” (Lipman, 2003, p. 113) but makes caring, empathy, 
and morally serious thinking possible. Thus, while it is possible for the methods described 
in the previous section to be applied in a purely cognitive manner, Philosophy for Children is 
fundamentally a relational approach. Second, its narrative approach (Knight & Collins, 
2010b) begins from learners identifying and discussing the ethical issues that matter in their 
lived experience. A notable extension of this is the growing use of ‘cafe philosophy’ in 
New Zealand schools, where young people organise lunchtime and afterschool discussion 
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sessions. Third, a number of theorists are considering how Philosophy for Children could 
break away from its humanist and pragmatic foundations (J. White, 2012). One author, for 
example, has considered how emotions, play and creativity could be embraced in the 
approach (Weber, 2011) – important dimensions of an ethically reflexive orientation. 
 
Philosophy for Children is not the only approach to deliberative democracy with a narrative 
orientation. Ralph Levinson (2006), for example, has argued that use of personal 
narratives may help bridge “the gap between the local/personal and the emergent 
science” (p. 855) in learners’ consideration of controversial socio-scientific issues. 
Another example draws from the work of Iris Young (1990, 1997, 2000) and, in 
particular, her concern about the ways in which the processes of reason may exclude 
some voices. Her proposal for communicative democracy hoped “to make way for a 
deliberative conception that was open to means of expression beyond the rational 
expression of mainstream deliberative democratic theory” (McAfee, 2014, n.p.). Enslin, 
Pendlebury, and Tjiattas (2001) suggest that citizenship education could be productively 
informed by Iris Young’s emphasis on story-telling in deliberation because it “exhibits 
the situated knowledge of the collective from each perspective, and the combination of 
narratives from different perspectives produces the collective social wisdom not 
available from any one position” (p. 126).   
 
However, this thesis has expressed caution about the consensus politics of deliberation 
and has, instead, argued for agonistic approaches. How could this be enacted in social 
studies classrooms?  One possibility is suggested by Keown (2003) and drawn from post-
structural and social constructionist theories. The process he outlines engages learners in 
identifying stories/discourses about an ethical issue, describing the dominant features of 
the story (deconstruction), selecting a preferred story (using ethical criteria), and 
considering and implementing a plan to give the story more power. The productive 
potential of this approach is that it (a) highlights the effects of overlapping and 
contradictory discourses on learners’ choices, values and actions, (b) leaves open the 
possibility that ethical perspectives could be positioned as interlocutors in relation to 
learners’ everyday lives, (c) prompts attention to voices, and experiences of ethical life, 
that are missing, and (d) enables a consideration of how stories could offer different ways 
to go on.  
 
There is arguably some way to go in considering how collective passions, as Mouffe 
(2000) puts it, could be pedagogically mobilised in this process, that is, how the visceral, 
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spiritual, emotional and fleshy feelings innately connected to ethical decision-making 
and action could be brought in. In light of the literature regarding embodiment 
discussed in this thesis I make two recommendations. This is an extension of 
approaches to bringing in feelings that were a focus of New Zealand social studies 
education in the 1970s. One local example of this is a group of Year 10 social studies 
students who were asked to write about their embodied experiences of extreme natural 
events in the lead-up to considering how different theoretical perspectives have a 
bearing on responses to natural disasters (Harcourt, 2009).  The second 
recommendation relates to the marginalisation of religion and spirituality in successive 
New Zealand social studies curricula. Here, I suggest that the literature on learners’ 
everyday spirituality in education (see, for example, Bone, Cullen, & Loveridge, 2007; 
Sewell, 2009; K. Simon, 2001; Tolliver & Tisdell, 2006) offers useful pedagogical 
examples in terms of bringing in this aspect of learners’ lives. In addition, I strongly 
recommend work that is occurring in independent schools that engages with the idea 
that the demands of contemporary society necessitate learning about and from – that is, 
not a sole focus on instruction into – religion (Syms, 2011). While there exists 
considerable variation in approach across independent schools, the work of the Dialogue 
Australasia Network63 and, in particular, Peter Vardy (2002) is salient to this discussion in 
the way that it connects the affective to learners’ critical consideration of ethical 
decision-making and action. A ‘five strand’ model includes a theory-based approach to 
(i) ethics, (ii) the philosophy of religion, (iii) biblical studies, (iv) world religions 
(understanding and tolerance), and an affective strand that (v) brings in stillness and 
silence. Notably, Dialogue Australasia Network’s membership is not limited to 
independent and Catholic schools; it has been taken up in secular state schools. 
 
ENFOLDING IMAGINATION: How could imaginative perception, envisionment, and action 
(Johnson, 1993) be enfolded, pedagogically speaking, with critical reflection about, and 
learners’ lived experiences of, ethical decision-making and action? Perhaps we might 
conceive bringing in lived experience in less formalised terms than recommended in the 
previous section. Noddings (1994), for example, makes a case for ordinary conversation 
between adults (including teachers) and children as the basis of moral education. One of 
the key characteristics of this kind of conversation is that “for both parties, in the 
conversation under consideration, the partner is more important than the topic, the 
conclusion or the argument” (n.p.). Such ordinary conversation is an important site of 
                                                        
63 http://www.dialogueaustralasia.org/ 
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imaginative responses to ethical issues. Conversely, Egan and Judson (2009) have argued 
for an insertion of the extraordinary into social studies teaching and learning, and have 
identifed a range of ‘cognitive tools’ through which learners of different ages could 
imaginatively engage with the social studies curriculum. For example, they suggest that 
topics could be associated with (i) an “emotionally charged image” (p. 130) that captures 
learners’ imaginations, (ii) powerful abstract opposite concepts (such as good and evil) 
used as a structuring device, (iii) jokes and humour as a method for noticing incongruity 
and, (iv) exposure to mysteries, the surprising and the seemingly absurd. What interests 
me about these suggestions is the potential for the imaginative consideration of ethical 
issues to enfold lived experience and critical reflection. Consider the following cartoon 
as an example: “Does my butt look big in this?” asks a woman. “Yes”, replies a man. A 
tag line reads,  “Surprisingly, Immanuel Kant did not get many dates” 64.   
 
Another seam of imaginative possibility stems from the use of fiction to explore ethical 
themes and questions65. This might seem paradoxical in a subject concerned with real 
world social issues. However, I’ve observed many primary and secondary social studies 
teachers use books such as The Lorax (Dr. Seuss) and Belonging (Baker, 2004) to explore 
environmental ethics. Social studies teaching and learning could provide more 
opportunities for students to traverse and imaginatively transform both fiction and non-
fiction texts and, in doing so, develop their critical literacy: 
Knowledge that texts are not ideologically natural or neutral -- that they represent particular 
points of views while silencing others and influence people's ideas -- and that their designs 
and discourses can be critiqued and redesigned in novel and hybrid ways. (Luke & 
Freebody, 2014, n.p.). 
 
To return to the importance of enfolding the relational and embodied dimension of 
lived experience in learners’ consideration of ethical decision-making and action, Luce-
Kapler, Sumara, and Ifody (2010) note that in an online, media-saturated world, people’s 
real lives often become “presented in fictional structures” (p. 538).  They argue that 
teaching ethical know-how is central to learners’ ability to enter imaginatively into 
everyday lives of the other. 
 
These suggestions draw social studies more closely to what might be considered the 
preserve of English teaching and learning. However, I suggest that the opportunities for 
                                                        
64  http://www.deviantart.com/?offset=48&view_mode=2&order=9&q=immanuel+kant 
65  For a discussion of narrative ethics used in this literary sense, see Lothe and Hawthorn (2013). 
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enfolding imagination do not end there. New Zealand Anglican Life’s 2014 Big picture 
competition66, for example, involves both social studies and the visual arts learning in 
learners imagining and creatively communicating responses to child poverty in their 
local communities. While recently attending the Wellington regional round of the New 
Zealand stage challenge67, a purely student-run dance and drama competition, I was struck 
by the opportunities for follow-up in social studies classrooms that the student entries 
afforded. The students had imaginatively explored themes of, for example, government 
suveillance, nuclear disarmament, family violence, and the impact of technology as social 
issues that are pressing in their lives. Similarly, a UK programme, Theatre of debate, 
enables young people to explore social and moral issues through performance, digital 
technology, and live debate.68  
 
SUMMARY: This section perhaps reads as an eclectic mix of pedagogical suggestions. My 
undertaking here has not been to exclusively advocate for one approach over another, 
but to point to some opportunities that are (a) extant in the literature and school life 
and, (b) intersect with an ethically reflexive orientation. The real and actual potential of 
many of these suggestions are journeys yet to be made. However, just as democratic 
societies depend on plural visions of the good life, I urge that social studies teachers’ 
reflexive consideration of the Values statement is at least in part dependent on access to 
a repertoire of pedagogical approaches to better supporting learners’ ethical decision-
making and action – approaches that assist learners to assemble responses to ethical issues 
in their lives. 
PLACING STAKES IN THE GROUND 
Ehara i te mea, he kotahi tangata nāna I whakaaro te pō. It is not as if there’s only one person 
watching the night. 
 
To return to the wero introduced at the beginning of this thesis: what of placing stakes 
in the ground?  To the extent that a thesis is a book of oneself, this research has called 
into question my previous professional preoccupation with critical thinking in social 
studies education. It has simultaneously expanded my sense of the ground on which 
social studies education could lie and provoked an ongoing reconsideration of where, 
for the moment, I place my stakes in that ground. I have found within the literature an 
enlivening dimension of social studies education – and an enlivened sense of ethics that 
                                                        
66 http://thebigpicture.org.nz/ 
67 http://www.stagechallenge.co.nz/ 
68 http://www.theatreofdebate.com/ 
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is a world away from childhood experiences of philosophic debate as combative, 
disembodied and abstract. This thesis has argued that ethically reflexive orientation to 
social studies education is an important means of transcending a curricular lacuna and a 
response to the immediate, everyday challenges of social studies education. The cogency 
and ethics of this argument is, however, to reprise Hill (1994), a matter for each and 
every social studies educator’s consideration. This thesis offers a way to go on, in the 
hope that others may join in the conversation. 
 
 
 
 
  
212 
  
213 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbiss, J. (2011). Social sciences in the New Zealand curriculum: Mixed messages. 
Curriculum Matters, 7(2011), 118-137.  
Abowitz, K. K., & Harmish, J. (2006). Contemporary discourses of citizenship. Review of 
Educational Research, 76(4), 653-690. doi.org/10.3102/00346543076004653 
Adams, M. (2003). The reflexive self and culture: A critique. The British Journal of Sociology, 
54(2), 221-238. doi:10.1080/0007131032000080212 
Adams, M. (2006). Hybridizing habitus and reflexivity: Towards an understanding of 
contemporary identity? Sociology, 40(3), 511-528. 
doi.org/10.1177/003803850663672 
Adkins, A. (1989). Plato. In R. J. Cavalier, J. Gouinlock & J. P. Sterba (Eds.), Ethics in the 
history of western philosophy (pp. 1-31). New York: St Martins Press. 
Aitken, G. (2004, May). Social studies traditions. Paper presented at the Ministry of 
Education New Zealand Curriculum Project Social Sciences Hui., Town Hall, 
Wellington Convention Centre.  
Aitken, G. (2005a). The purpose and substance of social studies: Citizenship education 
possibilities. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Towards effective social studies 
(pp. 85-112). Palmerston North: Kanuka Grove Press. 
Aitken, G. (2005b). Curriculum design in New Zealand social studies: Learning from the past 
(Doctor of Education thesis). University of Auckland, Auckland.   
Aitken, G. (2006). Signalling shifts in meaning: The experience of social studies 
curriculum design. Curriculum Matters, 2, 6-25.  
Aitken, G., & Sinnema, C. (2008). Effective pedagogy in social sciences/tikanga-a-iwi: Best 
evidence synthesis iteration [BES]. Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Education. 
Alcorn, N. (1999). To the fullest extent of his powers: C.E. Beeby's life in education. Wellington, 
NZ: Victoria University Press. 
Alexander, J. C. (1996). Critical reflections on `reflexive modernization'. Theory, Culture & 
Society, 13(4), 133-138. doi: 10.1177/0263276496013004009 
Alexander, L., & Moore, M. (2014). Deontological ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Winter 2012. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-deontological/  
Alexander, T. M. (1993). John Dewey and the moral imagination: Beyond Putnam and 
Rorty toward a postmodern ethics. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 29(3) 
369-400.  
Almond, B. (1993). Rights. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics: Blackwell companions to 
philosophy (pp. 259-269). USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Alvesson, M., & Sköldberg, K. (2009). Reflexive methodology: New vistas for qualitative research. 
(2nd ed.) London: Sage. 
Anderson, E. (2014). Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2012. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/feminism-epistemology/ 
Anderson, M., & Della Sala, S. (Eds.). (2012). Neurosceince in education: The good, the bad and 
the ugly. UK: Oxford University Press. 
Annette, J. (2006). Education for community involvement and as service learning. In T. 
Breslin & B. Dufour (Eds.), Developing citizens: A comprehensive introduction to effective 
citizenship education in the secondary school (pp. 257-264). UK: Hodder Murray. 
Aoki, R., Funane, T., & Koizumi, H. (2010). Brain science of ethics: Present status and 
the future. Mind, Brain, and Education, 4(4), 188-195. doi:10.1111/j.1751-
228X.2010.01098.x 
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers (1st ed.). New York: W. 
W. Norton. 
214 
Archer, E., & Openshaw, R. (1992). Citizenship and identity as "official goals" in social 
studies. In R. Openshaw (Ed.), New Zealand social studies: Past, present and future 
(pp. 19-33). Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 
Archer, M. S. (2007). Making our way through the world: Human reflexivity and social mobility. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Archer, M. S. (2012). The reflexive imperative in late modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univeristy Press. 
Argyrou, V. (2003). Reflexive modernization and other mythical realities. Anthropological 
theory, 3(1), 27-41. doi.org/10.1177/1463499603003001750 
Arthur, J., & Cremin, H. (Eds.). (2012). Debates in citizenship education. Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge. 
Arthur, J., & Davies, I. (Eds.). (2008). Citizenship education (Vol. 1-4). London: Sage. 
Arthur, J., Davies, I., & Hahn, C. (Eds.). (2008). The Sage handbook of education for 
citizenship and democracy. London: Sage. 
Asara, V., Profumi, E., & Kallis, G. (2013). Degrowth, democracy and autonomy. 
Environmental Values, 22(2), 217-239. doi: 10.3197/096327113X13581561725239 
Ashmore, M. (1989). The reflexive thesis: Wrighting sociology of scientific knowledge: Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority. (2014). Ethical understanding.  
Retrieved from 
http://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/GeneralCapabilities/ethical-
understanding/introduction/introduction 
Australian Government Department of Education, Science and Training. (2005). 
National framework for values education in Australian schools. Canberra: Author. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.curriculum.edu.au/verve/_resources/framework_pdf_version_for
_the_web.pdf. 
Bagnall, R. G. (1998). Moral education in a postmodern world: Continuing professional 
education. Journal of Moral Education, 27(3), 313-331. doi: 
10.1080/0305724980270304 
Bai, H., & Banack, H. (2006). To see a world in a grain of sand: Complexity ethics and 
moral education. Complicity: An International Journal of Complexity & Education, 3(1), 
5-20. 
Baier, K. (1993). Egoism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics: Blackwell companions to 
philosophy (pp. 197-204). USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Bailey, D. (2005). Who we are: Learning about our identity in social studies. In P. 
Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Towards effective social studies (pp. 163-188). 
Palmerston North: Kanuka Grove Press. 
Bailin, S., & Siegel, H. (2003). Critical thinking. In N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith & P. 
Standish (Eds.). The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of education (pp. 181-193). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Baker, J. (2004). Belonging. UK: Walker Books. 
Banks, J. A., McGee Banks, C. A., Cortes, C. E., Hahn, C. L., Merryfield, M. M., 
Moodley, K. A., . . . Parker, W. C. (2005). Democracy and diversity: Principles and 
concepts for educating citizens in a global age. Seattle: Center for Multicultural 
Education, University of Washington. 
Barr, H. (1998). The nature of social studies. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), New 
horizons for New Zealand social studies (pp. 103-120). Palmerston North: ERDC 
Press, Massey University. 
Barr, H., Graham, J., Hunter, P., Keown, P., & McGee, J. (1997). A position paper: Social 
studies in the New Zealand curriculum. New Zealand: School of Education, The 
University of Waikato. 
215 
Barr, R. D., Barth, J. L., & Shermis, S. S. (1978). The nature of the social studies. Palm 
Springs, CA: ETC. 
Barrow, R. (1978). Plato and education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern ethics. USA: Blackwell. 
Bauman, Z. (1997). Postmodernity and its discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
BBC. (2014a). Moral maze. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qk11 
BBC. (2014b). Everyday ethics. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/ethics 
BBC. (2014c). Introduction to ethics. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/ 
introduction/ 
Beals, F. (2001). Let's dig down deep: A philosophical look at the social studies 
education in New Zealand using a post-structural geneological analysis. New 
Zealand Annual Review of Education, 11, 199-213.  
Beauchamp, T. (1984). On eliminating the distinction between applied ethics and ethical 
theory. Monist, 67, 514-531. doi.org/10.5840/monist198467430 
Beauchamp, T. (2003). The nature of applied ethics. In R. Frey & C. Wellman (Eds.), 
Blackwell companion to applied ethics (pp. 1-16). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The theory of reflexive modernization 
problematic, hypotheses and research programme. Theory, Culture & Society, 
20(2), 1-33. doi.org/10.1177/0263276403020002001 
Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and 
aesthetics in the modern social order: Cambridge, England: Polity. 
Berlin, I. (1999). Concepts and catgories: Philosophical essays. London: Pimlico. Retrieved from 
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/cc/index.html 
Bernstein, R. J. (1987). The varieties of pluralism. American Journal of Education, 95(4), 
509-525. doi.org/10.1086/444323 
Biesta, G. (2007). Why “what works” won’t work: Evidence‐based practice and the 
democratic deficit in educational research. Educational Theory, 57(1), 1-22. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2006.00241.x 
Biesta, G. (2009). Good education in an age of measurement: On the need to reconnect 
with the question of purpose in education. Educational Assessment, Evaluation and 
Accountability (formerly: Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education), 21(1), 33-46. 
doi.org/10.1007/s11092-008-9064-9 
Biesta, G. (2010). Why ‘what works’ still won’t work: From evidence-based education to 
value-based education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 29(5), 491-503. 
doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9191-x 
Blattner, W. (2008). What Heidegger and Dewey could learn from each other. 
Philosophical Topics, 36(1), 57-77. doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20083614 
Bleakley, A. (1999). From reflective practice to holistic reflexivity. Studies in Higher 
Education, 24(3), 315-330. doi.org/10.1080/03075079912331379925 
Boethius. (d. 524). The consolation of philosophy of Boethius. (Trans. H.R. James, 1897). 
Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14328/14328-h/14328-h.htm 
Boler, M. (1999). Feeling power: Emotions and education. New York: Routledge. 
Bone, J., Cullen, J., & Loveridge, J. (2007). Everyday spirituality: An aspect of the holistic 
curriculum in action. Contemporary Issues in Childhood Education, 8(4), pp. 344-354. 
Brannelly, T., Boulton, A., & te Hiini, A. (2013). A relationship between the ethics of 
care and Māori worldview: The place of relationality and care in Maori mental 
health service provision. Ethics and Social Welfare, 7(4), 410-422.  
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. doi: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
Brennan, A., & Lo, Y.-S. (2014). Environmental ethics. The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy. Fall 2011. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ethics-environmental/  
216 
Brooks, C. (2013). How do we understand conceptual development in school 
geography? In D. Lambert & M. Jones (Eds), Debates in geography education. (pp. 
75-88) UK: Routledge. 
Brownlie, J. (2011). ‘Being there’: Multidimensionality, reflexivity and the study of 
emotional lives. The British Journal of Sociology, 62(3), 462-481.  
Bruner, J. (1960). The process of education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Burbules, N. C. (2000). Philosophy of education. In B. Moon, M. Ben-Peretz, & S. 
Brown (Eds.), Routledge international companion to education (pp. 3-18). London: 
Routledge. 
Burgh, G. (2004). Seeking justice as a strategy for teaching and learning in SOSE: The 
ring of Gyges, the veil of ignorance and the prisoner's dilemma. The Social 
Educator, 22(3), 25-33.  
Burgh, G., Field, T., & Freakley, M. (2006). Ethics and the community of inquiry: Education for 
deliberative democracy. Melbourne, Australia: Thomson Social Science Press. 
Burkitt, I. (2012). Emotional reflexivity: Feeling, emotion and imagination in reflexive 
dialogues. Sociology, 46(3), 458-472. doi.org/10.1177/0038038511422587 
Butler, J. (2011). For and against precarity. Tidal: occupy theory, occupy strategy, December 
2011(1), 12-13. Retrieved from http://tidalmag.org/pdf/tidal1_the-beginning-
is-near.pdf 
Butler, J. (2012, February). Occupy as form: Judith Butler. Retrieved from 
http://arcdirector.blogspot.co.nz/2012/02/occupy-as-form-judith-butler.html 
Camillus, J. C. (2008). Strategy as a wicked problem. Havard Business Review, 86(5), 98-
106. 
Caplan, A. L. (1979). Ethics and values in education: Are the concepts distinct and does 
it make a difference? Educational theory, 29(3), 245-253. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-
5446.1979.tb00857.x 
Caputo, J. D. (2000). The end of ethics. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to 
ethical theory (pp. 111-128). USA: Blackwell.  
Carpenter, J. J. (2006). The development of a more intelligent citizenship: John Dewey 
and the social studies. Education and Culture, 22(2), 31-42. 
doi:10.1353/eac.2007.0001 
Carr, D. (1999). Cross questions and crooked answers: Contemporary problems of 
moral education. In J. M. Halstead & T. H. McLauchlin (Eds.), Education in 
morality (pp. 23-42). Hoboken: Routledge. 
Carr, D. (2000). Exploring theory and practice in moral education. In B. Moon, M. Ben-
Peretz & S. Brown (Eds.), Routlege International Companion to Education (pp. 19-27). 
London: Routledge. 
Carrington, B., & Troyna, B. (1988). Children and controversial issues: Strategies for the early and 
middle years of schooling. London: Falmer. 
Case, R. (1993). Key elements of a global perspective. Social Education, 57(6), 318-325.  
Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age. UK: 
Polity Press. 
Castoriadis, C. (1987). The imaginary institution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Catling, S., & Martin, F. (2011). Contesting powerful knowledge: The primary 
geography curriculum as an articulation between academic and children's (ethno-
) geographies. Curriculum Journal, 22(3), 317-335.  
Catton, P. (2012, September). Philosophy, maturanga Māori and the meaning of 
biculturalism. Notes accompanying Keynote address to New Zealand 
Association for Philosophy Teaching conference, Christchurch. 
Caws, P. (1996). Ethics from experience. Massachusetts, USA: Jones & Bartlett. 
Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness. (2014). The historical thinking project: 
Historical thinking concepts. Retrieved from http://historicalthinking.ca/historical-
thinking-concepts 
217 
Chamberlain, M. (2004). Commentary: New Zealand/Te anga matauranga o Aotearoa 
project: A response. Teachers and Curriculum, 7, 79-80.  
Chambliss, J. (1991). John Dewey's idea of imagination in philosophy and education. 
Journal of Aesthetic Education, 25(4), 43-49. doi.org/10.2307/3332902 
Chazan, B. I. (1985). Contemporary approaches to moral education: Analyzing alternative theories. 
New York: Teachers College Press. 
Claire, H. (2001). Not aliens: Primary school children and the citizenship/PSHE curriculum. 
London: Trentham Books. 
Claire, H. (2003). Dealing with controversial issues with primary teacher trainees as part 
of citizenship education. citizED Commisioned Research Projects. Retrieved from 
http://www.citized.info/?strand=0&r_menu=res 
Claire, H., & Holden, C. (Eds.). (2007). The challenge of teaching controversial issues. 
Staffordshire, England.: Trentham Books. 
Clark, John (1997). Educational Research: philosophy, politics, ethics.  Palmerston North, NZ: 
ERDC Press.  
Clark, J. (2000). Values education in New Zealand: Past, present and future. DELTA, 
52(1), 69-74.  
Clark, J. (2004a). Rigorous eclecticism: The Ministry of Education’s bizarre philosophy 
of the curriculum. In A. O'Neill, J. Clark, & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Reshaping 
culture, knowledge and learning: Policy and content in the New Zealand curriculum 
framework (pp. 127-140). Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press. 
Clark, J. (2004b). The curriculum stocktake report: A philosophical critique. Teachers and 
Curriculum, 7, 73-78.  
Codd, J., Clark, J., O'Neill, A., & O'Neill, J. (Eds.). (1996/7). Delta: Policy and practice in 
education. Palmerston North, NZ: Massey University. 
Collins, C. (2004). Education for a just democracy: the role of ethical inquiry. (PhD thesis). 
Adelaide: University of South Australia. Retrieved from 
http://arrow.unisa.edu.au:8081/1959.8/51285 
Collins, C., & Knight, S. (2006). Ethical inquiry as central to the society and environment learning 
area. Paper presented at the The Australian Association for Research in 
Education National Conference, Adelaide. Retrieved from 
http://www.aare.edu.au/publications-database.php/4997/ethical-inquiry-as-
central-to-the-society-environment-learning-area 
Cook, H. (2013, September 7, 2013). Secular ethics alternative to religion in state 
schools, The Age. Retrieved from http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/secular-
ethics-alternative-to-religion-in-state-schools-20130906-2tau0.html 
Cortina, A. (2008). The public task of applied ethics: Transnational civic ethics. In A. 
Cortina, D. García-Marzá & J. Conill (Eds.), Public reason and applied ethics: The 
ways of practical reason in a pluralist society (pp. 9-30). England: Ashgate. 
Cortina, A., García-Marzá, D., & Conill, J. (Eds.). (2008). Public reason and applied ethics: 
The ways of practical reason in a pluralist society. England: Ashgate. 
Counsell, C. (2011). What do we want students to do with historical change and 
continuity? In I. Davies (Ed.), Debates in history teaching, (pp. 109-123) UK: 
Routledge. 
Critchley, S. (2002). Did you hear the one about the philosopher writing a book on 
humour? Think, 1(02), 103-112. doi:10.1017/S147717560000035X 
Crown. (2001). National certificate in education, Geography/Mātauranga Matawhenua: Statement 
on perspectives. Retrieved October 6, 2008 from http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/ 
Cubitt, S. (2005). Understanding social studies: Addressing the challenges posed by 
recent reviews of the curriculum statement. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw 
(Eds.), Towards effective social studies (pp. 5-18). Palmerston North, NZ: Kanuka 
Grove Press. 
Cubitt, S. (2006). The draft New Zealand curriculum. Curriculum Matters, 2, 195+.  
218 
Da Rocha, A. C., & Bergareche, A. M. (2008). Wired for autonomy. The American Journal 
of Bioethics, 8(5), 23-25. doi.org/10.1080/15265160802180042 
Dall’Alba, G., & Barnacle, R. (2007). An ontological turn for higher education. Studies in 
Higher Education, 32(6), 679-691. doi.org/10.1080/03075070701685130 
Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20(1), 43-63. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
5914.1990.tb00174.x  Retrieved from 
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~alock/position/position.htm 
Davies, B. (2010). The implications for qualitative research methodology of the struggle 
between the individualised subject of phenomenology and the emergent 
multiplicities of the poststructuralist subject: The problem of agency. 
Reconceptualizing Educational Research Methodology, 1(1), 54-68. Retrieved from 
https://journals.hioa.no/index.php/rerm/article/view/171 
Davis, B. (2004). Inventions of teaching: A genealogy. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Davis, B., Sumara, D., & Luce-Kapler, R. (2008). Engaging minds: Changing teaching in 
conplex times (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. 
D’Cruz, H., Gillingham, P., & Melendez, S. (2007). Reflexivity, its meanings and 
relevance for social work: A critical review of the literature. British Journal of Social 
Work, 37(1), 73-90. doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcl001 
de Botton, A. (2007). The consolations of philosophy. London: Penguin Books. 
de Sousa, R. (2014). Emotion. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2014. Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotion/ 
Dearden, R. F. (1981). Controversial issues and the curriculum. Journal of Curriculum 
Studies, 13(1), 37-44. doi:10.1080/0022027810130105 
Del Busso, L. (2007). III. Embodying feminist politics in the research interview: 
Material bodies and reflexivity. Feminism & Psychology, 17(3), 309-315. 
doi.org/10.1177/0959353507079084 
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2013). A thousand plateaus. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
den Heyer, K. (2012). History education as a disciplined 'ethic of truths'. In P. Clark 
(Ed.), New possibilities for the past: Shaping history education in Canada. Vancouver: 
UBC Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.secondaryed.ualberta.ca/en/People/AcademicStaff/~/media/seco
ndaryed/Documents/People/KentDenHayer/historyethicsoftruths-
denHeyer.pdf 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2000). The Sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Department for Education. (2013). Secondary national curriculum until 2014: Citizenship.  
Retrieved from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130904095100/https://www.edu
cation.gov.uk/schools/teachingandlearning/curriculum/secondary/b00199157/
citizenship 
Department for Education. (2014). Statutory guidance: National curriculum in England: 
citizenship programmes of study.  Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-curriculum-in-england-
citizenship-programmes-of-study 
Department of Education. (1928). Syllabus of instruction for public schools. Wellington: 
Government Printer. 
Department of Education. (1944). The post-primary school curriculum: Report of the committee 
appointed by the Minister of Education in November, 1942 (The Thomas Report). 
Wellington: Government Printer. 
Department of Education. (1948). The primary school revised syllabus: Social studies in history 
and geography. New Zealand: Author. 
219 
Department of Education. (1971). Suggestions for teaching social studies in the primary school: 
Parts I, II, III, IV. Wellington: Government Printer. 
Department of Education. (1973). Human development and relationships across the curriculum 
(The Ross Report). Wellington: Government Printer. 
Department of Education. (1977a). Social studies syllabus guidelines: Forms 1-4. Wellington, 
New Zealand: Author. 
Department of Education. (1977b). The report of the committee on health and social education: 
Growing, sharing, learning (The Johnson Report). Wellington: Government Printer. 
Department of Education. (1978). Faces primary social studies newsletter 4. Wellington, New 
Zealand: Author. 
Department of Education. (1981). Faces 5 primary social studies newsletter: Thinking, feeling, 
valuing. Wellington, New Zealand: Author. 
Department of Education. (1983). Faces 6 primary social studies newsletter: Social studies in the 
primary school. Wellington, New Zealand: Author. 
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Boston: D.C Heath. 
Dewey, J. (1916). Essays in experimental logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dewey, J. (1922). Human nature and conduct: An introduction to social psychology. New York: 
Henry Holt. 
Dewey, J. (1939). Logic: The theory of inquiry. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Diosecan School For Girls. (2014). Centre for ethics. Retrieved from 
https://www.diocesan.school.nz/centre-for-ethics 
Dogan, M., & Pahre, R. (1990). Creative marginality: Innovation at the intersections of social 
science. Boulder, USA: Westview Press. 
Doris, J., & Stich, S. (2014). Moral psychology: Empirical approaches. The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2014. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/moral-psych-emp/ 
Dowden, T. (2011). Locating curriculum integration within the historical context. History 
of Education Review, 40(1), 47-61. doi:10.1108/08198691111140802 
Dr Seuss. (1971). The Lorax. London: Collins. 
Duncan, C., Cloutier, J. D., & Bailey, P. H. (2007). Concept analysis: The importance of 
differentiating the ontological focus. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 58(3), 293-300. 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04277.x 
Dyke, M. (2009). An enabling framework for reflexive learning: Experiential learning 
and reflexivity in contemporary modernity. International Journal of Lifelong 
Education, 28(3), 289-310. doi.org/10.1080/02601370902798913 
Dyke, M. (2013). Reconceptualising learning as a form of relational reflexivity. British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, iFirst article. doi:10.1080/01425692.2013.843445 
Dyke, M., Johnston, B., & Fuller, A. (2012). Approaches to reflexivity: Navigating 
educational and career pathways. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 33(6), 831-
848. doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2012.686895 
Eagleton, T. (2009). Trouble with strangers: A study of ethics. UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Education Forum. (1996). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum: A submission on the 
revised draft. Auckland, NZ: Author. 
Education Review Office. (2001). The New Zealand curriculum: An ERO perspective. 
Wellington, NZ: Author. 
Education Review Office. (2006). The quality of teaching and learning in years 4 and 8: Social 
studies. Wellington, NZ: Author. 
Education Review Office. (2007). The teaching of social studies: Good practice. Wellington, 
NZ: Author. 
Education Review Office. (2010). Preparing to give effect to the New Zealand curriculum. 
Wellington, NZ: Author. 
Egan, K. (1997). The educated mind: How cognitive tools shape our understanding. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
220 
Egan, K., & Judson, G. (2009). Values and imagination in teaching: With a special focus 
on social studies. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 41(2), 126-140. doi: 
10.1111/j.1469-5812.2008.00455.x 
Eilam, E., & Trop, T. (2010). ESD pedagogy: A guide for the perplexed. The Journal of 
Environmental Education, 42(1), 43-64. doi.org/10.1080/00958961003674665 
Engle, S. H., & Ochoa, A. S. (1988). Education for democratic citizenship: Decision-making in 
the social studies. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Ennis, R. (2011). Critical thinking. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 26(2), 5-
19. doi.org/10.5840/inquiryctnews201126215 
Enslin, P., Pendlebury, S., & Tjiattas, M. (2001). Deliberative democracy, diversity and the 
challenges of citizenship education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 35(1), 115-130. 
doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.00213 
Ermine, W. (2007). The ethical space of engagement. Indigenous Law Journal, 6(1), 193-
203.  
Ermine, W., Sinclair, R., & Jeffrey, B. (2004). The ethics of research involving indigenous peoples: 
Report of the Indigenous People's Research Centre to the Interagency Advisory Panel on 
Research Ethics.  Retrieved from 
http://ahrnets.ca/files/2010/05/ethics_review_iphrc.pdf 
Etherington, K. (2007). Ethical research in reflexive relationships. Qualitative Inquiry, 
13(5), 599-616. doi.org/10.1177/1077800407301175 
Evans, J., Davies, B., & Rich, E. (2009). The body made flesh: Embodied learning and 
the corporeal device. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 30(4), 391-406. 
doi.org/10.1080/01425690902954588 
Evans, R. W. (2004). The social studies wars: What should we teach our children? New York: 
Teachers' College Press. 
Evans, R. W. (2010). The social studies wars, now and then. In W. C. Parker (Ed.), Social 
studies today: Research and practice (pp. 25-34). Hoboken: Taylor & Francis. 
Evans, R. W., Newmann, F. M., & Saxe, D. W. (1996). Defining issues-centred 
education. In R. W. Evans (Ed.), Handbook on teaching social issues: NCSS bulletin 
93 (pp. 2-5). Washington, DC: National Council for the Social Studies. 
Evans, R. W., & Saxe, D. W. (Eds.). (1996). Handbook on teaching social issues: NCSS 
bulletin 93. Washington, DC: National Council for the Social Studies 
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analyzing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. New York: 
Routledge. 
Fenton, E. (1991). Reflections on the 'new social studies'. Social Studies, 82(3), 84-90. 
doi.org/10.1080/00377996.1991.9958313 
Ferguson, S. (2007). Commentary on the New Zealand curriculum draft for consultation 2006: 
Paper prepared for the Ministry of Education’s New Zealand Curriculum Marautanga 
Project. Australia: Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER). 
Fischer, D. H. (2012). Fairness and freedom: A history of two open societies: New Zealand and the 
United States. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1983). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of a work in progress. In 
H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics (pp. 231-232). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Francis, G. S. (2007). Simple ethical skills for use in social inquiry and ethical decision-making. 
New Zealand: Author. Retrieved from www.valueseducation.co.nz 
Francis, G. S. (2009a). Forty lessons on citizenship for years 7-13. New Zealand: Author. 
Retrieved from www.valueseducation.co.nz 
Francis, G. S. (2009b). Key competencies, values and citizenship: A programme for primary schools 
relating to the 2007 curriculum. Wellngton, NZ: First Edition. 
Francis, G. S. (2009c). Dealing with values: How schools and their communities can achieve the 
outcomes required by the values statement in the 2007 NZ curriculum. Wellington, New 
Zealand: First Edition. 
221 
Frazer, E. (2008). Key perspectives, traditions and disciplines: Overview. In J. Arthur, I. 
Davies & C. Hahn (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of education for citizenship and democracy 
(pp. 281-291). London: Sage. 
Freire, P. (1986). Pedagogy of the oppressed. England: Pelican Books. 
Gallie, W. B. (1956). Eseentially contwested concepts. London: Williams & Northgate. 
Gaonkar, D. P. (2002). Toward new imaginaries: An introduction. Public Culture, 14(1), 
1-19. doi.org/10.1215/08992363-14-1-1 
Gavison, R. (1992). Feminism and the Public/private distinction. Stanford Law Review, 
45(1), 1-45. doi:10.2307/1228984 
Gazzinga, M. S. (2006). The ethical brain: The science of our moral dilemmas. New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Gendler, T. (2014). Imagination. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2013. Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/imagination/ 
Gert, B. (2014). The definition of morality. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2012. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/morality-
definition/ 
Gibson, S. E. (2009). Teaching social studies in elementary schools: A social constructivist approach. 
Toronto: Nelson Education. 
Gibson, S., & McKay, R. (2005). Reexamining competing views of citizenship education 
and their influence on social studies. In C. White & R. Openshaw (Eds.), 
Democracy at the crossroads: International perspectives on critical global citizenship education 
(pp. 167-186). USA: Lexington Books. 
Giddens, A. (1976). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social 
analysis. London: Macmillan. 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and identity in the late modern age. 
Cambridge: Polity.  
Gifford, R. (2011). The dragons of inaction: Psychological barriers that limit climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Am Psychol, 66(4), 290-302. 
doi:10.1037/a0023566 
Gilbert, R., & Hoepper, B. (Eds.). (2004). Teaching society and the environment (4th ed.). 
Australia: Cengage Learning. 
Glannon, W. (Ed.). (2007). Defining right and wrong in brain science: Essential readings in 
neuroethics. New York: Dana Press. 
Glass, R. D. (2009). Education and the ethics of democratic citizenship. In M. S. Katz, 
S. Verducci, & G. Biesta (Eds.), Education, democracy and the moral life (pp. 9-30). 
USA: Springer. 
Goldberg, I. Y. (2011). Reasoning and religion: The relevance of the academic study of religion to 
critical thinking pedagogy. (PhD thesis). Hamilton, New Zealand: University of 
Waikato.   
Golding, C. (2002). Connecting concepts: Thinking actvities for students. Australia: ACER Press. 
Golding, C. (2005). A 'philosophy for children' approach to social studies. In P. Benson 
& R. Openshaw (Eds.), Towards effective social studies (pp. 113-130). Palmerston 
North, NZ: Kanuka Grove Press, Massey University. 
Gorrie, A. M. (1963). Jam for breakfast, dinner and tea. Educational Research, 10(12), 17-
23.  
Gray, J. (2000). Pluralism and toleration in contemporary political philosophy. Political 
Studies, 48(2), 323-333. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00262 
Gregory, M. (2009). Ethics education and the practice of wisdom. Teaching Ethics, 9(2), 
105-130.  
Gregory, M. (2011). Philosophy for children and its critics: A Mendham dialogue. Journal 
of Philosophy of Education, 45(2), 199-219. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00795.x 
Grudens-Schuck, N., Allen, B. L., & Larson, K. (2004). Focus group fundamentals. 
Retrieved from http://www.extenison.iastate.edu/Publications/PM1969B.pdf 
222 
Guillemin, M., & Gillam, L. (2004). Ethics, reflexivity, and “ethically important 
moments” in research. Qualitative Inquiry, 10(2), 261-280.  
Gyekye, K. (2014). African ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2011. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-
ethics/  
Hanvey, R. (2004). An attainable global perspective. Retrieved from 
http://www.globaled.org/an_att_glob_persp_04_11_29.pdf 
Harcourt, M. (2009). Teaching perspectives as part of social inquiry. Presentation to Victoria 
University of Wellington, Faculty of Education, EPOL347 class. 
Harrison, K. (1998). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum: Dosing for amnesia 
or enemy of ethnocentrism? In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), New horizons 
for New Zealand social studies (pp. 63-82). Palmerston North: ERDC Press, Massey 
University. 
Hartoonian, H. M., & Laughlin, M. A. (1989). Designing a social studies scope and 
sequence for the 21st century. Social Education, 53(6), 388-398.  
Hattie, J. (2009). Visible learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. 
Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge. 
Hawe, E. M., Browne, I., Siteine, A., & Tuck, B. (2010). Beliefs of experienced and 
student teachers about the nature and purpose of social studies education in 
New Zealand elementary schools. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 30(3), 289-304. 
doi: 10.1080/02188791.2010.495842 
Haydon, G. (2003). Moral education. In R. Curren (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of 
education (pp. 320-331). USA: Blackwell. 
Heilman, E. (2006). Critical, liberal, and poststructural challenges for global education. 
In A. Segall, E. Heilman, & C. Cherryholmes, (Eds.). (2006). Social studies - the 
next generation: Re-searching in the postmodern, (pp. 189-208). New York: Peter Lang. 
Helm, B. (2014). Friendship. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2013. Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/friendship/ 
Helmsing, M. (2014). Virtuous subjects: A critical analysis of the affective substance of 
social Studies Education. Theory & Research in Social Education, 42(1), 127-140. doi: 
10.1080/00933104.2013.842530 
Hertz, R. (1996). Introduction: Ethics, reflexivity and voice. Qualitative Sociology, 19(1), 3-
9. doi.org/10.1007/BF02393245 
Hess, D. E. (2002). Discussing controversial public issues in secondary social studies 
classrooms: Learning from skilled teachers. Theory & Research in Social Education, 
30(1), 10-41. doi: 10.1080/00933104.2002.10473177 
Hess, D. (2004). Controversies about controversial issues in democratic education. 
Political Science and Politics, 37(2), 257-261. doi.org/10.1017/S1049096504004196 
Hess, D. (2008). Controversial issues and democratic discourse. In L. L. Levstik & C. A. 
Tyson (Eds.), Handbook of research in social studies education. Hoboken: Routledge. 
Hess, D. (2009). Controversy in the classroom: The democratic power of discussion. New York: 
Routledge. 
Hess, D., & McAvoy, P. (in press). The political classroom: Evidence and ethics in democratic 
education. Routledge. 
Hill, B. V. (1994). Teaching secondary social studies in a multicultural society. Australia: 
Longman Cheshire. 
Hill, B. V. (2014). The schooling of ethics. Educationl Philosophy and Theory, 46(3), 296-
310. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00832.x 
Hinman, L. M. (2008). Ethics: A pluralistic approach to moral theory (4th ed.). USA: 
Thomson Wadsworth.  
Hinman, L. M. (2013). Ethics: A pluralistic approach to moral theory (5th ed.). USA: 
Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
Hirst, P. H., & Peters, R. S. (1970). The logic of education. London: Routledge & K. Paul.  
223 
Højbjerg, C. K. (2002). Religious reflexivity: Essays on attitudes to religious ideas and 
practice. Social Anthropology, 10(1), 1-10. doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8676.2002.tb00042.x 
Holland, R. (1999). Reflexivity. Human Relations, 52(4), 463-484. 
doi.org/10.1177/001872679905200403 
Holmes, M. (2010). The emotionalization of reflexivity. Sociology, 44(1), 139-154. 
doi.org/10.1177/0038038509351616 
Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277-1288. doi:10.1177/1049732305276687 
Hugman, R. (2003). Professional values and ethics in social work: Reconsidering 
postmodernism? British Journal of Social Work, 33(8), 1025-1041. doi: 
10.1093/bjsw/33.8.1025 
Hugman, R. (2005). New approaches in ethics for the caring professions. UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hunter, P. (2006). Framing a social sciences learning area in the New Zealand 
curriculum: Draft for consultation 2006. Teachers and Curriculum, 9, 19-26.  
Hunter, P. (2007). Comment: Social sciences in the New Zealand curriculum: A case of 
arrested developemnt? Mediating challenges ahead. Teachers and Curriculum, 10, 
47-50.  
Hunter, P., & Keown, P. (2001). The New Zealand social studies curriculum struggle 
1993-1997: An 'insider' analysis. Waikato Journal of Education, 7, 55-72.  
Hupcey, J. E., Penrod, J., Morse, J. M., & Mitcham, C. (2001). An exploration and 
advancement of the concept of trust. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 36(2), 282-293. 
doi:10.1046/j.1365-2648.2001.01970.x 
Illes, J., & Racine, E. (2005). Imaging or imagining? A neuroethics challenge informed 
by genetics. The American Journal of Bioethics, 5(2), 5-18. 
doi:10.1080/15265160590923358 
Institutue for Global Ethics. (2014). Global ethics. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalethics.org/ 
Irwin, M. (1999). A decade of curricular reform. New Zealand Journal of Education Studies, 
34(1), 156-166.  
Jackson, P., & Massey, D. (2005). Thinking geographically. Retrieved from 
http://www.geography.org.uk/aboutus/papersandresponses 
Janman, P. (Director). (2012). Tongan Ark [Documentary film]. New Zealand: Public 
Films. 
Jasanoff, S. (2002). New modernities: Reimaging science, technology and development. 
Environmental Values, 11, 253-276.  
Jensen, E. (2009, September). Almighty row over ethics class in schools, Sydney Morning 
Herald. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/national/almighty-row-over-
ethics-class-in-schools-20090925-g6a0.html 
Johnson, M. (1993). Moral imagination: Implications of cognitive science for ethics. London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, M. (2009). What cognitive science brings to ethics. In D. Ambrose & T. Cross 
(Eds.), Morality, ethics and gifted minds (pp. 147-150). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Joll, N. (2010). Contemporary metaphilosophy. Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved 
from http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/ 
Jones, P. (2006). Toleration, value-pluralism, and the fact of pluralism. Critial Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 9(2), 189-210. 
doi.org/10.1080/13698230600655016 
Kallio, K. P., & Häkli, J. (2011). Tracing children’s politics. Political Geography, 30(2), 99-
109. doi:org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.006 
Kant, I. (1952). General introduction to the metaphysic of morals. In R. M. Hutchins 
(ed.) Great books of the western world: Kant (pp. 385-394). Chicago: William Benton. 
224 
Katz, M. S., Noddings, N., & Strike, K. A. (Eds.). (1999). Justice and caring: The search for 
common ground in education. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Kaposy, C. (2009). Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change 
our ethical practices? Neuroethics, 2(1), 51-59. doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9020-
x 
Keller, D. R. (2010). An introduction to ethics for teaching. Teaching Ethics, 11(1), 1-54. 
DOI: 10.5840/tej20101111 
Kennedy, K. (Ed.). (1997). Citizenship education and the modern state. London: Falmer Press. 
Keown, P. (1998). Values and social action: Doing the hard bits. In P. Benson & R. 
Openshaw (Eds.), New horizons for New Zealand social studies (pp. 137-159). 
Palmerston North: ERDC Press. 
Keown, P. (1999). Some strategies for the development of the values exploration and 
social decision making processes. In Social Studies on Broadway: Proceedings of the 
1999 FSSA Conference, Palmerston North. Wellington: Federation of Social Studies 
Associations of New Zealand. 
Keown, P. (2001). Weak, indecisive and ineffectual? Towards a national dialogue in 
values education through social studies. DELTA, 53(1&2), 43-60.  
Keown, P. (2003). Values education and the curriculum. Hamilton, NZ: School of Education. 
University of Waikato. Unpublished Manuscript. 
Keown, P., McGee, C., & Sands, F. (1993). Values education and social studies: Research and 
development: Values in social studies project research monograph 1. Hamilton, New 
Zealand: University of Waikato. 
Keown, P., Parker, L., & Tiakiwai, S. (2005). Values in the New Zealand curriculum: A 
literature review on values in the curriculum. (Report for the Ministry of Education by 
the Wilf Malcom Institute of Educational Research). New Zealand: University 
of Waikato.  
Kicker, D. (2009). Wendell Bell and Oliver W. Markley: Two futurists' views of the 
preferable, the possible and the probable. Journal of Futures Studies, 13(3), 161-
178.  
Kidder, R. (1995). How good people make tough choices. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
King, D. S. (2006). Activists and emotional reflexivity: Toward Touraine’s subject as 
social movement. Sociology, 40(5), 873-891.  
Knight, S. (2010). NSW ethics course trial: Final report. Australia: University of South 
Australia. 
Knight, S., & Collins, C. (2010a). ETHIC: A procedure for ethical decision making within society 
and environment. Paper presented at the SEAA Biennial Conference with SASOSE 
Annual Conference: Learning for Life, Sustainability, Global Citizenship and 
Social Justice, Adelaide, Australia. 
Knight, S., & Collins, C. (2010b). Enlivening the curriculum: The power of 
philosophical inquiry. Theory and Research in Education, 8(3), 305-318. doi: 
10.1177/1477878510381630 
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on moral development (Vol. 1&2). San Fransisco: Harper & 
Row. 
Kuntz, A. M. (2010). Representing representation. International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Education, 23(4), 423-433. doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2010.492769 
LaFollette, H. (2000). Introduction The Blackwell guide to ethical theory (pp. 1-12). USA: 
Blackwell. 
Lambek, M. (Ed.). (2010). Ordinary ethics: Anthropology, language and action. USA: Fordham 
Univerity Press. 
Lambert, D., & Morgan, J. (2010). Teaching Geography 11-18: a conceptual approach. England: 
Open University Press . 
Lash, S. (2003). Reflexivity as non-linearity. Theory, Culture & Society, 20(2), 49-57. 
doi.org/10.1177/0263276403020002003 
225 
Lather, P. (2006). Paradigm proliferation as a good thing to think with: Teaching 
research in education as a wild profusion. International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Education, 19(1), 35-57. doi:10.1080/09518390500450144 
Lavazza, A., & De Caro, M. (2010). Not so fast. On some bold neuroscientific claims 
concerning human agency. Neuroethics, 3(1), 23-41. doi.org/10.1007/s12152-009-
9053-9 
Le Métais, J. (2002). New Zealand stocktake: An international critique: Contract research for the 
New Zealand Ministry of Education. UK: National Foundation for Educational 
Research. 
Lee, G., & Hill, D. (1996). Curriculum reform: Outlining the new or restating the 
familiar? DELTA, 48(1), 19-32.  
Lee, G., & Lee, H. (2007). Some reflections on the New Zealand curriculum. Teachers 
and Curriculum, 10(2007), 35-38.  
Lennon, K. (2014). Feminist perspectives on the body. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Fall, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/feminist-body/ 
Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S., & Auld, G. (2012). Overcoming the tragedy of 
super wicked problems: Constraining our future selves to ameliorate global 
climate change. Policy Sciences, 45(2), 123-152. doi:10.1007/s11077-012-9151-0 
Levinson, R. (2006). Towards a theoretical framework for teaching controversial socio‐
scientific Issues. International Journal of Science Education, 28(10), 1201-1224. 
doi:10.1080/09500690600560753 
Levy, N. (2007). Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st century. UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lister, R. (2003). Citizenship: feminist perspectives (2nd ed.). New York: New York 
University Press. 
Lister, R. (2007). Inclusive citizenship: Realizing the potential. Citizenship Studies, 11(1), 
49-61. doi:10.1080/13621020601099856 
Lockstone, R. H. (1963). The neglect of mind: Social studies in the primary school. 
Landfall, 17(1), 49-55.  
Lockstone, R. H. (1996). The end of history at the end of the world. New Zealand 
Education Review, 18(1), 8-15.  
Lockwood, A. L., & Harris, D. E. (1985). Reasoning with democratic values: Ethical problems in 
United States history (Vol. 1, pp. 1607-1876). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Longboat, C. (2010). Ethical space as an engagement strategy. In J. S. Te Rito, & S. M. 
Healy (Eds.) Proceedings of the 4th International Traditional Knowledge Conference: Kei Muri 
i te Kapara He Tangata Ke: Recognising, Engaging, Understanding Difference. Auckland, 
New Zealand: Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga. 
Longstaff, S. (2010). Almighty row over ethics in schools: Democracy and the welfare of children.  
Retrieved from http://stephenlaw.blogspot.co.nz/2010/04/almighty-row-over-
ethics-in-schools.html 
Luce-Kapler, R., Sumara, D., & Iftody, T. (2010). Teaching ethical know-how in new 
literary spaces. Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy, 53(7), 536-541. doi: 
10.1598/JAAL.53.7.1 
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems. USA: Stanford University Press. 
Luke, A. (2005). Nothing objectionable or controversial: The image of Maori ethnicity 
and 'difference' in New Zealand social studies. In Y. Nozaki, R. Openshaw, & 
A. Luke, Struggles over difference: Curriculum, texts, and pedagogy in the Asia-Pacific. 
(Eds.) (pp, 25-40) Albany: State University of New York Press. 
226 
Lynch, M. (2000). Against reflexivity as an academic virtue and source of privileged 
knowledge. Theory, Culture & Society, 17(3), 26-54. 
doi.org/10.1177/02632760022051202 
Lynch, S. (2009). The fact of diversity and reasonable pluralism. Journal of Moral 
Philosophy, 6(1), 70-93. doi:doi:10.1163/174552409X365937 
Macbeth, D. (2001). On “reflexivity” in qualitative research: Two readings, and a third. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 7(1), 35-68. doi.org/10.1177/107780040100700103 
MacDonald, M. N., & O’Regan, J. P. (2013). The ethics of intercultural communication. 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 45(10), 1005-1017. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
5812.2011.00833.x 
MacIntyre, A. (1996). A short history of ethics: A historical moral philosophy from the Homeeric 
age to the twentieth century. New York: Touchstone. 
Mackie, J. L. (1979). Ethics: Inventing write and wrong. UK: Penguin Books. 
Mansfield, N. (2000). Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway. Australia: Allen 
& Unwin. 
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2014). Concepts. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy Spring 
2014. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/ 
Mason, E. (2014). Value pluralism. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism/ 
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1998). The tree of knowledge: The bological roots of human 
understanding. (Rev. ed.). Boston, USA: Shambala. 
May, S. (1992). Taha what? Social studies and multicultural education: An holistic 
alternative. In R. Openshaw & E. Archer (Eds.), New Zealand Social Studies: Past, 
present, and future (pp. 122-136). Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.  
McAfee, N. (2014). Feminist political philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Spring 2014. Retrieved from  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/feminism-political/  
McGee, C. (1995). Ideological influences on curriculum and teachers. Waikato Journal of 
Education, 1, 29-44.  
McGee, C. (2004). Commentary: Curriculum revision critique: A response to Clark. 
Teachers and Curriculum, 7, 81-83.  
McGee, C., Jones, A., Cowie, B., Hill, M., Miller, T., Harlow, A., & MacKenzie, K. 
(2003). Teachers' experiences in curriculum implementation: English, languages, science and 
social studies: National School Sampling Study. Hamilton, NZ: University of Waikato. 
McGee, J. (1998). Curriculum in conflict: Historical development of citizenship 
education in social studies. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), New horizons for 
New Zealand social studies (pp. 43-62). Palmerston North: ERDC Press, Massey 
University. 
McGee, J. (2001). Changing attitudes towards curriculum development: 1900-1940. 
DELTA, 53(1&2), 7-24.  
McGeorge, C. (1992). The moral curriculum: Forming the Kiwi character. In G. 
McCulloch (Ed.), The school currculum in New Zealand: History, theory, policy and 
practice (pp. 40-56). Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press. 
McGeorge, C. (2000). More than talk this time? Values education in a new millennium. 
DELTA, 52(1), 57-68.  
McLaughlin, T. H. (1992). Citizenship, diversity and education: A philosophical 
perspective. Journal of Moral Education, 21(3). Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305724920210307?journa
lCode=cjme20 
Meyer, J., & Land, R. (2003). Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge: Linkages to ways of 
thinking and practising within the disciplines: UK: University of Edinburgh. 
227 
Meyer, J., & Land, R. (2005). Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge (2): 
Epistemological considerations and a conceptual framework for teaching and 
learning. Higher Education, 49(3), 373-388. doi.org/10.1007/s10734-004-6779-5 
Meyer, J., & Land, R. (2006). Overcoming barriers to student understanding: Threshold concepts 
and troublesome knowledge. UK: Routledge. 
Milligan, A. (2006). Representing the social world: New Zealand's social studies curriculum 
(Masters of Education). Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.   
Milligan, A., & Beals, F. (2004). Inserting the question marks: The impact of 
postmodernism on teaching and learning in social studies. The New Zealand 
Journal of Social Studies, 12(1), 16-23.  
Milligan, A., Taylor, M., & Wood, B. E. (2011). Teachers' conceptions of citizenship in 
New Zealand social studies education. Citizenship Teaching and Learning, 6(3), 287-
301. doi:10.1386/ctl.6.3.287_1 
Milligan, A., & Wood, B. (2010). Conceptual understandings as transition points: 
making sense of a complex social world. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 42(4), 487-
501. doi:10.1080/00220270903494287 
Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Minister of Education. (1988). Tomorrow’s schools: The reform of education administration in 
New Zealand. Wellington: Government Printer. 
Ministry of Education. (1961). Syllabuses for schools: Social studies in the primary school. 
Wellington, NZ: Author. 
Ministry of Education. (1991). Social studies forms 3 and 4: A handbook for teachers. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (1993). The New Zealand curriculum framework. Wellington, NZ: 
Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (1994). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum: Draft. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (1996). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum: Revised draft. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (1997). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum. Wellington, NZ: 
Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (1998). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum: Getting started. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2004). The New Zealand curriculum exemplars: Social studies. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2005a). Setting the direction for learning: The New Zealand curriculum 
marautanga project. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2005b). Values in the New Zealand curriculum: Background, rationale 
and recommendations. Retrieved from 
http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/Archives/Curriculum-project-archives 
Ministry of Education. (2006a). Draft Social Sciences Essence Statement. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.tki.org.nz/r/nzcurriculum/whats_happening/social_science_e.php 
Ministry of Education. (2006b). The New Zealand curriculum: Draft for consultation 2006. 
Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2007). The New Zealand curriculum. Wellington, NZ: Learning 
Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2008a). Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: 
Approaches to social inquiry. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2008b). Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: 
Belonging and participating in society. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
228 
Ministry of Education. (2009a). Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: 
Approaches to building conceptual understandings. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Retrieved from http://ssol.tki.org.nz/ 
Ministry of Education. (2009b). Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Being 
part of global communities. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2012). Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences: Taking 
part in economic communities. Wellington, NZ: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education. (2014a). The Māori education strategy: Ka hikitia - accelerating success 
2013-2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.minedu.govt.nz/theMinistry/PolicyandStrategy/KaHikitia.aspx 
Ministry of Education. (2014b). New Zealand curriculum guides senior secondary: Philosophy.  
Retrieved from http://seniorsecondary.tki.org.nz/Social-sciences/Philosophy 
Ministry of Education. (2014c). New Zealand curriculum guides senior secondary: Social sciences.  
Retrieved from http://seniorsecondary.tki.org.nz/Social-sciences 
Ministry of Education. (2014d). New Zealand curriculum guides senior secondary: Senior social 
studies.  Retrieved from http://seniorsecondary.tki.org.nz/Social-
sciences/Senior-social-studies 
Ministry of Education. (2014e). Points of view, values, and perspectives in senior social 
studies. New Zealand curriculum guides: Senior secondary. Retrieved from 
http://seniorsecondary.tki.org.nz/Social-sciences/Senior-social-
studies/Pedagogy/Social-inquiry/Points-of-view 
Ministry of Education. (2014f). Using a social inquiry approach in geography. New 
Zealand curriculum guides: Senior secondary. Retrieved from 
http://seniorsecondary.tki.org.nz/Social-
sciences/Geography/Pedagogy/Social-inquiry#exploring 
Mitchell, K., & Parker, W. C. (2008). I pledge allegiance to...Flexible citizenship and 
shifting scales of belonging. Teachers College Record, 110(4), 775-804.  
Moll, J., De Oliveira-Souza, R., & Zahn, R. (2008). The neural basis of moral cognition. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 161-180. 
doi:10.1196/annals.1440.005 
Moore, H. L. (2011). Still life: Hopes, desires and satisfactions. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Moore, T. (2011). Critical thinking: Seven definitions in search of a concept. Studies in 
Higher Education, 38(4), 506-522. doi:10.1080/03075079.2011.586995 
Mouffe, C. (2000). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Political Science Series. 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Retrieved from 
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf 
Mouffe, C. (2009). Democracy in a multipolar world. Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 37(3), 549-561. doi:10.1177/0305829809103232 
Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistics: Thinking the world politically. London: Verso. 
Mullen, A. (2004). "Some sort of revolution": Reforming the social studies curriculum, 
1957-1972. In C. Woyshner, J. Wattras & M. S. Crocco (Eds.). Social education in 
the twentieth century: Curriculum and context for citizenship (pp. 110-126). New York: 
Peter Lang. 
Mulnix, J. W. (2012). Thinking critically about critical thinking. Educational Philosophy and 
Theory, 44(5), 464-479. doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2010.00673.x 
Munby, H. (1989). Reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. Education and Culture, 
9(1), 31-41.  
Munshi, D., Broadfoot, K. J., & Smith, L. T. (2011). Decolonizing communication 
ethics: A framework for communicating. In G. Cheney, S. May & D. Munshi 
(Eds.), The Handbook of communication ethics (pp. 119-133). New York; UK: 
Routledge. 
229 
Mutch, C. (1998). The long and winding road: The development of the new social studies curriculum 
in New Zealand. Paper presented at the New Zealand Educational Administration 
Society Biennial Conference Wellington, New Zealand.  
Mutch, C. (2000). Values education in New Zealand: Old ideas in new garb. Children's 
Social and Economics Education, 4(1), 1-10. doi.org/10.2304/csee.2000.4.1.1 
Mutch, C. (2005a). Confident, informed and responsible citizens: By what means? In P. 
Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Towards effective social studies (pp. 69-84). 
Palmerston North, NZ: Kanuka Grove Press. 
Mutch, C. (2005b). Developing global citizens: The rhetoric and the reality in the New 
Zealand curriculum. In C. White & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Democracy at the 
crossroads: International perspectives on critical global citizenship education (pp. 187-209). 
Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Mutch, C. (2011). Citizenship education in New Zealand: We know 'what works' but to 
what extent is it working? Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 10(2 & 3), 
182-198. doi.org/10.2304/csee.2011.10.2.182 
Mutch, C., Hunter, P., Milligan, A., Openshaw, R., & Siteine, A. (2009). Understanding the 
social sciences as a learning area: A position paper. Prepared for the Ministry of 
Education. Retrieved September 9, 2010 from: 
http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/Media/Files/UV-files/Understanding-the-
social-sciences-as-a-learning-area-A-position-paper-February-2008 
Neiman, S. (2004). Evil in modern thought: An alternative history of philosophy. New Jersey, 
USA: Princeton University Press. 
Nelson, J. (1996). The historical imperative for issues-centred education. In R. W. Evans 
& D. W. Saxe (Eds.), Handbook on teaching social issues: NCSS bulletin 93 (pp. 14-
24). Washington, DC: National Council for the Social Studies. 
New Zealand Teachers Council. (2004). Code of ethics for registered teachers.  Retrieved from 
http://www.teacherscouncil.govt.nz/content/code-ethics-registered-teachers-1 
Newseum. (2014). The Bancroft family ethics center. Retrieved from 
http://www.newseum.org/exhibits-and-theaters/permanent-exhibits/ethics-
center/index.html 
Newton, K., & Francis, C. (2009). School letter stoush: Michael Laws invited to Otaki. 
Retrieved from http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/2828828/School-
letter-stoush-Michael-Laws-invited-to-Otaki 
Neyland, J. (2004). An ethical critique of the paradigm case: The mathematics 
curriculum. In A. O'Neill, J. Clark & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Reshaping culture, 
knowledge and learning? Policy and content in The New Zealand Curriulum Framework 
(pp. 143-160). Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press. 
Neyland, J. (2005). Towards an ethically oriented curriculum: Resisting the growth of 
instrumentalism. Curriculum Matters, 1, 109-129.  
Neyland, J. (2010). Rediscovering the spirit of education after scientific managament. Rotterdam: 
Sense. 
Noddings, N. (1994). Conversation as moral education. Journal of Moral Education, 23(2), 
107-118. doi: 10.1080/0305724940230201 
Noddings, N. (2007). Philosophy of education (2nd ed.). USA: Westview Press. 
Notman, R. (2012). Integrating values in the New Zealand curriculum (2007): Four 
years on. Set, 3, 41-49.  
Notman, R., Latham, D., Angus, H., Connor, P., McGregor, K., & Scott, J. (2012). 
Integrating values in the New Zealand curriculum: Caught or taught? New Zealand: 
Teaching and Learning Research Initiative. 
 
 
230 
Novak, J. D., & Cañas, A. J. (2014).  The theory underlying concept maps and how to construct 
and use them: Technical report, 2008. Institute for Human and Machine Cognition. 
Retrieved from 
http://cmap.ihmc.us/publications/researchpapers/theorycmaps/theoryunderlyi
ngconceptmaps.htm 
O'Loughlin, M. (2006). Embodiment and education: Exploring creatural existence (Vol. 15). The 
Netherlands: Springer. 
O'Neill, A., Clark, J., & Openshaw, R. (2004). Reshaping culture, knowledge and learning? 
Policy and content in the New Zealand curriculum framework. Palmerston North, NZ: 
Dunmore Press. 
O'Neill, O. (1993). Kantian ethics. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics: Blackwell 
companions to philosophy (pp. 175-185). USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Ochoa-Becker, A. S. (2007). Democratic education for social studies: An issues-centred decision 
making curriculum. USA: Information Age. 
Oddie, G. (2009). Values educaton. In H. Siegel (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of 
education. (pp. 260-277) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Oliver, D., & Shaver, J. P. (1986). Teaching public issues in the high school. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Openshaw, R. (1995). Unresolved struggle: Consensus and conflict in New Zealand state post-
primary education. Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press. 
Openshaw, R. (1998). Citizen who? The debate over economic and political correctness 
in the social studies curriculum. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), New 
horizons for New Zealand social studies (pp. 19-42). Palmerston North: ERDC Press, 
Massey University. 
Openshaw, R. (2000). Culture wars in the Antipodes: The social studies curriculum 
controversy in New Zealand. Theory and Research in Social Education, 28(1), 65-84. 
doi.org/10.1080/00933104.2000.10505897 
Openshaw, R. (2004). Able to take their part? Social studies and the curriculum 
framework. In A. O'Neill, J. Clark & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Reshaping culture, 
knowledge and learning: Policy and content in the New Zealand curriculum framework (pp. 
245-264). Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 
Openshaw, R., Adams, P., & Hamer, J. (2005). Education and society in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Southbank, Vic: Thomson. 
Openshaw, R., & Archer, E. (1992). The battle for social studies in the New Zealand 
secondary school: 1942-1964. In R. Openshaw (Ed.), New Zealand social studies: 
Past, present and future (pp. 49-64). Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 
Openshaw, R., & White, C. (2005). Democracy at the crossroads? In C. White & R. 
Openshaw (Eds.), Democracy at the crossroads: International perspectives on critical global 
citizenship education (pp. 3-12). USA: Lexington Books. 
Osler, A., & Starkey, H. (2005). Changing citizenship: Democracy and inclusion in education. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Oulton, C., Day, V., Dillon, J., & Grace, M. (2004). Controversial issues: Teachers' 
attitudes and practices in the context of citizenship education. Oxford Review of 
Education, 30(4), 489-507. doi:10.1080/0305498042000303973 
Paley, J. (1996). How not to clarify concepts in nursing. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24(3), 
572-576. doi:10.1046/j.1365-2648.1996.22618.x 
Palmer, P. J. (1998). The courage to teach: Exploring the inner landscape of a teachers' 
life. USA: Jossey-Bass. 
Parker, W. C. (2006). Public discourses in schools: Purposes, problems, possibilities. 
Educational Researcher, 35(8), 11-18. doi: 10.3102/0013189x035008011 
Partington, G. (1998). Social studies in the New Zealand curriculum. In P. Benson & R. 
Openshaw (Eds.), New horizons for New Zealand social studies (pp. 83-102). 
Palmerston North, NZ: ERDC Press, Massey University. 
231 
Patrick, J. J., Vontz, T. S., & Nixon, W. A. (2002). Issues-centred education for 
democracy through Project Citizen. In W. C. Parker (Ed.), Education for democracy: 
Contexts, curricula and assessments (pp. 93-112). USA: Information Age. 
Patterson, J. (1992). Exploring Maori values. Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press  
Patterson, J. (1994). Maori environmental virtues. Environmental Ethics, 16(4), 397-409.  
Rabinow, P. (Ed.). (1984). The Foucault reader. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Pass, S. (2007). Exploring teaching ethics in social studies. International Journal of Social 
Education, 21(2), 62-78. 
Pass, S., & Willingham, W. (2009). Teaching ethics to high school students. The Social 
Studies, 100(1), 23-30. doi: 10.3200/TSSS.100.1.23-30 
Paul, R. (2012). Teaching critical thinking in the strong sense: A focus on self-deception, 
world views, and a dialectical mode of analysis. Critical thinking: What every person 
needs to survive in a rapidly changing world (pp. 465-474). California, USA: 
Foundation for Critical Thinking. 
Paul, R. (2014). Critical thinking movement: 3 waves. Retrieved from 
https://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/critical-thinking-movement-3-
waves/856 
Payne, P. G. (2010). Moral spaces, the struggle for an intergenerational environmental 
ethics and the social ecology of families: An ‘other’ form of environmental 
education. Environmental Education Research, 16(2), 209-231. 
doi:10.1080/13504620903580545 
Peterson, A. L. (2009). Everyday ethics and social change: The education of desire. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Pfaff, D. W., Kavaliers, M., & Choleris, E. (2008). Mechanisms underlying an ability to 
behave ethically. The American Journal of Bioethics, 8(5), 10-19. 
doi.org/10.1080/15265160802179994 
Pence, G. (1993). Virtue theory. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics: Blackwell 
companions to philosophy (pp. 249-258). USA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Picken, A., & Milligan, A. (2013). The challenges of assessment in secondary social 
studies: Exploring the potential of learning stories. New Zealand Journal of 
Education Studies, 48(2), 112-129.  
Pike, G., & Selby, D. (1988). Global teacher, global learner: London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Pinar, W. F., Reynolds, W. M., Slattery, P., & Taubman, P. M. (Eds.). (1995). 
Understanding curriculum: An introduction to the study of historical and contemporary 
curriculum discourses. New York: Peter Lang. 
Poole, R. (1972). Towards deep subjectivity. USA: Harper Torchbooks. 
Popke, E. J. (2003). Poststructuralist ethics: Subjectivity, responsibility and the space of 
community. Progress in Human Geography, 27(3), 298-316. doi: 
10.1191/0309132503ph429oa 
Popke, J. (2010). The spaces of being in common: Ethics and social geography. In S. 
Smith, R. Pain, S. Marston & J. P. Jones (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of social 
geographies (pp. 435-454). London: Sage. 
Porter, E. (1999). Feminist perspectives on ethics. New York: Pearson Education. 
Preston, N. (2007). Understanding ethics (3rd ed.). Australia: The Federation Press. 
Pring, R. (2007). John Dewey: A philsopher of education for our time? London: Continuum. 
Pring, R. (2008). Philosophy in schools. London: Continuum Books. 
Prinz, J. J. (2011). The emotional construction of morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Oxford. 
Pritchard, M. (2014). Philosophy for children. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 
2014. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/children/ 
232 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. (1998). Education for citizenship and the teaching of 
democracy in schools: Final report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship (the Crick Report). 
London: Author. 
Quality Public Education Coalition. (2000). Values in schools. Palmerston North, NZ: 
Kanuka Grove Press. 
Radder, H. (1997). Philosophy and history of science: Beyond the Kuhnian paradigm. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 28(4), 633-655. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0039-3681(97)00015-0 
Rasmusson, A. (2009). Neuroethics as a brain-based philosophy of life: The case of 
Michael S. Gazzaniga. Neuroethics, 2(1), 3-11. doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9024-
6 
Raths, L., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. (1978). Values and teaching: Working with values in the 
classroom (2nd ed.). Columbus, Ohio: Merrill. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Reiss, M. J. (1999). Teaching ethics in science. Studies in Science Education, 34(1), 115-140. 
doi: 10.1080/03057269908560151 
Reiss, M. J. (2010). Ethical thinking. In A. Jones, A. McKim & M. Reiss (Eds.), Ethics in 
the science and technology classroom: A new approach to teaching and learning (pp. 7-17). The 
Netherlands: Sense. 
Reynolds, R. (2009). Teaching studies of society and the environment. Australia: Oxford 
University Press. 
Risjord, M. (2009). Rethinking concept analysis. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 65(3), 684-
691. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2008.04903.x 
Ritzer, G. (2005). The Sage encyclopedia of social theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Rohloff, A. (2011). Shifting the focus? Moral panics as civilizing and decivilizing 
processes. In S. P. Hier (Ed.), Moral panic and the politics of anxiety (pp. 71-85). 
London: Routledge. 
Rohloff, A., & Wright, S. (2010). Moral panic and social theory: Beyond the heuristic. 
Current Sociology, 58(3), 403-419. doi:10.1177/0011392110364039 
Rorty, A. (2005). Morality as an educational institution. In J. M. Halstead & T. H. 
McLauchlin (Eds.), Education in morality (pp. 7-22). Hoboken: Taylor & 
Francis. Retrieved from 
http://VUW.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=235163.  
Rorty, A. (2012). The use and abuse of morality. Journal of Ethics, 16, 1-13. 
doi.org/10.1007/s10892-011-9116-0 
Rorty, R. (1976). Overcoming the tradition: Heidegger and Dewey. The Review of 
Metaphysics, 30(2), 280-305. doi: 10.2307/20126921 
Ross, E. W. (1985). The evolution of the relationship between reflective inquiry and social studies 
education: Implications for the future. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
National Council for the Social Studies, Chicago, Illinois.  
Ross, E. W. (2006). The social studies curriculum: Purposes, problems, and possibilities (3rd ed.). 
USA: State University of New York. 
Ryan, B., & Buntting, C. (2012). Integrating ethics into primary science programmes. Set: 
Research Information for Teachers, 1, 17-25.  
Ryan, G. W., & Bernard, H. R. (2000). Data management and analysis methods. In N. 
K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed., 
pp. 769-802). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Sandywell, B. (2013). Reflexivity and the crisis of western reason: Logological investigations (Vol. 
1). London: Routledge. 
Sanger, M., & Osguthorpe, R. (2005). Making sense of approaches to moral education. 
Journal of Moral Education, 34(1), 57-71. doi:10.1080/03057240500049323 
Santa Clara University. (2014). Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. Retrieved from 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/ 
233 
Saunders, K., & Rennie, L. (2013). A pedagogical model for ethical inquiry into 
socioscientific issues in science. Research in Science Education, 43(1), 253-274. 
doi:10.1007/s11165-011-9248-z 
Saxe, D. W. (1992). Framing a theory for social studies foundations. Review of Educational 
Research, 62(3), 259-277. doi: 10.2307/1170739 
Samu, T. W. (2009). The location and dislocation of Pacific knowledge and experience in 
New Zealand social studies (1997-2007). Curriculum Matters 5: 2009. 
Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. USA: Basic 
Books. 
Schön, D. A. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner: San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Schön, D. A. (1992). The theory of inquiry: Dewey's legacy to education. Curriculum 
Inquiry, 22(2), 119-139. doi.org/10.2307/1180029 
Schroeder, M. (2014). Value theory. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2012. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-
theory/ 
Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., Losito, B., & (2010). ICCS 2009: Civic 
knowledge, attitudes, and engagement among lower secondary school students in 38 countries. 
Amsterdam: IEA. 
Schutt, R. (2001). Inciting democracy: A practical proposal for creating a good society. USA: 
SpringForward Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.vernalproject.org/IcD/contents/IcDDownload.html 
Scott, D., & Lawson, H. (Eds.). (2002). Citizenship education and the curriculum. USA: Alex. 
Segall, A. (2004). Social studies and the discourses of postmodernity.  In C. Woyshner, J. 
Wattras & M. S. Crocco (Eds.). Social education in the twentieth century: Curriculum 
and context for citizenship (pp. 160-175). New York: Peter Lang. 
Segall, A. (2013). Revitalizing critical discourses in social education: Opportunities for a 
more complexified (un)knowing. Theory & Research in Social Education, 41(4), 476-
493. doi:10.1080/00933104.2013.836382 
Segall, A., Heilman, E. E., & Cherryholmes, C. H. (Eds.). (2006). Social studies - the next 
generation: Re-searching in the postmodern. New York: Peter Lang. 
Sewell, A. (2009). Evoking children’s spirituality in the reciprocal relationships of a 
learning community. International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 14(1), 5-16. 
Siegel, H. (2003). Cultivating reason. In R. Curren (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of 
education (pp. 305-319). USA: Blackwell. 
Seixas, P. C., Morton, T., Colyer, J., & Fornazzari, S. (2013). The big six: Historical thinking 
concepts. Toronto: Nelson Education. 
Shaver, J. P. (1992). Rationales for issues-centred social studies education. Social Studies, 
83(3), 95-100.  
Shuker, R. (1992). Social studies as curriculum history. In R. Openshaw (Ed.), New 
Zealand social studies: Past, present and future (pp. 34-48). Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press. 
Simon, J. (1992). Social studies: The cultivation of amnesia? In G. McCulloch (Ed.), The 
school currculum in New Zealand: History, theory, policy and practice (pp. 253-271). 
Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press. 
Simon, K. (2001). Moral questions in the classroom: How to get kids thinking deeply about real life 
and their schoolwork. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press. 
Sinacore, A. L., Blaisure, K. R., Justin, M., Healy, P., & Brawer, S. (1999). Promoting 
reflexivity in the classroom. Teaching of Psychology, 26(4), 267-270. 
doi.org/10.1207/S15328023TOP260405 
Singer, P. (1993). A companion to ethics: Blackwell companions to philosophy. USA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Singer, P. (1994). Ethics. UK: Oxford University Press. 
234 
Singer, P. (2014). Ethics. Encyclopaedia Britannica online. Retrieved from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/194023/ethics  
Sinnema, C. (2011). Monitoring and evaluating curriculum implementation: Final evaluation report 
to the Ministry of Education on the implementation of the New Zealand curriculum 2008-
2009. New Zealand: University of Auckland. 
Sinnema, C., & Aitken, G. (2012). Effective pedagogy in social sciences. Belley International 
Academy of Education, International Bureau of Education. Retrieved from 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Educational_
Practices/EdPractices_23.pdf 
Siteine, A. (2013). 'Positive in their own identities?': Social studies and identity 
affirmation. New Zealand Journal of Education Studies, 48(2), 99-111.  
Skelton, T. (2010). Taking young people as political actors seriously: Opening the 
borders of political geography. Area, 42(2), 145-151. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
4762.2009.00891.x 
Slattery, P., & Rapp, D. (2003). Ethics and the foundations of education: Teaching convictions in a 
postmodern world. USA: Pearson Education. 
Smith, D. M. (2001). Progress reports, geography and ethics: Progress, or more of the 
same? Progress in Human Geography, 25(2), 261-268. 
doi.org/10.1191/030913201678580511 
Smith, R. (2005). Does reflexivity separate the human sciences from the natural 
sciences? History of the Human Sciences, 18(4), 1-25. 
doi.org/10.1177/0952695105058468 
Snook, I., & McGeorge, C. (1978). More than talk: Moral education in New Zealand. 
Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Education. 
Snook, I. (2000). The ethics and politics of values education. Delta, 52(1), 45-56. 
Snook, I. (2007). The timid curriculum. Teachers and Curriculum, 10(2007), 39-42.  
Somerville, M. (2006). The ethical imagination: Journeys of the human spirit. Toronto, Canada: 
Anansi Press. 
Splitter, L. J., & Sharp, A. M. (1995). Teaching better thinking: The classroom community of 
inquiry. Melbourne, Australia: The Australian Council for Educational Research. 
Sprod, T. (2002). Philosophical discussion in moral education: The community of 
ethical inquiry. London: Routledge. 
St James Ethics Centre. (2014). Our work. Retrieved from 
http://www.ethics.org.au/our-work/ethi-call 
Standish, P. (2003). The nature and purposes of education. In R. Curren (Ed.), A 
companion to the philosophy of education (pp. 221-231). USA: Blackwell. 
Standish, P. (2009). Global perspectives in the geography curriculum: Reviewing the moral case for 
geography. UK: Routledge. 
Starratt, R. J. (1994). Building an ethical school: A practical response to the moral crisis in schools. 
London: Falmer Press. 
Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical Assessment, Research and 
Evaluation, 7(17). Retrieved from http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17 
Stenhouse, L. (1968). The humanities curriculum project. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 
1(1), 26-33. doi:10.1080/0022027680010103 
Stenhouse, L. (1971). The humanities curriculum project: The rationale. Theory Into 
Practice, 10(3), 154-162. doi.org/10.1080/00405847109542322 
Sterba, J. P. (2001). Three challenges to ethics: Environmentalism, feminsim, and multiculturalism. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stern, B. S. (2010). The new social studies: People, projects and perspectives. USA: Information 
Age. 
Stocker, M., & Hegeman, E. (1996). Valuing emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
235 
Stoller, S. (2009). Phenomenology and the poststructural critique of experience. 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(5), 707-737. 
doi:10.1080/09672550903301762 
Stone, R. C. J. (1963). Human solutions are not enough. NZPPTA Journal, X(6), 27-29.  
Stradling, R. (1984). The teaching of controversial issues: An evaluation. Educational 
Review, 36(2), 121-129. doi: 10.1080/0013191840360202 
Strong, T. (2005). Constructivist ethics? Let's talk about them: An introduction to the 
special issue on ethics and constructivist psychology. Journal of Constructivist 
Psychology, 18(2), 89-102. doi:10.1080/10720530590914752 
Sullivan, K. (2002). Unreal tournament: The battle over the New Zealand social studies 
curriculum. New Zealand Annual Review of Education, 2001(11), 179-198.  
Swoyer, C. (2014). Relativism. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2014. Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/relativism/ 
Syms, C. (2011). Enhancing the effectiveness of religion and values education within ISNZ schools: 
Rationale, purpose and practice.  Heads of Independent Schools Scholarship Trust 
Research Project. Retrieved from 
2010/201http://www.isnz.org.nz/sites/default/files/SymsCatherineReport.pdf 
Taba, H., Durkin, M. C., Fraenkel, J. R., & McNaughton, A. H. (1971). A teacher's 
handbook to elementary social studies: An inductive approach (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Taylor, M. (2012). Social science teachers' critical engagement with best evidence synthesis research 
(Master's thesis). Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
Taylor, M. (2013). Social sciences teachers' utilisation of best evidence synthesis 
research. New Zealand Journal of Education Studies, 48(2), 34-50.  
Taylor, R. M., & Atkins, R. A. (2005). Putting the 'values' back into the values 
exploration process. In P. Benson & R. Openshaw (Eds.), Towards effective social 
studies (pp. 131-146). Palmerston North, NZ: Kanuka Grove Press, Massey 
University. 
Television New Zealand. (2009). Cadbury bows to pressure over palm oil. Retrieved from 
http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/cadbury-bows-pressure-over-palm-oil-
2921239 
Thiroux, J. P., & Krasemann, K. W. (2009). Ethics: Theory and practice (10th ed.). New 
Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall. 
Thomas, S. (1994). Artifactual study in the analysis of culture: A defense of content 
analysis in a postmodern age. Communication Research, 21(6), 683-697. 
doi:10.1177/009365094021006002 
Thrupp, M. & White, M. (2013). Research, analysis and insight into national standards 
(RAINS) project final report: National standards and the damage done. Report 
commissioned by the New Zealand Educational Institute Te Rui Roa (NZEI). 
Hamilton, New Zealand: Wilf Malcom Institute of Educational Research. 
http://www.waikato.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/179407/RAINS-Final-
report_2013-11-22.pdf 
Todd, S. (2003). Learning from the other: Levinas, psychoanalysis, and ethical possibilities in 
education. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Tolliver, D., & Tisdell, E. (2006). Engaging spirituality in the transformative higher 
education classroom. New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 109, 37-47. 
DOI: 10.1002/ace.206 
Tong, R., & Williams, N. (2014). Feminist ethics. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. 
Spring 2014. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/feminism-ethics 
Tweedie, R. (2013). Philosophy manifesto.  Retrieved from http://nzapt.net/?page_id=246 
236 
UNESCO. (2009). Teaching philosophy in Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved from 
http://www.unescobkk.org/resources/e-library/publications/article/teaching-
philosophy-in-asia-and-the-pacific/ 
University of San Diego. (2010). Moral orientations survey. Retrieved February 5, 2010 
from 
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/ActiveWebSurvey/General/MoralOrientations.asp 
University of San Diego. (2014a). Basic moral orientations. Retrieved from 
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/presentations/Theory/BasicOrientations/index.asp 
University of San Diego. (2014b). Brief overview. Retrieved 
fromhttp://ethics.sandiego.edu/presentations/Theory/Brief_Overview/ 
Vanderbeeken, R. (2011). A plea for agonism between analytic and continental 
philosophy. Open Journal of Philosophy, 1, 16-21. doi:10.4236/ojpp.2011.11003. 
Vardy, P. (2002). Becoming fully human: A five strand approach to religious and values education. 
Paper presented at 2002 DAN conference. Retrieved from 
http://www.dialogueaustralasia.org/?page_id=23 
Vardy, P., & Vardy, C.  (2012). Ethics matters. London: SCM Press. 
Varela, F. J. (1999). Ethical know-how: Action, wisdom and cognition. USA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1993). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and 
human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Verducci, S. (2009). Education, democarcy and the moral life: Where opposites collide. 
In M. S. Katz, S. Verducci & G. Biesta (Eds.), Education, deocracy and the moral life 
(pp. 1-8). USA: Springer. 
Vosniadou, S. (2010). International handbook of research on conceptual change: New York: 
Routledge. 
Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). Epistemic reflexivity. In P. Bourdieu & L. J. D. Wacquant 
(Eds.), An invitation to reflexive sociology (pp. 36-46). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Warner, K. D., & De Cosse, D. (2014). A short course in environmental ethics lesson one: An 
autobiography of your relationship with the earth. May 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/environmental_ethics/lesson
1.html 
Weber, B. (2011). Childhood, philosophy and play: Friedrich Schiller and the interface 
between reason, passion and sensation. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45(2), 235-
250. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00804.x 
Weiskrantz, L. (2009). Blindsight: A case study spanning 35 years and new developments. UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Wellington, J. J. (Ed.). (1986). Controversial issues in the classroom. Oxford, England: Basil 
Blackwell. 
White, J. (2012). Philosophy in primary schools? Journal of Philosophy of Education, 46(3), 
449-460. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2012.00860.x 
White, M. D., & Marsh, E. E. (2006). Content analysis: A flexible methodology. Library 
Trends, 55(1), 22-45. doi:10.1353/lib.2006.0053 
Whitehead, A. N. (1929). The aims of education and other essays. New York: The Macmillan 
company. 
Williams, B. (2011). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Willmott, H. (2008). For informed pluralism, broad relevance and critical reflexivity. In 
D. Barry & H. Hansen, (Eds.). The Sage handbook of new approaches in management 
and organization, (pp. 82-83). London: Sage. 
Wilson, R. A., & Foglia, L. (2014). Embodied cognition. Fall 2011. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/embodied-cognition/  
Wood, B. E. (2005). Beacon schools for senior programmes in social studies: Final 
report (unpublished). Wellington: Minsitry of Education. 
237 
Wood, B. E. (2007). Conflict, controversy, and complexity: Avoiding the ‘slippery stuff’ 
in social studies. Critical Literacy: Theories and Practices, 1(2), 42-49.  
Wood, B. E. (2012). Crafted within liminal spaces: Young people's everyday politics. 
Political Geography, 31(6), 337-346. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.05.003 
Wood, B. E., Taylor, R. M., & Atkins, R. A. (2013). Fostering active citizenship through 
the New Zealand social studies curriculum: Teachers' perceptions and practices 
of social action. New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 48(2), 84-98.  
Worley, P. (2011). The if machine: Philosophical enquiry in the classroom. London: Continuum. 
Wright, T. (2003). Phenomenology and the moral imagination. Logos: A Journal of Catholic 
Thought and Culture, 6(4), 104-121. doi.org/10.1353/log.2003.0049 
Wringe, C. (2006). Moral education: Beyond the teaching of right and wrong. The Netherlands: 
Springer. 
Young, I. M. (1990. Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Young, I. M. (1997). Intersecting voices: Dilemmas of gender, political philosophy, and policy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and democracy. Oxford political theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Young, M. (2008). Bringing knowledge back in: From social constructivism to social realsim in the 
sociology of education. London: Routledge. 
Young, M. (2013). Overcoming the crisis in curriculum theory: A knowledge-based 
approach. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 45(2), 101-118. 
doi:10.1080/00220272.2013.764505 
Young, M., & Muller, J. (2010). Three educational scenarios for the future: Lessons 
from the sociology of knowledge. European Journal of Education, 45(1), 11-27. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3435.2009.01413.x 
Young, M., & Muller, J. (2013). On the powers of powerful knowledge. Review of 
Education, 1(3), 229-250. doi:10.1002/rev3.3017 
Zevin, J. (2000). Social studies for teh twenty-first century (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
Zevin, J. (2007). Social studies for the twenty-first century: Methods and materials for teaching middle 
and secondary schools (3rd ed.). New Jersey, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Zocchi, M., & Pollack, C. (2013). Educational neuroethics: A contribution from 
empirical research. Mind, Brain, and Education, 7(1), 56-62. 
doi:10.1111/mbe.12008 
 
  
238 
  
239 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Values in The New Zealand Curriculum 
Appendix 2: Concept frequencies 
Appendix 3: Ethics in NCEA achievement standards 
Appendix 4: Social inquiry model 
Appendix 5: Student focus group discussion task 
  
240 
 
APPENDIX 1: VALUES IN THE NEW ZEALAND CURRICULUM  
Ministry of Education, 2007, p.10 
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APPENDIX 2: CONCEPT FREQUENCIES 
 
Curriculum statement 
and content analysed 
Ethics, cognates and proximal terms  
 
Note: Italicised terms mentioned in the 
pejorative 
Societal controversy, complexity, 
diversity 
Ideal societies 
Criticality/creativity 
Affect 
Examples of virtues/character Emphases noted but not 
coded 
1928: Syllabus of 
instruction for public 
schools 
 
 
General introduction 
and character training 
sections (pp. 5-6, 63-65)  
History (pp. 31-34, 144-
146)  
Geography (pp. 35-41, 
147-164) 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Utilitarianism: 1 
Evil results of behaviour: 1 
Character and character training: 16 
Virtues and moral habits: 5 
Examples of virtues: 65 
Moral ideas: 1 
Moral lessons: 2   
Morality: 2 
Right conduct and moral ideals: 9 
Duties and responsibilities of students: 6 
Rules and laws: 10 
Service and playing part in society: 5 
Rights: 2 
 
Conflict: 5 
Citizen/Citizenship: 8 
Peace: 3 
Reason intelligently: 1 
Justify conclusions: 1 
Spiritual development: 1 
Personal happiness: 2 
Love of social life: 1 
Self-expression/individuality: 2 
 
 
 
Confident, giving: 2, initiative: 2, 
endurance, concentration, self-
controlled: 4, leadership, seeks the 
general good, honest and truthful: 6, 
modest: 3, perseveres, self-reliant, 
honourable, fair , patient, pride in 
effort, considerate, non-interfering, 
sense of obligation, polite, kind: 3, 
helpful, obedient, cheerful, cares for 
others’ property: 4, responsible: 3, 
co-operative: 3, accepts defeat, well 
behaved, courageous: 2, industrious: 
3, dignified, self-sacrificing: 3, 
patriotic: 3, pride, respectful of law, 
noble, sense of community 
Opportunities for 
experiencing 
responsibilities e.g. prefect 
system, keeping the school 
grounds tidy 
 
 
1944: The post-
primary school 
curriculum: Report of 
the committee 
appointed by the 
Minister of Education 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Morality: 1 
Character: 3 
Examples of character: 18 
Law: 1 
Conflict/Current problems of 
national/world importance: 6 
Citizens/Citizenship: 10 
Democratic society, community, 
institutions, school system: 4 
Values of democracy : 3 
Democratic virtues: 1 
Self-disciplined, free in spirit, gifted 
in work and enjoyment, worthy, 
desirable, responsible: 2, generous, 
give and take, willing to serve social 
ends, intellectually curious, 
tenacious, clear thinking, flexibly 
History, Geography, Civics, 
Psychology, Anthropology, 
descriptive Economics 
mentioned as contributing 
disciplines for social 
studies. 
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in November 1942 
(The Thomas Report) 
Introduction and 
General aims (pp. 1-9) 
The common core: 
social studies (pp. 14-15, 
22-29) 
Options for the school 
certificate: social studies 
(pp. 48-50) 
Justice: 1 
Economic ideologies: 1 
Service and taking an active place in society: 
5 
Solving problems on democratic lines: 1 
Acts intelligently: 3 
Acts in the common good: 1 
Duties and responsibilities of students: 3 
Choices of adult life: 1 
Pakeha and Maori viewpoints: 1 
Civilized values: 1 
Civil liberties: 1 
Co-operation: 1 
Clear civic thinking: 2 
Firm social judgement: 1 
Creative powers youth: 1 
Spiritual values and religion: 2 
Emotional health: 1 
 
minded, capacity to adjust, sense of 
dignity and power, uses initiative. 
Reference to ‘sexual ethic’ 
as part of ‘general ethics’ in 
recommendations for 
physical education 
 
 
 
 
 
1948 Social studies in 
history and geography 
 
Introduction 
Prescription (including 
general suggestions, 
objectives, content, and 
suggestions for 
treatment)  pp. 78-99 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Examples of character: 5 
Ideals: 1 
Examples of ideals: 7 
Service/improving society: 3 
Duties and responsibilities of students: 5 
Democratic system: 1 
Interdependence: 7 
Co-operation/relationships: 5 
Weigh evidence: 1 
Think independently: 1 
Emotional life: 1 
 
Patriotic, willing to serve country, 
loyal member of groups, unselfish, 
ready to accept responsibility 
 
1961 Syllabuses for 
schools: Social studies 
in the primary school 
 
All 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Examples of character: 17 
Responsibilities: 6 
Viewpoints of others: 3 
Standards and ideals*: 4 
Values: 2 
Laws: 2 
Fairness: 1 
Justice: 2 
Protection^: 2  
Rights~: 3  
Playing their part in society: 1 
Act intelligently: 3 
Social problems”: 32 
Current events: 6 
Differences in background: 1 
Citizenship: 2 
Democracy: 2 
Cooperation/interdependence: 12 
Critical/clear  thinking: 7 
Creativity: 1 
Feelings: 3 
Sympathetic interest in others: 4 
Beliefs: 1 
Going to church: 1 
Attitudes: 2 
Aspirations: 6 
Pleasures: 8 
Habits of thought, open-minded, 
sympathetic, generous: 2, loyal to 
truth, tolerant, kindly, honest, 
courageous, just, independent, 
modest, respectful, accepts 
responsibility, energetic, 
adventurous. 
Anthropology , History, 
Geography, Literature, 
Music, Art and Languages 
mentioned as contributing 
disciplines 
 
*Includes respect for law 
^ of environment and 
working conditions 
~ Civil, commercial, human 
“ Includes threats to peace 
and well-being 
243 
Learning how to carry out the good life: 1 
1962 Suggestions for 
teaching social studies 
in the primary school 
 
Aims and principles 
School schemes 
Necessary conditions 
Methods 
Evaluation 
The study of the Maori 
people 
pp. 7-33, NB: pagination 
refers to the 1971 
edition 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Suitable kinds of people: 4 
Examples of character: 19 
Standards^ and ultimate loyalties: 12 
Societal values: 1 
Rights: 4 
Act/responsibly: 7 
Act intelligently: 9 
What others believe the good life to be: 1 
 
 
Social problems: 16 
Current events: 4 
Similarities/differences in cultures: 2 
Citizenship: 4 
Democratic society, aims, values, 
methods, behaviour, virtues: 14 
Civilisation: 1 
Interdependence: 2 
Critical/clear thinking: 10 
Creative thinking: 1 
Sympathetic interest/sensitivity: 3 
Attitudes: 10 
Aspirations: 1 
 
Wisdom: 2, tolerance: 3, 
independence: 2, generosity: 2, 
loyalty: 6, honesty, just: 2, respect for 
independence of mind. 
^ Equated with values: 3 
1977 Social studies 
syllabus guidelines: 
Forms 1-4 
 
All 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Important ideas about human behaviour: 
11# 
Examples of character: 6 
Commitments: 1 
Examples of commitments*: 5 
Values positions: 1 
Values: 28 
Value systems: 3 
Scale of values: 1  
Ways of looking at the world: 1 
Problem-solving/Decision making: 6 
Social action/participation: 13 
Individual and human rights: 2 
Consequences: 2 
Laws and rules: 2 
Freedom: 1 
Societal complexity: 3 
Conflict: 11 
Individual/cultural difference:  9 
Co-operation/interdependence: 7 
Clear/critical thinking~: 8 
Rational examination (of values): 1 
Clarification (of values): 1  
Beliefs: 4 
Attitudes: 5 
Aspirations: 1 
Feelings: 2 
Think with sensitivity: 1 
Display sensitivity towards others: 1 
 
 
 
Independent, objective, open-
minded, willing to be involved in 
community, sense of personal 
identity: 2. 
“Draws on the knowledge, 
ideas and methods of 
inquiry of the social 
sciences and humanities” 
(p. 4).  
 
#Based around the themes 
of cultural difference, 
interaction, social control, 
social change. 
*Respect for human 
dignity, concern for others, 
respect for difference, 
uphold social justice, 
acceptance of 
responsibility. 
~Includes objective, 
realistic, reasoned and 
rational thought 
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1978 Faces Primary 
Social Studies 
Newsletter 4 
 
pp. 2-10 
 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Examples of character: 5 
Ideas about human behaviour: 1 
Values: 4 
Decision-making: 1 
Social participation/action: 12 
Rules/law: 2 
Justice: 3 
Responsibilities: 3 
Keeping order: 1 
Respect: 1 
Caring for others: 1 
Problems/disagreements/conflict and 
challenges: 7 
Personal identities: 1 
Interdependence/co-operation: 4 
Valuing skills: 2 
Feelings: 12 
Hopes and fears: 2 
Beliefs: 2 
Aspirations: 1 
Attitudes: 2 
Religion: 3  
Pleasures = 2 
Sense of belonging: 1 
 
Open-minded, concern for truth and 
justice, feelings of empathy and 
humanity 
 
1981  Faces 5 Primary 
Social Studies 
Newsletter 
 
pp. 2-13, not including: 
Reiteration of previous 
curricula – p. 4; Bank of 
concepts - p. 6 and 7; 
explanation of moral 
reasoning – p. 10.  
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Moral instruction: 2 
Character training: 1 
 
Differences of opinion: 1 
Moral viewpoints: 1 
Values/valuing: 27 
Values education: 1 
Value system: 1 
Social participation/responses: 14 
Act responsibly: 1 
Act intelligently: 1 
Decision making/choices: 11 
Rules of conduct: 1 
Commitments/ideals: 5 
Principles: 2 
Obligation: 1 
Consequences: 3 
Issues/challenges/conflict/problems: 
8  
Moral dilemmas: 7 
Cultural diversity (including 
multicultural awareness)*: 2 
Citizenship: 1 
Think clearly: 1 
(Value) judgements: 2 
(Values) clarification: 3 
Moral decisions/reasoning: 14 
Feelings: 42 
Enter sympathetically (into the 
feelings of others): 1 
Beliefs and religion: 3 
Aspirations: 1 
Pleasures: 1 
 
 
 
 
Re-iteration of virtues from 1904, 
1928, 1961 and 1978 included as a 
stimulus for teacher discussion about 
the place of values in education. 
*Emphasis on similarities 
and differences between 
own and others cultures 
extends the comparative 
approach of Faces 4. 
 
Note concepts listed on pp. 
6 and 7 that have a distinct 
moral content: e.g. rules, 
faith, loyalty, obedience, 
fair play, justice, right and 
wrong, disagreement. 
 
^ NB: “no simple right or 
wrong” (p. 12) 
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Rules: 6 
Respecting elders: 1 
Fairness: 1 
Right and wrong: 2^ 
Social contract: 1 
Concern for others: 1 
 
1983 Faces 6 Primary 
Social Studies 
Newsletter 
 
pp. 2-15, not including 
bank of contexts for 
study - p. 6; examples of 
skills - p. 7 
 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Ideas about human behaviour: 4 
Points of view: 1 
Values: 6 
Act intelligently: 2 
Responsible/social participation: 22 
Rules: 2 
Problem solving: 2 
Commitment: 1 
Courage: 1 
Ideals: 1 
Consider consequences of moral decisions: 
1 
Tolerance: 1 
Justice: 1 
Responsibilities: 1 
Social problems/challenges: 7 
Current events: 3 
Cultural diversity: 5 
Reason about moral issues/dilemmas:  
Valuing skills: 3 
Critical/clear thinking: 3 
Sympathetic interest in others:  
Feelings: 16 
Beliefs: 5 
Aspirations: 5 
Pleasures: 2 
Attitudes: 1 
Virtues from 1961 syllabus reiterated 
in a quote: open-minded, 
sympathetic, generous, loyalty to 
truth, strong feelings of humanity 
and kindness. 
Note contexts listed on  
p. 6 that have a distinct 
moral content: e.g. seeking 
justice, taking 
responsibility, practising 
religion. 
 
Note bank of valuing and 
social participation skills p. 
7 
 
1991 Social Studies 
Forms 3 and 4: A 
Handbook for 
teachers 
 
pp. 1-51, note that not 
all grade related criteria 
for exploring values and 
social participation (pp. 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Important ideas: 6# 
Commitments^: 4 
Points of view: 11 
Ways of looking at the world: 1 
Values: 53 
Value systems: 16 
Controversial issues/societal 
complexity: 15 
Current events: 3 
Conflict/resolution: 12 
Cultural diversity/perspectives: 7 
Co-operation/interdependence: 8 
Think clearly/critically/objectively: 5 
Valuing: 8 
Objectively examine: 1 
Objectivity, open-mindedness, 
willingness to be involved in 
community. 
Reiterates emphasis on 
comparative and inquiry 
approach of 1997 syllabus 
 
#Based around the themes 
of social control, and social 
change, and an emphasis of 
the handbook. 
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47-48) are reflected in 
the coding. 
 
Values conflict: 2 
Decision-making/reasoned choices: 7 
Social participation/action: 24 
Initiate/respond to change: 1 
Contribute constructively to group: 
8 
Apply to welfare of people: 1 
Laws/rules: 6 
Human rights: 8 
Social justice: 3 
Conformity: 7 
Accepting/responsibility: 12 
Treaty principles: 1 
 
Consequences: 3 
Values judgement: 1 
Open-mindedness: 2 
Values exploration: 3 
Identify relationships between 
values: 1 
Identify points of 
agreement/disagreement: 1 
Resolving conflict: 2 
Feelings/sensitivity: 6 
Feelings 
Beliefs: 11 
Attitudes: 6 
Aspirations: 2 
^ Respect for human 
dignity, concern for others, 
respect difference, uphold 
social justice. 
 
Note introduction of grade-
related criteria for skills 
social action as part of 
inquiry: p. 38 
 
1993 The New 
Zealand Curriculum 
Framework 
 
pp. 1-9, 14, 17-28 
 
 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Valued attributes: 1 
Examples of valued attributes: 27 
Viewpoints: 2 
Values: 21 
Commonly held values: 2 
Examples of commonly held values*: 13 
Perspectives: 2 
Rights: 3 
Responsibilities: 2 
Decision-making/problem-solving: 6 
Social participation/action: 8 
 
Issues/problems/challenges: 6 
Conflict: 1 
Diversity (including bicultural and 
multicultural): 8 
Context nature (of values): 1 
Democratic society: 3 
Democratic citizenship: 2 
Consensus: 1 
Co-operative skills: 4 
Valuing skills: 1 
Explore values: 1 
Clarify own values : 2 
Informed judgements: 1 
Think clearly/critically: 3 
Thinking creatively: 1 
Reflective thinking: 1 
Feelings/emotions: 3 
Attitudes: 13 
Beliefs: 2 
Religion/spirituality: 2 
Confident, informed, responsible: 7, 
initiative, effort, self-esteem, 
commitment, perseverance, courage, 
enterprise, self-discipline, integrity: 2, 
reliable, trustworthy, caring, fair, 
diligence, tolerance, hospitable, life-
long learner 
Schools will provide in 
particular for social studies, 
history, geography and 
economics. 
 
Note references to ethics in 
Health/PE and science 
descriptors. 
 
*Concern for social justice, 
Acceptance of diversity, 
Respect for environment, 
Individual and collective 
responsibility, Honesty, 
Reliability, Respect for 
others, Respect for law, 
Tolerance, fairness, Caring, 
Non-sexism, Non-racism. 
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1997 Social studies in 
the New Zealand 
Curriculum 
 
pp. 5-58 
Ethics and cognates:  0 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Human behaviour: 9 
Examples of character: 8 
Consequences: 35 
Principles: 2 
Standards: 2 
Points of view/values positions: 36 
Values: 12 
Perspectives: 24 
Social decision-making/choices: 44 
Resolving conflict: 3 
Participation/social action: 60 
Problem-solving skills: 1 
Responsibilities: 22 
Rights: 37 
Social justice: 7 
Rules/laws: 15 
 
Current/social issues/problems: 44 
Global issues: 2 
Conflict: 5 
Diversity (including bicultural and 
multicultural): 32 
Identities (personal, cultural, national): 
26 
Citizens (citizenship): 4 
Democracy: 3 
Co-operation/co-operative skills: 8 
Interdependence: 2 
Think clearly and critically: 3 
(Skills of) reflection: 7 
Informed judgements: 3 
Values exploration: 10 
Values clarification: 2 
Evaluate: 14  
Establish/use evaluation criteria: 7 
Feelings: 1 
Attitudes: 9 
Beliefs/belief systems/religion: 21 
Aspirations: 4 
 
Informed: 3, confident: 3, 
responsible: 2, effective 
Pull-out flaps not included 
in coding 
 
Social studies is the 
systematic study of an 
integrated body of content 
drawn from the social 
sciences and the 
humanities p.7…see 
definition on p. 57 
 
‘Perspectives’ section 
contains examples of 
principles to be adhered to 
in social studies teaching 
e.g. non-racist, non-sexist.  
Arguably many of these 
extend to learners’. 
 
 
2007 The New 
Zealand Curriculum 
 
pp. 4-17, 30, 34-44, fold 
out flaps of AOs 
Ethics and cognates:  2 
Acting ethically: 1 
Make ethical decisions and act on 
them: 1 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Moral values: 1 
Examples of character: 29 
Encouraged to value*: 11 
Viewpoints: 3 
Values: 51 
Issues/community challenges: 9 
Disagreements: 1 
Diversity (including bicultural and 
multicultural): 15 
Identities (personal, cultural, national): 
10 
Citizens/Citizenship: 7 
Common good: 1 
Peace: 1 
Critical thinking~: 9 
Creative thinking: 2 
Informed, responsible, critical, 
creative, energetic, enterprising 
seize opportunities, work to 
recognise all cultures, confident (5 
examples), connected (5 examples), 
actively involved (2 examples), 
lifelong learner (4 examples) 
 
*Note that these are 
clusters of values which 
could be read both as 
virtues and principles: 
excellence, innovation, 
inquiry, curiosity, diversity, 
equity, community and 
participation, ecological 
sustainability, integrity, 
respect. 
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Perspectives: 4 
Ideologies: 1 
Decision-making/problem-solving: 12 
Participation/social action: 64 
Consequences: 8 
Care for the environment: 1 
Social justice/fairness: 3 
Rights: 8 
Responsibilities: 7 
Rules/laws: 2 
Explore values: 2 
Critically analyse values/actions: 1 
Reflective thought: 9 
Challenge basis of assumptions: 1 
Evaluate (sustainability): 1 
Beliefs: 4 
(Explore values) with empathy: 1 
Attitudes: 1 
 
 
~ Includes critical analysis 
of values and actions 
 
‘Purpose and scope’ and 
‘Principles’ sections include 
principles for curriculum 
design and decision-
making. Arguably many of 
these extend to learners’. 
2008 Approaches to 
social inquiry 
 
pp. 2-16 
Ethics and cognates:  1 
Make ethical decisions and act on 
them: 1 
Ethics as a contributing discipline: 0 
 
Conceptual understanding/ideas: 43 
Personal/social significance of ideas: 5 
Viewpoint: 7 
Values: 50 
Moral values: 1 
Perspectives/worldviews: 19 
Ideology: 1 
Decision-making/negotiate solutions: 15 
Social action/responses/participation: 63 
Rights: 1 
Responsibilities: 3 
Social issues: 19 
Disagreements: 1 
Citizens: 1 
Democracy: 1 
Critical thinking: 20 
Reflective thinking: 26 
Critically analyse values/actions: 1 
 
Beliefs: 7 
(Explore values) with empathy: 1 
Attitudes: 1 
Aspirations: 1 
 
 
Informed, responsible. Note that the more critical 
aspects of the Values 
statement are emphasised 
in this document. 
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APPENDIX 3: ETHICS IN NCEA ACHIEVEMENT STANDARDS 
 
Subject Level  Achievement standard 
Accounting  2 AS91481 - Demonstrate understanding of a topical accounting issue for decision-making 
Biology 3 US6315 - Complete an investigation into the ecological niche of an animal species, with guidance 
Biology 3 AS91602 - Integrate biological knowledge to develop an informed response to a socio-scientific issue 
Biology 3 AS91607 - Demonstrate understanding of human manipulations of genetic transfer and its biological implications 
Business Studies 1 AS22847 - Demonstrate knowledge of enterprising behaviour, innovation, and entrepreneurship in business contexts 
Business Studies 2 AS90848 - Carry out, review and refine a business activity within a community context with guidance 
Business Studies 
 
3 AS90848 - Carry out, with consultation, an innovative and sustainable business activity 
Classical Studies 2 AS91204 - Demonstrate understanding of the relationship between aspects of the classical world and aspects of other cultures 
Classical Studies 3 AS91398 - Demonstrate understanding of the lasting influences of the classical world on other cultures across time 
Digital Technologies 1 AS91071 - Implement basic procedures to produce a specified digital information outcome 
Digital Technologies 2 AS 91367 - Demonstrate understanding of advanced concepts relating to managing shared information within information systems 
Health  3 US23392 - Describe ethical behaviour in a health, disability, or community setting 
Health 3 AS91464 - Analyse a contemporary ethical issue in relation to well-being 
 
Home Economics 3 AS91468 - Analyse a food related ethical dilemma for New Zealand society 
 
Media Studies 2 AS91254 - Demonstrate understanding of an ethical issue in the media 
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Media Studies 3 AS91494 - Produce a design for a media product that meets the requirements of a brief 
 
Physical Education 3 AS91500 - Evaluate the effectiveness of a performance improvement programme 
Physical Education 3 AS91504 - Analyse issues in safety management for outdoor activity to devise safety management strategies 
 
Physics 3 AS91527 - Use physics knowledge to develop an informed response to a socio-scientific issue 
Psychology 1 US27258 - Demonstrate understanding of the key principles of the Code of Ethics for psychologists working in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
Psychology 2 US27692 -  Analyse ethical standards in psychological practice 
Religious Studies 1 AS90818 -  Describe the application of the key ethical principle(s) of a religious tradition to an issue 
Religious Studies 3 AS90826 -  Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue 
Social Studies 1 AS91040 -  Conduct a social inquiry 
Social Studies 3 AS91597 - Conduct a critical social inquiry 
Social Studies 3 AS91599 - Examine personal involvement in a social action(s) that aims to influence policy change(s). 
Sociology 1 US9001  Conduct a quantitative sociological enquiry with direction 
Sociology 1 US9005  - Conduct a qualitative sociological enquiry with direction 
Technology 
 
1 AS91051  - Demonstrate understanding of how different disciplines influence a technological development 
Technology 3 AS91612 - Demonstrate understanding of how technological modelling supports technological development and implementation 
Technology 3 AS91616 - Demonstrate understanding of how the fitness for purpose of technological outcomes may be broadly interpreted 
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APPENDIX 4: SOCIAL INQUIRY OVERVIEW (MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, 2008A, P. 3) 
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APPENDIX 5: STUDENT FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION TASK 
 
What should we do? 
 
1. Consequentialist perspectives 
 
What actions could be taken? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
What might be the consequences: for you, your group, others, and everyone? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Choose the action that has the best consequences. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
2. Deontological perspectives 
 
What are some of the rules that people might follow (e.g. doing our duty, religious 
rules)? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Choose the rule that seems the best: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
What would happen if this rule was followed? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. Character perspectives 
 
What kind of person do I want to be? E.g. courageous, truthful, respectful 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
What action(s) should I take, being this kind of person? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Taking these perspectives into account, what should we do and why?  What 
would you actually do and why? 
